In this paper we reconsider the issue of free choice and the role of the wh-morphology employed in it. We show that the property of being an interrogative wh-word alone is not sufficient for free choice, and that semantic and sometimes even morphological definiteness is a pre-requisite for some free choice items (FCIs) in certain languages, e.g. in Greek and Mandarin Chinese. We propose a theory that explains the polarity behaviour of FCIs cross-linguistically, and allows indefinite (Giannakidou 2001) as well (...) as definite-like FCIs. The difference is manifested as a lexical distinction in English between any (indefinite) and wh-ever (definite); in Greek it appears as a choice between a FCI nominal modifier (taking an NP argument), which illustrates the indefinite option, and a FC free relative illustrating the definite one. We provide a compositional analysis of Greek FCIs in both incarnations, and derive in a parallel manner the Chinese FCIs. Here the definite versus indefinite alternation is manifested in the presence or absence of dōu, which we take to express the maximality operator. It is thus shown that what we see in the morphology of FCIs in Greek is reflected in syntax in Chinese. Our analysis has important consequences for the class of so-called wh-indeterminates. In the context of current proposals, free choiceness is taken to come routinely from interrogative semantics, and wh-indeterminates are treated as question words which can freely become FCIs (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002). Our results from Mandarin and Greek emphasize that wh-indeterminates do not form a uniform class in this respect, and that interrogative semantics alone cannot predict either sensitivity of free choice to definiteness, or the polarity behaviour of FCIs. (shrink)

The search for meaningful work has been of interest to researchers from a variety of disciplines for decades and seems to have grown even more recently. Much of the literature assumes that employees share a sense of what is meaningful in work and there isn’t much attention given to how and why meanings might differ. Researchers have not only called for more research studying demographic differences in definitions of meaning :77–90, 2014), but also more research utilizing mixed methods to study (...) psychological concepts like meaningful work Handbook of multimethod measurement in psychology, American Psychological Association, Washington, 2006). This study specifically examines differences across generational cohorts on their prioritization of sources of meaningful work through qualitative, in-depth interviews followed by a more generalizable, quantitative survey. Findings from the qualitative study show that generational cohorts define the meaning in their jobs differently, and they hold negative perceptions about the lack of desire for meaning in each of the other cohorts. Study 2 maps generational cohorts on the comprehensive model of meaningful work designed by Lips-Wiersma and Morris :491–511, 2009) to reveal that although there are some differences in prioritization of sources of meaningful work, all generational cohorts share similar desire to “develop and become themselves” when asked about their definitions of meaningful work. Implications and future research are discussed. (shrink)

The definition of death was clearer one hundred years ago than it is today. People were declared dead if diagnosed with permanent cessation of both cardio‐circulatory function and respiratory function. But the definition has been muddled by the development of new technologies and interventions—first by cardiopulmonary resuscitation and ventilators, which were introduced in the mid‐twentieth century, and now by extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, which creates the ability to keep oxygenated blood circulating, with or without a beating heart or functioning lungs. In (...) Defining Death: The Case for Choice, Robert Veatch and I argue that the definition of death should focus on “what change in a human being is so fundamental that we can say the individual is no longer with us as a member of the human community bearing rights such as the right not to be killed.” We assert that this decision is a normative issue about which different stakeholders may believe that different changes are fundamental, and we therefore propose that the optimal policy solution may be to allow stakeholders to choose their own definition within a reasonable range of options. There are three caveats that need to be highlighted regarding this approach. (shrink)

This paper argues for a particular semantic decomposition of morphological definiteness. I propose that the meaning of ‘the’ comprises two distinct compositional operations. The first builds a set of witnesses that satisfy the restricting noun phrase. The second tests this set for uniqueness. The motivation for decomposing the denotation of the definite determiner in this way comes from split-scope intervention effects. The two components—the selection of witnesses on the one hand and the counting of witnesses on the other—may take effect (...) at different points in the composition of a constituent, and this has non-trivial semantic consequences when other operators inside the DP take action in between them. In particular, I analyze well-known examples of mutually recursive definite descriptions like ‘the rabbit in the hat’ as examples of definites whose referent-introducing and referent-testing components are interleaved rather than nested. I further demonstrate that this picture leads to a new theory of relative superlative descriptions like ‘the kid who climbed the highest tree’, which explains the previously mysterious role of the definite determiner in licensing such readings. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The scaffolding of facts The role of our nature Forms of life Agreement: consensus of human beings and their actions.

This paper explores the link between number marking and(in)definiteness in nominals and their interpretation. Differencesbetween bare singulars and plurals in languages without determinersare explained by treating bare nominals as kind terms. Differencesarise, it is argued, because singular and plural kinds relatedifferently to their instantiations. In languages with determiners,singular kinds typically occur with the definite determiner, butplural/mass kinds can be bare in some languages and definite inothers. An account of singular kinds in terms of taxonomic readingsis proposed, with number marking playing (...) a crucial role inexplaining the obligatory presence of the determiner. The variationbetween languages with respect to plural/mass kinds is explained bypositing a universal scale of definiteness, with individual languageschoosing different cut-off points for lexicalization of the definitedeterminer. The possibility of further cross-linguistic variation isalso considered. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I examine Socrates' defense of justice in Plato's Republic. I contend that recognizing the problematic character of Socrates' defense of justice in the Republic is a key to understanding his teaching regarding justice. In response to the request made by Glaucon and Adeimantus at the beginning of Book Two, Socrates tries to show, in the bulk of the Republic, that justice is intrinsically good and that it is better than injustice. In doing so, he relies especially on (...) the definition of the justice of the individual that he provides at the end of Book Four, i.e., allowing each of the parts of the soul to mind its own business. But this definition is paradoxical and appears to have little link with justice as ordinarily understood. It contrasts with the more commonsensical definitions of justice offered in Book One, e.g., that justice is giving to each what is owed and telling the truth. In Book Five through Book Ten, Socrates continues his defense of justice by equating the just man and the philosopher--indeed, by making clear that the philosopher is just more or less in the sense outlined in Book Four. But Socrates implicitly points to the problematic character of the equation of the just man and the philosopher by revealing, among other things, that the philosophers must be compelled to rule in the best regime even though it would be a matter of justice for them to rule willingly. I attempt to comprehend why Socrates provides such a problematic defense of the justice of the individual in the Republic. So too, I explore Socrates' equally problematic defense of the justice of the city. In particular, I consider the possibility and goodness of Socrates' three paradoxical proposals aimed at bringing about the greatest justice attainable within a city--namely, the community of women and children, the equality of the sexes, and the philosopher-kings. (shrink)

This paper proposes that elementary reciprocal sentences have four semantic readings: a strongly reciprocal interpretation, a weakly reciprocal interpretation, a situation-based weakly reciprocal reading, and a collective reading. Interpretational possibilities of reciprocal sentences that have been discussed in the literature are identified as one of these four. A compositional semantic analysis of all of these readings is provided in which the reciprocal expression is uniformly represented as 'the other ones among them' (recasting Heim, Lasnik and May 1991a, b). A reciprocal (...) sentence is thus a special kind of relational plural. Interpretational variability comes about by the same mechanisms of plural predication at work in relational plurals: pluralization operators, LF operations like QR, and addition of contextual information. (shrink)

MAKKY, Lukáš : Od začiatku po koniec a ešte ďalej: umenie v definičných súradniciach. [From the Beginning til the End and Beyond: The Art in Definitional Coordinates]. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta Prešovskej univerzity v Prešove, Opera Philosophica. 256 pp.

This article identifies and analyses issues related to defining and evaluating the so-called scientific imperialism. It discusses John Dupré's account, suggesting that it is overly conservative and does not offer a definition of scientific imperialism in not presenting it as a phenomenon of interdisciplinarity. It then discusses the recent account by Steve Clarke and Adrian Walsh, taking issue with ideas such as illegitimate occupation, counterfactual progress, and culturally significant values. A more comprehensive and refined framework of my own is then (...) summarized. It suggests types and aspects of scientific imperialism as a dynamic interdisciplinary relationship, distinguishing between imperialism of scope, style and standing, for example. It also suggests normative constraints on scientific imperialism. This enables us to distinguish, in principle, recommendable from non-recommendable kinds of it, while recognizing the difficulties involved in trying to do this in practice. (shrink)

Why does Socrates favour definitional speech discussion of virtue’s instances and attributes? Why does he take such a dim view of applied ethics? In this article, I criticise the received answers to these questions and offer a different view. I argue that Socrates favours definitional dialogue because it actualises knowledge that the logic of his argument shows to be essential to virtue. By leading the interlocutor to a paradoxical definition of virtue as knowledge, Socrates engenders this knowledge in his soul.

The greatest wish of the Baeda l people, or South Koreans, living in the Korean Peninsula is the unification of Korea. However, even when it has been 70 years since the outbreak of the Korean War, the two Koreas that used to be one nation are still in conflict. There have been many discourses on unification over the past 70 years, but these discourses still fail to create clear rules and a framework for unification. Discourses from the perspective of biblical (...) theology offer insight regarding the problems at stake as well as alternatives, but they do not offer perspectives on a definite solution. This article, in line with its statement on biblical theology, does not pretend to contribute to a clear-cut solution to meet the challenge of Korea’s unification. Rather, this article intends to contribute to the formation of an emotional consensus that can contribute to the unification of Korea by looking at the teachings about peace in the Gospel of Matthew. The article explores whether the notion of embracement, forgiveness and love written during the conflict between the Matthean community and Formative Judaism can be applied to help create an emotional bond between the two Koreas. The terms embracement, forgiveness and love found in the Gospel of Matthew are upheld as symbolising peace derived from opposition and conflict. Jesus taught us to overcome situations of opposition and conflict through embracement, forgiveness and love.Contribution: The purpose and contribution of this article was to discuss if the notions of embracement, forgiveness and love found in the Gospel of Matthew can be helpful for the emotional preparation of the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula by comparing the situations reflected in the Gospel of Matthew and that of the Korean Peninsula. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified dependent type analysis of three puzzling phenomena: inversely linked interpretations, weak definite readings in possessives and Haddock-type readings. We argue that the three problematic readings have the same underlying surface structure, and that the surface structure postulated can be interpreted properly and compositionally using dependent types. The dependent type account proposed is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to formally connect the three phenomena. A further advantage of our proposal over previous analyses is (...) that it offers a principled solution to the puzzle of why both inversely linked interpretations and weak definite readings are blocked with certain prepositions. (shrink)

In the dictionary, kināya, which means “to say a word and to mean a second meaning with that word”, means “to use a word both in its true meaning and in a second meaning other than this meaning“ as the Arabic rhetoric term. The conceptualization process of kināya as a sub-title of the ilm al-bayān started in the second century hijrī and took its present form in the seventh century hijrī with Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229) and in the eighth (...) century with Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338). The authors of modern Arabic rhetoric, based on the methodological approaches of these two authors in their definitions and classifications of kināya, sometimes adopted the same approach as they were, and sometimes made some additions and criticisms by making original evaluations. For example, Qazvinî's لفظ أريد به لازم معناه مع جواز إرادة معناه حينئذ “(Original) meaning can be meant, but the necessary meaning is the word that is meant by it.” While some contemporary authors have taken the definition of kināya with the same words, some have added the phenomenon of clue to this definition. There is a similar situation in the classification of kināya, and while some authors have taken the categorization made by Sakkākī without making any changes, some authors have made various additions to this division. In the modern period covering the last century, many books have been written on Arabic rhetoric, and some of these books have come to the fore in Arab countries and our country. In this study, in the context of the subject of kināya, twelve of the Arabic rhetoric books written in the modern period were selected and the definitions and classifications of kināya in these books were examined. The aim of this study is to bring together and compare various perspectives on kināya in contemporary Arabic rhetoric books and to identify different approaches to the subject. (shrink)

A recent challenge to Russell’s theory of definite description centers upon the divergent behavior of definites and their Russellian paraphrases in non-extensional contexts. Russellians can meet this challenge, I argue, by incorporating the familiarity theory of definiteness into Russell’s theory. The synthesis of these two seemingly incompatible theories produces a conceptually consistent and empirically powerful framework. As I show, the coalescence of Russellianism and the familiarity theory of definiteness stands as a legitimate alternative to both Traditional Russellianism and alternative (...) semantic frameworks. (shrink)

I aim to show how and why some definitions can be benignly circular. According to Lloyd Humberstone, a definition that is analytically circular need not be inferentially circular and so might serve to illuminate the application-conditions for a concept. I begin by tidying up some problems with Humberstone's account. I then show that circular definitions of a kind commonly thought to be benign have inferentially circular truth-conditions and so are malign by Humberstone's test. But his test is too demanding. The (...) inferences we actually use to establish the applicability of, e.g., colour concepts are designed to establish warranted assertability and not truth. Understood thus, dispositional analyses are not inferentially circular. (shrink)

From the Supreme Court to the bedroom, privacy is an intensely contested interest in our everyday lives and privacy law. Some people appeal to privacy to protect such critical areas as abortion, sexuality, and personal information. Yet, privacy skeptics argue that there is no such thing as a right to privacy. I argue that we cannot abandon the concept of privacy. If we wish to avoid extending this elusive concept to cover too much of our lives or shrinking it to (...) cover too little, we must come to understand it. After exploring the privacy arguments of philosophers and constitutional and tort privacy law, I argue for a new definition of privacy and an explanation of its value that clarifies and resolves many of our conflicts. Privacy is critical because it allows us to protect a realm in which we can have intimate relations with others. (shrink)

This study investigates to what extent the amount of variation in a visual scene causes speakers to mention the attribute color in their definite target descriptions, focusing on scenes in which this attribute is not needed for identification of the target. The results of our three experiments show that speakers are more likely to redundantly include a color attribute when the scene variation is high as compared with when this variation is low (even if this leads to overspecified descriptions). We (...) argue that these findings are problematic for existing algorithms that aim to automatically generate psychologically realistic target descriptions, such as the Incremental Algorithm, as these algorithms make use of a fixed preference order per domain and do not take visual scene variation into account. (shrink)

Articles on the history of Assamese Sikhs.

(1974). Newton, Gases, and Daltonian chemistry: The foundations of combination in definite proportion. Annals of Science: Vol. 31, No. 6, pp. 561-574.

Definition of the problem:Truog’s critique of the ”brain death” concept outlines inconsistencies well understood in the U.S. ethical debate, while he is one of the first to suggest returning to the traditional, coherent concept of death, thus breaking with the ”dead-donorrule.” The German transplantation law of 1996 endorses equating ”brain death” with death. A defeated draft, however, had acknowledged that irreversible total brain failure is a death-near state with a zero prognosis; organ harvesting, then, was to be allowed only in (...) case of prior personal consent. The politically effective objection against this concept was its admitted violation of the dead-donorrule and thus its (incorrectly) alleged precedent potential for legalising active euthanasia. Truog’s suggestion to justify organ explantation on the grounds of ”consent and nonmaleficence” would have fuelled German counter-critics had they known it. The problem is how to justify organ harvesting after breaking the dead-donorrule. Arguments: With the allegation that ”imminent death” and ”irreversible coma” allow concluding that there is ”no harm,” Truog ironically returns to the weak arguments traditionally used to support the ”brain death” concept. His suggestion opens the door to a wide array of eligible organ donors (and, indeed, to a precedential case for active euthanasia). The euphemistic tradition of the ”brain death” concept, perhaps a prominent reason for public scepticism towards transplantation, will be perpetuated unless it is acknowledged that the interference of organ explantation with the donor’s dying process does as such constitute ”harm” to this individual. Organ harvesting, then, requires prior personal consent and needs to be clearly differentiable from any act of ”killing” if it is to be compatible with the law, acceptable to surgeons and not a precedent for active euthanasia. A close look at the actual procedure reveals that consent has invariably the effect of prolonging, not shortening the factual life span of the person in whom irreversible total brain failure has been diagnosed. This peculiarity distinguishes organ explantation from all other forms of terminating a person’s life and is not congruent with the ethical and legal notion of ”killing”. Conclusion: Breaking the dead-donorrule by allowing for the donor to give prior personal consent to organ explantation as a procedure that is going to interfere with his or her dying can be justified, informed consent provided, without setting foot on a slippery slope. (shrink)

The meaning of definite descriptions (like ‘the King of France’, ‘the girl’, etc.) has been a central topic in philosophy and linguistics for the past century. Indefinites (‘Something is on the floor’, ‘A child sat down’, etc.) have been relatively neglected in philosophy, under the Russellian assumption that they can be unproblematically treated as existential quantifiers. However, an important tradition, drawing from Stoic logic, has pointed to patterns which suggest that indefinites cannot be treated simply as existential quantifiers. The standard (...) dynamic semantic treatment of those phenomena, however, has well-known problems with negation and disjunction. -/- In this paper I develop a new approach to (in)definites. On my theory, truth-conditions are classical. But in addition to truth-conditions, meanings comprise a second dimension of what I call bounds. It is at the level of bounds, not truth-conditions, that I locate the characteristically dynamic coordination between indefinites and definites. The resulting system thus has a classical logic. This approach avoids dynamic semantics’ logical problems, and, more generally, yields a new perspective on the relation between truth-conditional and dynamic effects in natural language. (shrink)

Grime (1979) in a recently developed theory distinguished three basic plant strategies: stress tolerance,ruderality and competition. He relates them to environments characterized in terms of stress and disturbance. Classifications of strategies and environments both are ultimately defined in terms of production. This tends to make the theory tautological. If the theory is to make sense, environments had better be defined in independent terms.

Using data on submitted and published manuscripts in Feminist Economics from 1995 to 2019, we examine differences in method and scope used by authors residing in the Global North and Global South. We specifically focus on research methods, intersectional analyses, region of analysis, and co-authorship status. Further, using logistic regression models, we examine the relationship between authors’ location and use of research methods. We find authors in the Global South are more likely to engage in empirical and mixed-methods papers compared (...) to Global North authors in our sample. Moreover, a greater share of Global South authors engage in intersectional analysis and exhibit geographical focus on developing countries. Drawing insights from the Feminist Economics manuscripts data, we argue that encouraging Global South research can contribute to the goals of the field of feminist economics – aimed at inclusivity, diversity of standpoints, and plurality in research methods, thereby improving overall economic research. (shrink)

Throughout history, schools of economic thought have defined political economy—or economics—and its object of study in multiple ways. This paper reflects on the definitions of economics by schools of economic thought and also proposes the concepts of value and scarcity as key concepts to explain the differences between them. The most important findings of the paper are: (a) the ontological and epistemological characteristics of the concept of value and scarcity have shaped the definitions of economics; (b) the boundaries of the (...) study object of economics have been expanded since today’s mainstream economics deals with multiple topics as diverse as crime, education, development, health, etc. However, the methodological tools used in mainstream economics have been narrowed since approaches such as the philosophical, ethical, historical, and institutional approaches have been left behind; (c) the part of reality that mainstream economics can grasp have left behind important issues of the contemporary world, such as gender, social, and environmental issues. A clear understanding of the scope and boundaries of economics could help to define more realistic research questions for economic science, and it would help to define new economic paradigms that address the contemporary issues. (shrink)

In the past 20 years, the concept of instinct has been discussed in respect to various disciplines such as evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, linguistics, ethics, aesthetics, and phenomenology, etc. However, the meaning of instinct still remains unclarified in many respects. In order to overcome this situation, it is necessary to elucidate the genuine meaning of instinct so that the discussion of instinct in these disciplines can be carried out systematically. The objective of this paper is to establish the genuine concept (...) of instinct on the basis of a phenomenological criticism of A. Gehlen’s theory of instinct-reduction. Moreover, it seeks to show that this concept is the genetic origin of the embodied consciousness. According to Gehlen, instinct is defined as Instinkthandlung. However, this definition of instinct is problematic in the formal logical sense, since the definiendum is already included in the definiens. Moreover, it faces different kinds of serious material problems. Criticizing Gehlen’s theory of instinct systematically, I will show that instinct should be redefined as “the innate living force that urges a species of living being to pursue a certain kind of object,” and I will attempt to clarify this definition of instinct in a more detailed manner by offering 11 points. Thereafter, I will argue that Gehlen’s theory of instinct-reduction has to be replaced by the theory of instinct-enlargement in human beings. Finally, I will point out that the genuine concept of instinct is nothing other than the genetic origin of the embodied consciousness. (shrink)

We have reason to think that a fundamental goal of natural science, on Aristotle’s view, is to discover the essence-specifying definitions of natural kinds—with biological species as perhaps the most obvious case. However, we have in the end precious little evidence regarding what an Aristotelian definition of the form of a natural kind would look like, and so Aristotle’s view remains especially obscure precisely where it seems to be most applicable. I argue that if we can get a better understanding (...) of how the forms of natural kinds are or come to be known, and how they make things intelligible, we can get a better appreciation of the nature of form in general, as well as solve certain puzzles about form and definition. (shrink)

The Department of Fisheries and Wildlife Sciences (FWS) graduate program at Virginia Tech held a student-led, discussion-based, 9-week seminar in the philosophy of science during the fall 1999 semester. This seminar presented the sociologist of science with the opportunity to investigate questions such as, How does a contemporary scientific discipline use the philosophy of science? What do scientists hope to gain from an understanding of demarcation issues? And how do they perceive themselves as a science? Issues of demarcation between science (...) and pseudo-science are prevalent in FWS. The role of public funding is at the forefront of the department’s concerns, as governmental agencies are responsible, to a dominant degree, for funding research that the public assumes will benefit them. Thus, the concerns of the department are of utility, or the perception thereof. An investigation of the sort proposed here is practical yet restrictive. The topics are preselected and noncomprehensive because the seminar organizers in FWS chose select readings pertinent to their discipline. Discussions revolved around such topics as the definition of science, methodology, credibility, specialization within FWS, the value (or lack thereof) of theory in FWS, the manager-scientist distinction, and the use of models. The intent of this article is to provide a brief ethnographic view of the seminar. It will review some of the seminar topics and relate them to the broader issue of scientific self-definition and the concept of science as a social mechanism. It is not an evaluative article about FWS but a descriptive article about how a scientific discipline regards itself. (shrink)

There is an essentialist view that requires one to specify the set of necessary and sufficient properties of the things that exist when establishing definitions. The endorsement of essentialism for definitions in economics has been largely motivated by the Taxonomic Tower of Babel (TTB), which encompasses two intellectual fears. The fear of scientific aphasia is the fear that scientific progress is hampered because economists do not agree on the definitions they use. The fear of nihilism refers to the fear of (...) the advent of an unmanageable proliferation of definitions of the same term. We advocate the abandonment of essentialism by offering three arguments. First, essentialism seems impracticable in economics because essences are either mostly unavailable or useless. Second, the TTB, rather than a bug, is a feature of economics. Third, the TTB does not necessarily display the negative implications presumably associated with its existence. (shrink)

Definitions are traditionally seen as abbreviations, as tools for notational convenience that do not increase inferential power. From a Philosophy of Mathematical Practice point of view, however, there is much more to definitions. For example, definitions can play a role in problem solving, definitions can contribute to understanding, sometimes equivalent definitions are appreciated differently, and so on. This chapter reviews the literature on definitions and (to a certain extent) concepts in mathematical practice. It is structured according to four themes through (...) which definitions (and concepts) in mathematical practice have been studied. These themes concern (1) the nature of definitions, (2) whether and how concepts evolve, (3) definitions and concepts from a communal perspective, and (4) different values relating to definitions and concepts. (shrink)

Grime in a recently developed theory distinguished three basic plant strategies: stress tolerance,ruderality and competition. He relates them to environments characterized in terms of stress and disturbance. Classifications of strategies and environments both are ultimately defined in terms of production. This tends to make the theory tautological. If the theory is to make sense, environments had better be defined in independent terms.

We conclude that the commentators seem to fundamentally agree on the substance of our proposal of a partial real definition of emotion as a dynamic episode which has to fulfill a certain number of conditions to count as a member of the class. We raise the issue of prescriptive functions of a definition, suggesting parallels to biomedical ontologies. We also clarify the issues of linguistic and cultural relativity and of differences in the nature of individual emotions.

In the past century the received view of definition in mathematics has been the stipulative conception, according to which a definition merely stipulates the meaning of a term in other terms which are supposed to be already well known. The stipulative conception has been so absolutely dominant and accepted as unproblematic that the nature of definition has not been much discussed, yet it is inadequate. This paper examines its shortcomings and proposes an alternative, the heuristic conception.

In an article in "mind," 1971, pp. 282-283, the authors raised objections to a certain definition in "principia mathematica." in this paper we demonstrate that (a) their argument is faulty, (b) their suggested remedies are unsatisfactory, and (c) there is nothing wrong with the original definition.

Socrates' greatest philosophical contribution was to have initiated the search for definitions. In Definition in Greek Philosophy his views on definition are examined, together with those of his successors, including Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Galen, the Sceptics and Plotinus. Although definition was a major pre-occupation for many Greek philosophers, it has rarely been treated as a separate topic in its own right in recent years. This volume, which contains fourteen new essays by leading scholars, aims to reawaken interest in a (...) number of central and relatively unexplored issues concerning definition. These issues are briefly set out in the Introduction, which also seeks to point out scholarly and philosophical questions which merit further study. (shrink)

Es wird versucht, die Camapsche Definitions- und Begriffslehre darzustellen, die er bei der Entwicklung seiner Konstitutionstheorie aufstellte. Camap unterscheidet zwei Hauptteile der Definitions- und Begriffslehre: den Abschnitt, der zum Konstitutionssystem gehört, und den Abschnitt, der nicht dazu gehört. Die Definitionslehre besteht wiederum aus zwei zentralen Definitionsarten: der Strukturbeschreibung, mit der das Konstitutionssystem aufgebaut wird, und der impliziten Definition, die außerhalb des Konstitutionssystems steht. Auch die Begriffslehre läßt sich in zwei Hauptgruppen unterteilen: in die eigentlichen Begriffe, die die Begriffe des Konstitutionssystems (...) bilden, und in die uneigentlichen, die nicht zum Konstitutionssystem gehören. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Part 1 - The Constituent Disciplines of Cognitive Science -- Philosophical Epistemology -- Glossary -- 1.0 What is Philosophical Epistemology? -- 1.1 The reduced history of Philosophy Part I - The Classical Age -- 1.2 Mind and World - The problem of objectivity -- 1.3 The reduced history of Philosophy Part II - The twentieth century -- 1.4 The philosophy of Cognitive Science -- 1.5 Mind in Philosophy: summary -- 1.6 The Nolanian Framework (so far) -- (...) Psychology -- 2.0 Why is Psychology so difficult? -- 2.1 A brief history of Experimental Psychology -- 2.2 Methodologies in Psychology -- 2.3 Perception -- 2.4 Memory -- 2.5 Mind in Psychology -- Linguistics -- 3.0 Introduction -- 3.1 Why Linguistics? -- 3.2 Computation and Linguistics -- 3.3 The main grammatical theories -- 3.4 Language development and linguistics -- 3.5 Toward a definition of context -- 3.6 The multifarious uses of Language -- 3.7 Linguistics and Computational Linguistics -- 3.8 Language and other symbol systems -- 3.9 On the notion of context -- 3.10 Mind in Linguistics: summary -- Neuroscience -- 4.0 The constituent disciplines of Neuroscience -- 4.1 The methodology of Neuroscience -- 4.2 Gross Neuroanatomy -- 4.3 Some relevant findings -- 4.4 Connectionism (PDP) -- 4.5 The victory of Neuroscience? -- 4.6 Mind in Neuroscience: summary -- Artificial Intelligence -- 5.0 Introduction -- 5.1 Al and Cognitive Science -- 5.2 Skeptics and their techniques -- 5.3 Al as Computer Science -- 5.4 Al as software -- 5.5 The current methodological debate -- 5.6 Context, syntax and semantics -- 5.7 Mind in Al -- 5.8 Texts on Al -- Etholoqy and Ethnoscience -- 6.1 Etology -- 6.2 Ethnoscience -- 6.3 Mind in Ethology arid Ethnoscience -- Part II - A New Foundation for Cognitive Science -- - Symbol Systems -- 7.1 Characteristics of symbol systems -- 7.2 Context and the layers of symbol systems -- 7.3 Mind and symbol systems -- Consciousness and Selfhood -- 8.0 Introduction -- 8.1 Cognitive views -- 8.2 What is at stake? -- 8.3 Consciousness as treated in Philosophy -- 8.4 The Development of Selfhood -- 8.5 The minimal requirements for this theory -- 8.6 Self as a filter -- 8.7 Self and motivation -- 8.8 Conclusions -- 8.9 Recent developments -- Cognitive Science and the Search for Mind -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Review -- 9.3 A Theory of Mind anyone? -- 9.4 Foundational considerations -- 9.5 Coda: the Nolanian Framework. (shrink)

Definitions vary according to context of use and target audience. They must be made relevant for each context to fulfill their cognitive and linguistic goals. This involves adapting their logical structure, type of content, and form to each context of use. We examine from these perspectives the case of definitions in ontologies.