(Back Cover:) « La pensée métaphysique renaîtra demain. Ce sont des savants qui ont le goût et le sens de la pensée conduite jusqu’au terme de ses exigences internes, et des philosophes initiés aux sciences expérimentales qui, en commun, la feront. » L’œuvre de Claude Tresmontant (1925-1997) illustre parfaitement cette recherche de la métaphysique d’un monde en devenir, qui sait écouter et se modeler sur la transformation – la métamorphose – promise à une Création finalisée. Le trait commun aux (...) exposés ici présentés sous forme définitive a été cette recherche autour d’une pensée qui renouvelle de l’intérieur la métaphysique en réalisant le vœu de Bergson qu’elle devienne « auscultatrice », que l’énigme que pose l’homme face à son origine et sa destinée ne soit pas recouverte par une pensée qui se perdrait dans la description des choses ou dans l’esprit de système, mais qui non plus n’irait se recroqueviller sur elle-même, en narrant sa propre expérience subjective sous le mode de la déréliction. Claude Tresmontant a su penser l’être en genèse, et il a cherché à renouveler la question de l’existence de Dieu, en en transformant la problématique en dialogue avec les sciences contemporaines. À ce goût de l’être dont les sciences ont renouvelé l’approche, il a également voulu infuser un « supplément d’âme », en repensant la réalité de la création et l’horizon de la cause finale, toujours à partir de la nature ultimement théologique de la réponse à la question « qu’est-ce que l’homme ? » Contributeurs : Yves Tourenne, Philippe Gagnon, Fabien Revol, Brunor, Frédéric Crouslé, Bertrand Souchard, Emmanuel Gabellieri. Table of Contents: Note Liminaire (Ph. Gagnon) - 7 En quoi la pensée de Claude Tresmontant nous stimule-t-elle encore ? Hommage et critique (Y. Tourenne) - 13 L’imbrication de la preuve de Dieu et de la cosmologie chez Tresmontant représente-t-elle une preuve ? (Ph. Gagnon) - 27 L’usage apologétique de la philosophie de Tresmontant dans les Indices pensables de Brunor (F. Revol) - 49 Réponse à Fabien Revol (Brunor) - 77 Qu’est-ce qui cloche dans la théologie de Claude Tresmontant ? (Fr. Crouslé) - 85 Les métaphysiques principales de Claude Tresmontant : la foi biblique est-elle à part de la raison philosophique grecque ? (B. Souchard) - 109 Maurice Blondel et Claude Tresmontant (E. Gabellieri) - 123 La vision informationnelle de Tresmontant, surtout en référence au problème de l’âme (Ph. Gagnon) - 133. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Claude Tresmontant (1925-1997) est un philosophe, helléniste et hébraïsant, ainsi qu'un exégète français. Il enseigna pendant de nombreuses années la philosophie médiévale et la philosophie des sciences à la Sorbonne. Le philosophe Yves Tourenne a travaillé tout sa vie l'oeuvre de Claude Tresmontant auquel, dit-il, il doit tout. Dans ce livre majeur, il cherche à livrer le coeur de la pensée du philosophe. Le coeur, le centre et le sommet de l'oeuvre de Claude Tresmontant : l'ontologie de (...) la métamorphose de l'Homme créé inachevé ou la science de la vie mystique selon l'orthodoxie chrétienne. C'est une philosophie qui part du réel, de l'univers créé, pour montrer que l'homme est en création, en perpétuelle transformation, métamorphose. (shrink)

This article is a response by the author of Defending Life, Francis Beckwith, to Kevin Corcoran’s critical review of that book. In his review Corcoran maintains that Beckwith provides only a “typical” genetic code argument for the zygote’s individual humanity, and that Beckwith fails to show that there exists an individual human organism that subsists from conception and develops into a mature version of itself. Beckwith argues that Corcoran is mistaken on both counts.

This paper examines Claude Tresmontant's attempt to provide a philosophical argument in favour of God's existence using the results of modern science. Like many contemporary theists, Tresmontant believes that discoveries in the field of astrophysics, rightly interpreted, lead to the postulation of a deity. This paper challenges the philosophical presuppositions of Tresmontant's argument and the thesis that current cosmological theories can be used to construct a valid proof of the existence of God.

Taking as a starting point for his quest the teaching received from the Hebrew prophets and transmitted by the people of Israel, Claude Tresmontant identifies in it the specific moment where an entirely new and creative thought is introduced in the history of mankind. Trained in philosophy of science and conscious of the discipline involved in a rigorous experimental method as a key to valid and true knowledge, Claude Tresmontant boldly recreated bridges, long destroyed, between science and philosophy (...) of nature, as well as metaphysics and theology. Following an immense effort, he has found back, stringently and often on his own, a unifying concept capable of integrating the experience and the questions of today's man: "...the central question is that of integrating the teaching of creation and that of revelation in the unity of an intelligible vision of the world, desirable, and verifiable..." as he said himself in the preface to L'histoire de l'univers et le sens de la Création. This immense, powerful and thought-provoking work is here presented by a young philosopher, long time correspondent of Claude Tresmontant, who benefited from decisive moments of encounter with him. (shrink)

This study is devoted to the problem of the place and significance of the scientific quest and worldview, and to their articulation with metaphysics as they serve to bring the mind to the consideration of the problem and mystery of the existence of God in the thought of the contemporary French philosopher and theologian Claude Tresmontant (1925-97).

Joaquim Hernandez-Dispaux propose une étude qui est le fruit d’un long contact avec les notes préparatoires ayant servi à la rédaction de la trilogie sur le christianisme de Michel Henry, où il révèle l’influence latente de Cl. Tresmontant dans la compréhension henryenne du milieu johannique. Ce n’est toutefois pas tant le parangon de la « philosophie chrétienne » qui retient M. Henry, mais ses recherches autour d’un Christ hébreu, essentiellement utilisées pour fonder une sorte d’archéologie christologique permettant de remonter vers (...) la parole la plus originaire. Par cette médiation inattendue, on voit combien M. Henry recherche à la fois la fondation transcendantale de la parole christique dans son authenticité la plus originaire, mais aussi sa radicale différence par rapport aux mondes grec et juif, celui-ci voyant passer le point de rupture par rapport à la question de l’immanence. (shrink)

Claude Tresmontant (1925-1997) était professeur de philosophie médiévale et d'histoire des sciences à la Sorbonne. Ce livre présente ses thèses en insistant sur l'articulation entre les sciences et la question de l'existence de Dieu. La rationalité de la théologie chrétienne est soutenue. Ses travaux aboutissent à démontrer l'existence de Dieu et soulèvent l'alternative suivante : admettre l'existence du Créateur ou la refuser tout en continuant d'être les héritiers du matérialisme qui fit florès jusqu'aux réductionnistes contemporains. La finalité de l'évolution (...) n'étant autre que l'union de la nature humaine créée à la nature divine incréée, union dont le Christ incarne le Premier-Né. Les sciences donneraient alors accès à la Création en cours d'évolution, tandis que la Bible contiendrait le secret de l'information essentielle sur son avenir. 'Emounah' en hébreu, 'certitude de la vérité', la foi reviendrait ainsi à un acte rationnel, et non à une croyance purement affective"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L'oeuvre de Claude Tresmontant est un formidable appel à un développement théologique digne des défis actuels du XXIe siècle, fondé sur les bases solides théologiques reconnues par l'Eglise, en particulier les conciles. Tresmontant qui connaît parfaitement l'hébreu s'est livré à une recherche approfondie sur le véritable contenu du christianisme. Sa pensée est celle d'une métaphysique qui nous réconcilie avec le réel : il donne toute sa place dans la réflexion à ce que les sciences de la nature nous enseignent.

Qu'est-ce que la foi? Sous ce nom on met un peu tout et n'importe quoi. Et comme le fait remarquer Claude Tresmontant, il règne de nos jours un malentendu sur le sens de ce mot. Cet auteur a le mérite de rétablir ce que l'orthodoxie, depuis les débuts de l'Église, entend par la 'foi'. En traduisant l'Évangile il lui préfère le terme de 'certitude de la vérité'. Car le terme apparaît de nombreuses fois dans le Nouveau Testament. Il a (...) paru approprié à Michèle Juin de répertorier toutes ces occurrences, qui sont riches de compréhension, pour cerner tout ce qui concerne la foi, ainsi que ce que cela implique, et d'en faire un livre. (shrink)

In many species of reptiles, sex is determined at fertilization by zygotic sex chromosome composition. In other species, including all crocodilians, most turtles and some lizards, sex is determined by temperature during the earlier stages of gonadal differentiation. The effects of exogenous estrogens, antiestrogens and aromatase inhibitors at different temperatures have unambiguously demonstrated the involvement of estrogens in sexual differentiation of the gonads. Aromatase is the enzyme that converts androgens to estrogens. Gonadal aromatase activity is well correlated with gonadal (...) structure. It increases exponentially in differentiating ovaries, whereas it remains low in differentiating testes. Moreover, there is a high correlation between the thermosensitive periods for both ovary differentiation and increase in aromatase activity. We suggest that a thermosensitive factor intervenes, directly or indirectly, in the transcriptional regulation of the aromatase gene in reptiles with temperature‐dependent sex determination. (shrink)

Zygotic gene activation (ZGA) is the critical event that governs the transition from maternal to embryonic control of development. In the mouse, ZGA occurs during the 2‐cell stage and appears to be regulated by the time following fertilization, i.e. a zygotic clock, rather than by progression through the first cell cycle. The onset of ZGA must depend on maternally inherited proteins, and post‐translational modification of these maternally derived proteins is likely to play a role in ZGA. Consistent with (...) this prediction is that protein phosphorylation catalyzed by the cAMP‐dependent protein kinase is involved in ZGA and that protein synthesis is not required for ZGA. Recent results suggest that ZGA may occur earlier than previously thought, i.e. not during the 2‐cell stage, but rather in G2 of the 1‐cell embryo. Thus ZGA may comprise a period of minor gene activation in the 1‐cell embryo that is followed by a period of major gene activation in the 2‐cell embryo. Following ZGA, the expression of constitutively activated genes may require an enhancer. (shrink)

René Girard (1923-2015) et Claude Tresmontant (1925-1997) ont chacun de leur côté, à travers le judéo-christianisme, réhabilité le monothéisme à partir d'une seule idée directrice : la négation d'un Dieu persécuteur pour Girard, l'affirmation d'un Dieu créateur du monde pour Tresmontant. A partir de là, les deux "balayeurs" font le ménage dans l'histoire de la pensée, au bénéfice d'une nouvelle psychanalyse ("chrétienne"! ) ; en tant que "constructeurs", ils montrent la profonde continuité entre le christianisme et le judaïsme et (...) confirment la légitimité d'un "évolutionnisme chrétien" pour qui l'Evolution, c'est "la Création en acte". (shrink)

It is no longer possible to claim that the biological characteristics of the future adult are already determined at conception. After all, a zygote may develop into a hydatidiform mole rather than into a human being. The development of an individual human person is determined by genetically and nongenetically coded molecules within the embryo, together with the influence of the maternal environment. Consequently, it is an error to regard the zygote's chromosomal (and other) DNA as sufficient to determine the (...) uniqueness of the future individual. (shrink)

This paper re-examines the question of whether quirks of early human foetal development tell against the view (conceptionism) that we are human beings at conception. A zygote is capable of splitting to give rise to identical twins. Since the zygote cannot be identical with either human being it will become, it cannot already be a human being. Parallel concerns can be raised about chimeras in which two embryos fuse. I argue first that there are just two ways of dealing with (...) cases of fission and fusion and both seem to be available to the conceptionist. One is the Replacement View according to which objects cease to exist when they fission or fuse. The other is the Multiple Occupancy View – both twins may be present already in the zygote and both persist in a chimera. So, is the conceptionist position tenable after all? I argue that it is not. A zygote gives rise not only to a human being but also to a placenta – it cannot already be both a human being and a placenta. Neither approach to fission and fusion can help the conceptionist with this problem. But worse is in store. Both fission and fusion can occur before and after the development of the inner cell mass of the blastocyst – the entity which becomes the embryo proper. The idea that we become human beings with the arrival of the inner cell mass leads to bizarre results however we choose to accommodate fission and fusion. (shrink)

Many people believe that human beings begin to exist with the emergence of the 1-cell zygote at fertilization. I present a novel argument against this belief, one based on recently discovered facts about human embryo development. I first argue that a human zygote is developmentally plastic: A zygote that naturally develops into a singleton (i.e., develops into exactly one infant/adult without twinning) might have naturally developed into a numerically different singleton. From this, I derive the conclusion that a human (...) infant or adult is numerically distinct from the zygote she came from and so did not begin to exist at fertilization. This implies that a zygote does not have a “future like ours” and strongly suggests that it is not a human being. (shrink)

It is often argued that certain metaphysical complications surrounding the phenomenon of monozygotic twinning force us to conclude that, prior to the point at which twinning is no longer possible, the zygote or early embryo cannot be considered an individual human organism. In this essay, I argue, on the contrary, that there are in fact several ways of making sense of monozygotic twinning that uphold the humanity of the original zygote, but also that there is no easy answer to (...) what happens when the human zygote twins. All of the options available carry with them one or more surprising, alarming, or otherwise counterintuitive implications. All things considered, I conclude that the “budding option,” according to which the original human organism present before twinning carries on as one of the resulting embryos but not the other, is the most plausible explanation of what happens when a human zygote twins. (shrink)

W Deklaracji o przerywaniu ciąży z 1974, Kościół Katolicki argumentuje, że zygota jest człowiekiem ponieważ posiada ludzki genotyp. Artykuł przedstawia logiczną analizę tej argumentacji. Pokazuje, że argumentacja ta jest w dużym stopniu wadliwa. Tomizm pełni tu funkcję uprawo-mocnienia. Entymematyczne założenia tomistyczne są niezbędne, by w ogóle możliwe było przejście od przesłanek do wniosku. Okazuje się ponadto, że argumentacja ta zakłada tomistyczną interpretację pojęć biologicznych, która jest niezgodna ze współczesną wiedzą biologiczną. Twierdzenie zawarte w Deklaracji nie zostało więc skutecznie uargumentowane na (...) gruncie biologii, a wręcz wydaje się, że biologia je wyklucza. Jest ono możliwe jedynie jako twierdzenie metafizyczne i wyłącznie na gruncie pewnych metafizyk. (shrink)

Robert George and Christopher Tollefsen argue that human beings have fundamental dignity and basic rights (“human rights”) in virtue of the kind of entity they are—creatures bearing a rational nature. The indicia of a rational nature are the basic natural capacities—which obtain from the point a rational creature comes into existence—for thinking, deliberating, and choosing, whether or not these capacities are immediately exercisable. All human beings, including those who are asleep, or under general anesthesia, or who are in deep comas (...) or persistent minimally conscious states, are bearers of a rational nature. The same is true of those suffering even severe cognitive disabilities. A person with advanced Alzheimer’s disease, for example, has not undergone a change of nature—he is not a creature different in species or otherwise different in kind from what he was before the onset of the disease. Bearers of fundamental dignity and basic rights, which includes all human beings, must not be treated as mere objects or instruments by, for example, subjecting them to damaging or deadly experimentation designed for the benefit of others. So the question at the heart of debates over human embryo research is the empirical one, fully accessible to inquiry using scientific methods of analysis: Is the human embryo, from the formation of the zygote forward, a human being, viz., a living member of the species Homo sapiens. George and Tollefsen assess the evidence and conclude that the answer to that question is unambiguously yes. (shrink)

I consider the argument, thought to clinch the moral case for use of a human embryo solely as a means, that only a human individual can be a person, because it can happen at any time before formation of the primitive streak that an embryo splits into monozygotic twins, no embryo in which the primitive streak has not formed is a human individual, and therefore no embryo in which the primitive streak has not formed is a (...) person. I explore the following proffered arguments for : indivisibility is a necessary condition of individuality, nonidentity of an embryo with successor twins impugns the embryo’s individuality, and totipotency of an embryo’s constituents is inconsistent with the embryo’s being a human individual. These arguments are tested and found wanting; so too is an alternative to , the argument that indivisibility is intrinsic to personhood. Whereupon is unsustained. In search of ways to rehabilitate the nonindividuation argument, I canvass alternative metaphysical views and inquire further into biological individuality, but find that the argument cannot be saved. I conclude by analyzing where this leaves matters concerning the morality of embryo use. (shrink)

Stem cell-derived embryo models (SCEMs) are model embryos used in scientific research to gain a better understanding of early embryonic development. The way humans develop from a single-cell zygote to a complex multicellular organism remains poorly understood. However, research looking at embryo development is difficult because of restrictions on the use of human embryos in research. Stem cell embryo models could reduce the need for human embryos, allowing us to both understand early development and improve assisted reproductive (...) technologies. There have been several rapid advances in creating SCEMs in recent years. These advances potentially provide a new avenue to study early human development. The benefits of SCEMs are predicated on the claim that they are different from embryos and should, therefore, be exempt from existing regulations that apply to embryos (such as the 14-day rule). SCEMs are proposed as offering a model that can capture the inner workings of the embryo but lack its moral sensitivities. However, the ethical basis for making this distinction has not been clearly explained. In this current controversy, we focus on the ethical justification for treating SCEMs differently to embryos, based on considerations of moral status. (shrink)

Reproductive biotechnologies, also known as assisted reproductive technologies (ART), have undergone significant development over time, reaching a remarkable level of evolution in the 20th century. Currently, several biotechnologies stand out, among which Artificial Insemination (AI), widely spread globally, Embryo Production (EP) both in vivo and in vitro for embryo transfer, Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI), sexing, among other innovations. In Vitro Production (IVP) of embryos has emerged as the biotechnology that has experienced the greatest development and evolution in recent (...) decades, covering various fields such as research in assisted human reproduction, obtaining transgenic animals for biomedicine, preservation of endangered species and conservation of animals of high genetic value. This research aims to analyze the relevance of IVP, as well as the fundamental elements that make up this complex process. IVP of embryos involves several stages, from oocyte procurement, oocyte selection and in vitro maturation, sperm preparation, in vitro fertilization, to the culture of the resulting zygotes to blastocysts. These blastocysts, once transferable to recipients, culminate in the birth of a new being. However, this process has both advantages and disadvantages, which motivates continuous innovation in the field. (shrink)

In his paper, the author argues that human embryos are individuals and persons. He accepts the critique of the non-individuation argument of human zygote and refutes the possibility of understanding blastomers as individuals. Finally, realism in the understanding of personal identity is accepted on the basis of an argument justifying substantial form as a principle of personal identity.

Early development of animal embryos begins from spatially distributed products of gene expression, i.e., gradients. While maternal and early zygotic genes form broad and/or terminal gradients, their direct targets appear later on as relatively narrow stripes, which foreshadow presumptive germ layers or future segments. Evidently, stripe expression of the zygotic genes is among the key mechanisms of embryo patterning. In this paper, known qualitative and quantitative models for the stripe formation are considered on the example of early (...) embryogenesis of Drosophila. The current model analysis emphasizes the role of spatial information flow in development. Discussion is given on frequent network motifs, pointing to spatial stripe formation solutions. (shrink)

A number of philosophers maintain that the destruction of an embryo in the first 2 weeks after fertilization is not morally problematic as it is metaphysically impossible for any human organism to then have existed. We contend that the typical adult human organism was once a zygote so there is no metaphysical shortcut to justify early abortion. We show that five arguments against human organisms ever having been zygotes fail. All of the arguments have to do with one variant (...) or another of the zygote or early embryo dividing. They do not provide any reason to believe that since some adult organisms are not identical to zygotes due to earlier divisions, none could have been. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the transformation from the human zygote to the implanted embryo under the prism of substantial change. After a brief introduction, it vindicates the Aristotelian ideas of substance and accident, and those of substantial and accidental change. It then claims that the transformation from the multicelled zygote to the implanted embryo amounts to a substantial change. Pushing further, it contends that this substantial change cannot be explained following patterns of genetic reductionism, emergence, and self-organization, and proposes (...) Gustavo Bueno’s idea of anamorphosis as a means to encapsulate criticism against such positions. (shrink)

During embryogenesis, cell division must be spatially and temporally regulated with respect to other developmental processes. Leech embryos undergo a series of unequal and asynchronous cleavages to produce individually recognizable cells whose lineages, developmental fates and cell cycle properties have been characterized. Thus, leech embryos provide an opportunity to examine the regulation of cell division at the level of individual well‐characterized cells within a community of different types of cells. Isolation of leech homologues of some of the highly conserved regulators (...) of the cell division cycle, and characterization of their patterns of maternal and zygotic expression, indicate that the cell divisions of early leech embryos are regulated by cell type‐specific mechanisms. These studies with leech embryos contribute to the emerging appreciation of the diverse mechanisms by which animals regulate cell division during early development. (shrink)

Some commentators argue that conception signals the onset of human personhood and that moral responsibilities toward zygotic or embryonic persons begin at this point, not the least of which is to protect them from exposure to death. Critics of the conception threshold of personhood ask how it can be morally consistent to object to the embryo loss that occurs in fertility medicine and research but not object to the significant embryo loss that occurs through conception in vivo. (...) Using that apparent inconsistency as a starting point, they argue that if that embryo loss is tolerable as a way of conceiving children, it should be tolerable in fertility medicine and human embryonic research. Double-effect reasoning shows, by contrast, that conception in vivo is justified even if it involves the death of persons because the motives for wanting children are not inherently objectionable, because the embryo loss that occurs in unassisted conception is not the means by which successful conception occurs, and because the effect of having children is proportionate to the loss involved. A similar outcome holds true for in vitro fertilisation in fertility medicine but not for in vitro fertilisation for research involving human embryos. (shrink)

This is a discussion of the reaction to the recent research article publication in the journal Protein & Cell by a group of scientists at Sun Yat-sen University using the CRISPR/Cas9 technique on editing non-viable human zygotes. Many commentators condemned the Chinese scientists for overstepping ethical boundaries long accepted in Western countries and accused China of having lax regulations on genomic research in general. We argue that not only did this research follow strict ethical standards and fully comply with current (...) regulations, but China also has a well-developed regulatory framework governing such research comparable to many developed countries. We see the reactions among Western commentators as a misunderstanding of the current situation and an expression of a lack of willingness to acknowledge China as an equal partner in the international debate about proper limits to the development of new biotechnologies. (shrink)