Preliminary Material -- Editorial Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction -- Value -- The Domain of Morality -- What Is Intrinsic Value? -- Essential Capacities -- Worthwhile Lives -- Priorities among Values -- Obligation -- Acting for the Best -- The Limits of Obligation -- Justice -- Population and the Total View -- Practice-Consequentialism and Its Critics -- Meta-Ethics -- Moral Cognitivism -- Comparing Moral Outlooks -- Foundations -- Notes -- Bibliography -- About (...) the Author -- Index -- VIBS. (shrink)

According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object''s intrinsic value may sometimes depend (in part) on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, (...) then the traditional contrast between intrinsic value and instrumental value is mistaken. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) aperson. My argument incorporates the comparative claim that existence canbe better (or worse) for a person than never existing. Since these claimsare highly controversial, I consider and reject a number of objectionswhich threaten them. These objections raise various semantic, logical,metaphysical and value-theoretical issues. I then suggest that there is animportant sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person not to comeinto existence. Again, I consider (...) and reject some objections. Finally, Ibriefly consider what the conclusions reached in this paper imply for ourmoral obligations to possible future people. (shrink)

THE VALUE OF SCIENCE INTRODUCTION The search for truth should be the goal of our activities; it is the sole end worthy of them. Doubtless we should first bend our efforts to assuage human suffering, but why ? Not to suffer is a negative ...

Using a signaling framework, we argue that ethical behavior as evidenced by charitable donations is viewed more positively by investors when seen not to be based on self-serving motives but rather on authentic generosity that builds moral capital. The affirmed religiosity of CEOs may make their ethical position more credible, while their embeddedness within a family business suggests that CEOs are backed by powerful owners with long-time horizons and a desire to build moral capital with stakeholders. We find in a (...) study of market responses to 1572 corporate donations by S&P 1500 firms that financial markets react more positively to charitable initiatives from firms with religion-declared CEOs, but only if these are family businesses. (shrink)

Here I examine the charge that the indeterminism required by event-causal accounts is at best superfluous; if free will is incompatible with determinism, then, it is said, no event-causal libertarian account adequately characterizes free will. The distinction between broad incompatibilism and merely narrow incompatibilism is brought to bear. If the latter thesis is correct, then an event-causal account can secure all that is needed for free will. However, if broad incompatibilism is correct, then no event-causal account is adequate, though such (...) views can still secure some things of value that cannot exist given determinism, such as distinctive types of difference-making and attributability, and the truth of the presumption of open alternatives that we commonly make while deliberating. (shrink)

A number of philosophers of medicine have attempted to provide analyses of health and disease in which the role that values play in those concepts is restricted. There are three ways in which values can be restricted in the concepts of health and disease. They can be: (i) eliminated, (ii) tamed or (iii) corralled. These three approaches correspond, respectively, to the work of Boorse, Lennox, and Wakefield. The concern of each of these authors is that if unrestricted values are allowed (...) to infect our concepts of health and disease, then anything could be construed as healthy or diseased. They believe that, if at all possible, such a result should be avoided. Unfortunately, as I argue, this result is unavoidable and such attempts to limit values in these concepts are destined to fail. I argue for this position by showing how each of these three attempts to provide value-restricted analyses of health and disease fail as analyses of the concepts of health and disease and that they fail because of their attempts to restrict the role of values in their accounts. I also show how, despite their best efforts, each of these analyses are, themselves, value-driven and value-laden. This leads to the conclusion that values infect our concepts of health and disease at all levels. (shrink)

Many believe that because we are so small, we must be utterly insignificant on the cosmic scale. But whether this is so depends on what it takes to be important. On one view, what matters for importance is the difference to value that something makes. On this view, what determines our cosmic importance is not our size, but what else of value is out there. But a rival view also seems plausible: that importance requires sufficient causal impact on (...) the relevant scale; since we have no such impact on the grand scale, that would entail our cosmic insignificance. I argue that despite appearances, causal impact is neither necessary nor sufficient for importance. All that matters is impact on value. Since parts can have non-causal impact on the value of the wholes that contain them, this means that we might have great impact on the grandest scale without ever leaving our little planet. (shrink)

Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is good (or successful, or correct) just in case it is true. But it does not follow that truth is a good-making property, nor does it follow that the nature of truth explains its value. Instead, this paper argues that the nature of belief explains its value.

This article analyzes the epistemic value of understanding and offers an account of the role of understanding in science. First, I discuss the objectivist view of the relation between explanation and understanding, defended by Carl Hempel and J. D. Trout. I challenge this view by arguing that pragmatic aspects of explanation are crucial for achieving the epistemic aims of science. Subsequently, I present an analysis of these pragmatic aspects in terms of ‘intelligibility’ and a contextual account of scientific understanding (...) based on this notion. †To contact the author, please write to: Faculty of Philosophy, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Current debates in science and technology studies emphasize that the bio-economy—or, the articulation of capitalism and biotechnology—is built on notions of commodity production, commodification, and materiality, emphasizing that it is possible to derive value from body parts, molecular and cellular tissues, biological processes, and so on. What is missing from these perspectives, however, is consideration of the political-economic actors, knowledges, and practices involved in the creation and management of value. As part of a rethinking of value in (...) the bio-economy, this article analyzes three key political-economic processes: financialization, capitalization, and assetization. In doing so, it argues that value is managed as part of a series of valuation practices, it is not inherent in biological materialities. (shrink)

Although artificial intelligence has been given an unprecedented amount of attention in both the public and academic domains in the last few years, its convergence with other transformative technologies like cloud computing, robotics, and augmented/virtual reality is predicted to exacerbate its impacts on society. The adoption and integration of these technologies within industry and manufacturing spaces is a fundamental part of what is called Industry 4.0, or the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The impacts of this paradigm shift on the human operators (...) who continue to work alongside and symbiotically with these technologies in the industry bring with it novel ethical issues. Therefore, how to design these technologies for human values becomes the critical area of intervention. This paper takes up the case study of robotic AI-based assistance systems to explore the potential value implications that emerge due to current design practices and use. The design methodology known as Value Sensitive Design (VSD) is proposed as a sufficient starting point for designing these technologies for human values to address these issues. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between the ascription of value to an object and an assessment of conative attitudes taken towards that object. It argues that this relationship is captured by an a priori necessary truth that falls out of the mastery conditions for the concept of value: what has value is worth valuing, when valuing is understood to be a relatively stable conative attitude distinct from judging valuable. What kind of assessment of attitude is at stake? (...) How are we to understand the worth-relation that holds between an object and the attitude? It is argued that deontological, evaluative and alethic eluciations of the worth-relation are wrongheaded. We should be looking for a mind-world relation that marks a success in how the emotional and motivational energies integral to valuing are directed: a success that does not consist in meeting a deontic requirement, in exemplifying value, or in representing truly. (shrink)

This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.

This chapter gives substance to the idea of a ‘communitarian value-driven epistemology’ by developing and combining ideas from Edward Craig's and Bernard Williams' ‘epistemic genealogy’ and Barry Barnes' and Steven Shapin's ‘sociology of knowledge’. In order to make transparent how this project might slot into more familiar, or more mainstream, projects, the paper maintains throughout a critical dialogue with Jon Kvanvig's position. The chapter is structured around an attempt to defend Craig's position against Kvanvig's criticisms: by treating the institution (...) of testimony as a collective good underwritten by the intrinsic and interrelated values of accuracy and sincerity; by rendering protoknowledge attributions as ascriptions of honour; and by allowing attributions of protoknowledge to be intertwined with attributions of freedom. The view that emerges is that the core of our knowledge practices comprises institutions of testimony, and that these practices are a collective good. (shrink)

Why think that conscious experience of reality is any more epistemically valuable than testimony about it? I argue that conscious experience of reality is epistemically valuable because it provides cognitive contact with reality. Cognitive contact with reality is a goal of experiential inquiry which does not reduce to the goal of getting true beliefs or propositional knowledge. Such inquiry has awareness of the truth-makers of one’s true beliefs as its proper goal. As such, one reason why conscious experience of reality (...) is more epistemically valuable than testimony about reality is that it gives us more epistemic goods than only true belief or propositional knowledge. I defend this view from two rival accounts. First, that while conscious experience of reality has greater value than testimony, its value is only eudaimonic. Second, that while it has greater epistemic value than testimony, this value is not distinctive: for it only promotes truth better than testimony. (shrink)

Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it (...) is false that x is worse than y with respect to V and (iii) it is false that x and y are equally good with respect to V . Most philosophers have followed Raz in adopting this account of incomparability. Recently, however, John Broome has advocated an alternative view, on which value incomparability is explained in terms of vagueness or indeterminacy . In this paper I aim to further Broome’s view in two ways. Firstly, I want to supply independent reasons for thinking that the phenomenon of value incomparability is indeed a matter of the indeterminacy inherent in our comparative predicates. Secondly, I attempt to defend Broome’s account by warding off several objections that worry him, due mainly to Erik Carlson and Ruth Chang. (shrink)

According to the popular-choice theory of secession, the inhabitants of any territory, as a group, should have an internationally recognized right to secede from a sovereign state if their majority chooses by referendum to do so, and if they are capable of sustaining legitimate state institutions. Prior efforts to defend this group right on individualistic grounds—such as the individual right to associate freely or to participate as an equal in democratic decision-making—have failed. As a result, some recent defenders of the (...) choice theory have suggested that the group right the theory implies is “irreducibly collective.” I argue, to the contrary, that this group right can be grounded fully in the fundamental right of each individual to be treated as an equal by the political institutions to which he is subject. The territorial implications of the choice theory are, moreover, consistent with a plausible account of the territorial rights of states. (shrink)

The Value of Evidence thesis (VE) tells us to gather evidence before deciding in any decision problem, if the evidence is free. This appar- ently plausible principle faces two problems. First, it fails on evidence externalism or nonclassical decision theories. Second, it’s not general enough: it tells us to prefer gaining free evidence to gaining no evi- dence, but it doesn’t tell us to prefer gaining more informative evidence to gaining less informative evidence when both are free. This paper (...) defends an alternative value-of-evidence principle that solves the above two problems. We call it ‘the Comparative Value of Evidence for the Resolute (CVER).’ CVER not only generalizes VE to the comparative case but is also compatible with evidence externalism and nonclassical decision theories. Our argument, if successful, broadens the scope of the value-of-evidence principle and shows that it’s more robust than previously imagined. (shrink)

Demonstrating value is an ongoing process and requirement for institutional survival for ethics programs. Although our ethics program has significantly increased our ethics consultation volume and maintains a robust database that tracks ethics consultation data, these data regarding ethics consultations alone do not accurately represent the program’s overall activities and value to the institution. The roles and responsibilities of clinical ethicists extend beyond clinical ethics consultation, and there are many other ways that clinical ethicists contribute and add (...) class='Hi'>value to their institutions. This article describes our ethics program’s early efforts to systematically track ethics program activities outside of ethics consultations as a way to demonstrate additional value to the institution that goes beyond ethics consultation. By systematically tracking activities such as internal ethics education sessions, conference presentations, publications, grants, committee/policy work, and other activities, our ethics program has been able to gather substantial quantitative data that highlight our program’s numerous activities and outreach, both within and outside the institution, that provide additional value to the institution beyond our ethical consultation activities. (shrink)

The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than (...) knowledge, such as justification or understanding, are distinctively valuable. We will call the general question of why knowledge is valuable the value problem. (shrink)

In defense of his Market Failures Approach to business ethics Joseph Heath relies on an understanding of business as essentially oriented towards competition and profit maximization. In these remarks I defend an alternative understanding of business that is centered on the creation of valuable goods and services. It is preferable because it: (a) creates less pressure to take advantage of vulnerable stakeholders, (b) can readily recognize “beyond compliance” norms that do not relate to efficiency, (c) provides a more meaningful framework (...) for people who work in and with corporations, (d) may mitigate negative moral impacts outside the market, and (e) better captures the range of what actually counts as business activity. (shrink)

This articles assesses the arguments that bioethicists have presented for the view that patient’ autonomy has value over and beyond its instrumental value in promoting the patients’ wellbeing. It argues that this view should be rejected and concludes that patients’ autonomy should be taken to have only instrumental value in medicine.

The aim of this study is to understand how governance mechanisms in cross-sector collaborations (CSCs) for sustainability affect value creation and capture and subsequently the survival of this organizational form. Drawing on a longitudinal, participatory, single-case study of collaborative action in the textile industry, we identify three governance mechanisms—safeguarding, bundling and connecting—that coevolve with the rising and waning of collaborative tensions and the shifting levels of action in the CSC we studied. These mechanisms aided value creation and helped (...) facilitate private value capture. We integrate these insights into a process model that visualizes the interplay between governance mechanisms of tensions and systems of value creation and capture in CSCs for sustainability. Our study contributes to the cross-sector collaboration literature by providing a dynamic and nuanced understanding of how governance mechanisms influence outcomes in CSCs for sustainability. We also add to the business model for sustainability literature by theorizing the value creation and capture system of collaborative rather than individual organizations. Our findings have important implications for policymakers who fund collaborative organizations and practitioners who manage or participate in them. (shrink)

The aim of this literature study was to suggest a value ground for nursing anchored in two ethical principles: the principle of human value and the right to experience a meaningful life. Previous nursing research between the years 2000 and 2009 was analysed. Presented values suggested in this value ground are thus in line with the nursing context and science of today. Statements within ethical literature have been used in order to formulate arguments aimed at supporting the (...) values that were found in the study. In the literature study six values were found: trust, nearness, sympathy, support, knowledge and responsibility. These values hold equal status and are not presented in hierarchical order. They vary due to the persons involved, nursing situations and cultural surroundings, but have the common requirement of being non-excluding. In order to implement the values within the value ground, two prerequisites are discussed and claimed as essential: ethical dialogue and a caring encounter between care provider and patients. (shrink)

Is the ideal of value neutrality in science (a) achievable, (b) desirable, and, (c) not detrimental? Alex van den Berg and Tay Jeong (2022) passionately defend the ideal of value neutrality. In this reply, I would like to fine-tune some of their arguments as well as refute others. While there seems to be a broad consensus among philosophers of science that value neutrality is not achievable, one could still defend it as an ideal to aspire to for (...) the sciences (including social sciences). However, I argue that the ideal of value neutrality advanced by van den Berg and Jeong is detrimental, therefore not desirable. We should rather adjust our view of science towards scientific pluralism and perspectivism in combination with strategies to productively deal with values in science. The latter approach is, pace van den Berg and Jeong, more conducive to democracy and egalitarianism than the ideal of value neutrality. (shrink)

Clark, R. L. Facts, fact-correlates, and fact-surrogates.--Heintz, J. The real subject-predicate asymmetry.--Stenius, E. All men are mortal.--Wilson, N. L. Notes on the form of certain elementary facts.--Binkley, R. The ultimate justification of moral rules.--Castañeda, H. Goodness, intentions, and propositions.--Patterson, R. L. An analysis of faith.--Simpson, E. Discrimination as an example of moral irrationality.--Welsh, P. Osborne on the art of appreciation.--Lachs, J. The omnicolored sky: Baylis on perception.--Strawson, P. F. Causation in perception.--Reid, C. L. Charles A. Baylis: a bibliography.

If contextual values can play necessary and beneficial roles in scientific research, to what extent should science communicators be transparent about such values? This question is particularly pressing in contexts where there appears to be significant resistance among some non-experts to accept certain scientific claims or adopt science-based policies or recommendations. This paper examines whether value transparency can help promote non-experts’ warranted epistemic trust of experts. I argue that there is a prima facie case in favor of transparency because (...) it can promote four conditions that are thought to be required for epistemic trustworthiness. I then consider three main arguments that transparency about values is likely to be ineffective in promoting such trust (and may undermine it). This analysis shows that while these arguments show that value transparency is not sufficient for promoting epistemic trust, they fail to show that rejecting value transparency as a norm for science communicators is more likely to promote warranted epistemic trust than a qualified norm of value transparency (along with other strategies). Finally, I endorse a tempered understanding of value transparency and consider what this might require in practice. (shrink)