Creating a man by means of cloning will certainly raise many legal and halakhic questions. But is this sufficient reason to restrain human creativity? Artificial insemination as well as surrogate motherhood also brought many questions, among them questions concerning who is considered the child's father and who is considered the child's mother. But grave questions such as these arise in every field of human endeavor. The emergence of new questions is however not in itself reason to prohibit the creative endeavors (...) that give rise to them. (shrink)

This article presents, for the first time in English, a translation of the two letters of the usurping emperor Magnus Maximus that are to be found within theCollectio Avellana(letters 39 and 40). The letters—from Maximus to the Emperor Valentinian II and from Maximus to Siricius, bishop of Rome—are each introduced with an extensive discussion of their subject matter, the circumstances of their composition, and their probable date. The article then considers possible reasons for these letters’ unusual survival; as letters of (...) a usurping emperor, one would have expected them to be destroyed, and the article explores how we may understand their inclusion in theCollectio Avellana. Finally, the translations are given, with extensive commentary in their notes. (shrink)

Un nouveau discours politique prétend restaurer le peuple dans sa dignité en s’attaquant aux timides réformes multiculturalistes de ces dernières années. Une nouvelle séparation sociale est revendiquée en termes ethnoculturels, notamment dans le domaine scolaire, pour faire réapparaître les distances sociales qui ne peuvent plus être parlées en termes de classes.

Cet article part d’un constat : certains objets produits par des IA génératives ressemblent à des œuvres d’art qui existent déjà et renversent de ce fait les problématiques liées à l’indiscernabilité entre l’art et le non-art. La facilité avec laquelle ces objets sont acceptés comme œuvre d’art semble reposer sur cette ressemblance qu’il s’agit dès lors d’interroger. Elle semble en effet subrepticement redonner de l’importance à l’objet et son apparence. Les productions issues d’IA permettent ainsi de réfléchir sur le rapport (...) que l’art contemporain entretient à ses objets. Une question symptomatique des pistes discutées est de savoir s’il est plus pertinent de considérer The Next Rembrandt comme une nouvelle peinture d’un Rembrandt virtuel ou comme une nouvelle œuvre appropriationniste d’une Elaine Sturtevant virtuelle. Une manière de répondre à cette question est d’insister sur la dimension immatérielle des œuvres et la différence à faire avec les objets qui les instancient, et ce afin d’éviter tout fétichisme. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultants (CECs) are not moral authorities. Standardization of CECs’ professional role does not confer upon them moral authority. Certification of particular CECs does not confer upon them moral authority (nor does it reflect such authority). Or, so we will argue. This article offers a distinctly Orthodox Christian response to those who claim that CECs—or any other academically trained bioethicist—retain moral authority (i.e., an authority to know and recommend the right course of action). This article proceeds in three parts. (...) First, we discuss recent movements toward the certification of CECs in the United States, focusing primarily on proposals and programs put forth by the American Society for Humanities and Bioethics (ASBH). Second, we outline two secular reasons to be concerned about the relevant trends toward certification. For one thing, certification is currently being advanced via political dominance, rather than gaining authority by reliance on rigorous philosophical argument or reason. For another, the trends operate on the assumption that there exists a secular, content-full, canonical, morality. There is no such morality. Next, we argue that Orthodox Christians should resist the current trends toward certification of CECs. Specifically, we unpack ways in which the ASBH’s certification program (and those like it) conflict with Orthodox claims about moral authority and the moral life more generally. We conclude that Orthodox Christians should resist the current certification trends. (shrink)

The fictional beings are another story ourselves, and tell us another way to recover what we, wanting to be what we want; Stories in which they live, not knowing that his life is a story, a story that does not live as if it were, as if they lived their lives. The fictions of the world show us, not necessarily, as others do not, who am not! But who still am not, because I have not discovered completely all myself, and (...) sometimes I am without be them in this otherness for myself it is mine, but not mine yet, I am part of stories that are not my history, the world of text, stories where I am another, even myself, intratextual entity and not intraworld, reowned those others who just the text opens so imaginary and that the actual closure and silent, to the point where it is discovered that about me are the many stories that tell me I have the me or other me, where the mirror the other gives me an identity different readings, Be-who-I-am-and-who-else-to be-said-that-I, because I have built my own history identity, but the pair, others tell my story as the story of another, stories over and over that overlap but without being the same but the same, the stories of others that I am for others, who suspect without built my otherness, my other identities. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Millennium Jahrgang: 12 Heft: 1 Seiten: 179-202.

The fictional beings are another story ourselves, and tell us another way to recover what we, wanting to be what we want; Stories in which they live, not knowing that his life is a story, a story that does not live as if it were, as if they lived their lives. The fictions of the world show us, not necessarily, as others do not, who am not! But who still am not, because I have not discovered completely all myself, and (...) sometimes I am without be them in this otherness for myself it is mine, but not mine yet, I am part of stories that are not my history, the world of text, stories where I am another, even myself, intratextual entity and not intraworld, reowned those others who just the text opens so imaginary and that the actual closure and silent, to the point where it is discovered that about me are the many stories that tell me I have the me or other me, where the mirror the other gives me an identity different readings, Be-who-I-am-and-who-else-to be-said-that-I, because I have built my own history identity, but the pair, others tell my story as the story of another, stories over and over that overlap but without being the same but the same, the stories of others that I am for others, who suspect without built my otherness, my other identities. (shrink)

In the early steps of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant briefly addresses the threat posed by usurpatory concepts such as 'fate' and 'fortune'. Commentators have largely passed over these remarks, but in this paper I argue that a careful analysis of the reasons why 'fate' and 'fortune' are usurpatory reveals an important point about the relation between the Deduction and the Principles chapters of the Critique. In particular, I argue that 'fate' and 'fortune' are usurpatory (...) because they are unable to discriminate between the particular contents of experience, and that this requires that Kant provide an account of how the categories are able to accomplish this task. And this in turn shows that the justificatory work begun in the Deduction can be completed only in the Schematism and Principles. (shrink)

The 8th volume in this edition contains the works written by Benjamin Constant between March 1813 and April 1814. The texts are different in nature. Alongside a work of fiction, »Florestan or the Siege of Soissons«, the reader will find »The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation«, various propagandistic writings penned in the service of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, and finally »Reflections on Constitutions and Guarantees«, a work of political theory. All these texts are precursors of the works from the (...) period of the First Restoration and the Cent-Jours assembled in Volume 9, so that these two volumes are closely interrelated. (shrink)

Many Levinasians are prone to merely assert or presuppose that the Other is ‘radically Other’, and that such Otherness is of patent ethical significance. But building ethics into the very concept of ‘the Other’ seems question-begging. What then, if not mere Otherness, might motivate Levinasian responsibility? In the following discussion I argue that this can best be answered by reading Levinas as a post-Holocaust thinker, preoccupied with how one’s simply being-here constitutes a ‘usurpation of spaces belonging to the other’. (...) Then, drawing on Schutz’s phenomenology, I explain how the resultant usurpatory bad conscience presupposes the embodied ‘interchangeability’ of self and Other. As such, one can be said to ‘usurp’ the Other’s place only insofar as self and Other are not radically different. (shrink)

In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose's influential argument that the knowledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables contextualism's ascendancy.

This essay argues that the neo-Roman republican principle of "non-domination," as developed in the recent work of Philip Pettit, cannot serve as a single overarching political ideal, because it responds to only one of two important dimensions of concern about human agency. Through critical engagements with several aspects of Pettit's work, ranging from his philosophical account of freedom as "discursive control" to his appropriation of the distinction between dominium and imperium, the essay argues that the idea of domination, which responds (...) to concerns about "control," needs to be supplemented by the idea of usurpation, which responds to questions about "involvement"; and it shows how attention to both domination and usurpation (and to the interaction between them) can shed light on such phenomena as imperialism, slavery, and democracy. (shrink)

Discursive history of the English language has been vital to analysing ‘the postcolonial condition’ in the Indian subcontinent, with a broadly overarching emphasis on how English is a ‘usurper language’. Simultaneous to this, however, there exists a hitherto understudied history featuring subaltern, ‘organic intellectuals’ from the lower castes. Not only does this ‘subaltern history of English’ exhibit a more positive affect toward the English language – by invoking its emancipatory potential in an economy of deeply casteist vernacular languages – but (...) it also complicates multiple assertions that the postcolonial apparatus has so far held as a priori. Jotirao Phule’s Slavery/Gulamgiri (1873) is one of the foremost examples of such a position; its preface, which lucidly announces this seemingly unique position, is quite possibly the first explicitly political treatise written in the English language in the history of the subcontinent. This paper highlights the enormous shifts that take place in our understanding of the history of English – and (post)colonial modernity – if we were to (aptly) classify Phule’s preface as a key text in the history of ‘Indian writing in English’. Subsequently, it is argued that Phule’s work crystallizes into a radically alternate – and far more egalitarian – conception of ‘world literature’ contra Tagore’s well-known idea of visva sahitya. (shrink)

Great Britain subjugated colonists using various power strategies, including dehumanization, misinformation, fear, and other divisive strategies. The Founders described these oppressive strategies as “a long train of abuses and usurpations.” Throughout the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, the Founding Fathers imbued the people with hope in a government for the people: one unlike that of the monarchy, which sought to protect itself at the expense of colonists. As a result, the Founders created a government more likely to lead (...) with fairness, demonstrate respect for human dignity, unite Americans as one people, empower citizens through hope, and lead the nation toward security. This socio-ethical framework was an abductive discovery nested within a grounded theory study where it had been concluded that the first principles of democracy were woven within the American founding documents. Using Charmaz’s constructivist grounded theory, the first principles of democracy—knowledge, fairness, human dignity, hope, unity, and security—were used to answer an emerging research question: Are there two democratic frameworks in the founding documents, and how do they differ? The first principles of democracy promote a culture of ethics, resilience, and freedom. Their empowering disposition makes them suitable as a normative framework for a democratic government for the people. (shrink)

The 'postmodern condition,' in which instrumentalism finally usurps all other considerations, has produced a kind of intellectual paralysis in the world of education. The authors of this book show how such postmodernist thinkers as Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard illuminate puzzling aspects of education, arguing that educational theory is currently at an impasse. They postulate that we need these new and disturbing ideas in order to "think again" fruitfully and creatively about education.

Everybody knows that the Revolution of 1911 was an anti-imperialist and antifeudal democratic revolution led by the revolutionary and democratic group of the bourgeoisie in the period of the old democratic revolution in China. The leader of that revolution was Sun Yat-sen, and the guiding ideology was his old Three People's Principles. It is well known that Chairman Mao has made a series of scientific appraisals of these facts, but the newspapers and magazines controlled by the anti-Party clique of Wang (...) Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing and Yao Wen-yuan openly oppose Chairman Mao's scientific appraisals, betraying the fundamental principles of Marxism, distorting the Revolution of 1911 as a struggle between Confucians and Legalists, and replacing Sun Yat-sen as the standard-bearer of the revolution with Chang T'ai-yen, who played first an active and then a devastating role in the revolution. All this is part of the clique's attack on the Party in order to usurp the Party, seize power, restore capitalism and fabricate the "history" of the struggle between the Confucians and the Legalists. (shrink)

Caesarism is contrasted with medieval monarchies, and the emperor is evaluated as a citizen who is in charge of the Republic and is all-powerful. However, two-thirds of the Augustuses and the Caesars died a violent death, often at the hands of close family members. Nobility is a ruling caste, in which bloody rivalries, usurpations and political romanticism are rife as it struggles to retain its social pre-eminence. The Senate, though, does not itself want to govern and eventually degenerates into an (...) Academy. The imperium, with its patriarchal nature, remains very popular among the people/citizens. Though the imperial cult would lead to tyranny, it continued to express both the stature and love accorded to the individual emperor, and the power of tradition, of charisma and the institution. (shrink)

With a vaulting ambition to usurp Party power, the "Gang of Four" has audaciously opposed Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. Lacking truth in their allegations, they have been compelled to invoke sophistry. Their sophistry runs counter to materialist dialectics and even formal logic. Alien class element Yao Wen-yuan used to accuse others of "violating even formal logic," but it is the "Gang of Four" that ignores the definiteness and distinctiveness of thinking, says black is white, and tramples on formal logic.

SIR, --- Your inaugural address is probably as honest, sensible, and consistent a one as that of any president within the last fifty years, or, perhaps, as any since the foundation of the government. If, therefore, it is false, absurd, self-contradictory, and ridiculous, it is not (as I think) because you are personally less honest, sensible, or consistent than your predecessors, but because the government itself --- according to your own description of it, and according to the practical administration of (...) it for nearly a hundred years --- is an utterly and palpably false, absurd, and criminal one. Such praises as you bestow upon it are, therefore, necessarily false, absurd, and ridiculous. Thus you describe it as "a government pledged to do equal and exact justice to all men." Did you stop to think what that means? Evidently you did not; for nearly, or quite, all the rest of your address is in direct contradiction to it. Let me then remind you that justice is an immutable, natural principle; and not anything that can be made, unmade, or altered by any human power. It is also a subject of science, and is to be learned, like mathematics, or any other science. It does not derive its authority from the commands, will, pleasure, or discretion of any possible combination of men, whether calling themselves a government, or by any other name. It is also, at all times, and in all places, the supreme law. And being everywhere and always the supreme law, it is necessarily everywhere and always the only law. Lawmakers, as they call themselves, can add nothing to it, nor take anything from it. Therefore all their laws, as they call them, --- that is, all the laws of their own making, --- have no color of authority or obligation. It is a falsehood to call them laws; for there is nothing in them that either creates men's duties or rights, or enlightens them as to their duties or rights. There is consequently nothing binding or obligatory about them. And nobody is bound to take the least notice [*4] of them, unless it be to trample them under foot, as usurpations.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Richard Rorty Lays Down the LawLeon SuretteRichard Rorty has found a large cross-disciplinary academic audience for his argument that philosophy ought to abandon its self-appointed role as a foundational discipline and adopt the “ironic” and “conversational” practices of literary criticism. Explicitly invoking early pragmatism—which argued that philosophy should join the natural sciences and regard itself as “the workshop of being, where we catch fact in the making” 1 —Rorty (...) argues that philosophers should now abandon the natural sciences, and become “edifiers” and “ironist theorists” on the model of literary criticism. 2Rorty’s pragmatism amounts to the claim that philosophy ought to wind up and put away its long preoccupation with metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology and abandon the pretense of deductive rigor to become “dialectical.” This newly reformed philosophy would, as Rorty puts it, “play off vocabularies against one another, rather than merely... infer propositions from one another” (CIS, p. 78). Rorty’s belief in philosophy as a form of conversation may owe less to American pragmatism, however, than to Continental hermeneutics (particularly Hans Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method). Nevertheless, I intend to take him at his word, and apply the fundamental tenet of pragmatism to his own theorizing. I take the following remark by William James as definitional of American pragmatism: “What practical difference would it make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show that some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other’s being right” (PR, p. 26).In the light of this pragmatic principal, most philosophical and [End Page 261] literary theories make little if any practical difference to the practice of literary criticism, although philosophy and theory can displace, occlude, or banish it. The whole issue turns on what is meant by the term, literary criticism. Rorty assumes that criticism is an interpretive activity, and that nothing further need be said. Yet interpretation is not the sole activity of literary criticism, nor is the practice of literary interpretation sufficiently well formulated to serve as a model upon which philosophy could reform itself.Although Rorty’s proposed reformation of philosophy on the model of literary criticism is seen by many literary critics as a friendly takeover, it can just as easily be seen as hostile, as an updating and domestication of Hans Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, which would make interpretation foundational for all of the knowledge industries. With respect to his paternalistic attitude toward literary criticism, Rorty is very much within a philosophical tradition of foundationalism that begins, as far as literary criticism is concerned, with Plato’s Ion. Whereas Plato argued that literary criticism is a misguided or unworthy form of discourse, Rorty turns it into an approved variety of philosophical discourse. But he can achieve this end only by occluding (through misrepresentation) the praxis of literary criticism as it has been constituted both within and without the academy.Rorty’s project of “edification” through the reform of philosophy as “conversation” was first proposed in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (pp. 360, 371) and has subsequently been refined in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, where it becomes the Nietzschean project of “making the best selves for ourselves that we can” (p. 80). This goal is said to be achieved through “literary criticism,” which he describes as “the attempt to play off vocabularies against one another” (pp. 78–79). Such an idea is enormously flattering to literary critics, and, not surprisingly, has garnered Rorty many admirers in literature departments. But it rests upon a highly selective characterization of literary criticism—a characterization which conforms roughly to New Critical and Deconstructive practice, though not to longer-standing critical practices.Rorty ignores literary criticism’s long standing self-definition as the reinterpretation or redescription of object texts. Instead, he assumes that the practice of Harold Bloom, in which both “creative” and critical discourse are regarded as varieties of usurpation or “misprision,” is standard. Rorty speaks of “literary discourse” as a... (shrink)

Formal, informal and material institutions constitute the framework for human interaction and communicative practice. Three ideas from institutional theory are particularly relevant to technical change. Exclusion cost refers to the effort that must be expended to prevent others from usurping or interfering in one’s use or disposal of a given good or resource. Alienability refers to the ability to tangibly extricate a good or resource from one setting, making it available for exchange relations. Rivalry refers to the degree and character (...) of compatibility in various uses for goods. The paper closes with a note on how attention to these factors might be useful ways toconceptualize what Langdon Winner has called “the technological constitution of society,” and what Andrew Feenberg has theorized as “secondary rationalization,” as well as within more practical contexts of technical research, development and design. (shrink)

"Yang Xiong is the most useless of all. He was truly a rotten Confucian."Zhu Xi (11301200 A.D.)With this comment from Song Dynasty Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi, the work of Han Dynasty philosopher Yang Xiong (53 B.C.18 A.D.) was effectively relegated to the dustbin of Chinese intellectual history. While influential in the Later Han as the clearest expression of the Old Text Confucian school, Yang's Fa yan has received little attention from Western scholars and appears here in a rare annotated English translation.Written (...) during the transition between the Former and Later Han Dynasties, the Fa yan is a notoriously elusive text that was stylistically modeled on the Analects of Confucius. Denigrated by later Neo-Confucians for his association with Han usurper Wang Mang, Yang Xiong served both the Former Han and Xin imperial courts as a court poet and scholar, and was well known for being a reclusive personality, earning him a reputation as a "hermit at court." Most famous for his position that human nature is a mixture of good and evil, Yang Xiong's philosophy stands in clear contrast to the syncretic Confucianism of his day as a reformer's vision of proper self-cultivation and statecraft.This volume presents an annotated translation of the entire text, focusing on the passages that elucidate Yang's discussion of the core concepts of the Confucian school. The translator's commentary traces the text's major philosophical concepts to their roots in Warring States era philosophy, noting stylistic and conceptual allusions to the Analects and Mencius, among other texts. Also included are a discussion of Yang's biography and the influence of the eremitic ideal on his life and thought. (shrink)

Dans son pamphlet contre Napoléon, intitulé De l’esprit de conquête et de l’usurpation, Benjamin Constant écrivait, en 1814 : « Un gouvernement qui voudrait aujourd’hui pousser à la guerre et aux conquêtes un peuple européen commettrait donc un grossier et funeste anachronisme. Il travaillerait à donner à sa nation une impulsion contraire..

Reclamation strategies -- Conceptual exclusion -- Reclamation from absence -- Insults and their possibilities -- From exclusion to reclamation -- Injuries and usurpations.

The case of W v M and Others, in which the court rejected an application to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from a woman in a minimally conscious state, raises a number of profoundly important medico-legal issues. This article questions whether the requirement to respect the autonomy of incompetent patients, under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, is being unjustifiably disregarded in order to prioritise the sanctity of life. When patients have made informal statements of wishes and views, which clearly—if not (...) precisely—apply to their present situation, judges should not feel free to usurp such expressions of autonomy unless there are compelling reasons for so doing. (shrink)

Though the realm of biology has long been under the philosophical rule of the mechanistic magisterium, recent years have seen a surprisingly steady rise in the usurping prowess of process ontology. According to its proponents, theoretical advances in the contemporary science of evo-devo have afforded that ontology a particularly powerful claim to the throne: in that increasingly empirically confirmed discipline, emergently autonomous, higher-order entities are the reigning explanantia. If we are to accept the election of evo-devo as our best conceptualisation (...) of the biological realm with metaphysical rigour, must we depose our mechanistic ontology for failing to properly “carve at the joints” of organisms? In this paper, I challenge the legitimacy of that claim: not only can the theoretical benefits offered by a process ontology be had without it, they cannot be sufficiently grounded without the metaphysical underpinning of the very mechanisms which processes purport to replace. The biological realm, I argue, remains one best understood as under the governance of mechanistic principles. (shrink)

A tercentenary conference of March, 1985, drew to Newport, Rhode Island, nearly all the most distinguished Berkeley scholars now active. The conference was organized by the International Berkeley Society, with the support of several institutions and many people. This volume represents a selection of the lead papers deliv ered at that conference, most now revised. The Cartesian marriage of Mind and Body has proved an uneasy union. Each side has claimed supremacy and usurped the rights of the other. In anglophone (...) philosophy Body has lately had it all pretty much its own way, most dramatically in the Disappearance Theory of Mind, whose varieties vary in appeal and sophistication, but uniformly shock sensibili ties. Only recently has Mind reasserted itself, yet the voices of support are already a swelling chorus. "Welcome," Berkeley would respond, since "... all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth... have not a subsis tence without a mind... ". In fairness, Berkeley does playa Disappearance trick of his own - with Matter now into the hat. But his act is far subtler than any brute denial of the obvious, and seeks rather to explain than bluntly to reject. Perhaps we are today better prepared to appreciate his insights. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer a critique of a rigidly moralistic temperament in public discourse from the perspective of political realism. It unpacks three types of moralism in public discourse, and for each, it explains why it is normatively problematic from a realist perspective: ‘Moralist Causalism’ is the belief that moral preaching is an apt way to affect the world for the better; ‘Moralist Manicheism’ is a dichotomous division of the world between good and evil; ‘Moralist Absolutism’ is the conviction (...) that only morality matters when we answer the question, ‘What should we do?’. The paper then turns these negative criticisms into a positive recipe for how to look realistically at what is valuable in the world. First, there are not only multiple values in the world but also different sources of values (epistemic, instrumental, aesthetic…) which may conflict with one another. We call this requirement ‘Meta-Normative Pluralism’. Second, politics is pivotal because it is the sphere where the clashes among all other spheres of value are authoritatively resolved—a role which moralists usurp for morality. (shrink)

The early paragraphs of John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government describe a poetic idyll of property acquisition widely supposed by contemporary theorists and historians to have cast the template for imperial possessions in the New World. This reading ignores the surprises lurking in Locke’s later chapters on conquest, usurpation, and tyranny, where he affirms that native rights to lands and possessions survive to succeeding generations. Locke warned his readers that this “will seem a strange doctrine, it being quite contrary (...) to the practice of the world.” His doctrine of native right is equally strange to recent scholars who see in Lockean theory the ideological prototype for England’s colonial expropriation in the “vacant lands” of North America. This interpretation, dignified by the elusive principle of vacuum domicilium, is considerably weakened when Locke’s arguments are placed in the historical context of the sixteenth and early seventeenth-century English colonial experience. Locke’s Second Treatise, with its literary flourish of a vast and idyllic state of nature, was written in the full appreciation of Amerindian agriculture, its established populations, the acknowledgement of native property rights, and the policy and practice of purchasing land from the native inhabitants. (shrink)

Questions about dirty hands have often focused on legitimate, secure leaders deciding whether to violate important deontological principles or the rules of interpersonal morality. The purpose of this paper is to show that revolutionaries have dirty hands; revolutionaries do wrong by engaging in unilateral usurpation of the existing system with the hope that latter benefits will justify their actions. Yet, once the revolution securely generates improvements for the common good, the initial usurpation becomes increasingly irrelevant to judgments of (...) the new government’s legitimacy. The paper argues that only retroactive justification—where later success forces opponents and advocates to reinterpret the wrongness of the initial action—can fully capture the complex moral dynamics of revolutions. (shrink)

Humor can be used as a tool for a wide range of tasks, including fighting for social justice. How to most effectively use it, however, is a matter of contention. Jokes that alienate members of an out-group can be called “Otherizing,” and can cause harm by virtue of the alienation. Woke comics, like Hari Kondabolu, intentionally avoid Otherizing in general, but may engage in a version of it that seeks to defang stereotypical treatments of out-groups by replacing the alienating content (...) with something benign. We term this use of Otherizing, “mOtherizing.” Pride comics, like Russell Peters, take a different approach and try to usurp the power of Otherizing by over-engaging in it. The intention is to use the jokes to cobble together a coalition of out-groups that turns itself into an in-group. We term this use of Otherizing, “brOtherizing.”. (shrink)

Inter-war Australia saw the emergence of a feminist campaign for indigenous rights. Led by women activists who were members of various key Australian women's organizations affiliated with the British Commonwealth League, this campaign proposed a revitalized White Australia as a progressive force towards improving ‘world’ race relations. Drawing upon League of Nations conventions and the increasing role for the Dominions within the British Commonwealth, these women claimed to speak on behalf of Australian Aborigines in asserting their right to reparation as (...) a usurped people and the need to overhaul government policy. Opposing inter-war policies of biological assimilation, they argued for a humane national Aboriginal policy including citizenship and rights in the person. Where white men had failed in their duty towards indigenous peoples, world women might bring about a new era of civilized relations between the races. (shrink)