Summary The famous essay by Christian von Ehrenfels, Über Gestaltqualitäten (1890), opens up, as is well-known, an important seam not only in the psychology of perception but also of aesthetics, of the psychology and philosophy of music, art and language. Here, in fact, the form understood as ‘Gestalt’ is something concretely audible and visible and not simply a formal abstraction. It is about a pioneering programme rich in ideas and original connections. The author does not mean simply to (...) define the meaning of the concept of Gestalt, but he also sets out a fertile variety of extraordinary applications. In the first place – following a suggestion of Ernst Mach’s – he indicates an application in the field of music, in particular in the exemplary case of melody. In this sense the melody, as a temporal Gestalt, is a more fitting illustration of Gestalt than a spatial Gestalt (e.g. of a geometric figure). But in other cases, as for instance in the case of perception of movement, both temporal and spatial Gestalts are admitted. And a characteristic example is provided by dance. In this article, we shall investigate the comparison between sound movement and visual–gestural movement, and we shall also be discussing the matter by having recourse to the experience of professional dancers. (shrink)

Recent studies have revealed that the temporal lobe, a cortical region thought to be in charge of episodic and semantic memory, is involved in creative insight. This work examines the contributions of discrete temporal regions to insight. Activity in the medial temporal regions is indicative of novelty recognition and detection, which is necessary for the formation of novel associations and the “Aha!” experience. The fusiform gyrus mainly affects the formation of gestalt-like representation and perspective taking. The (...) anterior and posterior middle temporal gyri are individually associated with extensive semantic processing and inhibiting salient or routine word associations, which are necessary to form non-salient, novel and remote associations. The anterior and posterior superior temporal gyri are individually responsible for integrating/binding and accessing various types of available conceptual representations. Based on the current knowledge, an integrated model of the temporal lobe's role in insight and some future directions are proposed. (shrink)

이 글은 세계 속 신체-주체와 지각 대상의 접속에 의한 지각 현상의 특성을 밝히고, 이를 바탕으로 영화 속 영화이미지의 현상학적 특성과 현상학적인 존재론적 살로서의 영화 이미지의 특성 및 영화이미지의 존재 의미를 밝히는 것을 목적으로 한다. 이런 밝힘으로 말미암아 현상학적인 존재론적 살로서의 영화이미지의 가치가 드러날 것이다. 현상학적 지각 현상은 차이장 속 차이의 지각 현상이 되고 차이 존재를 토대로 지각 현 상 자체를 나타내는 차이존재론적 지각 현상이 된다. 지각 현상은 운동적인 지각지평-차 이장 속 역동적인 차이들이 시공적으로 생산되고 있는 총체적 시스템의 지각 현상이다. 시간적 (...) 게슈탈트로서의 영화란 단순히 이미지들을 모아놓은 집합이 아니라, 이다. 영화이미지는 가상이면서도 현실이고 현실이면서도 가상이 되고 있으며, 차이장 속 가상과 현실을 맞물리게 하는 맞물림의 시뮬라크르 가 되고 있다. 영화이미지들의 관계적인 접속적 상황에서 영화적 현재는 영화적 과거와 영화적 미래 에 대한 시간적 살을 가진다. 영화이미지들은 서로에 대한 대립과 대립적 살을 가지고, 갈등, 권력, 사랑의 관계적인 영화이미지들은 각각 서로에 대하여 갈등과 갈등적 살, 권력과 권력적 살, 사랑과 사랑의 살을 가진다. 영화이미지들의 교차는 살적인 새로운 생성 의미 와 그 영화이미지들의 존재 의미를 드러내고, 관객은 영화이미지들의 살을 통해서 영화이 미지의 의미와 존재 의미 및 자신의 존재 의미를 느끼고 의식한다. 영화 속 영화이미지들은 항상 컨텍스트-영화이미지들로서 작동한다. (shrink)

In this article, first, we argue that the concept of ‘vitality forms’ endows direct social perception (DSP) with suitable constructed percepts. Vitality forms capture how embodied actions unfold in the process, encapsulating the how-dimension of action, which provides a new dimension for understanding the multiplicities of action. Second, we discuss how vitality forms, as a diachronic gestalt, are completed and recognized in the process of dyadic sharing. We attempt to invoke another concept advocated by Daniel Stern, ‘moments of meeting’, (...) thereby emphasizing the temporality problem of the constructed percepts in DSP. In these special moments, the minds of both parties intersect and co-construct a shared experience that can be perceived or seen by each participant. That is, vitality forms are a consequence of the co-construction within the dyad at the moments of meeting. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present an interpretation of the nature and role of absolute knowing, which rests upon the concepts of Form and Gestalt (shape). These concepts constitute the essential dimensions of absolute knowing, in virtue of which it is possible to give an account of its structure and central properties. The first dimension – “first” thanks to the ontological value it can be ascribed to – is Form, which expresses the conceptual structure of (...) absolute knowing; the second one, Gestalt, is the exemplification of that structure in the sphere of existence. By examining selected passages from the absolute knowing chapter it can be shown how Hegel uses these terms to refer respectively to the logical-conceptual structure of absolute knowing and to its concrete exteriorization, emphasizing from time to time one of the two sides. Hence it is shown that absolute knowing is fully achieved only insofar as consciousness attributes to its content both the Form and the Gestalt of the self or, in other words, insofar as it acknowledges that the properties of content are the same as its own, and conversely realizes that the properties of thought do reflect the structure of its content. The article concludes with the examination of some questions about the subject of absolute knowing in order to highlight the pivotal role played by the temporal-historical dimension. (shrink)

This paper first advances and discusses the hypothesis that so-called “iconic” or (for the auditory sphere) “echoic” memory is actually a form of perception of the past. Such perception is made possible by parallel inputs with differential delays which feed independently into the sensorium. This hypothesis goes well together with a set of related psychological and phenomenological facts, as for example: Sperling’s results about the visual sensory buffer, the facts that we seem to see movement and hear temporal (...) Gestalts, and the fact that we sometimes seem to hear sounds only after they have stopped. In it most simple form, and formulated in the somewhat misleading information processing idiom, my hypothesis says that each one of a number of parallel input lines with different delays feeds into a spatially separate sensory unit. The set of such units then holds information about the immediate past in what one might call a “chronotopic” sensory map. This contrasts with the idea (common in sensory buffer theory) that the received sensory information is kept (while possibly decaying) in the same unit for some time after it occurred. The hypothesis also contradicts the theory that all sensory information passes through the same unit but is then successively passed through a unidirectional chain of separate units, where the past experiences then become represented (the shift register hypothesis). The main advantage of my theory, beside the natural explanations it offers for the above-mentioned kind of phenomena, is that it postulates a parallel – and therefore robust – rather than a serial mechanism for the registering of temporal information. It can of course easily be modified to fit more complex models of the sensory cerebral code(s) as well as of the chronotopic representation as such. -/- In the second part of my poster, I advance a corresponding hypothesis for those motor commands which control brief movements. At closer inspection, most socalled “ballistic” movements do not seem to be truly ballistic (in the sense in which the movement of a cannonball is so) since the brain must exert some kind of feedforward control over the later part of their trajectory. I suggest that this control is at least sometimes realized by means of differentially delayed output from a chronotopic representation of successive segments of the movement. Not only could this be a biologically natural way of ensuring efficient adaptability of the movement; the hypothesis also explains the not uncommon experience of “seeing the whole movement laid out in advance” when it is initiated. (shrink)

Where is consciousness? Neurobiological theories of consciousness look primarily to synaptic firing and “spike codes” as the physical substrate of consciousness, although the specific mechanisms of consciousness remain unknown. Synaptic firing results from electrochemical processes in neuron axons and dendrites. All neurons also produce electromagnetic (EM) fields due to various mechanisms, including the electric potential created by transmembrane ion flows, known as “local field potentials,” but there are also more meso-scale and macro-scale EM fields present in the brain. The functional (...) role of these EM fields has long been a source of debate. We suggest that these fields, in both their local and global forms, may be the primary seat of consciousness, working as a gestalt with synaptic firing and other aspects of neuroanatomy to produce the marvelous complexity of minds. We call this assertion the “electromagnetic field hypothesis.” The neuroanatomy of the brain produces the local and global EM fields but these fields are not identical with the anatomy of the brain. These fields are produced by, but not identical with, the brain, in the same manner that twigs and leaves are produced by a tree’s branches and trunk but are not the same as the branches and trunk. As such, the EM fields represent the more granular, both spatially and temporally, aspects of the brain’s structure and functioning than the neuroanatomy of the brain. The brain’s various EM fields seem to be more sensitive to small changes than the neuroanatomy of the brain. We discuss issues with the spike code approach as well as the various lines of evidence supporting our argument that the brain’s EM fields may be the primary seat of consciousness. This evidence (which occupies most of the paper) suggests that oscillating neural EM fields may make firing in neural circuits oscillate, and these oscillating circuits. may help unify and guide conscious cognition. (shrink)

Erwin Straus nourished his spirit on "Act psychology", "Gestalt psychology" and "Husserlian phenomenology" in Berlin and Göttingen, and has renewed his engagement with these problems in Lexington without renouncing his commitment to a tradition to which he has remained always faithful. It is in the realm of the psychology of perception that Erwin Straus - as did the analyses of Bergson, Gestalt psychology, and the phenomenology of Husserl - made his point of departure for his critique of sensationistic (...) empiricism and of the sensory psychophysiology from Johannes Miller to Wundt... The guiding idea of Erwin Straus, as Merleau-Ponty has so profoundly made explicit, is that the sphere of sensing, the sense of the senses, is discovered to be the constitution of the very corporeity of experience, the latter being capable of being lived only in and by a living body. As abstract an sophisticated as this primordial description of the phisical body might be insofar as it is the object and subject of phenomenology, it appears to me to be the only possible, or more simply, the only one which allows us to formulate a general law of the temporal organization of the existent, that is to say, of the human being in the proper constitution of his own becoming. The phenomenology that I have just outlined founds the system of reality as the very form of conscious being, and the organization of the psychical body as the constitution of the ego. Four theses within this framework relating perceptual and hallucinatory activity are : hallucination is virtual in perception, and that it is, as Ernest Hartman recently stated, an "ubiquitous capacity" immanent to this "psychical apparatus" of which Freud spoke, and which I prefer to call "the psychical body". That hallucinatory difficulties are real difficulties and not a simple difference of intensity between the image and sensation. The pathogenesis of hallucinations can only be theorized according to the Jacksonian model of negative and positive ; and There is a fundamental distinction between the diverse forms and levels of delirious or psychotic hallucinatory activity and hallucinatory images. (shrink)

This, the second in the Psychological Series of Duquesne Studies, is a translation of the author’s classic Théorie du Champ de la Conscience, written in 1953, first published in 1957. The thesis of the book is that ‘every total field of consciousness consists of three domains, each domain exhibiting a specific type of organization of its own. The first domain is the theme, that which engrosses the mind of the experiencing subject, or as it is often expressed, which stands in (...) the “focus of his attention”. Second is the thematic field, defined as the totality of those data, co-present with the theme, which are experienced as materially relevant or pertinent to the theme and form the background or horizon out of which the theme emerges as the center. The third includes data which, though co-present with, have no relevancy to, the theme and comprise in their totality what we propose to call the margin’. The aim is ‘to bring out the structure of each of these domains’. We perceive a material thing in a context of other things, and if our mind is preoccupied with a problem we are also aware not only of its intellectual background and possible solutions, but of our actual environment and of ourselves as sitting in our room or walking in the street; all these data are experienced simultaneously. Consciousness here includes not only perceiving but remembering, imagining etc and its objects may be material things, mathematical relations, musical compositions or theoretical implications. These objects of consciousness are, however, objects understood descriptively, not as independent realities with causal relations to a mind but as they appear to a subject. It is the intentionality of consciousness, the bipolarity of the subject and its object which is shown to render inadequate Bergson‘s and William James’ correction of Humean empiricism in terms of temporal interpenetration of elements of the ’stream of thought‘, although the author uses concepts and theories of James’ to formulate and present problems to which a more Husserlian answer is given. Gestalt theory is explored and its phenomenological potential used to solve the problems of a theory of organization. (shrink)

Following the pioneering studies of the receptive field (RF), the concept gained further significance for visual perception by the discovery of input effects from beyond the classical RF. These studies demonstrated that neuronal responses could be modulated by stimuli outside their RFs, consistent with the perception of induced brightness, color, orientation, and motion. Lesion scotomata are similarly modulated perceptually from the surround by RFs that have migrated from the interior to the outer edge of the scotoma and in this way (...) provide filling-in of the void. Large RFs are advantageous to this task. In higher visual areas, such as the middle temporal and inferotemporal lobe, RFs increase in size and lose most of their retinotopic organization while encoding increasingly complex features. Whereas lowerlevel RFs mediate perceptual filling-in, contour integration, and figure–ground segregation, RFs at higher levels serve the perception of grouping by common fate, biological motion, and other biologically relevant stimuli, such as faces. Studies in alert monkeys while freely viewing natural scenes showed that classical and nonclassical RFs cooperate in forming representations of the visual world. Today, our understanding of the mechanisms underlying the RF is undergoing a quantum leap. What had started out as a hierarchical feedforward concept for simple stimuli, such as spots, lines, and bars, now refers to mechanisms involving ascending, descending, and lateral signal flow. By extension of the bottom-up paradigm, RFs are nowadays understood as adaptive processors, enabling the predictive coding of complex scenes. Top-down effects guiding attention and tuned to task-relevant information complement the bottom-up analysis. (shrink)

Summary I outline an approach to the phenomenology of improvised music which takes typification and the development of multi‐ordered phenomenological structures as central. My approach here is firmly in line with classical Husserlian phenomenology, taking the discussion of types in Experience and Judgment (Husserl, 1973) and Brudzińska (2015) as guide. I provide a phenomenological analysis of musical types as they are found in improvisational contexts, focusing on jazz in the 20th century. Styles are higher‐order musical types. Musical types are structures (...) that are temporally “thick,” relying on sedimented typification and knowledge, driving expectations as definitional. In most forms of music (including improvised music), musical styles involve maintaining a balance between confirming expectations and flouting expectations. I show that improvised music has a phenomenal structure which is enriched by the communicative and “ real‐time” nature of improvised music. Improvised music can be seen as an exploration of a possibility space rendered by the juxtaposition of the musical types afforded by a performance environment (instrumentation, harmonic and melodic traditions, etc.). I show that improvisation in music is a multi‐vectoral form of communication. The communication is founded in what Dieter Lohmar calls “non‐linguistic thinking.” The expression is constituted in the results of active and synthesis. The culmination of improvisational exploration of possibility spaces is the precisification and enrichment of styles‐as‐types, while in some cases developing new styles in the process. (shrink)