Hurlburt, K.R., Sufficiency conditions for theories with recursive models, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 55 305–320. We give conditions under which it is possible to construct recursive models for certain highly non-recursive theories. The main idea is to find an ‘α-friendly family’ of structures corresponding to the given theory and then to construct the desired recursive model by copying appropriate parts of these structures, choosing the part to copy in each structure so as to include important witnesses. All (...) of this is done using the recursive labelling systems designed by C. Ash. An example is given which involves orderings whose elementary first-order theories have degree O. (shrink)

National self-sufficiency in human biological materials such as blood and organs is now commonly invoked as a goal for healthcare policy makers. Despite its history as a strategic response to the ethical hazards of global trade in human blood, the ethical dimensions of the concept have been inadequately explored. This paper introduces self-sufficiency as an ethical paradigm for policy-making and explores some of the parallels found in Aristotle’s account of autarkeia in the polis. It highlights the ethico-political challenges (...) of pursuing self-sufficiency in culturally diverse societies and suggests that the motivation of donation through solidarity rather than the use of financial incentives is consistent with contemporary and ancient versions of the self-sufficiency model. (shrink)

We consider the problems arising from using sequences of experiments to discover the causal structure among a set of variables, none of whom are known ahead of time to be an “outcome”. In particular, we present various approaches to resolve conflicts in the experimental results arising from sampling variability in the experiments. We provide a sufficient condition that allows for pooling of data from experiments with different joint distributions over the variables. Satisfaction of the condition allows for an independence test (...) with greater sample size that may resolve some of the conflicts in the experimental results. The pooling condition has its own problems, but should—due to its generality—be informative to techniques for meta-analysis. (shrink)

The traditional conception of human rights, or the orthodox conception (OC), has, over the last few years, been vigorously challenged by the political conception (PC) of human rights. I have two main aims in this paper: the first is to articulate and evaluate the main points of disagreement between the OC and the PC in order to provide a clearer picture of what is at stake in the debate. The second is to argue that the OC has the resources to (...) respond to the PC's most challenging criticism; namely that it is not sufficiently political. (shrink)

On relational structures and on polymodal logics, we describe operations which preserve local tabularity. This provides new sufficient semantic and axiomatic conditions for local tabularity of a modal logic. The main results are the following. We show that local tabularity does not depend on reflexivity. Namely, given a class $\mathcal {F}$ of frames, consider the class $\mathcal {F}^{\mathrm {r}}$ of frames, where the reflexive closure operation was applied to each relation in every frame in $\mathcal {F}$. We show that if (...) the logic of $\mathcal {F}^{\mathrm {r}}$ is locally tabular, then the logic of $\mathcal {F}$ is locally tabular as well. Then we consider the operation of sum on Kripke frames, where a family of frames-summands is indexed by elements of another frame. We show that if both the logic of indices and the logic of summands are locally tabular, then the logic of corresponding sums is also locally tabular. Finally, using the previous theorem, we describe an operation on logics that preserves local tabularity: we provide a set of formulas such that the extension of the fusion of two canonical locally tabular logics with these formulas is locally tabular. (shrink)

A Partial Combinatory Algebra is completable if it can be extended to a total one. In [1] it is asked (question 11, posed by D. Scott, H. Barendregt, and G. Mitschke) if every PCA can be completed. A negative answer to this question was given by Klop in [12, 11]; moreover he provided a sufficient condition for completability of a PCA (M, ·, K, S) in the form of ten axioms (inequalities) on terms of M. We prove that just one (...) of these axiom (the so called Barendregt's axiom) is sufficient to guarantee (a slightly weaker notion of) completability. (shrink)

In On What Matters Derek Parfit advocates the Kantian Contractualist Formula as one of three supreme moral principles. In important cases, this formula entails that it is wrong for an agent to act in a way that would be partially best. In contrast, Parfit’s wide value-based objective view of reasons entails that the agent often have sufficient reasons to perform such acts. It seems then that agents might have sufficient reasons to act wrongly. In this paper I will argue that (...) such reasons are a symptom of a fundamental inconsistency between the Kantian Contractualist Formula and Parfit’s view of reasons. The formula requires that we consider what everyone could rationally will, while a wide value-based objective view requires that we consider only what the agent has sufficient reasons for doing. The same inconsistency is particularly obvious in Parfit’s version of the Consent Principle, which share important features with the Kantian Contractualist Formula. Parfit accepts that moral principles might entail that we sometimes have sufficient reasons to act wrongly. However, to accept that supreme moral principles have such implications is objectionable if you, like Parfit, also hold that principles with such implications should be rejected or revised. I suggest that we could abandon the requirement that we have to consider the reasons of everyone. This would make the Kantian Contractualist Formula consistent with Parfit’s view of reasons, at least in this respect. I also argue that we can keep most implications of the Kantian Contractualist Formula that Parfit finds attractive. (shrink)

Ralph Walker; VI*—Sufficient Reason, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 97, Issue 1, 1 June 1997, Pages 109–124, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9264.

This little-known work by the famous German pessimist and critic of Hegel was originally written as a doctoral dissertation when Schopenhauer was just twenty-six, but it was later revised when the philosopher was sixty. So important did he consider this work, originally titled "On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," that he often underscored the fact that no one could hope to understand his magnum opus, The World as Will and Representation, without having first read this work. (...) Schopenhauer takes up where Kant left off in response to Hume, and his insights into the nature of perception and understanding remain amazingly relevant and still unsurpassed. Schopenhauer's analyses of causation and related concepts rival and probably surpass in their depth and brilliance the more celebrated discussions of David Hume. Where Hume grossly oversimplified these problems and left them riddled with paradoxes, Schopenhauer disentangled them and shed light on what had seemed hopelessly dark. (shrink)

My aim is to show that supervenience claims follow from instances of a principle I call the principle of defeasibly sufficient reason. This principle construes the completeness of physics quite differently from strong or reductive physicalism and encodes both scientific and common sense patterns of explanation and justification. Rather than thoroughly defending the principle in the short space of this paper, I will sketch how one might defend it and a resulting fainthearted physicalism.

This article analyses the concept of sufficiency in relation to sustainability and discusses ethical implications for sustainable organisation in time and place. We identify three foundational conceptualisations of sufficiency related to sustainability: (1) a limits model that starts with objective boundaries imposed by the biosphere and basic human needs; (2) a preference model that treats sufficiency as a subjective inclination for moderation defined situationally; and (3) a balancing model that seeks to integrate the objective limits and subjective (...) preferences by focussing on action embedded in the socio-ecological context. This includes balancing the needs of humans with those of non-humans. The limits model builds on universal duty, the preference model on preference utilitarianism and the balancing model on action-oriented virtue ethics. The balancing model of sufficiency is well suited to meeting the needs of present and future generations as well as delivering intra- and inter-generational justice not limited to humans. (shrink)

This paper outlines a conceptual framework for a sufficiency economy, defining sufficiency as the space between a generalizable notion of human wellbeing and ungeneralisable excess. It assumes an objective and universal concept of human needs to define a ‘floor’ and the concept of planetary boundaries to define a ‘ceiling’. This is set up as an alternative to the dominant preference satisfaction theory of value. It begins with a brief survey of the potential contributions of sufficientarianism and limitarianism to (...) this endeavor before outlining a theory of objective, universal human need. This recognizes the contextual variable nature of need satisfiers and the distinct methodology required to adjudicate necessities. It then turns to the planetary boundaries literature and utilizes a sequence of causal and normative reasoning to derive an operational ceiling and the concept of ungeneralisable luxuries. The final section addresses how the concepts of floors and ceilings might be operationalized via forms of dialogic democracy but noting the absence of any such institutions at the global level. Its policy conclusion is that a safe climate cannot be achieved through supply-side mitigation alone, and that fair demand-side mitigation necessarily requires a clear distinction between necessities and unnecessary luxuries, between which (hopefully) lies a space of sufficiency. (shrink)

This dissertation examines how we should respond to situations in which a person acts profoundly imprudently. We can, e.g., imagine the motorcyclist who prefers to drive without insurance and without a helmet. How should we, or the policy-makers, counter such imprudent activities performed by others? One option is that we do nothing, meaning that we do not interfere with other people’s imprudent behaviour, at the same time refraining from providing assistance in cases where the risk of the activities materialises. A (...) second option is to provide unconditional assistance to the person in need by taxing everyone. A third option is that we regulate the risky activity prior to the accident (e.g. by forcing the person to take out insurance, imposing security measures, or perhaps banning the activity in question). No matter what we choose, our choice seems to compromise at least one of the following moral considerations: i) satisfying sufficiency, ii) avoiding paternalism, or iii) internalising the costs associated with the risky activities (so that the persons performing the activities carry the relevant costs). For the same reason, it has been pointed out that together the three considerations constitute a trilemma, the so-called ‘imprudence trilemma.’ The dissertation argues that we should accept paternalism when people act so imprudently that they risk suffering serious, absolute deprivation as a result (i.e. in cases of relevance to the trilemma). That is not to say that we should always interfere when a person acts profoundly imprudently. The paternalistic view defended is that it is a good and relevant (but not necessarily decisive) reason in favour of interfering with a person’s voluntary choices that such interference will promote the person’s interests or well-being. Pace the anti-paternalistic view, I argue that such reasons should be included in the assessment of policies and actions that interfere with people’ liberty or autonomy. (shrink)

A common objection to sufficientarianism is that it allows large inequalities above the threshold. A sharpened form of this objection highlights that this indifference also encompasses large inequalities in the distribution of burdens. Consider the burdens that follow from climate change. A theory that does not rule out placing these burdens on the worst off (of the sufficiently well off) will appear implausible to many. This paper assesses ways of addressing this objection and defends a revised conception of sufficientarianism that (...) can demand fair distribution of burdens (and benefits) above the sufficiency threshold, without giving up core sufficientarian theoretical commitments. (shrink)

This essay examines the management of ventilatory failure in disaster settings where clinical needs overwhelm available resources. An ethically defensible approach in such settings will adopt a “sufficiency of care” perspective that is: (1) adaptive, (2) resource-driven, and (3) responsive to the values of populations being served. Detailed, generic, antecedently written guidelines for “ventilator triage” or other management issues typically are of limited value, and may even impede ethical disaster response if they result in rescuers’ clumsily interpreting events through (...) the lens of the guideline, rather than customizing tactics to the actual context. Especially concerning is the tendency of some expert planners to mistakenly assume that medical treatment of respiratory failure: (1) always requires full-feature mechanical ventilators, (2) will always occur in hospitals, and (3) can be planned in advance without sophisticated public consultation about likely ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

I give an argument for a version of the principle of sufficient reason from several plausible principles about negative facts and necessary conditions. I then give an argument for a slightly weaker version of the principle without the reference to negative facts.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discussing various forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes, from Parmenides, Leibnez, and Hume, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and (...) Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, including meta-ethics and the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

A libertarian theory of justice holds that persons are self-owners and have the Hohfeldian moral power to justly acquire property rights in initially unowned external resources. Different variants of libertarianism can be distinguished according to their stance on the famous Lockean proviso. The proviso requires, in Locke’s words, to leave ‘enough and as good’ for others, and thus specifies limits on the acquisition of property. Left-libertarians accept an egalitarian interpretation of the proviso, ‘right-libertarians’ either reject any kind of proviso or (...) accept rather weak versions of it. In be-tween there is room for moderate interpretations of the proviso, and in particular for a sufficientarian interpretation: a ‘sufficiency proviso.’ The resulting theory of justice can be called ‘moderate libertarianism.’ In this article I make a case for moderate libertarianism, so understood. I argue that moderate libertarianism has advantages over both left- and right-libertarianism because it better coheres with the most plausible rationale for endorsing a libertarian theory of justice in the first place. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen conceptualizes socialism as luck egalitarianism constrained by a community principle. The latter mitigates certain inequalities to achieve a shared common life. This article explores the plausibility of the community constraint on inequality in light of two related problems. First, if it is voluntary, it fails as a response to “the abandonment objection” to luck egalitarianism, as it would not guarantee imprudent people sufficient resources to avoid deprivation and to function as equal citizens in a democratic society. Contra (...) Cohenite socialism, this appears unjust. Second, if it is instead enforced, coercive equalization beyond sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism, which is possibly necessary to achieve a shared common life, seems to require unjustified restrictions on liberty. I therefore argue that the constraint is most plausibly specified as requiring enforcement of sufficiency and only voluntary equalization thereafter. I also note, skeptically, why this constraint might be morally preferable to a purely sufficientarian alternative. (shrink)

The notion of sufficiency has recently gained some momentum in separate discourses on distributive justice (‘sufficientarianism') and the environment (‘eco-sufficiency'). An investigation of their relationship is warranted, as their scope overlaps in areas such as environmental justice and socio-economic policy. This paper argues that the two understandings of sufficiency are incompatible, because eco-sufficiency has adopted an extremely perfectionist view of the good life while sufficientarianism is committed to pluralism. A plausible explanation for this incompatibility relates to (...) the two different meanings of the term sufficiency as a limit (eco-sufficiency) and as a minimum requirement (sufficientarianism). (shrink)

Neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC) are foundational to the scientific study of consciousness. Chalmers (2000) has provided the most informative and influential definition of NCC, according to which neural correlates are minimally sufficient for consciousness. However, the sense of sufficiency needs further clarification since there are several relevant senses with different entailments. In section one of this article, we give an overview of the desiderata for a good definition of NCC and Chalmers’s definition. The second section analyses (...) the merit of understanding the sufficiency of neural correlates for corresponding consciousness according to three relevant types of sufficiency: logical, metaphysical, and physical. In section three, a theoretical approach to consciousness studies is suggested in light of the sense in which NCC are sufficient for consciousness. Section four addresses a concern some might have about this approach. By the end, it will become apparent that our conception of NCC has important implications for research methodology, neuroethics, and the vitality of the search for NCC. (shrink)

In this paper I address the objection to sufficientarianism posed by Paula Casal and Richard Arneson, that it is hard to conceive of a sufficiency threshold such that distribution is highly important just below it, and not required at all just above it. In order to address this objection, I elaborate on the idea that sufficientarianism structurally can be seen to require two separate thresholds, which may or may not overlap. I then argue that a version of such a (...) view is plausible. Lastly, I distinguish this view from related proposals in the literature. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 8, Page 36-38, August 2012.

Douglas Diekema influentially argues that interference with parental decisions is not in fact guided by the child’s best interests, but rather by a more permissive standard, which he calls the harm principle. This article first seeks to clarify this alternative position and defend it against certain existing criticisms, before offering a new criticism and alternative. This ‘harm principle’ has been criticized for (i) lack of adequate moral grounding, and (ii) being as indeterminate as the best interest standard that it seeks (...) to replace. I argue that these are not serious problems. I take Diekema’s negative point to be right—our actual standard for intervention is not literally the best interests of the child—but I disagree with his proposed replacement. First, Diekema’s proposed harm threshold should be more carefully distinguished from Mill’s harm principle. Second, there is no reason to assume that the standard for permissible intervention coincides with the threshold for harm (or serious harm). Thus, I propose that the best alternative to the best interests standard is not a harm principle, but rather a sufficiency threshold between adequate (or ‘good enough’) and inadequate (or ‘substandard’) parenting. (shrink)

Past appraisal studies have shown that single appraisals are neither sufficient nor necessary for emotions but no study has examined the same issue with appraisal configurations (combinations of different single appraisals). Undergraduate participants repeatedly indicated their negative emotions (anger, sadness, fear, and guilt) and relevant appraisals as they occurred, or immediately after, in their everyday environments. The results not only replicated past findings on single appraisals but also suggested that appraisal configurations are neither sufficient nor necessary for these negative emotions.

Leibniz' Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes soll hier aufgrund von Russells Begriff des ‛logischen Eigennamens’ untersucht werden. Aus dieser Sicht kann vor der Schöpfung Gottes Begriff von Individuen keine individuelle Diesheit haben, sondern nur eine vollständige Beschreibung der noch nicht existierenden Individuen. Daraus ergibt sich, daß ein und dasselbe Individuum nicht durch mehr als eine Weltbeschreibung identifiziert werden kann, und darin darf man folglich Leibniz' tatsächlichen Beweis für die These des ‛Superessentialismus’ sehen, demzufolge alle Individuen ihre gesamten Eigenschaften mit Ausnahme der (...) Existenz wesenhaft besitzen. Im weiteren wird der Begriff einer Art möglicher Welten, die wir ‛parasitisch’ nennen wollen, erforscht. Dieser Begriff wird Leibniz' theoretischen Voraussetzungen gerecht, ohne zu seinen wenig überzeugenden Schlüssen zu führen. (shrink)

Pearl opened the door to formally defining actual causation using causal models. His approach rests on two strategies: first, capturing the widespread intuition that X = x causes Y = y iff X = x is a Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set for Y = y, and second, showing that his definition gives intuitive answers on a wide set of problem cases. This inspired dozens of variations of his definition of actual causation, the most prominent of which are due (...) to Halpern & Pearl. Yet all of them ignore Pearl’s first strategy, and the second strategy taken by itself is unable to deliver a consensus. This paper offers a way out by going back to the first strategy: it offers six formal definitions of causal sufficiency and two interpretations of necessity. Combining the two gives twelve new definitions of actual causation. Several interesting results about these definitions and their relation to the various Halpern & Pearl definitions are presented. Afterwards the second strategy is evaluated as well. In order to maximize neutrality, the paper relies mostly on the examples and intuitions of Halpern & Pearl. One definition comes out as being superior to all others, and is therefore suggested as a new definition of actual causation. (shrink)

The idea of contentment or sufficiency is an important theme throughout the Laozi 老子, and Western readings of this text have especially emphasized an understanding of contentment in terms of satisfaction with an existence free of excessive material possessions. Building on recent scholarship that suggests a close connection between the kind of early breath cultivation described in the “Neiye 內業” chapter of the Guanzi 管子 and the form and content of the Laozi, this article explores how the concept of (...) contentment or sufficiency is treated in both texts as an embodied phenomenon, often manifesting as a balance of psycho-physical energies. It argues that reading the Laozi on contentment in this light yields a more complete picture of how this concept functions there, concluding that this reading will be more helpful in thinking about wider ethical issues of materialism and acquisitiveness. (shrink)

According to the sufficiency theory of justice in health, justice requires that people have equal access to adequate health. In this article, I lay out the structure of this view and I assess its distributive implications for setting priority (i) between health needs across persons and (ii) between health care spending and other societal goods. I argue, first, that according to the sufficiency theory, deficiency in health cannot be completely offset by providing other societal goods. And, second, that (...) it can prevent the medicalization of societies by stressing that improvements beyond the level of adequate health have relatively little weight, if any, from the standpoint of justice. (shrink)

In the standard analysis of economic institutions--which include social conventions, the working rules of an economy, and entitlement regimes --economists invoke the same theories they use when analyzing individual behavior. In this profoundly innovative book, Daniel Bromley challenges these theories, arguing instead for "volitional pragmatism" as a plausible way of thinking about the evolution of economic institutions. Economies are always in the process of becoming. Here is a theory of how they become. Bromley argues that standard economic accounts see institutions (...) as mere constraints on otherwise autonomous individual action. Some approaches to institutional economics--particularly the "new" institutional economics--suggest that economic institutions emerge spontaneously from the voluntary interaction of economic agents as they go about pursuing their best advantage. He suggests that this approach misses the central fact that economic institutions are the explicit and intended result of authoritative agents--legislators, judges, administrative officers, heads of states, village leaders--who volitionally decide upon working rules and entitlement regimes whose very purpose is to induce behaviors that constitute the sufficient reasons for the institutional arrangements they create. Bromley's approach avoids the prescriptive consequentialism of contemporary economics and asks, instead, that we see these emergent and evolving institutions as the reasons for the individual and aggregate behavior their very adoption anticipates. These hoped-for outcomes comprise sufficient reasons for new laws, judicial decrees, and administrative rulings, which then become instrumental to the realization of desired individual behaviors and thus aggregate outcomes. (shrink)

The idea of using responsibility in the allocation of healthcare resources has been criticized for, among other things, too readily abandoning people who are responsible for being very badly off. One response to this problem is that while responsibility can play a role in resource allocation, it cannot do so if it will leave those who are responsible below a “sufficiency” threshold. This paper considers first whether a view can be both distinctively sufficientarian and allow responsibility to play a (...) role even for those who will be left with very poor health. It then draws several further distinctions that may affect the application of responsibility at this level. We conclude that a more plausible version of the sufficientarian view is to allow a role for responsibility where failure to do so will leave someone else who is not responsible below the sufficiency threshold. However, we suggest that individuals must exhibit “sufficient responsibility” in order for this to apply, involving both a sufficient level of control and an avoidable failure to respond adequately to reasons for action. (shrink)

What, if anything, do we owe others as a basic minimum? Sufficiency theorists claim that we must provide everyone with enough – but, to date, few well-worked-out accounts of the sufficiency threshold exist, so it is difficult to evaluate this proposition. Previous theories do not provide plausible, independent accounts of resources, capabilities, or welfare that might play the requisite role. Moreover, I believe existing accounts do not provide nearly enough guidance for policymakers. So, this article sketches a mechanism (...) for arriving at an account of the minimally good life that can help locate the sufficiency threshold. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. (...) If my defense is successful, it would cast doubt on an influential account of the epistemic value of understanding. (shrink)

What role do demand deposits serve in the financial system? The answer to this simple question has great implications in keeping the legal terms of the contract consistent with the demands of the financial system. Demand deposits are a perfect monetary substitute. Since money is only held to hedge against perceived uncertainty in both the timing and magnitude of future expenditures, demand deposits are demanded for the same reason. From this we derive three main conclusions. First, a financial contract similar (...) to a demand deposit cannot substitute for money. Second, full agreement to a financial contract does not create a perfect substitute for money unless it provides money’s two key characteristics: on demand and par value redemption. Finally, the demand for fractional-reserve demand deposits is fostered by an exogenous source and that demand for a good or service is not a sufficient condition to justify its legality or ethicality. (shrink)

In his ‘Review of Belief’s Own Ethics,’ Ars Disputandi 3 , Igor Douven argued that ‘P, but I lack sufficient evidence for p’ is heard as odd not for conceptual reasons, but for pragmatic reasons. We hear this sentence as odd, because we are not regularly exposed to it. In this reply, the author argues that the assertion ‘P, but I lack sufficient evidence for p’ sounds contradictory, because the two parts of the assertion refuse combination on conceptual grounds. We (...) are not regularly exposed to such assertions, because people normally find that a speaker can only be taken to assert p, if she beliefs that p. And people normally find that if one believes that p, then this is because, by one’s own lights, one has sufficient evidence for p. One may not be fully aware of this evidence. But it would certainly be contradictory to believe sincerely that p, while also believing that one lacks sufficient evidence for p. (shrink)

This article identifies value‐satiability sufficientarianism as a distinctive version of the sufficiency view, which has been ignored in the literature on distributive justice. This is unfortunate because value‐satiability sufficientarianism is much better equipped than alternative sufficiency views to cope with the standard objections against sufficiency. Most often, sufficientarianism refers to satiability as a feature of moral principles and reasons. But value‐satiability sufficientarianism also invokes satiability in the space of value‐theory, as it determines the sufficiency threshold at (...) the point where justice‐relevant values have been completely fulfilled. The article gives examples of how this view is widely apparent in the literature, and it provides some reasons in its favour. It then presents the two standard objections against sufficientarianism – the threshold objection and the indifference objection – and argues that these critiques do not apply to value‐satiability sufficientarianism. The general argument of the article therefore proves sufficientarianism more difficult to refute than is commonly credited. (shrink)

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (henceforth ‘PSR’), everything has an explanation or sufficient reason. This paper addresses three questions. First, how continuous is the contemporary notion of grounding with the notion of sufficient reason endorsed by Spinoza, Leibniz, and other rationalists? In particular, does a PSR formulated in terms of ground retain the intuitive pull and power of the PSR endorsed by the rationalists? Second, to what extent can the PSR avoid the formidable traditional objections levelled against it (...) if it is formulated in terms of ground? And finally, how might historical discussion of the PSR shed light on the contemporary notion of grounding? (shrink)

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal (...) closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism. (shrink)

Purpose Much prior literature has discussed bioethics from a Confucian perspective in biomedical research, but little has applied Confucianism in examining ethics in social and behavioral research involving human subjects. This paper aims to reexamine the Belmont principles in social and behavioral research from a Confucian perspective to discuss their applicability and limitations and propose implications for revising or extending them potentially in the future. Design/methodology/approach A comparison is conducted on bioethics and social and behavioral research ethics. Afterward, a critical (...) analysis is conducted on the Belmont principles of respect for persons, beneficence and justice from a Confucian perspective regarding their application in social and behavioral research. Findings From a Confucian perspective, the Belmont principles are necessary but may not be sufficient to cover the width and depth of ethical issues in social and behavioral research, such as those in crowd work-based research. This paper proposes that ethical guidelines for social and behavioral research may need to be updated from the Belmont principles adopting or incorporating certain Confucian ethics. Originality/value Social and behavioral research ethics have been relatively marginal compared to the bioethics deliberation in the existing literature. Unlike Beauchamp and Childress’s continued efforts in refining ethical guidelines for biomedical research specifically, little similar work has been done in this area since the Belmont report’s publication in 1979. This paper sheds light on building more refined and specific ethical guidelines to navigate the ever-growing numbers and diversities of nonmedical research topics, methodologies and contexts. (shrink)

Sufficient conditions for first-order-based sequent calculi to admit cut elimination by a Schütte–Tait style cut elimination proof are established. The worst case complexity of the cut elimination is analysed. The obtained upper bound is parameterized by a quantity related to the calculus. The conditions are general enough to be satisfied by a wide class of sequent calculi encompassing, among others, some sequent calculi presentations for the first order and the propositional versions of classical and intuitionistic logic, classical and intuitionistic modal (...) logic S4, and classical and intuitionistic linear logic and some of its fragments. Moreover the conditions are such that there is an algorithm for checking if they are satisfied by a sequent calculus. (shrink)

Telic sufficientarianism is the view that it is better, other things equal, if people are lifted above some sufficiency threshold of special moral importance. In a recent contribution, Shlomi Segall has raised the following objection to this position: The telic ideal of sufficiency can neither be grounded on any personal value, nor any impersonal value. Consequently, sufficientarianism is groundless. This article contains a rejoinder to this critique. Its main claim is that the value of autonomy holds strong potential (...) for grounding sufficiency. It argues, firstly, that autonomy carries both personal value for its recipient as well as impersonal value, and that both of these values are suitable for grounding sufficiency. It thus follows that we should reject both and. Secondly, although autonomy is presumably the strongest candidate for grounding sufficiency, the article provides some counterargument to Segall's rejection of the other candidates — the impersonal value of virtue; the personal value for the allocator; and the personal value for others. If the arguments are sound, they show that we need not worry about sufficientarianism being groundless. (shrink)

Green's target article is an attack on most current connectionist models of cognition. Our commentary will suggest that there is an essential component missing in his discussion of modeling, namely, the idea that the appropriate level of the model needs to be specified. We will further suggest that the precise form of connectionist networks will fall out as ever more detailed constraints are placed on their function.