Although it might seem to elicit only a marginal interest for philosophical inquiry, in 20th century continental philosophy the experience of solitude and loneliness were shown to have unexpected importance and gravity. For philosophers such as M. Heidegger, H. Arendt, H.-G. Gadamer or P. Sloterdijk, solitude and loneliness are to be seen, on the one hand, as an ontological determination of our Being and, on the other, as a cause for some of the most worrisome problems of our (...) times such, as the birth of totalitarianism or the phenomenon of self-alienation wide-spread in the Western bureaucratic societies. But none of the philosophers dealing with these matters offers us a clear positive understanding of what solitude and loneliness actually are nor what the task of philosophy should be with regard to these experiences even though they give us to understand that philosophy has one. The present paper tarries upon this question, approaching it from the other end though an investigation of the status of alterity in Heidegger and Gadamer’s philosophy. (shrink)

Historically, philosophers, artists, and spiritual leaders have extolled the benefits of solitude; currently, advice on how to achieve solitude is the subject of many popular books and articles. Seldom, however, has solitude been studied by psychologists, who have focused instead on the negative experiences associated with being alone, particularly loneliness. Solitude, in contrast to loneliness, is often a positive state—one that may be sought rather than avoided. In this article, we examine some of the benefits that (...) have been attributed to solitude—namely, freedom, creativity, intimacy, and spirituality. In subsequent sections, we consider the environmental settings and personality characteristics conducive to solitude, how time spent alone is experienced differently across the life span, and the potential dangers related to the attractiveness of solitude. We conclude with a brief discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of solitude. (shrink)

Recent research has defended the surprising thesis that in many cases the search for truth is better off if the information exchanged between the members of an epistemic community is limited. This is what one may call the limited information thesis. There is, however, the possibility of an even more radical position than this: the thesis that any communication between peers has zero epistemic value and that the search for truth is better off if the truth-inquirer does not take into (...) consideration the truth-claims of her peers. This can be called the solitude thesis. The paper defends the claim that Descartes is a supporter of the solitude thesis with respect to metaphysical inquiry. The defense is facilitated by means of interpreting textual evidence found in Descartes’ essays Discourse on the Method, The Search for Truth and the Meditations on First Philosophy. (shrink)

What makes solitude a positive experience? What distinguishes experiences of solitude from experiences of loneliness? We review some of the literature on the benefits of solitude, focusing on freedom, creativity, and spirituality. Then, we argue that the relationship between agent and environment is an important factor in determining the quality of experiences of solitude. In particular, we find that solitude may support a person’s sense of agency, expanding the possibilities for action that a person has, (...) and creating the conditions for authenticity. We describe a phenomenology of solitude, based on a study that explores the nature of experiences of loneliness and solitude in a religious community. One finding is that solitude is characterised by presence, whereas loneliness is characterised by absence. Another finding is that solitude can contribute to a sense of empowerment that enables agents to pursue and achieve the goals they find valuable. (shrink)

This chapter explores a so-far neglected way of avoiding the bads of loneliness: by learning to value solitude, where that is understood as a state of ‘keeping oneself company’, as J. David Velleman puts it. Unlike loneliness, solitude need not involve any deprivation, whether subjective or objective. This chapter considers the various goods to which solitude is constitutive or instrumental, with a focus on the promise that proper valuing of solitude holds for combating loneliness. The overall (...) argument is this: If loneliness significantly detracts from individual wellbeing, and if the ability to value solitude protects against loneliness, then such an ability is obviously valuable to human flourishing. If, further, loneliness raises concerns of justice, then supporting people’s ability to value solitude is a way to implement a desideratum of justice. Individuals can cultivate their ability to value solitude, an ability that others can promote or hinder. (shrink)

The following reflections are intended as a preliminary to a more extended and in-depth series of case studies, focused analyses of actual artworks, and the issues arising from their particularity within what will be described here as a Heideggerian post-aesthetic aesthetics. The essay is not written from the perspective of a professional or academic philosopher or of a practising artist (even though I am one), neither fields of which have sufficiently engaged with the existential and aesthetic predicament sketched out below. (...) Thus, the attraction of both Heidegger and Blanchot is not just related to their well-known discussions of inbetween-ness, but, more essentially, to the peculiarly in-between location of their own thought and trajectory of thinking: Heidegger from "out of" philosophy "drawn" towards art; Blanchot from within the space ofliterature towards the exteriority of ontological thinking. The intention is to identify similarities and differences in their thought, but this is only perceived as relevant to the extent that it allows an initial reassessment of a de-subjectivized existential and aesthetic mode of thinking that has been largely abandoned by academic philosophy and art practice alike (albeit for very different reasons). If nothing else, the hope is that a different voice might be heard in the clamorous exchange between philosopher and artists, one that is sensitive to the complex predicament of the artist in a post-Heidegerrian world, and which above all remains faithful to the project of the artist and the artwork in the face of the philosophical valorization of "Art". Las siguientes reflexiones se presentan como preliminares a una serie de estudios de caso mas extensos y profundos, analisis focalizados de obras de artes reales, y los temas que surgen de sus particularidades dentro de lo que se describira aqui como una estetica heideggeriana post-estetica. El ensayo no esta escrito desde la perspectiva de un filosofo profesional o academico ni de un artista operante (aunque yo lo soy), ninguno de cuyos campos se ha comprometido suficientemente con el dilema bosquejado mas adelante. Asi pues, la atraccion de Heidegger y Blanchot no solo tiene que ver con sus bien conocidas discusiones sobre la inbetween-ness, sino, mas esencialmente, con la ubicacion particularmente in-between de su propio pensamiento y trayectoria del pensar: Heidegger desde "fuera de" la filosofia "sacado" hacia el arte; Blanchot desde dentro del espacio de la literatura hacia la exterioridad del pensar ontologico. La intencion es identificar similitudes y diferencias en su pensamiento, pero esto solo es percibido como relevante en la medida en que permite una reevaluacion de un modo de pensar existencial y estetico des-subjetivado, que ha sido ampliamente abando-nado por la filosofia academica y la practica del arte (aunque por razones distintas). Sin mas pretensiones, la esperanza es que se pueda escuchar una voz diferente en el intercambio clamoroso entre el filosofo y los artistas; voz que es sensible al complejo dilema del artista en un mundo post-heideggeriano, y que sobre todo permanece fiel al proyecto del artista y a la obra de arte frente a la valorizacion filosofica del "Arte". (shrink)

Christian solitude -- Bounded solitude in Augustine's Confessions -- The humanist tradition : Petrarch, Montaigne, and Gibbon -- Rousseau's myth of solitude in reveries of the solitary walker -- Thoreau at Walden : soliloquizing and talking to all the universe at the same time -- Twentieth-century varieties of solitary experience -- Thomas Merton and solitude : the door to solitude opens only from the inside -- Solitude, writing, and fathers in Paul Auster's The invention (...) of solitude -- Conclusion: The value of solitude. (shrink)

Pétrarque a goûté la solitude et l’a prônée. L’a-t-il pour autant pensée comme telle et pour elle-même? Il sera permis d’en douter car elle n’est point la fin qu’il se fixe, condition qu’elle est pour lui de la vie solitaire, elle-même condition de la vie heureuse. Nous travaillerons alors à montrer de quelle solitude il est question quand la question de la vie solitaire est abordée par l’auteur, cela puisqu’il en est assurément de multiples. L’exercice littéraire d’une apologie (...) de la vie solitaire devant céder le pas à une analyse philosophique de la solitude, restera à savoir comment la définir : absence à soi-même ou excès de soi en soi? (shrink)

From the twentieth century into the twenty-first, psychoanalysis and deconstruction have challenged, and continue to challenge, our conceptions of subjectivity and selfhood. This book argues that taking forward this heritage we must retrace the subject and the self as undergoing perpetual auto-deconstruction, through the lens of solitude.

Certain strands of modern literature and philosophy have laid pronounced emphasis upon the impossibility of sharing the experience of dying: in the face of death, all social bonds dissolve and the human being finds himself in the deepest and most inescapable of solitudes. Greek myth, however, depicts stories in which death is physically shared by two individuals, or magically transferred from one individual to another: such stories provide a fascinating starting point for comparing ancient and modern views on the same (...) problem, or, rather, for exploring ancient perspectives on a modern problem. This article takes as its premise the idea that ‘death’ as an abstract notion is a human construct, and argues that feelings and questions associated with death, such as that of its inexorable power to isolate the dying person psychologically from the rest of mankind, are not intrinsic to the phenomenon, but instead determined by culture. (shrink)

Five philosophical meditations on the conflict between personality and society.

Dans cet article, nous relions la solitude à la souffrance chez Kierkegaard. Nous montrons que la pensée existentielle est un travail de distance, précisément un jeu de dissimulation dont la signification réside dans la capacité à sauvegarder le silence. Le secret de intériorité est intraduisible dans l’extériorité du langage, ce qui isole et fait souffrir, mais ouvre le passage vers le religieux. Dieu seul peut voir les efforts de l’existant dissimulant dialectiquement sa souffrance dans la différence entre l’infini et (...) le fini. Pour illustrer cette thèse, nous approfondissons les cas où Kierkegaard présente la souffrance en recourant à des figures d’exception — des marqueurs de solitude — comme Abraham, Job et le quidam. Nous relisons l’« Histoire de la souffrance » des Stades et le Post-scriptum pour mieux saisir les liens entre la souffrance et la solitude — une idée qui se trouve justifiée dans le Point de vue explicatif — de celui qui se veut, finalement, seul devant Dieu. (shrink)

Pas d'expérience plus immédiate ni plus évidente que celle d'être un moi, mais rien de plus énigmatique que sa réalité. Jamais son intensité et son inconsistance ne sont aussi manifestes que dans la solitude. C'est elle que ne cessent de décrire les journaux intimes de Maine de Biran, d'Amiel, de Kafka et de Pessoa. Il suffisait à l'analyse de prendre appui sur leur témoignage pour élucider les divers statuts du moi et caractériser la crise de son identité. Quel hiatus (...) entre ce que chacun sent de soi et ce qu'en imaginent les autres! Son obstination à explorer ce hiatus fait aussi de Simenon le romancier des solitudes. Nulle part aussi pathétiquement qu'en son œuvre ne s'opposent la clandestinité de l'ego et les jeux de la représentation. (shrink)

As interest in aesthetic experience evolved in the eighteenth century, discussions of the sublime located two opposed accounts of its place and use. Ferguson traces these two positions - the Burkean empiricist account and the Kantian formalist one - to argue that they had significance of aesthetics, including recent deconstructive and New Historicist criticism.

In so far as the Tao Te Ching and the Chuang Tzu are life-philosophies, they are philosophies of solitude. My aim in the following pages is to explain and defend this claim, clarifying the distinctive kind of solitude that is taught by Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu.

Adrian Paul Iliescu, Solitude and the Birth of Modernity Ed. Cris, Bucuresti, 1999, 120 p.

In this article, I consider two interpretations of Spinoza's account of the good life in recent literature, which I call the social activist model and the solitary intellectualist model, in order to shed light on his underexamined views on solitude within this context. The former model has gained more support than the latter due to Spinoza's criticism of the solitary life and the importance he ascribes to friendship and living cooperatively with others within his corpus. While I recognize its (...) strengths, I am skeptical as to whether the social activist model appreciates the complexity of Spinoza's account of the good life in the Ethics. For even though Spinoza clearly values friendship, he has a largely pessimistic view of those he calls ordinary people, which bears on the possibility of friendship between the philosopher and ordinary people. Furthermore, intuitive knowledge is unlike reason in that it concerns an asocial and intellectual insight beyond an identification with humanity and imaginative dimensions of ordinary life. It is, thus, conducive to what psychologists James Averill and Louise Sundararajan have called authentic solitude to the extent that it brings about a metaphysical awareness of our ontological status as finite modes of God. Although neither of the aforementioned models offers an entirely accurate representation of Spinoza's understanding of freedom in the Ethics, considering them enables us simultaneously to appreciate the complexity of Spinoza's thought and recognize a problematic tension within it. This tension is due to the gap between, on the one hand, his pessimistic view of ordinary people and his intellectualist portrayal of the philosopher who becomes disconnected from ordinary people as she increases her knowledge of the eternal, and his insistence on the shareability of knowledge and the importance he ascribes to the task of bringing ordinary people to enlightenment, on the other. (shrink)

This fictionalized script traces the contours of the conversation that seeks to fathom the crisis unleashed by the outbreak and global spread of the coronavirus and the ensuing anxieties created in our current social living. The scenario of deepened isolation of the self from the other is considered, and it is proposed that isolation, while an unavoidable requirement, does not mean it is some mental lassitude but rather may be seen as an enthusiastic concern toward recovering physical and mental wellbeing (...) of the larger communities concerned to control the possible avenues of transmission of the contagion. The conversation meanders around the issue of quarantine, its attraction or otherwise, and who benefits from this restriction, its effects on one’s mental constitution, etc. Philosophers have been known to isolate themselves in other contexts and situations give us a taste of what is to come in the dialogue to resist the calamity of the coronavirus and its grim effects that engulf the entire humanity. (shrink)

L’article offre une discussion de l’affirmation qui ouvrait en 1977 les Fragments d’un discours amoureux de Roland Barthes, selon laquelle le discours amoureux se trouvait dans une condition d’extrême solitude. Afin de comprendre cette affirmation, on commence par un aperçu des caractéristiques du discours amoureux, pour montrer en quelle mesure son incohérence et sa fragmentation lui sont constitutives. Ensuite, on analyse le projet barthésien de restituer une dignité à ce discours et à l’expérience qu’il véhicule — de le soustraire (...) à sa solitude. Pour conclure, on montre pourquoi certaines attaques moralisatrices contemporaines contre l’instabilité de l’expérience amoureuse actuelle, au lieu d’offrir un espace d’écoute au discours amoureux, finissent souvent par le réduire encore au silence. (shrink)

This paper explores the contextual value of solitude in learning; in so doing, it attempts to suggest an alternative method of instruction that is based on aesthetics as the reciprocal relationship between emotions and intellect, and between action and contemplation. Such an aesthetic education or method seeks to guide the student towards the attainment of her own life: to perfect, as much as possible, her human qualities in what she does by paying attention to the things of Beauty. The (...) method that the essay uses is both historical and interdisciplinary: it draws from theology, philosophy, the sciences and visual art; and, it is guided by an explanatory perspective that is constructive. (shrink)

This article aims to examine Pierre Charron’s conception of solitude, a task which is complicated by the fact that this conception underwent several changes between the two editions of De la sagesse. Unlike the 1601 edition, the 1604 edition includes passages on the importance of the social dimension of the good life, which may look like an exhortation to actively participate in social life in order to acquire civil prudence. In order to clarify the Charronian position on this issue, (...) I undertake a comparative analysis of the two editions of De la Sagesse, as well as an enquiry into the letters sent to a Doctor of the Sorbonne and to Gabriel Michel de La Rochemaillet, in which Charron deepens his reflections on solitude. I will show that Charron describes solitude not only as a physical separation from a civil context, but also as an emotional autonomy which can be reached everywhere. Charron’s perspective on solitude is also the result of his reading of previous philosophers, such as Seneca, Aristotle and Michel de Montaigne, as well as an analysis of Renaissance discussions of the active and contemplative lives. (shrink)

In Machiavelli’s Prince there appears to be a link between Chap.IX on the civil principality and the hope for a unification of Italy by a new prince – a theme presented in the final Exhortation. In both sections, Machiavelli’s unusual lack of historical illustrations suggests the hypothesis that the civil principality and the new prince play a symbolic function. The reading here proposed argues that there is an ideal relation between Machiavelli’s Prince and the Discourses on Livy regarding the opportunity (...) of a regime change from popular principality to Republic. The possibility to switch from one form of government to the other is due to Machiavelli’s idealizations of the civil principality and the new prince. Accordingly, it is argued that Machiavelli’s method follows a strategy of mythologizing realism. In the civil principality the tension between the new prince and his people is not resolved, nor that between the plebs and the nobles. The paper concludes that Machiavelli emphasis on ‘the solitude’ of the prince is what ultimately justifies a transition from the civil principality to the Republic. (shrink)

Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s opponents. (...) We outline one such non-Dualist view, suggest how to resolve the dispute, respond to some objections, and argue that ours is but one of many views that survive Unger’s challenge. All these views are incompatible with microphysicalism. So Unger’s discussion does contain an insight: if you are the only conscious subject in your chair, then microphsyicalism is false. Unger’s mistake was to infer Substance Dualism from this; for microphysicalism is not the only alternative to Dualism. (shrink)

Si la solitude est peut-être d’abord l’expérience d’une scission fondamentale, venant rompre l’apparente indistinction primitive du moi, il y a aussi une aspiration à la solitude absolue, qui vise l’unité par-delà la dualité, qui cherche à dépasser la séparation du soi avec soi, à retrouver l’identité hégélienne du Je=Je, dont l’expression la plus haute est l’Un de la première hypothèse du Parménide de Platon. Unité du moi dans la contemplation de la nature, révélation de l’absolu en soi dans (...) la foi, voire dans l’extase mystique, dithyrambe dionysiaque dans le consentement à l’éternel retour du même, impersonnalité du Je dans la création de l’œuvre : que nous apprennent ces figures essentielles de la solitude? (shrink)

In this paper, the “secret” that the Other always retain for us and the unescapable loneliness of every existence are approached in the double light projected on them by philosophy and literature, and for the latter more particularly Proust and Rilke. The author’s claim is that philosophy, and especially phenomenology with a cartesian background, has misunderstood the meaning of both phenomena – secret and loneliness – by interpreting the first one as absolute transendance, and the second one as egological closeness. (...) Of greater interest is the writers’ testimony that would lead us to a completely different phenomenology of the Other. (shrink)

A philosophical anthropology of solitude is presented through the art, literature and music of and around Modernism, Postmodernism. It is presented as an insight into both Modernism and Postmodernism. These movements portrayed and contributed to the lonely alienated worlds of the early-to-mid twentieth century. Culture and society together developed forms of loneliness that were centred on individualist, alienated, guilt and shame, to which a response may be appropriately silent or humorous, living or dead, and sometimes a lewd masochism. Even (...) those who rejected Modernism and Postmodernism help describe – either positively or apophatically – the distinctive forms of lonely solitude in those movements. (shrink)

_In a time of social distancing and isolation, a meditation on the beauty of solitude from renowned Buddhist writer Stephen Batchelor__ A _Los Angeles Review of Books_ “Best of the Year” selection__ “Whatever a soul is, the author goes a long way toward soothing it. A very welcome instance of philosophy that can help readers live a good life.”—___Kirkus Reviews___ “Elegant and formally ingenious.”—Geoff Wisner, _Wall Street Journal__ When world renowned Buddhist writer Stephen Batchelor turned sixty, he took a (...) sabbatical from his teaching and turned his attention to solitude, a practice integral to the meditative traditions he has long studied and taught. He aimed to venture more deeply into solitude, discovering its full extent and depth. This beautiful literary collage documents his multifaceted explorations. Spending time in remote places, appreciating and making art, practicing meditation and participating in retreats, drinking peyote and ayahuasca, and training himself to keep an open, questioning mind have all contributed to Batchelor’s ability to be simultaneously alone and at ease. Mixed in with his personal narrative are inspiring stories from solitude’s devoted practitioners, from the Buddha to Montaigne, from Vermeer to Agnes Martin. In a hyperconnected world that is at the same time plagued by social isolation, this book shows how to enjoy the inescapable solitude that is at the heart of human life. (shrink)

Loneliness, social isolation, aloneness, and solitude are frequently used interchangeably but are actually different. Loneliness is particularly salient now, due to the international restrictions on social activities imposed as a result of COVID-19, which brought loneliness into open discussion worldwide. The article highlights loneliness as a multidimensional construct and reviews its impact on cognitive, behavioral and affective functioning. In doing so, particular attention is given to loneliness as it manifests through the various life stages, as well as how personal (...) predisposition and contextual factors may exacerbate it. in this article we also review solitude, and a clear distinction between loneliness and solitude is established. Finally, we conclude by addressing the global claims of loneliness during the pandemic and its implications. We offer a point of view which may assist in coping with it. (shrink)

Spinoza is widely understood to criticize the role that fear plays in political life. Yet, in the Political Treatise, he maintains that everyone desires civil order due to a basic and universal fear of solitude. This chapter argues that Spinoza represents the fear of solitude as both a civilizing passion and as an affect that needs to be amplified and encouraged. The turbulence of social and political life makes solitude attractive, but isolation undermines the conditions of human (...) power. Although it may seem uncontroversial to understand isolation as something to avoid in political life, this chapter argues that Spinoza deflates the appeal of la vita solitaria even for philosophers and those seeking ethical perfection. (shrink)

The pandemic situation showed us, that the separation from other people is an important part of our lives and makes even more impact than we thought. Yet, the dominant picture of this separation is hugely negative and was so for a long time. Solitude, being nor positive nor negative on its own, just as being with others, is not something that people as a whole acknowledge in their lives – it is perceived as a state to endure, something that (...) can be useful, but not something we should just live with, at least partially. This paper shows how important it is to create a new picture of solitude – as something normal, not exceptional. It indicates the task to create a new vocabulary around the phenomena of solitude, free of its negative connotations, which will enable us to incorporate the solitude back to our lives. I argue, that such change in vocabulary may enable us normalization of solitude and that such normalization should be our goal. (shrink)

Chercheure à l’université du Minnesota et docteure en histoire des universités de Montpellier III et de Sherbrooke (Canada), Lucie Laumonier a publié en 2015, aux éditions Brepols, un ouvrage intitulé Solitudes et solidarités en ville. Montpellier, mi XIIIe-fin XVe siècles. Ce travail, résultat d’une thèse réalisée sous la direction de Geneviève Dumas et Daniel Le Blévec, consiste en un examen détaillé de ceux et celles qui, échappant aux solidarités familiales, vivent seuls à la fin du Moyen...

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Peu d'oeuvres souffrent autant que celles de Rousseau et Sartre de la réputation qui leur est faite. Prix de leur accessibilité peut-être, de l'ampleur des controverses auxquelles elles ont donné lieu, elles sem-blent irrémédiablement marquées l'une et l'autre par quelques formules censées en résumer la substance: errant seul dans les bois, Rousseau serait le champion d'un homme sauvage et bon qu'il opposerait à toutes les manifestations de la vie sociale; assis seul dans les cafés, Sartre affirmerait, de son côté, l'échec (...) douloureux de tout rapport interpersonnel—et leurs oeuvres réspectives developperaient cette position centrale. Simplifications sans doute. Malgré tout, il n'est peut-être pas inutile d'interroger le fait qu'on ait surtout retenucelad'oeuvres si riches, particulièrement en regard de leurs nombreux textes politiques, en tentant d'envisager ces oeuvres moins à travers l'une ou l'autre de leurs théses que selon des lignes de force plus génerales sur ce problème de l'existence sociale. Ceci peut permettre, croyons-nous, quelques mises en rapport suggestives. (shrink)

Dans les pays occidentaux, de nombreux nouveaux parents se sentent seuls et parfois impuissants avec leur nouveau-né. Ce sentiment peut être lié à un défaut d’étayage familial dans l’immédiat post-partum. Cet article présente, à partir d’une recherche universitaire plus large, un cas clinique approfondi dans lequel la distance familiale et géographique a été un facteur de vulnérabilité majeur. Ce cas montre les incidences multiples et intriquées d’un défaut d’étayage familial sur les processus intrapsychiques et intersubjectifs : dépression du post-partum chez (...) la mère qui persiste dans le temps, relations conjugales et parentales qui se dégradent progressivement, et sur les interactions précoces difficiles. Révéler l’existence de ce risque améliorera la compréhension des besoins des parents et des bébés après la naissance et permettrait d’envisager une adaptation plus fine des pratiques professionnelles et des programmes de santé publique et, à plus grande échelle, des politiques familiales. (shrink)

In this paper I address the problem of the pejorativisation of solitude in philosophical discourse. By the pejorativisation of solitude I mean giving it a negative meaning. I show that the tendency to the pejorativisation of solitude in philosophy was initiated by Aristotle. He saw solitude as contrary to human nature. This nature is supposed to determine people to form organised communities with others. Only through them the individual is able to survive and thrive. In (...) class='Hi'>solitude, one quickly learns how inautarkic is and suffers because of it. Thomas Hobbes was one of the first philosophers to challenge Aristotle’s approach. He argued that man strives for community with others not as a result of a supposedly social nature, but because as a child one is dependent and helpless, and as an adult one expects benefits or honours from others. My thesis is that the pejorativisation of solitude is responsible for its negative stereotyping, the formation of prejudices against it and the learned helplessness syndrome, which makes us vulnerable to solitude. (shrink)