Self-determination does and should play an important role in our conceptions of what it is to treat persons and peoples justly. I write at a time when the Middle East is erupting with demands for more appropriate rule by and for the people . Indigenous peoples around the world have been demanding better control over their traditional lands, over the last few decades in particular. And a serious global recession has affected all local economies since 2008, raising pertinent issues about (...) the wisdom of having a global economy as interlinked as ours has become. Would we not do better to "de-link" from the global economy? Would more robust ideals of self-determination and political and economic autonomy provide better guidance than those that seem to dominate the current discussion of models of global justice? (shrink)

THE PAPER DEFINES AND DEFENDS A PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DETERMINATION AS ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ORDERING OF A JUST SOCIETY. THAT PRINCIPLE SPECIFIES THAT INDIVIDUALS PARTICIPATE EQUALLY IN THE MAKING OF DECISIONS WHICH WILL GOVERN THEIR ACTIONS WITHIN INSTITUTIONS OF SPECIAL COOPERATION. THE PAPER ADOPTS THE STRATEGY OF ARGUING TO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE BY ASKING WHAT PRINCIPLES WOULD BE CHOSEN IN RAWLS' ORIGINAL POSITION. IT ARGUES THAT, CONTRARY TO THE THRUST IMPLICIT IN RAWLS AND OTHER LIBERAL THINKERS, PERSONS (...) IN THE ORIGINAL POSITION WOULD HAVE NO BASIS FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN POLITICAL AND NON-POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIAL COOPERATION, AND THUS WOULD CHOOSE THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION DIRECTLY AS APPLYING TO ALL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF SOCIAL COOPERATION. (shrink)

Several political theorists argue that states have rights to self-determination and these rights justify immigration restrictions. Call this: the self-determination argument for immigration restrictions. In this article, I develop an objection to the self-determination argument. I argue that if it is morally permissible for states to restrict immigration because they have rights to self-determination, then it can also be morally permissible for states to deport and denationalize their own citizens. We can either accept that it is permissible for states to (...) deport and denationalize their own citizens or reject the self-determination argument. To avoid this implication, we should reject the self-determination argument. That is, we should also reject the conclusion that rights to self-determination can justify any significant immigration restrictions. (shrink)

Offering a transdisciplinary study that benefits from the conceptual and theoretical contri­butions of sociology, political science and international relations, this article focuses on three key notions that shed light on the promise and limitations of the prevailing globalization scholarship. The proposed notions are self-determination, autonomy, and agency, which are often seen as merely antagonistic – if not a ‘prey’ or victim – to globalization. They are wor­thy of attention for their common emphasis that rests on the increasingly blurred boundar­ies underlying (...) the nexus between agent and environment, agent and action, and capability and expectations. Besides, they constitute an important source of inspiration for the rise of critical studies on globalization with a special emphasis on glocalization (Robertson) and world society (Meyer). Focusing on the prevailing global context in which claims to agency, autonomy and self-determination emerge, spread and receive diverse reactions, the study aims to discuss the complexity defining the relationship between homogenizing and hetero­genizing, universalizing and parochializing, converging and diverging logics, forces and processes underlying globalization. Overall, the article emphasizes that far from being hostile to global phenomena, self-determination, autonomy, and agency are both the products and key constitutive ingredients of the globalization as we understand it today. (shrink)

Many of the major self-determination movements of the 20th and early 21st Centuries did not go smoothly, but resulted in forced or semi-forced transfers of groups of people from one country to another. Forced population transfers are not, of course, supported by major theorists of self-determination and secession. However, the problems that make population transfers extremely common in actual cases of self-determination and secession, are not squarely faced in many theories of self-determination. And, I shall argue, certain leading theories of (...) self-determination and secession would make population transfers almost inevitable in practice, even if not called for or sanctioned in theory. This is a major stumbling block for any attempt to move from an abstract account of self-determination towards a working theory. In this paper I take a first step towards addressing this problem. I shall show how any approach to dealing with secession, including “primary rights” accounts, “remedial rights only” accounts, and even “consensual” accounts, must be able to deal with the inevitable problem of population transfers, if it is to be a complete and plausible theory. I shall also show how population transfers, to the extent that we can always expect them to take place, can be made as just as possible, in light of any approach to the problem of secession. I will not here attempt to adjudicate between different approaches to secession and self-determination. To that extent, my argument may be seen as a friendly addition to all of the above approaches, showing how they may try to meet an objection which they have not yet faced. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the language of ‘rights’ to secession is not helpful in dealing with the complexities of national self‐determination and is unnecessarily inflammatory and oppositional.

(Abstract: The right of “national self-determination” sometimes claimed for ethnic/religious/linguistic groups is not to be confused with the right to rebel against tyranny or with a right to secede, and it is limited by respect for the territorial integrity of functioning states. In some cases self-determination may take the form of some sort of autonomy within a mixed state. Ockham’s use of the canon..

According to reductionists about agency, an agent’s bringing something about is reducible to states and events involving the agent bringing something about. Many have worried that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-determination. One common reductionist answer to this worry contends that self-determining agents are identified with certain states and events, and so these states and events causing a decision counts as the agent’s self-determining the decision. In this paper I discuss J. David Velleman’s identification reductionist theory, (...) according to which an agent is identified with his desire to make most sense of himself. I develop two constraints that an adequate identification reductionist theory must satisfy and show that Velleman’s theory cannot satisfy both. In particular, I argue that Velleman’s account founders on cases of self-determined self-transformation. (shrink)

This dissertation provides a systematic analysis of when an individual or group has a right to secede that is grounded in self-determination. Since the primary question in a secessionist conflict concerns the territory being contested, any analysis of the right to secede must provide an account of what grounds the existing state's claim to political jurisdiction over its territory. With this in mind, I examine consent and teleological justifications for the state and find both inadequate. ;The consent account posits that (...) a political state is justified just in case it has the consent of its citizens. I reject the consent approach for its unacceptable implication that unlimited secession is permissible from all existing states. I then suggest that our disinclination to allow unlimited secession is instructive since it indicates not only that we believe a consentual justification is morally unnecessary, but also that a state is justified in virtue of the peace it secures and the rights it protects. This teleological justification ultimately proves inadequate as well, however, because it both restricts secessionist movements that seem permissible and allows coercive annexations that appear clearly unjustified. ;As an alternative to these extremes, I propose a hybrid model of political legitimacy. According to my theory, while individuals and small groups may not secede, a larger group may, provided it is of sufficient size to satisfactorily perform the functions that are necessary for a state to ground its claim to territory. Thus I conclude a political state should limit political liberty in a manner analogous to the way it legitimately limits the liberty to drive a car. Specifically, since many people would be harmed if there were no legal restrictions on who could drive, states institute age and health requirements limiting who may drive. Citizens not eliminated by these standards must also demonstrate a minimum threshold of competence by passing tests. In similar fashion, a state may initially restrict the right to secede to groups of a specific size, and then further require that interested parties demonstrate their ability and willingness to govern in a stable, efficient, and liberal manner. (shrink)

David Rodin argues that the right of national-defence as conceived in international law cannot be grounded in the end of defending the lives of individuals. Firstly, having this end is not necessary because there is a right of defence against an invasion that threatens no lives. However, in this context we are to understand that 'defending lives' includes defending against certain non-lethal threats. I will argue that threats to national-self determination and self-government are significant non-lethal threats to the wellbeing of (...) individuals that can justify lethal defensive force. Therefore the end of defending individuals can ground a right of national-defence against a 'bloodless invasion'. Secondly, Rodin argues that defending lives is not a sufficient condition for military action to be national self-defence, because humanitarian intervention is military action to defend individuals, and such action is in deep tension with national self-defence. I will argue that a reductive account, grounded in claims of need and threats of harm, can justify principles of both intervention and non-intervention on the same grounds; that is, protecting the wellbeing of individuals. (shrink)

Is territorial jurisdiction over natural resources justified? This paper argues that a freedom-based account of self-determination coupled with ‘functionalist’ justifications of territorial right support territorial jurisdiction over natural resources. This justification simultaneously gives rise to limits on the permissible exercise of the right: the principles of reciprocity and generality, and of equal freedom. This ‘reciprocal’ view on territorial jurisdiction over natural resources, defended here, differs from two alternatives: the traditional sovereignty view on the one hand and the transnational jurisdiction view—which (...) favours the transfer of sovereignty over natural resources from states to transnational institutions—on the other hand. (shrink)

This chapter examines the appropriate view of the relationship between territory, national communities, and self‐determination. It examines various arguments for territorial rights.

Philosophers and others have criticized the courts for ascribing a right of self-determination to severe incompetents. I defend ascription of a right of self-determination to these incompetents against both conceptual and normative attacks. I argue that a court need make no conceptual error when it ascribes a right of self-determination to a being who never had capacity for rational choice, and I argue that proper judicial deference to reflective conventional morality supports ascription of a right of self-determination to severe incompetents. (...) Keywords: Self-determination, incompetence, person CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: God and I God and the Teenage I – The Theodicy Fiasco God and the Adult I – Harmful Religious Beliefs at Life's Beginning God and the Adult I – Harmful Religious Beliefs During Our Lives God and the Adult I – Harmful Religious Beliefs at Life's End Why I Speak Out Notes.

: Kant speaks of our capacity to be “self-determining […] in certain […] laws holding firm a priori”. Here the “laws” refer to the categories of freedom introduced in KpV. The categories of freedom, then, are necessary for self-determination. I first explain how Kant employs the notion of determination in his theoretical philosophy. I then explain how the notion is utilized also in his practical philosophy, particularly in connection to the act of determining the forms of willing that make morality (...) possible. I conclude by answering the question, Why are the categories of freedom necessary for self-determination? Understanding why the categories of freedom are required for self-determination will also help clarify the nature and function of Kant’s categories of freedom, which have puzzled many scholars. (shrink)

American adults currently enjoy a widely accepted and legally well-settled right to refuse health care, including life sustaining treatment. Joel Feinberg provides a moral foundation for this right in liberal political theory. Feinberg's theory grounds the right to refuse in a broad right to self-determination, and it implements the right through a variable conception of voluntariness. This theory provides a plausible account that comports with the widely accepted right to refuse, commonsense, and ordinary practice. -/- Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock (...) contend, however, that Feinberg's priority for the right to self-determination is inconsistent with his variable scale of voluntariness. Although Feinberg presents his theory as one that grants categorical priority to self-determination over individual well-being, Buchanan and Brock argue that Feinberg's variable scale of voluntariness involves a balancing of self-determination and well-being. This balancing approach, which Buchanan and Brock endorse, seems to undermine the competent patient's right to refuse care because it allows concern for the patient's well-being to override that person's right to self-determination in some circumstances. Taken together, these arguments seem to suggest that we must give up either the competent patient's right to refuse treatment or the intuitively sensible variable scale. -/- In this paper, I argue that one can reconcile a categorical priority for self-determination with legal rules that incorporate a variable scale of competence. This integration requires careful examination of the practical and expressive functions of legal rules as well as of the manner in which these rules embody moral priorities. This analysis pursues specific and general projects. Specifically, it addresses the moral foundations of the legal right to refuse treatment, identifying a substantive difference between the balancing approach and the priority for self-determination that characterizes Feinberg's liberalism. Generally, it examines the types of priorities embodied by legal rules as practical decision guides and as expressions of the conventional morality represented by the law. This general project extends beyond the right to refuse treatment to the analysis of the manner in which legal rules express and apply moral priorities. (shrink)

This book proposes an alternative to the consent model which is currently at the heart of patient self-determination and which is shown here to have fundamental flaws that constrain its effectiveness. The proposed model is a property model in which the patient’s bodily integrity is protected from unauthorised invasion, and their legitimate expectation to be provided with the relevant information to make an informed decision is taken to be a proprietary right. This model enables the courts to overcome the requirement (...) to prove causation in consent cases and offers a complementary approach to patient self-determination. (shrink)

Odon Lottin, O.S.B. was an historian and a moral theologian. As an historian, he studied the scholastic attention to human psychology and morality. As a theologian, he studied the roles that thought and action play in the development of the moral agent. His influence in historical and moral theology has been significant. Nonetheless, moralists and medievalists independently have appropriated his insights. No one has yet studied the relationship between his historical investigations and his moral theology. This work accomplishes that study. (...) ;This dissertation considers Lottin's contributions to both historical and moral theology. Lottin studies the medieval history and understanding of free choice, moral action, the acquired virtues and conscience. He traces this history to uncover specific ideas, expose the development of thought, recognize the emergence of consensus, and find whether satisfying resolutions were achieved. Many of his contemporaries in the manual tradition misinterpreted this history. This misinterpretation was due to their inaccurate or undeveloped historical method. And, just as there was deficiency in their method, there were significant shortcomings in the scope of their theological investigations. Thus, by looking back to history, Lottin presents a moral theology more substantive than the manuals. Each of the first four chapters of this dissertation presents Lottin's historical studies of the major debates, examines his incorporation of that material into his own contribution to the debates' resolutions, and concludes with how his work has been appropriated and where it may yet lead. The final chapter considers Lottin's contribution to the discipline of moral theology. ;Moral theology can neither be ahistorical nor impersonal. Lottin's work demonstrates the necessity of accurate history for interpretation and of critical reflection on the cause of human action. His return to medieval moral theology is a return to human agency. His agent-centered moral theology retrieves prudence and the moral virtues as dynamic means for rightly forming consciences and determining action. Historical and agent-centered moral theology is concerned with theory and practice. The theory of the moral life looks at human intentionality, the practice is its free expression; together they comprise the meaning of self-determination. (shrink)

Health-related quality of life measures aim to assess patients’ subjective experience in order to gauge an increasingly wide variety of health care issues such as patient needs; satisfaction; side effects; quality of care; disease progression and cost effectiveness. Their popularity is undoubtedly due to a larger initiative to provide patient-centered care. The use of patient perspectives to guide health care improvements and spending is rooted in the idea that we must respect patients as self-determining agents. In this paper I look (...) at the two main orientations to quality of life measurement: standardized and individualized measures. I argue that while these measures are attempts to provide for patient self-determination, they both fail to do so. In their place I suggest a new approach which overcomes their respective difficulties: a dialogic approach. (shrink)

Many abused women from patriarchal collectivistic societies that are subjected to social control seek help in community health clinics. The article is based on a qualitative study, which consisted of 24 interviews with 12 abused Israeli Arab women who sought the help of social workers in community health clinics. A central theme that emerged from the interviews was the women’s wish to maintain their self-determination in retaining the power to determine the boundaries of the intervention within the professional relationship. The (...) discussion focuses on the dialectical consequences of maintaining the women’s self-determination—empowering them, on one hand, and limiting them, on the other. (shrink)

The right of national groups to self-government should be universally conceived of in sub-statist forms. Instead of interpreting the right to national self-determination in terms of independent statehood, it should in all cases be conceived of as a package of privileges to which each national group is entitled in its main geographic location, normally within the state that coincides with its homeland. According to this sub-statist conception, self-determination is not a right of majority nations within states vis-a-vis national minorities, but (...) rather a right of homeland groups vis-a-vis non-homeland groups. It is a right to which each national group in the world is entitled, and which must be realized in at least one place. (shrink)

This article defines a republican feminist agenda by reference to the key term ‘self-determination’, in its nationalist and its feminist meanings. It describes the activities of a republican feminist group, Clár na mBan, including a conference organized in March 1994, and initiatives taken since then.

In a period in which the concept of self‐determination has become a cliche, it seems astonishing that it occupies the center of the historical stage in the various searches for a community in the horn of Africa. Thus, the concept itself might indeed have been a cliche, but not for the millions of human beings that have sacrificed, and continue to sacrifice, their lives for the sake of a way of life that the concept promises.

From the beginnings of philosophical investigation, there has been widespread recognition that reason must be autonomous to think the truth and that philosophy must be the freest of all disciplines. Nonetheless, conceiving how self-determination can be in thought and reality seems to pose insurmountable challenges. The essay shows how these challenges can be met, explaining how the nature of the concept enables reason to be autonomous, how nature can give rise to animal life, providing the enabling conditions for linguistic intelligence, (...) how the psychological and cultural conditions of discourse leave it free, and how conduct can achieve self-determination in the intersubjective exercise of institutionalized rights. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom suggests that promoting self-determination for peoples and protecting the human rights of individuals are competing priorities. By this is meant that securing individuals in their human rights requires limits on the rights of their peoples, and vice versa. In contrast, the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Draft Declaration) treats the two as not only mutually supporting but mutually necessary. In the Draft Declaration, the right of peoples to self-determination is more than a principle (...) that constrains states in their behavior towards other states and territories “outre-mer”; it also constrains states within their domestic realm. This view of self-determination reflects the experience of many indigenous groups, for whom refusal to respect the integrity of their group and failure to respect the integrity of their persons have gone hand in hand. In this chapter, I argue that the Draft Declaration’s treatment of self-determination is right: self-determination is a human right and this human right is the same right that underpins the rights of states. Treating an interest of peoples like self-determination as a constitutive element of human dignity raises practical worries about the stability of the international system, and philosophical worries about potential conflicts between individuals and peoples. But it also casts state sovereignty itself in a different light. This new light has interesting consequences both for international law and for philosophical debates about minorities within minorities. In particular, it allows one to think about questions about internal minorities as ultimately questions about legitimacy and representation. (shrink)

This article asks whether states have a right to close their borders because of their right to self-determination, as proposed recently by Christopher Wellman, Michael Walzer, and others. It asks the fundamental question whether self-determination can, in even its most unrestricted form, support the exclusion of immigrants. I argue that the answer is no. To show this, I construct three different ways in which one might use the idea of self-determination to justify immigration restrictions and show that each of these (...) arguments fails. My conclusion is that the nature and value of self-determination have to do with the conditions of genuine self-government, not membership of political society. Consequently, the demand for open borders is fully consistent with respect to self-determination. (shrink)

I offer in this paper a new conception of democratic self-determination. My proposal defends Rafanelli's peaceful reform intervention from the concern that we should not promote justice abroad, because it would interfere with the self-determining choice of other people to select an authoritarian government. I challenge this influential view of authoritarian self-determination. I argue instead that self-determination should be democratic in its input, or the procedure deliberating and voting on the constitution. Self-determination should also be democratic in its output, or (...) the constitution's rules. Democratic self-determination offers three important advantages: it joins self-determination indivisibly with other inalienable human rights, such as the human right to racial non-discrimination. Second, it guards against the problem of the false mandate, or authoritarians attempting to legitimate their autocratic rule using rigged referenda and suppressed debate. Third, democratic self-determination reduces the risk of ethnic conflict given the diversity of actual states. Democratic self-determination passes the a ctual deliberation test, since it has been vindicated by inclusive deliberation with people from diverse cultures. (shrink)

Self-authorship has been established as the basis of an influential liberal principle of legislation and public policy. Being the author of one’s own life is a significant component of one’s own well-being, and therefore is better understood from the viewpoint of the person whose life it is. However, most philosophical accounts, including Raz’s conception of self-authorship, rely on general and abstract principles rather than specific, individual psychological properties of the person whose life it is. We elaborate on the principles of (...) self-authorship on the basis of self-determination theory, an empirically based psychological theory that has been at the forefront of the study of autonomy and self-authorship for more than 45 years. Our account transcends distinctions between positive and negative freedom and attempts to pinpoint the exact properties of self-authorship within the psychological processes of intrinsic motivation and internalization. If a primary objective of public policy is to support self-authorship, then it should be devised on the basis of how intrinsic motivation and internalization can be properly supported. Self-determination theory identifies three basic psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The satisfaction of these needs is associated with the support and growth of intrinsic tendencies and the advancement of well-being. Through this analysis, we can properly evaluate the significance of rationality, basic goods, and the availability of options to self-authorship. Implications for law and policy are discussed with an emphasis on legal paternalism and what many theorists call “liberal perfectionism,” that is, the non-coercive support and promotion of the good life. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie jüngste höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zur Selbstbestimmung der Patienten und zur Normierung medizinischer Handlungen am Lebensende hat eine intensive Debatte ausgelöst. Das Urteil und die akademisch vorgetragene Kritik werden einer grundlegenden medizinethischen Analyse unterworfen. Sie betrifft die objektive Eingrenzung der Zulässigkeit einer Behandlungsbegrenzung und die Subsumtion des Wachkomas als irreversibel tödliches Grundleiden, das ärztliche Ermessen bei der Indikationsstellung, die normative Einordnung einer Ernährungstherapie am Lebensende und die Verbindlichkeit von Patientenverfügungen. Die medizinethische Kritik offenbart eine unzureichende Wahrnehmung medizinischer und medizinethischer professioneller Dokumente (...) und den Rückgriff auf medizinethisch veraltete Konzeptionen der Sterbehilfe durch das Gericht. Die Folge ist eine fehlerhafte Subsumtion der Wachkomapatienten in die Kategorie irreversibel tödlicher Erkrankungen und eine inhaltliche Schwächung der Verbindlichkeit von Patientenverfügungen. Beides bedarf dringend der Korrektur. (shrink)

What limitations on intervention in support of democratic revolutions does proper regard for the collective right of self-determination impose? Some have held that if intervention in support of democratic revolutions is justified, it must cease once the authoritarian regime has been deposed—that any effort by the intervener to use force to shape the new political order would violate the people’s right of self-determination. This essay argues that proper regard for self-determination is compatible with much more extensive interventions.

In this paper, I consider the objection that unilateral secession by a national group (e.g., the Scots) from a legitimate, nonusurping state would wrong minority nationalities within the seceding territory. I show first that most proponents of this objection assume that the ground of the right to national self-determination is the protection of the group’s culture. I show that there are alternative justifications available. I then set out a version of this objection that does not rely on this claim; on (...) this objection, a national minority that seceded and created its own state would commit an expressive wrong against minorities within the territory over which it claimed jurisdiction. I show that this objection is undermotivated: only under a specific set of circumstances would the minorities of the secessionist region be subject to an expressive wrong. Finally, I show that the correct way to think about the claims of minorities in secessionist regions is in terms of a claim to secure access to equal civic status such that they are not at risk of becoming justifiably alienated from their new state. If a secessionist group cannot provide this guarantee to the minority residents of their territory, then their seceding would commit wrongful harm, and the presumption in favour of collective autonomy is defeated. I call this defeater the ‘Alienation Defeater.’With this in hand, we are now in a position to explain why nations are normatively special. Responding to the objections broached by Allen Buchanan and others, I show that even if other kinds of groups, such as religious groups, have the features in virtue of which nations have a claim to self-determination, this does not entail that those groups also have the right to secede. This is because an account of self-determination needs a list of ‘defeaters’—features in virtue of which a group’s claim to self-determination is defeated. I argue that religious groups are the strongest candidate for having a claim to collective autonomy in virtue of sharing many features with nations. I then argue that religious groups will run afoul of the Alienation Defeater; religious identity is too narrow to be the basis of the dominant collective identity of a state. This does not apply to nationality. This, I explain, is because of qualitative differences between religious groups, qua religious groups, and nations. (shrink)

A recent surge of research has begun to examine music participation and well-being; however, a particular challenge with this work concerns theorizing around the associated well-being benefits of musical participation. Thus, the current research used Self-Determination Theory to consider the potential associations between basic psychological needs (competence, relatedness, and autonomy), self-determined autonomous motivation, and the perceived benefits to well-being controlling for demographic variables and the musical activity parameters. A sample of 192 Australian residents (17-85, Mage = 36.95), who were currently (...) participating in a musical activity at the time, completed an online questionnaire. Results indicated that females were more likely to perceive benefits to their well-being; and that how important an individual considers music in their life was positively related to perceived well-being. Importantly, the analyses also revealed that the basic needs of competency and relatedness were related to overall perceived well-being as well as specifically social, cognitive, and esteem dimensions of well-being. Autonomous motivation demonstrated significant associations with both an overall well-being score as well as four of five specific well-being subscales measured. Collectively, the findings indicate that Self-Determination Theory offers a useful theoretical framework to understanding the relationship between musical participation and well-being. Further, the pattern of findings reiterates the positive associations between musical participation and one’s psychosocial well-being, with broad implications for people involved in the facilitation of musical activity. (shrink)

In recent years numerous multi-national states have disintegrated along national lines, and today many more continue to witness bitter secessionist struggles. This ambitious study brings together for the first time a series of original essays on the ethics of secession. A host of leading figures explore key issues in this important debate, including, what is `a people' and what gives them a right to secede? And is national self-determination consistent with liberal and democratic principles or is it a dangerous doctrine?

Self-determination is a central concept in the field of bioethics and the most critical decision among the myriad of decisions concerning medical care is the decision to choose to die; “self-determination of death.” The purpose of this paper is to clarify the basic positions on self-determination of death held by present Japanese people and we tentatively sorted these positions into 10 arguments. We discuss the problems and implications of these positions revealed within our present review and conclude that a society (...) needs to deny unnecessary intrusion and tolerance for different views might be a keyword in our oncoming society. (shrink)

This study attempts to analyse the relationship between two key psychological variables associated with performance in sports - Self-Determined Motivation and Competitive Anxiety - through Bayesian Networks analysis. We analysed 674 university students/athletes from 44 universities that competed at the University Games in México, with an average age of 21 years (SD = 2.07) and with a mean of 8.61 years’ (SD = 5.15) experience in sports. Methods: Regarding the data analysis, first a CHAID algorithm was carried out to determine (...) the dependence links between variables, and then a Bayesian networks was developed. The validation of the BN revealed AUC values ranging from 0.5 to 0.92. Subsequently, various instantiations were performed with hypothetical values applied to the “bottom” variables. Results showed two probability trees that have extrinsic motivation and amotivation at the top, while the anxiety/activation due to worries about performance was at the bottom of the probabilities. The instantiations carried out support the existence of these probabilistic relationships, demonstrating their scarce influence on anxiety about competition generated by the intrinsic motivation, and the complex probabilistic effect of introjected and identified regulation regarding the appearance of anxiety due to worry about performance. (shrink)

The 1970s and 1980s meant an ethnic politicization of the indigenous movement in Ecuador, until this moment defined largely as a class-based movement of indigenous peasants. The indigenous organizations started to conceptualize indigenous peoples as nationalities with their own economic, social, cultural and legal structures and therefore with the right to autonomy and self-determination. Based on this conceptualization, the movement developed demands for a pluralist reform of state and society in order to install a plurinational state with wide degrees of (...) autonomy and participation for indigenous nationalities. A part of those demands was the double strategy to fight for legal pluralism while already installing it at the local level. Even if some degrees of legal pluralism have been recognized in Ecuador since the mid-1990s, in practice, the local de facto practice prevails until today. Another central part of the demand for plurinationality is the representation of indigenous peoples in the legislative organs of the state, developing since their first appearance in the 1940s in a complex way. This article will analyze the development of right-based demands within the discourse of the indigenous movement in Ecuador, the visions of the implied state-reform and the organizational and political background and implication they have. Based on an analysis of the central texts of the indigenous organizations, conceptualizations of rights and laws and their appropriation within an autonomist discourse and a local practice will be highlighted. (shrink)

Global climate change is likely to become a major cause of future migration. Small Island States are particularly vulnerable since territorial destruction caused by sea level rise poses a threat to their entire existence. This raises important issues concerning state sovereignty and self-determination. Is it possible for a state to remain self-determining even if it lacks a stable population residing on a specific territory? It has been suggested that migrants from disappearing Small Island States could continue to exercise sovereign control (...) over their abandoned territory. Such an arrangement would allow them to retain a measure of self-determination. The question posed in this paper is whether this ?deterritorialized state proposal? is conceptually plausible and normatively acceptable. It is argued that the proposal is conceptually plausible if we adopt a gradual understanding of ?self-determination?, but that its normative acceptability is weak even if it is supplemented with compensatory measures. (shrink)

This article looks at the relevance of the concept of self-determination to psychiatric patients by studying the existence, importance and manifestations of self-determination. The data were collected by interviewing long-term patients (n = 72) in one mental health care organization, which included a psychiatric hospital and an outpatient department. Self-determination was defined in terms of the right to decision-making, the right to information, the right of consent, the right to refuse treatment, and the right to be heard and taken into (...) account. It was found that, with the exception of the right to refuse and consent, these rights are indeed present in the practice of psychiatric nursing and that they are relevant and important to psychiatric patients. The patients typically gave ethical, practical and legal reasons for a psychiatric patient's right to self-determination. The main reasons why psychiatric patients said they lacked the right to self-determination were illness and staff authority. Recommendations for educational, clinical and methodological implications for the future in nursing are discussed. (shrink)

In the last decades, Mexican government applied traditional economic policies to overcome underdevelopment and to face the recurrent economic crisis. As a result, macroeconomic indicators show an acceptable economic performance, however, half of population is considered poor. One of the poorest region is Soconusco in the southern state of Chiapas. The Soconusco Strategic Plan 2020 proposes development strategies based on the regional characteristics. As a precondition for these strategies to work, a knowledge based platform has to be built. As suggested (...) by the evolutionary view of economic theory, knowledge, as an input in the creation of capabilities, can be a useful tool to promote development. (shrink)

This book articulates a systematic vision of an international legal system grounded in the commitment to justice for all persons. It provides a probing exploration of the moral issues involved in disputes about secession, ethno-national conflict, "the right of self-determination of peoples," human rights, and the legitimacy of the international legal system itself. Buchanan advances vigorous criticisms of the central dogmas of international relations and international law, arguing that the international legal system should make justice, not simply peace among states, (...) a primary goal, and rejecting the view that it is permissible for a state to conduct its foreign policies exclusively according to what is in the "national interest." He also shows that the only alternatives are not rigid adherence to existing international law or lawless chaos in which the world's one superpower pursues its own interests without constraints. This book not only criticizes the existing international legal order, but also offers morally defensible and practicable principles for reforming it. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination will find a broad readership in political science, international law, and political philosophy. (shrink)

If self-determination enables one to know truths and rule oneself, then it’s central to metaphysics and ethics because metaphysics concerns truths, and ethics grasps good actions requiring self-rule. Aristotle and Mencius agree about the relation between metaphysics and ethics. Nevertheless, closer examination shows differences in their conceptions of the self, how it knows truths, the nature of truth, and the effectiveness of the wise/virtuous on the world. Given the significance of self-determination to theory and practice, comparing Mencius’s and Aristotle’s views (...) illuminates it and the challenges for each author’s view. (shrink)

Rather than use Habermas’s writings as a paradigm for critiquing The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin, I intend to evaluate and to analyze the dynamic tension that develops between the ideas of pluralism and individualism. I will consider how Franklin defines rationalization and reason and how he continually adapts the definitions to recontextualize individual needs, interests, and values within the emergent general will. I will also suggest the ways in which Habermas’s theoretical language accommodates Franklin’s concept of self-determinism within his own (...) conception of noncoercive consensus. (shrink)

In this article, I show how the principle of democratic self-determination can answer the boundary problem by both grounding and constraining a people’s right to exclude potential immigrants. I argue that a people has the qualified right to exclude insofar as it respects the self-determination claims of outsiders. I analyze the concrete implications of the requirement to respect the self-determination claims of outsiders in the cases of long-term residents, refugees, and brain drain. Sometimes the only way for a people to (...) respect the self-determination claims of outsiders will be by including, rather than excluding, them as members. (shrink)