El propósito del presente trabajo es examinar la concepción kantiana del pensamiento y de su negativo a la luz de la crítica deleuziana a la imagen del pensamiento. Luego de cotejar las afirmaciones del filósofo francés con la letra de Kant, sostendremos que, si el concepto de ilusión trascendental se aparta de la misma en tanto cuestiona la buena naturaleza de la razón y la afinidad del pensamiento con lo verdadero, la ilusión es conjurada mediante su legitimación moral y, así, (...) Kant continúa postulando su rectitud natural. Mediante el análisis de la concepción kantiana del error, mostraremos asimismo que las afirmaciones deleuzianas relativas a la superación del concepto clásico de error como desviación del pensamiento por parte de Kant no pueden sostenerse sino que, por el contrario, Kant concebía las facultades como naturalmente rectas, pudiendo ser desviadas solo por interposiciones externas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE RECTITUDE OF INCLINATION NICHOLAS INGHAM, 0.P. Provincial Archives Providence, Rhode Island 0 F THE MOST plausible mainline treatments of the relation of inclination to action and of their combination to moral estimation-Kantian, Classical Utilitarian, and Aristotelian-Thomist--only the third, remarkably enough, provides for the possibility of intrinsic rectitude as regards inclination. For Kant, of course, inclination is not only indifferent to morality but censurable as a criterion (...) for action; indeed, any act done from inclination is, for Kant, pre-moral at best and immoral at worst. Classical Utilitarianism would appear to hold that the desire for pleasure, since it is correct by nature, must also be indefectibly and intrinsically correct. But this is not so, since in any choice situation an inclination toward a given pleasure, right by nature, may be counterbalanced by competing claims, whether these claims themselves arise from other inclinations within the one moral subject or from distinct subjects with differing claims. Hence, Classical Utilitarianism must accept a doctrine of extrinsic correctness as regards the evaluation of any inclination unless the version in question can establish a universally valid overriding principle of right-in which case it is Utilitarianism no longer but some form of deontological ethics. Only in the moral thought of Aristotle and Aquinas do we actually find a plausible case for the rectitude of inclination. And it is therefore surprising that so little attention has been paid this and that so many doctrinal Aristotelian-Thomists seem unaware of it. For many scholars, otherwise well acquainted with the basic philosophical views defended by St. Thomas Aquinas in his 417 418 NICHOLAS INGHAM, O.P. Aristotelian commentaries, remain surprisingly unfamiliar with one of the most interesting parts of his metaphysics of morals: right appetite, inclination, or emotion as an integral part of moral science, moral activity, and reflexive knowledge of the morality of conduct and of disposition.' I should like to set out what seem to me to be the general Aristotelian-Thomist views, as expressed in the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, and to develop from them a full account of intrinsic, extrinsic, stable, and per se rectitude as regards inclination or appetite. The first step in this development requires us to consider whether a moral science is possible and, if so, of what kind it must be. I Initially both St. Thomas and Aristotle appear to neglect altogether the problem whether there can be moral science as such. In listing the five intellectual virtues (understanding, science, wisdom, prudence, and art) neither mentions a science of right action. Would such a discipline be theoretical? Ordinarily the theoretical sciences in Aristotle and Aquinas perfect only theoretical powers. Does right action fall only under prudence? Prudence ordinarily is taken to be a practical virtue, not one specifically pertaining to the sciences. Three solutions to the difficulty offer themselves at once: first, moral science belongs essentially among ·the theoretical disciplines, even where allowance is made for the inclusion of practical elements in some methodologically defensible way; second, it is science but only in a highly derivative and improper sense and, in fact, is more correctly treated as providing something like a schema for the exercise of the cardinal virtues, especially prudence; third, it is thoroughly scientific in the strict and unqualified sense of the term, yet essentially not a theoretical but a practical discipline. 1 It is surprising how little serious attention seems to have been paid to Aristotle's remark in Ethics VII, 3, 1147a26-28, that, while the immediate conclusion of theoretical reasoning is affirmation, the immediate result of practical reasoning is action. THE RECTITUDE OF INCLINATION 419 The first solution, as one might easily imagine, has been championed by many of the most illustrious commentators. John of St. Thomas appears to hold that moral science is, as such, purely theoretical, even though it has practical application in prudential application.2 Maritain seems to believe that it is the theoretical treatment of a subject matter intrinsically practical in nature.3 Lottin holds that it is speculatively practical-a mixture 2 "Scientia moralis potest dupliciter considerari; uno modo, ut etiam includit prudentiam, alio modo, ut earn excludit et solum versatur circa cognitionem virtutum... (shrink)

Les remarques qui vont suivre n?ont pas pour objectif de dire positive­ment ce qu? est l?intentionnalité, et nous voudrions seulement, de façon plus modeste, contribuer à l?examen d?un des problèmes fondamentaux que sou­lève cette notion, en posant la question de savoir ce que l?intentionnalité doit être pour que nous puissions en parler, c?est-à-dire pour qu?un discours descriptif puisse se donner une prise sur elle. Cette question, nous l?emprun­tons de façon un peu détournée à un livre récent de John McDowell, Having (...) the world in view , dans le contexte duquel il nous faut d?abord essayer de la resituer. Dans le dernier texte de cet ouvrage 1 , McDowell commente la lecture que Wilfrid Sellars avait proposée de la Critique de la raison pure , et il revient significativement à cette occasion sur les reproches que lui-même avait adressés à Kant quelques années plus tôt, dans Mind and World . McDowell en vient alors à opposer, sur un modèle qui rappelle très fortement la distinction classique entre oratio recta et oratio obliqua , notre façon habi­tuelle de parler du monde d?un côté, et, de l?autre, une façon proprement philosophique (que McDowell nomme également « transcendantale ») de faire usage du discours pour analyser ce rapport au monde qui se noue dans notre pratique ordinaire du langage. Lorsque nous affirmons quelque chose du monde, que nous discutons de tel ou tel sujet, que nous nous. (shrink)

Many philosophers read Hegel as rejecting Kant's ethics of duty and advocating a more or less Aristotelian conception of virtue. However, in the Philosophy of Right Hegel sharply criticizes the ancient conception of virtue, or “virtue proper,” in his terms, and distinguishes it from a more modern concept of virtue, which he calls “rectitude.” In this paper I argue that interpretations that overlook or downplay the significance of the distinction between rectitude and virtue proper are wrong, and I (...) also put forward my own positive interpretation of Hegel's views on virtue. I am mainly concerned with defending two sets of claims: (1) Rectitude is fundamentally different from Aristotelian and other ancient conceptions of virtue. (2) Hegel believes that in modern society acting with rectitude is, in all normal circumstances, superior to attempting to use virtue proper to try to figure out what one should do. I also argue that the conception of virtue I attribute to Hegel has some distinct advantages over Aristotelian conceptions of virtue. (shrink)

Barnett Newman : Adam's line -- Kant and the newborn -- Virginia Woolf and the shadow of the "I" -- Plato erectus sed -- Men and trees -- We are not monkeys : on erect posture -- Hobbes and the macroanthropos -- Elias Canetti : upright before the dead -- Artemisia : the allegory of inclination -- Leonardo and maternal inclination -- Hannah Arendt : "a child has been born unto us" -- Schemata for a postural ethics -- Coda : (...) adieu to Lévinas. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to conceptualise Islamic workplace rectitude. Based on a comprehensive literature review, the study proposes that Islamic workplace rectitude is composed of a harmonious blend of Islamic workplace spirituality, Islamic workplace ethics, and submission to Allah. The study involved an inductive interpretive analysis, where critical aspects of workplace rectitude were extracted based on the agreed-upon Qur’anic verses and Hadith. The study augments the literature on workplace behaviour through divine command theory by offering (...) new theoretical evidence from an Islamic perspective. As presented in the current study, Islamic workplace rectitude is a higher-order, stable psychological construct that can be distinguished from other constructs. It comprises Islamic workplace spirituality, Islamic workplace ethics, and submission to Allah. However, further research is needed to accomplish conceptual and empirical distinctiveness for the proposed construct of Islamic workplace rectitude. This study presents an alternative approach to Islamic workplace behaviour, facilitating fresh insights and further development and research in this exciting area. The study adopts a holistic approach, contributing to identifying commonalities between workplace attitudes and Islam. It introduces Islamic workplace rectitude, a novel concept not present in the existing literature. The present work is, therefore, expected to trigger further interest and research in Islamic workplace rectitude. (shrink)

Pro Doernberg and Truog (2023), we recognize and acknowledge five spheres of morality in medicine. We posit that these spheres represent domains of practical engagement, which, as the authors note,...

Jim Stone has argued that a multiversal version of Modal Realism together with Counterpart Theory cannot account for a certain intuitive possibility. Roughly, it is the possibility that all free moral choices of a certain sort are the right choices in all cases in the multiverse. The present work offers an explanation of how the metaphysics in question can account for the intuitive possibility in question.

In this paper, I reveal systematic aspects of the moral epistemology of the Warring States Confucian, Mengzi. Mengzi thinks moral knowledge is 'internally' available to humans because it is acquired through normative dictates built into the human heart-mind. Those dictates are capable of motivating and justifying an agent's normative categorizations. Such dictates are linked to Mengzi's conception of human nature as good. I then interpret Mengzi's difficult discussion of courage and qi in Mengzi 2A: 2 as illuminating the idea of (...) 'internal' justification. The epistemology of courage is intimately related in 2A: 2 to its practice. Finally, I indicate at the end in outline the ways in which Mengzi and Gaozi are engaged in a dispute about moral epistemology that pits each of them against Xunzi and also against Zhuangzi. (shrink)

Aquí propongo mostrar, en contra de las interpretaciones dominantes, que el origen de la Ética como disciplina filosófica se encuentra en lo que llamo ‘el problema de la dikaiosunê’, la ‘rectitud moral’. El reconocimiento en el siglo V. a. C. de la dikaiosunê como una virtud moral central a la vida humana entra en conflicto con el marco eudaimonista admitido por varios intelectuales del siglo V, debido a que la dikaiosunê es una fuente de requerimientos normativos independiente del interés propio (...) (de la eudaimonía propia). Ante este conflicto, se perfilan solamente dos alternativas de resolución: la solución de los inmoralistas, que le niega a la dikaiosunê el estatus de virtud moral, y la de los moralistas, que admite dicho estatus e intenta integrar a dicha virtud al marco eudaimonista. La ética de Platón, considerado comúnmente como el padre de la Ética, es solo una pieza de este rompecabezas. (shrink)

Inspired by Adriana Cavarero’s recent work on maternal inclinations as a postural term, the overall purpose of this article is to seek out a geometry of the educational relation that is alien to the masculine myth of the ‘economic man’. Drawing on Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons’s critique of the marketization of education, reading their giving ‘shape and form’ to the scholastic school through the geometry of Cavarero’s ‘maternal inclinations’, the article shows how images and metaphors associated with the posture (...) of rectitude infuse the scholastic model of the school. At the same time, we argue, it testifies to a geometry of an inclined subject and, in doing so, it offers an opening for recovering the significance of the feminine and maternal to educational theory. Affirming this opening, the paper makes a shift of emphasis from scholastic techniques to educational postures. (shrink)

"The text mirrors a theory of cultural technology, which takes culture at its word and the technology of (cultural?) cultivation reclaims the word 'colore'. Cultural technology always asserts a predilection to symbolic order, but it not only institutes symbolic order, but contradicts it as well. After all, the conductors and media of cultural technology dare to put into question the presumption of a sovereign subject which is the master of the constituative processes for culture. Rectitude is challenged to respond (...) to this break-down of the classic sovereign teachings of symbolic order and allow the conductors and media a position other than that of only a means to a legitimately sanctioned end.". (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article, I examine the extent to which military officers are morally responsible for the actions of others by virtue of shared membership in various groups. I argue that career military officers share membership in morally relevant groups that include their branch of service, Department of Defense and the entire Executive Branch of Government, and I outline the circumstances under which career officers bear moral culpability for the actions of members of this group. A number of implications arise from (...) these findings. The first and most important is that military officers have an interest in ensuring the moral rectitude of government agents specifically as it pertains to their official capacities. Additionally, military officers have a duty not only to be informed about problematic government policies but also to educate themselves on the pertinent legal jurisprudence or ethical considerations. Finally, the Constitutional Paradigm of Military Ethics may be an insufficient guide for the part.. (shrink)

In this article I take up the image of inclination developed by Adriana Cavarero in her book, Inclinations: A Critique of Rectitude as a mode of developing an account of history informed by an ontology of heterogeneous ethics. Clarifying the potential of inclination contra the Kantian figure of “uprightness,” the principle task of this article is to reimagine the implications of inclination with regard to Walter Benjamin’s theses on history. Ultimately, I show that by pushing at the relationality inherent (...) to an inclined ontology of the self a meaningful exchange can be generated between plural historical temporalities, a move that reveals the inclined figure’s potential to redeem narratives of the historically dispossessed. (shrink)

Contemporain de la crise de la philosophie de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, Brentano a voulu contribuer à sa renaissance en revenant à ses sources aristotéliciennes. Husserl a reconnu sa dette - celle de toute la phénoménologie -, et Heidegger aussi, envers ce philosophe autrichien en qui ils voyaient celui qui les avait conduits à la philosophie. Dans sa Psychologie du point de vue empirique, il avait défendu la thèse de l'intentionnalité des faits de conscience et esquissé une théorie (...) de l'évidence. Fondamentale pour l'ensemble de sa philosophie, et en particulier pour penser la rectitude ou la correction du jugement et des sentiments d'amour et de haine, cette théorie ne sera pleinement élaborée qu'en 1889 dans L'Origine de la connaissance morale. Cette conférence, et celle, contemporaine, relative à l'évidence, ainsi que l'ensemble des dictées posthumes qui s'échelonnent de 1889 à 1915 permettent d'en saisir la nature et l'évolution. Récusant aussi bien le kantisme que l'utilitarisme, L'Origine de la connaissance morale sera discuté par les membres du Cercle de Vienne et inspirera, outre Husserl, la phénoménologie morale de Max Scheler. Brentano ne s'est pas contenté d'exposer le versant éthique de sa pensée sans lui donner une assise dans la sphère de la logique : c'est le rôle dévolu à La Doctrine du jugement correct qui invite, de son côté, à une réforme d'autant plus radicale de la logique qu'elle met en question la théorie prédicative traditionnelle du jugement. (shrink)

Résumé -/- Dans son premier livre (Philosophie de l’arithmétique 1891), Husserl élabore une très intéressante philosophie des mathématiques. Les concepts mathématiques sont interprétés comme des concepts de « deuxième ordre » auxquels on accède par une réflexion sur nos opérations mentales de numération. Il s’ensuit que la vérité de la proposition : « il y a trois pommes sur la table » ne consiste pas dans une relation mythique quelconque avec la réalité extérieure au psychique (où le nombre trois doit (...) être exemplifié de quelque manière), mais bien dans le fait que les pommes sur la table peuvent être dénombrées correctement en tant qu’elles sont au nombre de trois. Nous avons affaire ici à une position « antiréaliste » fondant la vérité mathématique non pas dans un monde platonicien, mais bien sur le concept de rectitude de nos opérations formelles. -/- Abstract -/- In his first book (Philosophy of Arithmetic 1891) Husserl develops a very interesting philosophy of mathematics. Mathematical concepts are interpreted as « second order » concepts gained by reflection on our mental operations of counting. Accordingly the truth of the proposition « There are three apples on the table » consists not in any mythical relation to the extra-mental reality (where the number three should be somehow exemplified), but rather in the fact that the apples on the table can be correctly counted as three. We have here an « anti-realist » position grounding the mathematical truth not in platonic realms, but rather in the concept of correctness of our formal operations. (shrink)

No writer or public intellectual of our era has been as sensitive to the role of faith in the lives of ordinary Americans as Robert Coles. Though not religious in the conventional sense, Coles is unparalleled in his astute understanding and respect for the relationship between secular life and sacredness, which cuts across his large body of work. Drawing inspiration from figures like Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dorothy Day, and Simone Weil, Coles’s extensive writings explore the tug of war between faith and (...) doubt. As Coles himself admits, the “back-and-forthness between faith and doubt is the story of my life.” These thirty-one thought-provoking essays are drawn from Coles’s weekly column in the Catholic publication America. In them, he turns his inquisitive lens on a range of subjects and issues, from writers and painters to his recent reading and film viewing, contemporary events and lingering controversies, recollections of past and present mentors, events of his own daily life, and ordinary encounters with students, patients, neighbors, and friends. Addressing moral questions openly and honestly with a rare combination of rectitude and authorial modesty, these essays position Coles as a preeminent, durable, and trusted voice in the continuing national conversation over religion, civic life, and moral purpose. (shrink)

Francisco de Vitoria en sus comentarios a la Summa Theologiae y en la Relectio de bello admite que un simple ciudadano tiene la posibilidad (incluso la obligación) de no combatir en una guerra que él, en conciencia, considera injusta. Aunque no tiene obligación de examinar por sí mismo las causas de la guerra, no puede dejar de obrar en conciencia. Lo contrario a como actúan, por ejemplo, los mercenarios, siempre dispuestos a combatir en cualquier guerra, sea justa o no. Sería (...) un precedente de la objeción de conciencia; pero no a combatir en cualquier guerra, sino en “esta guerra” en particular. No obstante, en caso de duda, un simple ciudadano podría combatir obedeciendo a su príncipe, fiado de la rectitud de intención del gobernante. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Happiness in Premodern Judaism: Virtue, Knowledge, and Well-BeingDaniel H. FrankHava Tirosh-Samuelson. Happiness in Premodern Judaism: Virtue, Knowledge, and Well-Being. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 596. Cloth, $50.00.Franz Rosenzweig tried hard to convince the neoKantian Hermann Cohen of the merits of Zionism and the normalization it would bring to Jews and Jewish life. His attempt met with this response from Cohen: "Oho! So the gang (...) now wants to be happy, does it?" For those ignorant of the history of Jewish philosophy, one might imagine that Jewish philosophers, no less than their non-philosophical kinsmen, were so weighed down by the burdens of history and persecution that happiness could play no role in their theorizing. But happiness plays a key role in the history of Jewish moral and political philosophy, especially in the premodern period. Even Spinoza, the last of the medievals and the first of the moderns, the great critic of the rabbinic tradition and of Maimonides in particular, is concerned in his Ethics with identifying those activities that together constitute human well-being and the good life. Only lately, since the Enlightenment and Kant, has non-eudaimonism been a live option for Jewish thinkers. Only with the rise of (modern) Orthodoxy, and its predilection for construing goodness as rectitude and rule-following, has eudaimonism fallen out of favor. But with Tirosh-Samuelson's weighty volume on happiness in premodern Judaism, there can be no excuse in the future to imagine that all Jews are, or must be, closet Kantians, strict deontologists. To think otherwise seems to come close to taking on the classical (anti-Semitic) dichotomy of legalistic Judaism vs. spiritual Christianity. In it own way, Happiness in Premodern Judaism is a critique of such a one-sided, monochromatic view of Judaism, whether from the Christian or even from the Jewish side.Tirosh-Samuelson writes explicitly as an intellectual historian, rather than as a philosopher. She understands herself and her project as one that presents just the facts, without evaluating them. While one may cavil at a lost opportunity, in the present case this would be churlish, given the enormous erudition on display. After an introductory chapter outlining the foundational moral theories of Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic philosophers, the text presents the (Greek-inspired) areteic wisdom literature of the Second Temple period, the teleological theocentrism of the rabbis, the Greco-Arabic Islamicate culture that nurtured Jewish philosophers from Saadia in the tenth century to Maimonides in the twelfth, the rabbinic and kabbalistic critiques of the philosophical ideal of happiness commencing [End Page 338] with the translation (into Hebrew) of Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and finally, very important and the focus of much recent scholarly work, the transformation of Jewish eudaimonism through direct contact with Christian Scholasticism and later with the humanist Renaissance. All in all, a millennium and a half of Jewish intellectual history is presented in a sober and scholarly way.Not surprisingly Maimonides plays a pivotal role in the story that Tirosh-Samuelson relates. A Janus-like figure, he represents the culmination and height of accommodation with Greek and Greco-Arabic philosophical culture. However, with the gradual worsening of the socio-economic condition of European Jewry in the thirteenth century, his accommodationism seemed traitorous, and as a result generations of thinkers, mystics and philosophers alike, strove to critically distance themselves from Maimonidean Aristotelianism. Tirosh-Samuelson is admirably clear in pointing out that such anti-Maimonidean tendencies are ill-characterized as anti-philosophical. Hasdai Crescas in the late-fourteenth and early-fifteenth centuries launched a massive critique of Maimonides' physics, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, but did so in as rigorous a manner as any philosopher would. The picture that enfolds over the course of the text is one of vigorous dialectic between partisans of 'alien' (Greek) wisdom and those who viewed such wisdom with considerable suspicion. Such a dialectic parallels, not surprisingly, developments in Christian philosophy.The trajectory of the story of premodern Jewish musings on happiness is from the centrality of reason and intellect, and the contemplative activity that is reason's preeminent actuality, to the primacy... (shrink)

Nuestro trabajo intenta presentar, en su primera parte, la práctica de la filosofía clínica a partir de su pertinencia dentro de la filosofía antigua (clásica) en tanto ejercicio espiritual de transformación de sí. Con ello se quiere referir con el concepto de espíritu en comprender un ejercicio no como producto sólo del pensamiento sino a una totalidad psíquica y emocional del individuo, en sentirse dentro de la perspectiva del todo. Era un arte de vivir, un modo de vida que intenta (...) comprender más profundamente la totalidad de la existencia. La filosofía no es una disciplina que perseguía plantarse ante la dimensión única del conocimiento teórico sino en el marco del yo y del ser: consiste en un itinerario, un proceso, un viaje para la ampliación de la conciencia, que busca aumentar la captación, la atención, la vivencia y expansión del ser. En su segunda parte nos adentramos a examinar la figura del tirano en y como conciencia política degradada. Para ello nos centramos en el proceso de la personalidad de la condición de lo tiránico y del tirano dentro de la vida política, pero también como éste se nos presenta como germen en nosotros mismos y de cómo se establece a partir de ello –junto a las condiciones sociales requeridas-, su existencia proyectada en un individuo particular. La filosofía clínica es una filosofía crítica en la medida que tiene por asunto el pensamiento en sí mismo; es una filosofía con conciencia de sí misma; coloca al pensamiento en una sala de observación y cuidados intensivos ¿Se trata de comprender la política como un ejercicio espiritual? Por supuesto, un ejercicio cotidiano a lo largo de nuestra existencia, donde pueda permitirnos desarrollar una atención,una inteligencia, un crecimiento y una transformación de nuestra individualidad social autónoma como ciudadano de una región y del mundo, pero comprometida con su comunidad de vida. De un modo de aprender el dominio de uno mismo, del cumplimiento de los deberes, de la libertad pública y privada, que nos lleva a renunciar de todo aquello que no dependa de nosotros y ocuparnos de lo que sí depende; mantener una rectitud de acción en conformidad con el grado de evolución de nuestra razón. On the tyranny in Plato Our work attempts to present, in its first part, the practice of clinical philosophy from its relevance as a spiritual exercise of self-transformation within ancient (classical) philosophy. The¡ concept of spirit is meant to bring about an understanding of this exercise not as a sole product¡ of thinking, but as the involvement of the individual’s psychic and emotional totality, which entails that the individual should feel as a part of the whole. It was an art of living, a way of life that attempts to understand more deeply the totality of existence. Philosophy is not a discipline that sought to face the sole dimension of theoretical knowledge. Rather, it is built around the framework of self and being. It consists of a route, a process, a journey to broaden consciousness. It seeks to increase uptake, attention, experience and expansion of being. In the second part we examine in depth the figure of the tyrant as degraded political consciousness. To this aim we focus on the process of the personality of the tyrannical and the tyrant within political life, but also on how the latter is a seed within ourselves, and on how, on this basis,his existence projected onto a particular individual becomes established –together with the required social conditions. Clinical philosophy is a critical philosophy inasmuch as its subject-matteris thought in itself; it is a philosophy with self-awareness; it places thought in an observation and intensive care room. Are we to understand politics as a spiritual exercise? Of course, an everyday exercise throughout our existence, which enables us to develop a degree of attention, intelligence, growth and transformation of our social autonomous individuality as citizens of a region and the world, while sill committed to our life community. It enables us to learn self-control, to carry out our duties, to exercise public and private freedom, in a way that makes us give up everything which doesnot depend upon us and pay attention to what actually does. It enables us to maintain rectitude of action, in agreement with our reason’s degree of evolution. (shrink)

Cet article se réfère au cours de Heidegger du semestre d’hiver 1942-1943, consacré au poème Sur la nature de Parménide, afin de mettre en évidence la différence qui se produit quand, avec la romanité, la vérité – qui pour les Grecs est l’autre nom du πόλεμος – est reformulée comme « rectitude ». Le regard est centré sur la portée éthique de cette transposition de la vérité dans le domaine d’expérience de la romanité. Ce travail vise à montrer, à (...) partir de l’analyse de Heidegger, comment cette transposition dans une autre sphère d’expérience a signifié un écart entre la vérité et l’éthique. (shrink)

Con este artículo se pretende indagar en el origen del mal moral. Se comienza planteando las aporías que se suscitan entre la libertad y el mal, así como entre el no ser del mal y sus efectos perniciosos. Remontándonos al primer pecado, intentamos responder al interrogante sobre cómo en la obra de la creación, buena en sí misma, pudo introducirse el mal y acudimos para ello al autoengaño sobre la jerarquía de los bienes, posibilitado por la noción poliana de límite (...) mental. Por fin, examinamos cómo tras el primer pecado quedan deformados el conocimiento cabal del bien y la distinción nítida entre los medios y el fin, que son condiciones para el obrar con rectitud. (shrink)

As in the transmigration of souls after death in the Pythagorean myth that Socrates recounts in the Phaedo, for G.W.F. Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right, individuals are also 'reborn' out of their original nature into a 'second nature'. This article asks whether the Hegelian transmigration aims at their becoming nothing higher than that 'race of tame and social creatures . . . bees perhaps, wasps, or ants' which the Pythagorean myth relates is the fate of those who 'practiced popular (...) and social goodness . . . but devoid of philosophy and intelligence'. Through an analysis of duty, virtue, rectitude, custom and habit, this article argues that Hegel's account of the nature of fully ethical self-consciousness contains within it a robust, practical knowledge that resists the 'bees problem', shifts the focus of criticism from the truncation of human possibilities to the vitality of life, and ultimately furnishes resources that can secure the latter -- all without abandoning conventionality as the ethical horizon. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:OwlJohn HollanderOwlNow that the owl-light—in the time between Dog and wolf, as some call it—ends, we wait As you alight on an unseen Branch to interrogateThe listener and the rememberer; Lost outlines heighten—as last colors fade— The sounder darkness you confer Upon the spruce’s shade.Deluded by the noonlight’s wide display Of everything, our vision floats through thin Spaces of ill-illumined day: How we are taken inBy what we take (...) in with our roving eyes! Your constant ones, if moved to track or trace, Take their head with them, lantern-wise Taking heed, keeping faceIn the society of night, and keeping Faith with the spirit of pure fixity That sets the mind’s great heart to leaping At what you more than see. [End Page 163]Medusa’s visage gazed our bodies to Literal stone unshaded: your face, caught In our glance widely eyes us through, Astonishing our thought. You who debated with the nightingale The rectitude of northern wisdom, cold Against the love-stuff of the tale The laid-back south had told; And yet who stood amid the lovely, thick Leaves of the ivy, while in all their folly The larks and thrushes sought the prick And berries of the holly; You who confounded the rapacious crow Thus to be favored by the great sky-eyed Queen of the air and all who know, Now ever by her side; With silent wing and interrogative Cry in lieu of a merely charming song, You sound the dark in which you live Perched above right and wrong. Resonance is not vacancy: although He could hear nothing in your hollow howls But woe and his own guilt, Thoreau Rejoiced that there were owls. Scattered and occasional questionings With here and there too late a warning shout, Wisdom arises on the wings Of darkness and of doubt. Where in day’s vastnesses does truth reside? In noon’s uncompromising light and heat When even our own shadows hide Under our very feet? Or in the hidden center of the quick Resilient dark on which your narrowed sight So pointedly alights to pick Not the day, but the night, [End Page 164] Its fruitful flower, petaled a hundredfold? Oh it is there, truth, with the poor blind prey Trembling with prescience or cold Waiting for how your way Of well-tuned suddenness and certitude Tight-strung and execution highly wrought Leads to the pounced-on object, food For something beyond thought, By overlooking nothing, overseeing In all the stillness hidden, tiny motions Squirming with the life of being Inferences and notions. With patient agency the beak and claws Of fierce sublime awareness pluck it clean Deriving what for us are laws Governing the unseen. Under torn canvas we put out to sea Trusting, though puzzled by what glows above, To something like philosophy To be the helmsman of Life (but whose life?). Your lessons of the land, Down-to-tree, then, if not -to-earth, indict Our helplessness to understand Just what we are at night. Immensities of starlight told us lies Of what and where we are; but, we allow, Drunk with the Milky Way, our eyes Are on the Wagon now, Fugitive slaves, leaving despair for dread As if in search of the cold, freeing North, Keep gazing steadily ahead Keep on Keep knowing forth You urge us, as your silences address The power that Minerva chose you for: Great-winged, far-ranging consciousness Now come to rest in your [End Page 165] Olympian attentiveness that finds The affrighted heartbeat on the ground, perceives The flutter of substances, the mind’s Life in the fallen leaves.John HollanderYale UniversityCopyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "Georges Canguilhem nous laisse une oeuvre marquée par une exigeante lucidité et une grande rectitude morale. Ce livre se limite à analyser ses recherches sur la biologie et la médecine. L'apport majeur de Canguilhem porte sur l'histoire des idées médicales des origines jusqu'au début du XXe siècle. Il avait l'intention, et c'est ainsi que certains cherchent à le lire, de donner à ses recherches une dimension à la fois médicale et philosophique. En fait, (...) il nous propose un regard anthropologique sur la médecine, un regard qui lui est extérieur, et qui ne réussit pas à saisir la réalité humaine, sociale, culturelle et finalement médicale de la maladie. Il tirait de ses recherches des spéculations et des critiques sur la médecine contemporaine, en général surannées, car il n'avait pas compris la mutation profonde dont elle était, sous ses yeux, l'objet, car lui ont manqué les connaissances, l'expérience et le jugement clinique, qui eurent été nécessaires pour réaliser son ambition. Il a mal compris les concepts de normes, de normal et d'anormal en médecine". (shrink)

Teaching business ethics and corporate social responsibility should neither be misconstrued as a plea for moral rectitude, nor as a limited utilitarian recipe for managing public interest issues or stakeholders — as it too often is. Rather, teaching CSR should allow students to recognize corporations as social institutions so that they can gauge their impact on a social scale and better weigh the values that inform them.However, this vision of CSR training has not found many supporters in North American (...) schools of management, even as the demand for ethics education continues to increase. Our paper endeavours to clarify the bipolar origins of the rising concern around ethics in the business world and how demand for more ethical corporate management is impacting demand for ethics education in management programs. We have noted that despite the intensity of demand, there is a great deal of skepticism and strong resistance to the integration of ethics and social responsibility into the education of management students. Therefore, while providing a preliminary assessment of ethical training in North American schools of management, we raise questions regarding current objectives and those that could be pursued. With these factors in mind, teaching choices that inspired the development of a new course in economic and social ethics can be presented and justified. (shrink)

That Sallust owed a considerable debt to the writings of Cato the Censor was observed in antiquity, and the observation has often been discussed and expanded on by modern scholars. The ancient references to Sallust's employment of Cato are mainly in the context of his adoption of an archaic style, and specifically Catonian vocabulary. But the choice of Cato as a model had an obvious significance that went beyond the purely stylistic. Sallust's works articulate extreme pessimism at the moral state (...) of late-Republican Rome, and do so partly by contrasting the modern age with a prelapsarian time of near-untrammelled virtue, brought to an end only by the fall of Carthage and the consequent dominance of Roman power, which in turn led to moral corruption. Similarly, Cato famously stood in his own day for moral rectitude—and specifically appealed to past virtue as the standard to which he wished to hold his contemporaries. Sallust, by writing in a Catonian style, aligns himself with that tradition. (shrink)

L’article se propose de présenter la conception de la lecture défendue par Roman Ingarden. Elle est comprise comme un processus complexe entre un lecteur et une œuvre littéraire, au cours duquel le lecteur porte la responsabilité de faire exister le sens du texte, soit d’en actualiser la vérité. Cette conception trouve des prolongements et des affinités aussi bien chez Jean-Paul Sartre que chez Hans-Georg Gadamer. Tous les trois s’accordent sur le fait qu’il y a une rectitude de la lecture (...) qui trouve ses normes et ses règles dans l’œuvre mais suppose un lecteur scrupuleux et généreux, qualifié pour s’efforcer d’éviter le relativisme et le nihilisme. La lecture ainsi prise au sérieux s’avère une expérience cognitive et esthétique au service des valeurs. Elle se caractérise comme une expérience de création et de découverte au terme de laquelle la vérité est toujours l’apparition de « la chose même ». (shrink)

Aunque la cuestión de la licitud de la guerra no se plantee para Maquiavelo, como no lo hace para la mayoría de los pensadores italianos de principios del siglo XVI, el componente ético no está ausente de la reflexión maquiaveliana en El arte de la guerra. De hecho, junto al aspecto técnico de la creación de una milicia de ordenanza y sus diversos modos de combatir en el campo, sin embargo, se encuentran estrechamente vinculadas a los requisitos políticos de una (...) república virtuosa las fundamentales exigencias éticas tanto en las cualidades morales de los ciudadanos-soldados como en la virtud de los comandantes y en la rectitud de los dirigentes políticos que los reclutan y emplean en las operaciones militares. Esto se evidencia, particularmente, en las partes introductoria y final del tratado. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.1 (2001) 177-180 [Access article in PDF] Book Review How to Defend Humane Ideals: Substitutes for Objectivity How to Defend Humane Ideals: Substitutes for Objectivity, by James R. Flynn; ix & 212 pp. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000, $40.00. James Flynn's search for non-objective grounds for humane ideals opens with an admission that the author spent decades searching for an "ethical truth-test" by which to (...) measure ideals. This truth-test would constitute a "higher court of appeals," a nonpartisan judgment of right and wrong that would grant objectivity to the winning belief. This is the stance of Socrates and Kant. What Flynn came to realize was that the truth-tests he sampled proved to be contradictory, easily exploited, and ineffectual in convincing people of the tests' warrant. For many this collapse of ethical truth leads to relativism, and a concomitant tolerance of the values of others, however repellant one finds them. This is the stance of the postmodernists, those dedicated to "building bonfires to celebrate the demise of the Enlightenment" (p. 181). But Flynn deems the anti-truth position just as contradictory and exploitable as the truth-test position. Instead, he proposes an intermediate stance, short of objective truth but more than relativist assertion, an outlook that takes the best of truth, beauty, diversity, perfectibility, utilitarianism, and justice and casts them in a relation of trade-off and compromise.To reach this negotiation model of humaneness, Flynn must dispense with [End Page 177] three faulty beliefs. The first mistake is the objective one, that is, the reliance on ethical truth-tests (chapters 2-4). The problem lies in their grounding in "a theory of being that posits something beyond the physical universe... or that asserts that the physical universe contains something not revealed by science, such as the purposes of nature" (pp. 47-48). Plato has his Forms, Rousseau his nature, Moore his "moral goodness." The difficulty with these criteria is that, granted their existence, we know not how to apply them to human affairs. We may appeal to God to justify our actions, but in doing so "we tend to assume that God's overriding criterion of moral rectitude is similar to our own. The humane posit a benevolent God, the not so humane a stern God" (p. 72). In other words, such criteria beg the question of their use. Their transcendence of the world renders them eminently adaptable to various worldly designs, for example, when Kant reads into nature "whatever content he needs to get decisions in favor of his own principles" (p. 77).When ethical truth-tests fail in their implementation, the temptation is to reject ethical grounds altogether. Flynn terms this the "nihilist fallacy," the notion that if there is no extra-human ground for ethics, no ethical truth-test, then no ethic is justified. Flynn counters that "Even in the absence of a truth-test, people may internalize ideals and be deeply committed to them" (p. 9). They believe in those ideals not because they think they are true, but because they think they are right. Only those who believe that ethical beliefs are an epistemological matter assume that ideals must be shored up by evidence and proven to be correct. It is ironic, Flynn notes, that it is anti-epistemologists like Nietzsche who make this argument, claiming that ethical believers fail a truth-test when in fact those believers are not interested in truth-testing at all.The flip side of this nihilism is postmodernism, another ethical outlook Flynn rejects. Nihilists and postmodernists share an epistemological skepticism, treating putatively objective ideals as disguised power plays concocted to promote certain interests. They differ in how they direct that skepticism. For the Nietzschean nihilist, the interests are those of the herd and its institutions (like the Church), and so he counsels great geniuses to use lesser persons as means to their ends (pp. 127-33). For the postmodernist, the interests are those of the Western male, the naive empiricist, the imperialist, and so he counsels those privileged individuals to examine themselves... (shrink)

How should we live? What kind of people should we be? What meaning is there in our day-to-day existence? What are the truly important things? We live in turbulent times. Torrents of information, fractured families, and politically correct rhetoric color our understanding of ourselves, each other, and the world. We are sorely in need of moral compasses. In his timely and provocative work, Things That Count, ethicist and theologian Gilbert Meilaender provides us with just such a guide. Whether explicating When (...) Harry Met Sally or John Updike's fiction, meditating on the works of C. S. Lewis or St. Augustine, or presenting a different look at such controversial issues as cloning and homosexuality, Meilaender provides an ethic that ignores neither our humanity nor our thirst for rectitude. (shrink)

Considerations of well-being or flourishing include Maslow’s and Rogers’ concepts of self-actualisation and actualising tendency. Recent empirical findings suggest that only a modest proportion of the population might be considered to be flourishing. Separate findings focused upon the nature and determinants of post-traumatic growth identify it as comparable to flourishing, and facilitated by supported accommodation to the trauma. This can be understood as reflecting self-actualisation. Empirical findings such as these provide ontological stability to a set of phenomena that share much (...) with ancient teachings extolling redemption through suffering. This framework challenges conventional healthcare policies and practices, but in ways that offer insights into how patient-centred approaches to chronic illness and disability might be better conceived and enabled. It also throws into doubt the rectitude of an economic model built around services and products designed to provide easy access to sources of immediate gratification. (shrink)

The control of women's public form of mourning in India was undertaken in the colonial era by male social reformers. The article argues that this was both a part of the process which enabled the consolidation of colonial rule – since laments were repositories for the social memory of the dead which could lead to vendettas – and that this fed into the construction of a specific domestic ideology. The latter was predicated on the privatization and interiorization of grief, whereby (...) women were enjoined to bear themselves with rectitude. The taming of the transgressive form of mourning, whereby women who had earlier exhibited their grievances in a spectacular form through lament, took to more quietist (devotional) forms, has reconfigured the relationship to death and mourning. However, this has been a partial phenomenon, limited to the upper-caste, middle-class milieu. Where women continue to hold a dependent position within community, nation-state and international economy, the article suggests that, in contexts of modern conflicts and warfare, where death runs ‘wild’, the exhibitionist and ‘wild’ forms of showing grief and anger continue to be demonstrated by women as an appropriate public response. (shrink)

Peu de notions semblent a priori aussi vertueuses, donc aussi inoffensives, que celle de " transparence ", synonyme de clarté, de sincérité voire de rectitude morale. Mais en philosophie, c'est bien connu, aucun concept n'est bon ou mauvais en soi. Et, à y bien regarder, rien n'est si clair qu'il n'y paraît lorsqu'il s'agit de transparence. Chaque citoyen a par exemple le droit d'être informé de la façon la plus objective. Faut-il pour autant tout montrer dans les médias, y (...) compris les images les plus choquantes? Si ce même citoyen se plaît à mettre en scène son intimité sur les réseaux sociaux, doit-il pour autant ne pas s'inquiéter de l'utilisation marchande ou sécuritaire de ses données personnelles? Si un homme politique a pour obligation d'être irréprochable, peut-il tolérer d'être constamment épié, y compris jusque dans sa vie privée? Cette recherche sans limite de " transparence " est en train de gommer une frontière qu'on croyait jusqu'ici sacrée : celle qui sépare l'espace publique de l'espace privé. Qu'il s'agisse de la presse à scandale ou de la téléréalité, de la vie de nos dirigeants, du traitement de l'information par les médias ou des nouvelles technologies, l'exigence de transparence s'est imposée dans tous les domaines de la société, glissant subrepticement de l'injonction morale au fantasme de contrôle absolu, au risque de nous conduire à la lisière du totalitarisme. C'est sur ce danger que Mazarine Pingeot a souhaité attirer l'attention. (shrink)

El Cratilo, verdadera primicia de la filosofía del lenguaje, es una de las obras más difíciles salidas de la pluma de Platón. De un lado, en él se esbozan ideas de gramática y semiótica –semántica, sintáctica y pragmática–, se analiza el lenguaje griego real y se esboza un lenguaje ideal; del otro, está tachado por la enorme dificultad que le imprimen el tono irónico de Sócrates y el anonimato de sus interlocutores, la larga y misteriosa lista de etimologías y la (...) dinámica dialéctica del discurso. Ese poder de sugestión y repulsión, signo inequívoco de todas las grandes obras, explica que filósofos y filólogos de todos los tiempos le sean deudores, desde Aristóteles y Dionisio el Tracio hasta Saussure y Gadamer. Su distinción entre rectitud natural y convencional de los nombres marcó un hito insuperable en la teoría de los signos; sus ideas sobre el cuerpo humano como signo viviente y primordial, sobre la pintura y la música como paradigma del lenguaje escrito y oral, sobre el signo perfecto, «doble» o biunívoco, como signo realmente inútil, encierran virtualidades todavía sin explotar. La edición del profesor Atilano Domínguez ofrece una serie de instrumentos de gran utilidad tanto para el lector general como para el estudioso. Unos son de carácter general: la extensa y documentada introducción, las notas al texto platónico, el índice analítico, y una bibliografía que contiene las principales ediciones y traducciones del Cratilo, así como el listado alfabético casi completo de cuantos estudios se le han dedicado. A esos instrumentos generales, se añaden otros específicos que intentan responder al carácter propio de la obra: la introducción de nuevos párrafos, la estructuración sistemática del texto platónico, con sus epígrafes también entre corchetes, el índice, en caracteres griegos, de las doscientas etimologías recensionadas en esta obra, con sus diversas acepciones. Además, se han incorporado al índice analítico, en caracteres latinos, los términos griegos que corresponden a los castellanos. (shrink)