The essay reconsiders Wolfgang Iser’s phenomenology of reading, taken as a possible non reductionist answer to the neuroscientific theories of literature. By emphasizing the aesthetic nature of reading, thanks also to Hans Robert Jauss’ contribution, the idea of a ‘reader’s imagination’ emerges here, as a specific and unique power which allows not only the access to the world of the literary text, but opens also new spheres for the understanding and exploration of the real world. In shorts, it is (...) concerned with the constitution of a special cognitive-emotional pattern, which depends on the building of what Iser considers as the reader’s «artificial habitats», through the interaction with the text. (shrink)

A timely book that uses science fiction to provoke reflection and discussion on philosophical issues From the nature of mind to the ethics of AI and neural enhancement, science fiction thought experiments fire the philosophical imagination, encouraging us to think outside of the box about classic philosophical problems and even to envision new ones. Science Fiction and Philosophy explores puzzles about virtual reality, transhumanism, whether time travel is possible, the nature of artificial intelligence, and topics in neuroethics, among other (...) timely issues. This thought-provoking volume is suitable for students and general readers but also examines new and more advanced topics of interest to seasoned philosophers and scientists. Susan Schneider is Assistant Professor in the department of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania and an Affiliated Faculty Member at the Institutes for Research in Cognitive Science and Center for Cognitive Neuroscience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Vergil's Aeneid and the Roman Self: Subject and Nation in Literary DiscourseJames J. O'HaraYasmin Syed. Vergil's Aeneid and the Roman Self: Subject and Nation in Literary Discourse. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005. x + 277 pp. Cloth, $65.This book, which "began as a PhD dissertation at the University of California, Berkeley" (1997), tackles a timely, large, and difficult topic, possibly a topic too difficult to (...) be handled in a satisfactory way in a dissertation and first book. In sum, it makes a decent but flawed contribution on a topic that needs much more work, and in some ways, much more careful work.Two introductory chapters describe the importance of the Aeneid in imperial culture and the role of manipulation of the emotions in ancient theories of rhetoric. In a section called "The Reader's Subject Position," two chapters (both largely on Aeneas and Dido) treat "The Gaze" and "The Spectacle of Emotions." In the next section, on "Gender and Ethnicity," four chapters treat "Gendered Emotions" (before Allecto's visit, Amata is worried, but Turnus is calm; "frenzy, then, is female," 122), "Gendered Ethnicity" (Dido's characterization as Punic "is hard to detect because it is blended with her lover's persona," but it is still significant, 145), "Cleopatra and the Politics of Gendered Ethnicity" ("Augustan representations of Cleopatra form the birth of the Western discourse of orientalism," 177, somewhat overstated, but with interesting ideas about the connection between Cleopatra and Dido), and "Romanitas" (Greek stereotypes, and others, define Romans but are characterized by a "fundamental ambivalence," 203). A brief conclusion ends the book.The interesting argument that Syed makes in the first few chapters is "that the Aeneid used its visuality and its sublime style to appeal to the readers' emotions, and that it created a fictional space for an internal reader within the poem for [End Page 317] 316 whom the poem could articulate an identity by creating various fictional characters as figures of identification" (35). Both these and later chapters offer a mix of the new, the familiar, and, at times, the unconvincing. Two of the book's flaws are actually signaled in the surprising final paragraph, which declares that the book's "most glaring omission has been that of considering more Italian characters and generally of giving more attention to the second half of the poem" (227). Syed says that this "focus" on other aspects of the poem "has been a personal decision on my part," but it is hard to imagine thinking about "subject and nation" in the Aeneid without discussing the relationship between Rome and Italy both in the poem and in Vergil's world; see C. Ando, "Vergil's Italy: ethnography and politics in first-century Rome," pp. 123–42 in D. S. Levene and D. Nelis, eds., Clio and the Poets (Leiden, 2002), whose date is probably too close to Syed's publication date. Presumably there will be a full discussion of Rome and Italy in Alessandro Barchiesi's forthcoming The Geopoetics of Vergil's Aeneid.The lack of attention to Books 7–12 is also a problem, because often the arguments Syed makes about the parts of the Aeneid that she does treat are less convincing when we think about passages in the second half of the poem. The claims that Aeneas has a special ability "to control his emotional responses to the world" (70) and that "in contrast to Aeneas, whose emotions are carefully controlled, many characters in the poem give free rein to their emotions" (87), surely cry out for a consideration of Aeneas' rampage after the death of Pallas in Book 10 and the rage with which he kills Turnus in the poem's final lines. The discussion of Dido's wounds and of Lavinia's association, through allusive simile, with the wound of Menelaus (125–35) is fairly good. But Syed does not mention that Turnus at the start of Aeneid 12 is compared to a wounded deer, or that right before the Lavinia scene Vergil says Turnus "grows sicker with the attempt to heal" (aegrescitque medendo, 45). Lavinia is indeed associated with Menelaus by allusion, but Aeneas... (shrink)

In this project, I offer an extended treatment of Gabirol's metaphysical doctrine of universal hylomorphism . My thesis is that, for Gabirol , matter signifies the most sublime moment of the Neoplatonic Intellect, and, by extension, the pre-determinate, essential existence which each thing has in virtue of its subsistence in said Intellect. My reading thus identifies matter with a grade of pure Being. Drawing upon Latin, Hebrew and Arabic Fons Vitae materials, I develop and support this thesis in light of (...) three of Gabirol's most vexing remarks about matter, viz., that matter is 'per se existens,' descended directly from the First Essence, and like a Divine Throne. In the course of developing my thesis, I argue for strictly distinguishing between Gabirol's UH and other Augustinian forms of UH, for revising the accounts of Pines, Weisheipl, Brunner and Schlanger, for the relevance of Saadiah's Sefer Yez&dotbelow;irah commentary in a study of Gabirol, and for the conceptual identification of creation ex nihilo and emanation. I also provide the reader with a larger Neoplatonic context for considering the superiority of the material over the formal, as I additionally examine relevant notions of materiality in a variety of other textual traditions, including the writings of Plotinus, Proclus, and the Neopythagorean Nicomachus, as well as various Jewish and Islamic texts . ;I close with a 'meta' analysis of Gabirol's metaphysical project in which I suggest treating Gabirol's interest in universal hylomorphism---and any other bits of cosmo-ontology---in terms of said doctrine's ability to effect the reader's soul in certain ethically and epistemologically crucial ways. In this move, I suggest that the importance of Gabirol's philosophical metaphysics is not best gauged by considering what his metaphysical propositions denote, but instrumentally by considering the effect said propositions are intended to have on the reader. I develop this point by providing analyses of Neoplatonic dialectic, textual rhetoric, and the mechanics of imagination in Gabirol's Arabic Neoplatonic tradition. (shrink)

The article reflects on the therapeutic and ethical potential of literature, the theme which is often marginalized and overlooked by literary critics, in the novel Mister Pip by Lloyd Jones. Matilda, the main character of the analyzed novel, finds salvation in the times of war and oppression thanks to Charles Dickens’s masterpiece, Great Expectations, and the only white man on the island−her teacher, Mr. Watts. Matilda’s strong identification with Dickensian Pip and imagination make her escape to another world, become (...) a self-conscious person and reunite with her father. The paper also discusses relationships between Matilda, Mr. Watts and her mother, Dolores. I attempt to show the emotional development of the characters, their interactions, changes, sense of identity, and, having analyzed their actions, I compare them to protagonists created by Charles Dickens. Needless to say, drawing the reader’s attention to British culture and traditions, Lloyd Jones avoids focusing on the negative aspects of the postcolonial views, pointing out that “the white man” can be an example of a Dickensian gentleman. (shrink)

E-Z Reader's account of the interaction between oculomotor and cognitive processes depends critically on distinguishing between early and late stages of lexical processing, because this distinction allows saccadic programming to be decoupled from shifts of attention. Precisely specifying the nature of this distinction has important implications both for current models of lexical retrieval and for the development of E-Z Reader 8.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Weeds: Cultivating the Imagination in Medieval Arabic Political PhilosophyMichael S. KochinAny reader of Plato’s dialogues in their entirety feels the constant tug of two very different solar motions. In the Laws the young field-legates (agronomoi) of the city move in a twelve-month cycle through each of the divisions of the city’s territory (Laws 760) in obedience to the law and the gods of the city. Socrates, too, moves through (...) the city, questioning each citizen about the beliefs concerning the virtues implanted by the city’s laws and myths. Socrates, like the field-legates, moves in “obedience” to the command of the sun-god Apollo, a command that Socrates claims to have received through the god’s oracle at Delphi.1 To live in the light of the sun of reason is only possible within a city totally ordered in imitation of heavenly order—so speaks the Laws.2 To follow the sun is to move in opposition to the shadows of artificial light that dominate all actual and even possible cities—so speaks the Apology and, more explicitly, the Republic.Our learned prejudices about these two solar motions lead us to divide Plato’s thought into periods of composition. Socratic heliotropy belongs to the dialogues of Plato’s earlier period, especially the earliest, the Apology, scholars believe; the city itself in seasonal motion belongs to the dialogues of Plato’s later period, and especially the latest, his Laws. The Republic, which describes the best city as an artificially lighted cave, whose inhabitants ought nonetheless to be ruled by the philosopher-king who has, at least momentarily, seen the sun, belongs to Plato’s middle period. [End Page 399]Whatever the merits of this family of readings as interpretations of Plato, 3 they use a scholar’s device to avoid coming to terms with a genuine tension. The two modes of solar motion represent two different modes of relating philosophy to politics, even under their modern guises of theory and practice. Either the philosopher is to bring the political into rational order, or he is to bring his own life into rational order against the disorders and deliberate confusions of the political. Either the philosopher is to weed the fields of the city of disorderly weeds, or he himself is a weed or, more politely, a wildflower, pushing up toward the sun through the broken asphalt of politics.Plato himself seems to resolve this tension by distinguishing between the philosopher’s duties in the best city and in other cities. As Socrates says in the Republic:Observe, then, Glaucon, that we won’t be doing injustice to the philosophers who grow up among us, but we will say just things to them, when we compel them to care and guard for the others. For we will say that those who are of their sort who grow up in the other cities fittingly do not share in the labors therein. For they grew in them spontaneously though the regime in each did not intend it, and the spontaneously grown has a just claim not to be eager to repay the cost of its nurture to anybody, since it owes [its] nurture to nobody. But you we reared up, just as in hives, as leaders and kings for yourselves and the rest of the city, and you have been educated better and more perfectly than those and are more able to have a share of both [philosophy and rule]. Each of you must then go down in turn to the common dwelling of the others and accustom yourself to the shadows there. For when you are accustomed, you will see in a myriad ways better than those there, and you will know the images, that they are images and of what they are images, on account of your having seen the true things that concern the beautiful, the just and the good. 4Yet Plato’s Socrates availed himself only partially of the just claim of the philosopher in an actual city that contributed nothing to his nurture. While Socrates took only a minimal part in the official business of the city, he never hesitated to [End... (shrink)

What did Rousseau's readers mean when they called him an ‘Epicurean’? A seemingly simple question with complex implications. This article attempts to answer it by reconstructing Rousseau's contemporary reception as an Epicurean thinker. First, it surveys the earliest and most widely read critics of the second Discourse: Prussian Astronomer Royal Jean de Castillon, Jesuit priest Louis Bertrand Castel, and Hanoverian biblical scholar Hermann Samuel Reimarus. These readers branded Rousseau an Epicurean primarily to highlight his atheism, his anti-providential and materialist natural (...) philosophy. Then, it discusses Genevan pastor Jacob Vernet's positive assessment of Rousseau as a critic of ‘fashionable’ Epicureanism, before reconstructing Rousseau's critique of the reception of Alexander Pope's Essay on Man as an Epicurean text. These sources elucidate Rousseau's engagement with a range of ideas and argumentative positions that would inform his later self-identification as a ‘refined’ Epicurean. In particular, they highlight his interest in how a sentimental awareness of beauty might mitigate the potentially vicious effects of hedonism. The article concludes with novelist Mme. de Genlis’ critique of Rousseau's Wise Materialism, using his thoughts on the imagination to suggest some of the ways the neglected aesthetic dimensions of Rousseau's reception of Epicureanism might be developed. (shrink)

How can the one influence the many? From posing seminal questions about what comprises a human individual, to asking whether human evolution is alive and well, favoring individuals or the species, this work is a daring, up-to-the-minute overview of an urgent, multidisciplinary premise. It explores the extent to which human history provides empirical evidence for the capacity of an individual to exert meaningful suasion over their species, and asks: Can an individual influence the survival of the human species and the (...) planet? If there are to be cultures of transformation dedicated to seeing us all through the Sixth Extinction Spasm, the Anthropocene, inflicting as little biological havoc as possible, what might such orientations—a collective, widespread biophilia, or reverence for nature—look like? In this powerful work, with a combination of data and direct observation, the authors invite readers to explore how such transformations might resonate throughout the human community; in what ways a person might overcome the seemingly insurmountable environmental tumult our species has unleashed; the clear and salient motives, ethics, aspirations and pragmatic idealism he/she might mirror and embrace in order to effect a profound difference—at the individual level—for all of life and life’s myriad habitats. Chapters illuminate an ambitiously broad digest of research from two-dozen disciplines. Those include ecodynamics, biosemiotics, neural plasticity, anthropology, paleontology and the history of science, among others. All converge upon a set of ethics-based scenarios for mitigating ecological damage to ourselves and other life forms. This highly readable and tightly woven treatise speaks to scientists, students and all those who are concerned about ethical activism and the future of the biosphere. Michael Charles Tobias and Jane Gray Morrison are ecological philosophers and animal liberation activists who have worked for decades to help enrich our understanding of ecosystem dynamics and humanity’s ambiguous presence amid that great orchestra that is nature. (shrink)

This chapter considers how and why real people can care about fictional characters.. Caring rests on having interests at stake, and in literary contexts those interests concern the accuracy and content of a representation; we as people, as part of our natural history, are beings for whom representation and being represented are centrally important. This chapter argues for a better integration of the “internal” and “external” perspectives on fictional characters, that is, a better integration of what are too often taken (...) as divergent and incompatible points of view: (1) the characters as witnessed from the outside, and (2) the reader’s vicarious identification with, and thus imaginative entry into the life of, the character from the inside. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Avicenna’s Metaphysics in ContextTaneli KukkonenRobert Wisnovsky. Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. Pp. ix + 305. Cloth, $65.00.The challenges facing the contemporary writer on Arabic philosophy are many, but none more daunting than that of striking a satisfying balance between faithfully reproducing what is there in the text (alongside a lineage of likely sources, perhaps), and actively engaging the materials philosophically. From among the (...) current crop of scholars, the more cautious will argue that as long as we lack critical editions of even basic works, and as long as ambiguities remain concerning who was reading what, where, and when, any ambitious statements regarding the substance of Arabic thought, its development, and (especially) what its distinctive contributions might be, must remain hopelessly premature. The counterargument goes that by refusing the philosophically impatient the licence to speculate, at least, about the relevance of the materials at hand—however rough and ready—one will end up stifling just those endeavours the philologist hopes to promote. For without the promise of philosophical rewards, what incentive remains for the thankless and endless task of textual refinement and identification of sources? Strides made in late ancient and Latin medieval scholarship seem to indicate that philosophical curiosity serves to feed historical acuity, rather than hinder it. Yet with the study of Arabic philosophy the perceived opposition between philosophy and philology has led to a precious few works escaping charges of being found lacking either in textual or philosophical sophistication, or indeed both.To this select company one may now add Robert Wisnovsky's aptly titled Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context. The author pursues a particularly deft course of action: honing in on themes for whose evaluation sufficient materials are available, then infusing his exposition at every turn with philosophical insight and a scholar's eye for detail, Wisnovsky demonstrates by example what a resourceful scholar can accomplish in this day and age. Wisnovsky takes it as his task to situate the very doctrines Abû 'Alî Ibn Sînâ (980-1037) is most famous for—the essence-existence distinction, the distinction between contingent and necessary existence, and the created and embodied yet ultimately separable perfection of the human soul—in a continuous line of discussion stretching from Alexander of Aphrodisias to the kalâm theologians of Avicenna's own age.The resulting narrative threads together a dizzying array of thinkers and discussions, showing just how fertile the scholarship ranging from late antiquity to Arabic thought was, both considered in its original setting and in terms of the contemporary scholarly imagination. Among other things, Wisnovsky's book constitutes the fullest study to date of the [End Page 112] evolution of the concepts of final and efficient causality in the increasingly Neoplatonising interpretations of Aristotle. The cosmological and metaphysical motifs behind these developments are rightly pointed out by Wisnovsky, and their impact on Avicenna's metaphysics of the soul and his views on process and return receive thorough attention.In the midst of all this, sight may be lost of Avicenna's original achievement, and it has to be said that Wisnovsky does not play this aspect up by much. But this, the reader suspects, is part of the point. In order to appreciate a thinker's intellectual prowess it is not necessary to insist that he or she be conjuring up concepts out of thin air. A great mind may instead be a synthetic one, one that is able to negotiate between various conceptual schemes and commitments, and this is the picture Wisnovsky paints of Avicenna. Avicenna's deep engagement with the Peripatetic tradition is evident to any scholar, yet it is often difficult to determine exactly whose opinions he references, as contending viewpoints are typically introduced by enigmatic preambles such as "if it is said... " or, "some contend." Wisnovsky's attention to how terminological shifts reflect philosophical ones succeeds in demonstrating Avicenna's reliance in general not only on ancient sources, but on al-Fârâbi and the kalâm as well. His subtle analysis of the development of key Avicennian doctrines simultaneously serves to lend credence to the picture that is currently emerging concerning the... (shrink)

From the Ninth Circle of hell in Dante’s Inferno to the idea of human cryogenic storage, cold has been an important part of human life and imagination. In History of Artificial Cold, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Issues, editor Kostas Gavroglu has brought together a well-balanced and very readable collection of essays on the history of the investigation and use of “cold.” There is something here for a broad range of readers, with articles ranging from fundamental physics to industrial refrigeration (...) and the international politics of frozen meat.Cold is a very relative term, and this book looks at a broad range of coldness. On the laboratory side, there was a competition starting in the late part of the nineteenth century to create the lowest temperature possible. The effort to transform gases into liquids and solids had serious implications for material science and laboratory practice, but it also contributed to the experimental understanding of quantum physics. At about the sa .. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard, the nineteenth-century Danish philosopher rediscovered in the twentieth century, is a major influence in contemporary philosophy, religion, and literature. He regarded Either/Or as the beginning of his authorship, although he had published two earlier works on Hans Christian Andersen and irony. The pseudonymous volumes of Either/Or are the writings of a young man and of Judge William. The ironical young man's papers include a collection of sardonic aphorisms; essays on Mozart, modern drama, and boredom; and "The Seducer's Diary." (...) The seeming miscellany is a reflective presentation of aspects of the "either," the esthetic view of life. Part II is an older friend's "or," the ethical life of integrated, authentic personhood, elaborated in discussions of personal becoming and of marriage. The resolution of the "either/or" is left to the reader, for there is no Part III until the appearance of Stages on Life's Way. The poetic-reflective creations of a master stylist and imaginative impersonator, the two men write in distinctive ways appropriate to their respective positions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Reviewed by: Hume’s Imagination by Tito MAGRI Don Garrett MAGRI, Tito. Hume’s Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. xiii + 494 pp. Cloth, $115.00In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume defines “the imagination” in an inclusive sense as “the faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas”—that is, those that are not memories. In the narrower sense, it is “the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative and probable (...) reasonings.” Book 1 of the Treatise is largely a work about the imagination in the inclusive sense. Indeed, by Magri’s count, book 1 contains more occurrences of the term imagination/imagine and its variants than of any other philosophical term with the exceptions of impression and idea. Yet until the late 1990s, it was surprisingly rare to find commentators treating the Humean imagination as a focus of attention in its own right, and the complete range of its many roles and operations has largely remained uncatalogued until now. With twelve highly detailed chapters distinguishing no fewer than twenty different “works of the imagination” governed by eighteen different “principles,” Hume’s Imagination is by far the most comprehensive treatment of the faculty to date. Indeed, its only limitations are its two announced ones. First, it does not discuss the imagination in Hume’s subsequent An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (where its operations receive much less attention) or other writings. Second, it does not discuss the extensive roles played by the imagination in Treatise, book 2 (“Of the Passions”) and book 3 (“Of Morals”)—although readers may hope that a sequel will take up those roles. The wide array of roles and operations that Hume attributes to the inclusive imagination, even in Treatise, book 1 alone, naturally raises the question of how much real unity it has as a psychological natural kind. Magri’s original and provocative answer to this question is that the various operations of Hume’s imagination are unified by their filling in various “cognitive gaps” between the representational contents of the mind’s sensations and memories, on the one hand, and the full range of its cognitive contents and capacities, on the other. Rather than appealing to the kind of purely intellectual ideas posited by Descartes and other so-called rationalists who drew a strong distinction between the intellect and the imagination, however, Hume traces our further abilities to the inferences and mental transitions that the imagination produces utilizing only broadly imagistic ideas. In support of this answer, the book is divided into five parts. Part I, chapter 1 explains the central notion of a “cognitive gap” in terms of a “dualism of representation and inference.” For Magri, “representation” applies only to sensation and memory (although he grants that [End Page 156] “presentation” might be the better term in the case of sensation), as governed by Hume’s self-described first principle: “our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.” This principle is the topic of chapter 2. “Inference” (or, more broadly, “transitions”) applies only to the imagination, which generates new “nonrepresentational” cognitive content in accordance with what Hume calls his second principle: “the liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas.” This principle is the topic of chapter 3. To say, as Magri does, that the only “representational” ideas for Hume are those of memory sounds highly paradoxical, but the intended (nonparadoxical) meaning becomes clear enough on careful reading. Part 2 of the book takes up the role of the imagination in generating specifically conceptual modes of thought. In chapter 4, Magri explains the mind’s capacity for generality in thought through the operation of “abstract ideas” and its capacity to distinguish different aspects of an object through the operation of “distinctions of reason.” In chapter 5, he examines the generation of distinctively modal content through the capacity of the imagination to conceive the same object as having different qualities or being placed in different circumstances. Part 3 turns to the crucial topic of the imagination’s generation of cognition of a world of “realities” beyond sensation and memory through the production of “causal ideas.” Chapter 6... (shrink)

Now classified as mid-way between epistemology and metaphysics, that part of 18th-century ‘science of human nature’ concerned with the investigation of human perceptions and passions was in fact closely allied both to moral and natural philosophy and to medicine. This chapter the roles in the formation of belief that writers in this tradition and authors of novels attributed to the readers' senses and imagination, and to their social intercourse. In particular, it focusses on the relative educational and moral value attributed (...) to history, romance, and novels, and the readers' sympathetic responses to historical and fictional writings as they were represented and discussed in Charlotte Lennox' The Female Quixote, and in David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. (shrink)

As a young student in Paris, O'Connell was first enamored of the intriguing artistic imagery of Augustine's works. The imagery continued to impress him as his scholarship continued. Now, after many years of research and regarding study on the topic, a thorough treatment of Augustine's "image clusters" is revealed in this volume, Soundings in St. Augustine's Imagination. That St. Augustine's writings are empowered by use of poetic imagery is of interest to readers of philosophy, theology, as well as language. In (...) this work, Augustine's imagery is used as a basis to shed light on some of his thought which had previously puzzled the scholarly world. Soundings in St. Augustine's Imagination is an imperative addition to any philosophical library and a rich reward for all intrigued by his dramatic use of language and metaphor. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Imagining Japan: The Japanese Tradition and Its Modern InterpretationIan ReaderImagining Japan: The Japanese Tradition and Its Modern Interpretation. By Robert N. Bellah. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2003. Pp. 254.While Robert Bellah is probably best known for his work on religion in America, his earlier work focused on Japanese intellectual history, culture, and religion, and it is to these subjects that he has returned (...) in this latest book, Imagining Japan: The Japanese Tradition and Its Modern Interpretation, almost five decades after publishing his seminal work Tokugawa Religion. In returning to Japan, Bellah brings to this broad overview of dominant themes within Japanese tradition, social structure, and intellectual and cultural history the grasp of a historical sociologist deeply rooted and [End Page 351] well versed in mainstream sociological theory. He also reminds us that although his reputation is as a sociologist of American religion, his intellectual roots are in the study of Japan, and he makes clear in his comments on one of his earlier essays (p. 3) that it was through the study of Japan that his eyes were opened to new possibilities, which he then applied to his study of the sociology of religion in the United States.Imagining Japan is not so much a new book as essentially a collection of essays written in the 1960s and 1970s that are now wedded to a new and extensive Introduction, in which Bellah develops an overarching theoretical framework through which to interpret and analyze Japan and to situate the materials addressed in these essays. That the book can be read without any apparent disjuncture between essays written in the 1960s and an Introduction produced at the start of a new century indicates how consistent Bellah's thinking has been over the last four decades, and how deeply his early understanding of Japanese thought, religion, society, and culture has penetrated and framed his subsequent thinking.Essentially Bellah is concerned with problems that have challenged scholars and Japanese thinkers for decades: how is it that, in Bellah's view, this society more than any other has retained such a strong sense of what is native and what is foreign (p. 188) and managed to preserve and emphasize its own cultural identity while engaging with, absorbing, and utilizing foreign (i.e., external) cultural influences. And, in the final essay of the book, Bellah asks how it is that a nation so economically and technologically advanced has continued, in the twenty-first century, to maintain an archaic, Bronze Age monarchical system (p. 184). Japan may not be quite as unique in some of these aspects as Bellah suggests (Britain, after all, is also modern, complex, and wedded to a monarchical system grounded in archaic notions of heredity, primogeniture, and privilege), but it remains perhaps the most striking case of how archaic notions can persist and form the basic framework of a society even as that society functions within a different framework, namely of modernity. In focusing on such issues, Bellah takes in-especially in the Introduction-the great sweep of Japanese history from the seventh century to the late twentieth, displaying a masterful ability to combine historical insight and sociological analysis.The basis of his framework, expressed overtly in the Introduction but implicit in many of the chapters, is the application of theories that developed initially out of Max Weber's thesis that religion (in Weberian terms, Protestantism), with its focus on a universalizing ethic, is an essential factor in the emergence of modernity and of societies founded on capitalism. Following in this tradition, S. N. Eisenstadt described world religions as "axial" ("world religions"-particularly Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam-being those that have engaged in missionary activities across borders and that have posed a transcendent reality that supersedes or goes beyond the parameters of localized societies and states). Bellah, too, is convinced of the critical importance of the notion of axial religions and asserts that they are the "indispensable precondition" of modernity (p. 6). Yet, for Bellah, as for Eisenstadt (who also was fascinated with and wrote about Japanese society), Japan has been non-axial in that its primary orientation has remained focused on the... (shrink)

The mention of “self-control” calls up certain stock images: Saint Augustine struggling to renounce carnal pleasures; dispassionate Mr. Spock of Star Trek; the dieter faced with tempting desserts. In these stock images reason is almost always assigned the power and authority to govern passions, desires, and appetites. But what if the passions were given the power to rule—what if, instead of sovereign reason, there were sovereign sentiments? My dissertation examines three sentimentalist conceptions of self-control: David Hume’s conception of “strength of (...) mind”; Adam Smith’s conception of “self-command”; and Jane Austen’s examination of these conceptions. Hume divests reason of motivational power, and with this new moral psychology comes a new conception of self-control. Humean strength of mind is indirect, artificial, and social—a regulatory system that humans cannot develop until societal systems of government and regulations have been instituted. Smith accepts Hume’s anti-rationalist arguments, but he emphasizes that only certain sentiments are fit to rule. And he argues that self-control develops without the sophisticated external conditions posited by Hume. Smithian self-command is the capacity to modify one’s feelings in accordance with a regulative ideal: the sentiments of an imagined impartial spectator. Austen responds to these conceptions, illustrating and complicating them. Sense and Sensibility explores the difficulties of discerning the feelings of others, and Persuasion dramatizes the difficulties of distinguishing strength of mind in another, offering sets of characters for the reader’s scrutiny, each with a competing claim to strength of mind. Taken together, Austen’s novels offer a fuller and more delicately shaded depiction of the sort of self-control that Hume and Smith imagine in their philosophical works. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Animal Part: Human and Other Animals in the Poetic ImaginationNancy WormanMark Payne. The Animal Part: Human and Other Animals in the Poetic Imagination. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010. ix + 164 pp. Cloth, $35.Mark Payne’s elegant and unusual book addresses an elusive topic: human perceptions of animal consciousness. Focusing largely on literary artists’ senses of other animals, Payne initially approaches the conundrum of how these (...) artists devise ways to bridge this gap from a broad but distinctly personal perspective. He takes the reader with him out into a natural setting, complete with details such as the beers he drank in the evening and the driftwood on which he hung his clothes to swim, and puzzles over how we as humans make meaning from and with animals. Payne’s personally imbedded starting point grounds his insistence from the outset that we share certain aspects of our behaviors with animals and that we may even through particular experience countenance something of what might be called the animal perspective. To put it this way, however, somehow reduces the attentive grace with which Payne navigates such profound topics; while his concerns are essentially existential he is also after the delicate distinctions among phenomena that open out onto animal being, the diversities of which certain types of literary expression seek to capture.The book is divided into two sections of two chapters each, running from tropes and inhabitations of the “beast in pain” to articulations of human-animal experiences (embraced as “becoming something else”). Payne begins his exploration of how poets take account of animal lives by addressing their use of bestial otherness to capture abject and aggressive outsider experiences. As Payne demonstrates, the archaic poet Archilochus flashes his brilliant and disturbing poetic control of animal subjectivity as a means of antagonistic warning to his enemies and other iambic targets. Hipponax in contrast appears to offer up more fully inhabited images of the dog when he is down—that is, the scapegoat, the quintessential figure of abjection, the human reduced to animal status and rejected by the community of men. Hipponax is also the inventor of the iambic meter that famously “limped,” a deformity of rhythm that interested the modern American poet William Carlos Williams. In a wonderfully rich and responsive discussion, Payne shows how in his long (and last) poem, Patterson, Williams shapes his subjectivity as a “dog poet” by means of a similar inhabitation of the deformed or lowly animal, whose perspective is then celebrated as more attuned to the songs close to the ground: the sounds of the river’s run, the very local details attended [End Page 696] to by bug or snail. Here Payne claims that Williams’ “biopoetics” “keeps an ear open for the lameness of Hipponax’s choliamb in its efforts to communicate the experience of physical impediment by formal means” (48). He reveals the details of this formal engagement by tracking Williams’ use of triadic structures to capture human-animal incapacities and the vulnerabilities of imaginative work.The second discussion in this section takes on violent rejections of the continuities of human-animal experiences, which Payne likens to the myth of Satan because of the narcissistic hatred of other life forms that is central to its dynamics. This “destructivism” (a term Payne borrows from the American poet Susan Howe) originates in a sense of homelessness in the world and results in a groundless need to kill other animals, as well as in the fetishization of the artificial and inorganic. Payne’s poetic sources run from Milton to Flaubert, in whose descriptions of these lost killers he locates metonymies of this turn to artificiality. While there is something mildly disturbing in the apparently uncritical ways in which Payne represents this murderous perspective—so that, for instance, Symbolist aesthetics become consonant with its “biocide”—he captures effectively the dark fascination of this rejection of so much that is living. Against the human tendency to mass decimation of other life forms Payne sets the imagination’s attention to the “thisness” of individual things and beings. Gerard Manley Hopkins and, perhaps more surprisingly, Ezra Pound provide for Payne examples of modern poets who unfold... (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “Who Conceives of Society?” by Ernst von Glasersfeld. Excerpt: Von Glasersfeld claims that socialization arises from drives, interests, purposes, and inclinations . These are all functions of intelligence, and none of these is a social phenomenon. The concept of society, he claims, “has to be formed by each individual by means of generalization from his or her own experiences” . This sort of methodological individualism views the individual as a natural kind and society (...) as an artificial construction. In the wake of the new sociology of science, which has demonstrated the dangers of trying to distinguish immutable facts from our descriptions of the world, methodological individualism is doubly problematic. It violates the fundamental perspective that drives sociology, and it ignores the empirical results of the new sociology of science. (shrink)

Writing About a Woman Writer's Writing: On Gender Identification and Being a Male Critic of Carol Shields's Work This essay takes as its starting point my experience as a male critic of Carol Shields's work. Throughout the researching and writing of my PhD on Shields, I have noted with curiosity the surprise registered by many people upon discovering that a male critic would choose to write about the work of a female author. This reaction, confirmed by other male academics (...) working on female authors, raises a number of interesting questions. What does it mean for a male critic to write about the work of a female author? Why is this still considered surprising, unusual, even strange? Is this view symptomatic of the kind of disturbing devaluation of women's fiction that Shields herself explores so candidly in her final novel Unless? I suggest that the anti-feminist backlash, and the profitable establishment of popular literary genres such as "Chick Lit" and "Lad Lit," have led to a retrogressive "hardening" of gender roles within popular culture, one which endorses a simplistic relationship between author and audience, presuming that texts "by" women must necessarily be "for" women only. Situated within the context of Shields's own professed ambivalence about her status as a "women's writer," and drawing on the theories of Emma Wilson, the essay attempts to broaden out into a wider reflection upon issues of gender and identification within contemporary literary culture. Shields's work, I argue, subverts assumptions about gendered reading patterns, encouraging through its polyphony and its use of dual narrators a mobile and flexible reading experience which allows the reader to inhabit a range of perspectives and to read productively across gender binaries. (shrink)

Carnap famously argued that metaphysics unavoidably involves a confusion between science and poetry. Unlike the lyric poet, who does not attempt to make an argument, the metaphysician attempts to make an argument while simultaneously lacking in musical talent. Carnap’s objection that metaphysics unavoidably involves a blend of philosophy and poetry is not a 20th century insight. Plato, in his beautifully crafted Phaedo, presents us with the imprisoned Socrates, who having been condemned to death for practicing philosophy in the Apology, has (...) a dream in which he realizes that he ought to make music. In this dialogue, however, Plato indicates no hint of the scorn that Carnap has for metaphysics—rather Socrates’ friends find him setting Aesop’s fables to verse. In the modern era, Nietzsche re-introduced the ‘music making Socrates’ in his Birth of Tragedy. But Nietzsche is not the first to revive the concept in modern philosophy. Before Nietzsche’s call for a new music-making Socrates, the early German Romantics, in particular Schlegel, explicitly called for the identification of poetry and science in the concept of Poesie. As Schlegel writes: ‘Alle Kunst soll Wissenschaft werden, und alle Wissenschaft Kunst werden; Poesie und Philosophie sollen vereinigt sein.’ On the one hand, in Ion Socrates is not wrong to critique Ion for not knowing the significance of his own work. On the other hand, Socrates himself recognizes in Phaedo that he is guilty of failing to heed the call to make music. Long misunderstood, the Romantic concept of Poesie is not mere irrationalism, for it offers an aesthetic metaphysics of the Absolute. Romanticism is indeed a philosophy of the Absolute, but one which cannot conceive of any solution to the profound impasses that confront philosophical knowing except by learning to make music. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:'Is* and Ought' in Context: Maclntyre's Mistake1 Murray MacBeth (1)What drives Hume to the conclusion that morality must be understood in terms of, explained and justified by reference to, the place of the passions and desires in human life is his initial assumption that either morality is the work of reason or it is the work of the passions and his own apparently conclusive arguments that it cannot be (...) the work ofreason. (2)At the same time as they [Diderot, Hume, Kierkegaard and Kant] agree largely on the character of morality, they agree also upon what a rationaljustification ofmorality would have to be. Its key premises would characterise some feature or features of human nature; and the rules of morality would then be explained and justified as being those rules which a being possessing just such a nature could be expected to accept. (3)[Hume] treats this ground for the justification of the rules of property and this explanation ofthem as holding for all times andplaces, prosperous as well as unprosperous, ever since the rules were first artificially contrived. (4)It isjust suchreasoning which Hume advanced both to explain and to justify the rules ofjustice, conceived as he conceived them, and the obligations imposed by those rules, understood as he understood them. One characteristic common to these four quotations from Alasdair Maclntyre's influential books After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is a yoking which is neither explained nor justified in the surrounding context, of the concepts of explanation and justification. Hume is said to be concerned both to explain and to justify (1) "morality," (2) "the rules of morality," (3) "the rules of property," and (4) "the rules ofjustice," and it seems that in each case he used the same argument to do both. My aim in this paper is to argue that Maclntyre altogether fails to dojustice to the distinctionbetweenjustification and Volume XVII Number 2 41 MURRAY MACBETH explanation, a distinction which is of the utmost importance for the interpretation ofHume—and notjust ofHume's moral philosophy. I take as my target, however, not either ofthe books from which I drew my opening quotations, but a much earlier article ofMaclntyre's, "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'," in which the ideas expressed in the above quotations are foreshadowed. An examination ofaspects ofthis article will enable me to show, if I am right, how Maclntyre goes startlingly astray. That 1959 article set in motion a lively discussion of the interpretation of Hume: no less than six articles, by Atkinson, Flew, Hudson, and Hunter, all contributions to the debate sparked off by Maclntyre, are reprinted in either or both of Chappell (1968) and Hudson (1969).6 I am in broad agreement with the criticisms made of his article by Atkinson and Flew; but I think it instructive to identify, as they failed to do, Maclntyre's fundamental mistake, which, I shall argue at the end ofthis paper, resulted from the very kind ofconfusion against which Hume warned his readers, and warned them in precisely that passage with which Maclntyre was primarily concerned, the famous paragraph about "is" and "ought" at the end of the opening section of book 3 of Hume's Treatise. My identification of Maclntyre's mistake involves putting that "is"-"ought" paragraph in context: in both, ambitiously on my part, the broad context of the Treatise as a whole, and also the more immediate context of the opening sections of book 3. Maclntyre wrote his article less as a contribution to an ongoing discussion of Hume than as a contribution to an ongoing discussion of ethical naturalism. Mid-twentieth century anti-naturalists, as Maclntyre pointed out, often invoked the "is"-"ought" paragraph as putting forward a view which was direct a ancestor oftheir own. Hare, for instance, appeals in his article "Universalisability" to what he calls "Hume's Law,"7 with a footnote referring the reader to this paragraph of the Treatise; the "law" in question is, roughly, that "ought"-judgements cannot be deduced from "is"-judgements. Maclntyre argued that such an interpretation of Hume was mistaken; and a crucial part ofhis evidence was the claim that, "ifthe currentinterpretation ofHume'sviews on "is'and'ought... (shrink)

Before presenting his own account of value in the Ethics, Spinoza spends much of EIAppendix and EIVPreface attempting to refute a series of axiological ‘prejudices’ that he takes to have taken root in the minds of his readership. In doing so, Spinoza adopts what might be termed a ‘genealogical’ argumentative strategy. That is, he tries to establish the falsity of imagined readership’s prejudices about good and bad, perfection and imperfection, by first showing that the ideas from which they have arisen (...) are themselves false. Many elements of this genealogy, however, remain unclear. First, both the nature of the metaethical prejudices Spinoza believes we have been labouring under, and the metaphysical prejudices that he takes to have given rise to them, continue to attract widespread disagreement. Although much less commented on, it is also not entirely obvious why Spinoza takes the one to have engendered the other. In this article, I attempt to clarify Spinoza’s reasoning in both of these respects, ultimately concluding that Spinoza offers us two accounts of how this process has occurred, the first beginning from an anthropocentric doctrine of divine providence, the second from more secular, perhaps more purely Aristotelian metaphysical tradition. (shrink)

Identification as a psychological concept is widely used in psychology and in social science. This use relies on an ordinary understanding of what identification is, and this understanding has itself been influenced by psychoanalysis. The concept is, however, in need of philosophical exploration. Central to its use is the idea of character, its nature and its development, which like identification itself is under-theorized. I use Richard Wollheim's philosophical analysis of identification in terms of the imagination, to (...) trace a path from ordinary psychology's conception of characterological identification to the psychoanalytic one. I link this to a short discussion of character as a conception of the self available to reflection. Making reference to some psychoanalytic case material, I defend psychoanalysis? version of identification and its applicability in psychology and the social sciences. (shrink)

In a fluent, clear, and lively style this translation by two of Maslov's junior colleagues brings the work of the late Soviet scientist S. Yu. Maslov to a wider audience. Maslov was considered by his peers to be a man of genius who was making fundamental contributions in the fields of automatic theorem proving and computational logic. He published little, and those few papers were regarded as notoriously difficult. This book, however, was written for a broad audience of readers and (...) describes elegant examples of applications in such fields as computer science, artificial intelligence, operations research, economic modeling, and biological modeling, among others. The book also brings to light the work by the American mathematician E. L. Post, which inspired Maslov's own work in the development of a general theory and which has been long neglected by mathematicial logicians and systems theorists in the United States. The book's first chapter introduces the Rules of the Game. Part I, Mathematics of Calculi, covers E. L. Post's canonical systems, deductive systems and algorithms, and probabilistic calculi and deductive information. Part II, Horizonal Modeling, takes up a "toy" economy, the calculi of technological possibilities, and the development of rules. Part III, Vertical Modeling, deals with the topics of "to fight and to search" and the consequences of the asymmetry of cognitive mechanisms. Vladimir Lifschitz is affiliated with the Department of Computer Science at Stanford University, and Michael Gelfond with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the University of Texas, El Paso. Theory of Deductive Systems and Its Applicationsis included in the Foundation of Computing Series, edited by Michael Garey. (shrink)

This is an introduction to the thematic section on Science Fiction's Imagined Technologies, which includes three articles that were presented at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR) in San Diego, CA on November 24, 2019.

This is the most comprehensive anthology of Søren Kierkegaard's works ever assembled in English. Drawn from the volumes of Princeton's authoritative Kierkegaard's Writings series by editors Howard and Edna Hong, the selections represent every major aspect of Kierkegaard's extraordinary career. They reveal the powerful mix of philosophy, psychology, theology, and literary criticism that made Kierkegaard one of the most compelling writers of the nineteenth century and a shaping force in the twentieth. With an introduction to Kierkegaard's writings as a whole (...) and explanatory notes for each selection, this is the essential one-volume guide to a thinker who changed the course of modern intellectual history. The anthology begins with Kierkegaard's early journal entries and traces the development of his work chronologically to the final The Changelessness of God . The book presents generous selections from all of Kierkegaard's landmark works, including Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Works of Love , and The Sickness unto Death , and draws new attention to a host of such lesser-known writings as Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions and The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air . The selections are carefully chosen to reflect the unique character of Kierkegaard's work, with its shifting pseudonyms, its complex dialogues, and its potent combination of irony, satire, sermon, polemic, humor, and fiction. We see the esthetic, ethical, and ethical-religious ways of life initially presented as dialogue in two parallel series of pseudonymous and signed works and later in the "second authorship" as direct address. And we see the themes that bind the whole together, in particular Kierkegaard's overarching concern with, in his own words, "What it means to exist . . . what it means to be a human being." Together, the selections provide the best available introduction to Kierkegaard's writings and show more completely than any other book why his work, in all its creativity, variety, and power, continues to speak so directly today to so many readers around the world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 30.4 (2000) 3-13 [Access article in PDF] Benjamin's Arcades Project and the Postcolonial City Rajeev S. Patke [Tables]Walter Benjamin. The Arcades Project. Trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999. [AP] Post-this, post-that, post-the-other, yet in the endNot past a thing. —Seamus Heaney, "On His Work in the English Tongue" Preamble Among the several Benjamins to be conjured from The Arcades Project is the one (...) who invites a speculative discourse on the idea of the postcolonial city. We can imagine him first conceding, and then qualifying, three propositions about himself: he mitigates the force of the first—that he was Eurocentric—with the counterproposition that the cities he wrote about were formative of a discourse that can be transposed to other cities whose patterns of urban development were shaped by forces analogous to those he studied in the period of their inception. He then concedes that his work on the city remains problematic in several ways related to an uncertain temperament and method, but urges the recognition that his method came to resemble his object of study; the fortuitous correspondence reinforces the self-reflexive relation between modern cities and the discourse they generate. His third concession—that his use of Marxian ideas mixes them with elements of bourgeois thought—is marginalized by the recognition that he always took his Marx with such a difference that to confine him within such a debate would be to take him in the wrong spirit. He then proceeds to reiterate in the specific instance of the postcolonial a more familiar general claim made by many contemporary readers of the metropolitan experience, that the set of approaches he uncovered continue to remain valid wherever the project of modernity is at work. They help us address "[t]he split image of modernity, modernity's promises for social and individual emancipation, as well as modernity's failures" [Paetzold 216a]. Modern Benjamin would begin by reminding us that his "modern" and "modernity" refer primarily to the industrial transformation of society by technology, as part of the Enlightenment project of progress through the application of reason to nature and society. He would [End Page 3] qualify his sense of the project of "modernity" through the image of "[t]he world dominated by its phantasmagorias" [AP 26]. He would then shrug off the cloak of the Eurocentric by turning, for illustration, to the many Asian manifestations of the postcolonial. Here, he would make the twofold claim that the postcolonial experience brings out the disillusionment latent in the myth of progress, just as the postmodern brings out the phantasmal that is incipient in the myth of an evenly distributed access to capital and goods in the era of globalization. He would argue that the cities of contemporary Asia are the sites for a partial and uneven overlap between the postmodern and the postcolonial. This overlap, he would say, invites us to treat the idea of the city in a generic mode, without discounting the fact that the diversity separating the metropolitan centers in Asia makes little sense of an Asian city except as banal literalism. He would note that colonialism did not affect all of Asia, nor did it follow quite the same course from colony to colony, though the term retains some usefulness in accounting for the general factors that link different cities in Asia to what happened after colonialism. He would treat the postcolonial and the postmodern as three-tiered phenomena: each is a historical phase of world history, a predicament affecting collectivities, and an attitude or state of mind. The aptness of the notion of the postcolonial city, he points out, increases in direct proportion to the degree to which a city has acquired a distinctive identity through colonial administration or commerce, and decreases in direct proportion to the degree of discontinuity between the colonial and postcolonial phases of its history. He would add the corollary that any contemporary city in the developing world approximates to the postcolonial condition when its role in the network of power relations negotiates... (shrink)

Founded in 1993, ELEKTRIK: Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, has gradually become better known and is fast establishing itself as a research oriented publication outlet with high academic standards. In a modest attempt to advance this trend, this special issue of ELEKTRIK brings together five papers exemplifying the state of the art in artificial intelligence (AI). Written by experts, the papers are especially aimed at readers interested in gaining a better appraisal of the applications side of (...) the AI enterprise. In all papers there is a strong emphasis on measuring the benefits of the proposed approaches in experimental contexts. The papers broadly fall into five actively researched, contemporary domains of AI: pattern recognition, genetic algorithms, fuzzy sets, intelligent design, and agents. (shrink)

Through imaginative engagement readers of fiction become, to an extraordinary extent, the narrator’s ‘children’: they often submit themselves to the narrator’s authority without reserve. But precisely because of that, readers are deeply at a loss when their trust is betrayed. This underscores a core function of fiction, namely to evoke emotional response in the reader. In this paper, we hypothesize how a reader’s imaginative engagement can be subjected to narrative frustration due to processing or moral complexity. The types of (...) narrative frustration we consider differ in terms of their sources, and their emotional and behavioral impacts on the reader. Here, we break down these frustrations into their component parts, in an effort to better characterize the different classes of frustrations. We propose that frustrations arise from different combinations of local uncertainty, moral clash and global uncertainty. These sources of frustration in turn explain the reader’s emotional response and their consequent reading behavior as they imaginatively engage with fiction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Scale Theory: A Nondisciplinary Inquiry by Joshua DiCaglioS. Scott GrahamScale Theory: A Nondisciplinary Inquiry. By Joshua DiCaglio. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2021. 349 pp. Paperback: $30.00. ISBN: 978-1-5179-1207-9.Scale Theory embodies its title in every possible way. It offers both a deep dive into and a 10,000-foot view of scale, scalar thinking, and the role of scale in scientific inquiry. The subtitle, A Nondisciplinary Inquiry, is no less (...) apt. Author Joshua DiCaglio blends insights from rhetoric, philosophy, literary studies, and mysticism to create a novel account of scalar thinking. In so doing, he weaves together detailed thought experiments, the work of Gregory Bateson, and Philip K. Dick's account of an extraterrestrial communication he received while under the influence of anesthesia. Provocatively, Scale Theory treats these diverse intellectual resources as coequal contributors to an emerging theory of scale and scalar thinking. Within this nondisciplinary framework, the book is devoted to advancing two primary theses: (1) Notions of scale are undertheorized in science studies and related strands of new materialisms; and (2) Proper attention to questions of scale within these theoretical traditions should prompt a more thoughtful reconsideration of the merits of mystic holism. Ultimately, Scale Theory makes a compelling case for the first thesis and advances inquiry usefully in this area. With respect to the second thesis, DiCaglio refers to a certain academic "allergy" to holism (99), and I must confess I share this allergy. That said, I assume readers already predisposed favorably toward mystic holism are likely to find Scale Theory's attention to the second thesis thoughtful and engaging.Scale Theory is organized into three distinct parts. Part 1, "Algorithms for a Theory of Scale," presents three interrelated thought experiments that call upon readers to imagine themselves at various distances and vantage points with respect to several objects of interest. Part 1 is stylistically [End Page 388] Wittgensteinian. Like the Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (Wittgenstein 2013) or Latour's "Irreductions," (1993), the thought experiments unfold as a series of numbered and nested propositions, each postulating or interrogating an emerging concept in DiCaglio's theory of scale. Part 2, "Configurations for a Theory of Scale," returns the reader to more familiar styles of prose, providing a sort of review of the relevant literature and its relationship to the insights of the thought experiments. Finally, part 3, "Rhetorical Technologies for a Theory of Scale," reflects on the twin marginalizations of rhetoric and mysticism in mainstream Western academia and argues for a new embrace of disembodied inquiry.The aforementioned thought experiments of part 1 outline DiCaglio's theories of scale, scalar thinking, and scalar analysis. The discussion makes extensive use of visual and cinematic metaphors to aid the reader's consideration of scalar questions. Ultimately, DiCaglio posits that scale is a function of the relationship between the "'being' of phenomena" and "the one who is measuring" (8). He argues, therefore, that "scale functions at a level above ontology and epistemology: scale is a means of orienting yourself both to experience and the being of things" (8). In making this argument, Scale Theory reflects on a range of scientific practices that require gradients of scale. Microscopy, telescopy, and simulations all provide scientists with tools to escape the mundane scales of embodied human experience. DiCaglio argues that "science must always find itself grouping things together, speaking of species, types, systems, and so on which exist on a different logical type than the individual encounters that make up these groups" (41). The taxonomic activities of scientific practice require shifts in scale to account for kingdoms, phyla, orders, genera, species, and all manner of nonbiological analogs.Within this framework, scale functions as a sort of meta-ontology that allows objects to be provisionally identified and delineated. Echoing Bateson, DiCaglio argues thatIn order for any thing to be said to exist whatsoever, a differential must exist out of which a difference can be discerned. Every differential occurs on some scale at which a fluctuation or movement is able to make a difference. If one goes to a smaller scale, any given differential is no longer able to be used to register a difference.(51... (shrink)

Many readers will be familiar with the power of stories to stimulate rich, ethically-focussed philosophical enquiry with communities of children and young people. This paper presents a view of the relationship between ethics and narrative that attempts to explain why this is the case. It is not an accident that moral matters are illuminated in stories, nor is the explanation for this fitness for purpose merely pragmatic, or a matter of convention. Narrative is at the heart of learning how to (...) live a good live and living that life. Unlike other forms of organising human experience, such as mathematics or science, narrative represents ethical experience particularly well. This is possible because of the logical structures of human experience that narrative successfully communicates and because of the human faculties that it successfully engages , which are the faculties we use in ethical life. Understood in this way, narrative is both a source, and a method of ethical knowledge and understanding. The implication of this claim is that narrative is is not only useful as a stimulus for ethical enquiry in the way in which delegates may be familiar. According to my account, telling and being told stories and exploring narrative features such as character and setting constitute a form of ethical enquiry in their own right. These activities require us to engage the same faculties at work in ethical life and in doing so, we gain ethically relevant experiences that reinforce, challenge and enlarge what we know and understand about the ethical world. However, we do not strive to grasp propositional knowledge through engaging with narratives as a source and method of knowledge and understanding. Books, plays and films on my account, do not have ‘a moral of the story’ that must be grasped and then internalised. What we learn through engagement with narrative is ethical perceptiveness. Perceptiveness in this sense, is knowing how to read and respond to the ethically salient features of a text or an everyday experience. It is a function of the use of our emotion and imagination in conjunction with the intellect. In light of these claims, I advocate ‘Narrative Ethical Enquiry’, a pedagogy that aims at three things I consider to be constitutive of perceptiveness: Ethical awareness: The active and self-conscious identification of the ethical content in stories. Narrative competence: The encouragement of sophisticated acts of giving and receiving stories, as an integral part of ethics education and not just as the basis for an exploration of issues in some other gear e.g. philosophical, legal, scientific, religious etc. Self-conscious enquiry: The recognition – by learners and teachers – of the potential of narratives and active use of narrative to gain ethical knowledge and understanding. Although ethical enquiry in PwC often begins with a story, this does not mean that narrative has been optimised in that educational encounter. Often in a PwC class that begins with a story, there is a hasty move made from an exploration of the detailed content of the story to the identification of one or two ethical concepts followed by the pursuit of understanding through conceptual analysis, the construction of prima facie axioms, principles and other theoretical constructs. All of which operate at a suitably high level of generality and abstraction. This is what philosophy does well, but in in doing so in ethical enquiry, it overlooks narrative features of a stimulus that can offer ethical illumination. Features such as the time and place in which the story takes place; the intentional and emotional states of certain characters; the contingency of certain events and the necessity of others; the uniqueness of the story as a singular whole including its particular details and simultaneously, the generic patterns of tragedy or parody that it assumes. An intellectualistic philosophical engagement with a story will typically neglect the faculties of emotion and imagination that enable us to fully access the ethical dimension of a story and in turn allow us to navigate the ethical dimension of every day life. I propose an approach to ethical enquiry that draws on the self-conscious and systematic clarity of philosophy and the richness, complexity and immediacy of narrative. Philosophical and narrative modes of understanding can - and often do - complement one another in PwC. In proposing Narrative Ethical Enquiry I simply advocate that this be acknowledged, understood and capitalised upon. (shrink)

This long, diffuse, and intermittently quite interesting work is an attempt to explain and justify the process by which the concept of truth has been transformed in modern and contemporary philosophy from a doctrine of adequation via one of the true vision of things to that of the activity of the free subject. The main figures in this process are Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel, although considerable space is devoted to Fichte, Schelling, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and even K. O. (...) Apel and Hans Wagner. Despite the discussion of Wittgenstein and an odd comment or so about Frege, modern philosophy means primarily modern German philosophy; there is, however, some peripheral treatment of contemporary analytical thought. One may perhaps point to three main aspects of the author’s program. The first is his acceptance of the currently fashionable view that semantics is the orientating branch of philosophy. This thesis follows from the author’s acceptance of the historical rejection of Cartesian and Leibnizian intuition in favor of Kantian and Hegelian emphasis upon rationality as categoricity or conceptualism. The second aspect is Simon’s regular attempt to assimilate semantics into the doctrine of reflection. Hence the emphasis upon concepts shifts from that of objects to a second-order reflection upon the nature of conceptual thinking. The third aspect is in many ways the most comprehensive; at least Simon’s book culminates in its articulation. This is the attempt to assimilate the doctrine of reflection into a conception of freedom as a doctrine of both Recht and communication. I found especially valuable the emphasis upon the contribution of the subject to "objective" conceptions of meaning and truth. There are very good pages on the modern doctrine of intuition and the changing role assigned to imagination. The regular emphasis placed by Simon on negation as determination, and hence upon negation of negation as a crucial element even within non-dialectical logic, is also valuable. I was less persuaded by the treatment of intersubjectivity as an expression of a hermeneutics of communication within the context of a doctrine of individual rights. This Fichtean revision of Habermas and Apel may be the latest chapter in German academic philosophy of the traditional stream, but it does not follow even on Simon’s quasi-Hegelian principles that the text is sound. The deepest problem facing the author is to prevent the concept of truth from dissolving altogether into subjective reflection upon the limitations of objective definitions of truth. Stated somewhat differently, the author fails to persuade this reader that truth is actually the consensus of the community. Whatever the "positivist" deficiencies of Descartes and Leibniz, they do provide us with a concept of truth that is not easily mistaken for ideology.—S.R. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s relationship to his contemporaries, as expressed in his writings, was often figured by corporeal imagery evocative of disgust. For instance, in On the Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche declared himself to suffer from mankind—which he then proceeds to describe as “maggot”—or worm-like. Nietzsche’s philosophical project can be interpreted as a visceral protest against, and attempt to overcome, humanity. This paper argues that Nietzsche attempted through his writings to create a future community of like-constituted companions in his readers through a transmission (...) of affect and education in taste. This would-be "community" is premised on a curious affective dialectic that seeks to transform disgust for humanity into a pure movement of self-creation. The socio-political effects of this dialectic of disgust will be examined alongside Nietzsche's co-option of images of purity, in order to evaluate his response to modern nihilism. (shrink)

Phenomenological analysis of the bodiliness of human existence establishes a sense in which human consciousness is prereflectively spatial and located at a particular place, and at the same time a sense in which consciousness detaches itself from its location by reflecting on it and itself. This paper probes a parallel aspect of that self which the reader becomes upon reading and entering the world of three selected fictive narratives: this “reading self,” as it will be called, replicates the structure of (...) real-world consciousness, for the reading self is both located at a specifiable place within each of the three fictive worlds and at the same time floats free of that location without leaving the narrative's world. Although the paper does not claim that the reading consciousness always or necessarily replicates real-world consciousness, it suggests that such replication, when it happens, is significantly related to the reading self's encounter with the fictive characters as both selves and others. To say that the latter are self-transcending selves is to say that the reading self may identify itself with them and move into the story's world; such identification does in fact take place. To say that at the same time the characters remain other selves is to say that the reading self, floating free within the story's world, also experiences a distance between itself and them. Yet this otherness does not turn the fictive characters into objects; that is, their otherness does not imply that they are merely objects to be explained in terms of social or biological forces nor that they are the products of an author's manipulations. Much of the paper is occupied with working out the interaction between the reading self's locatedness and non-locatedness, on the one hand, and the fictive characters' selftranscendence and otherness on the other. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Unmastering Speech:Irony in Plato's PhaedrusMatthew S. Linck"So, my shall suffer what it deserves."—Phaedrus 242a1It is tempting, after one has reflected closely on the words and deeds of the Phaedrus, to read the dialogue as if Socrates had the whole conversation worked out from the first words. The art of Plato is such that the intricate cohesion of word and action reveals itself through many layers. Plato writes; and as (...) a writer he has the time and the means (written letters) to compose. But what is Socrates doing? He does not have the leisure to compose "over a long period of time" (228a). He is responding to particular individuals, in particular circumstances, in the moment. He is thinking on his feet. One might claim that this is actually the first deficiency of the dialogues, that they are artificial and unrealistic in this way. If the written text reveals itself as finely crafted in the subtlety of its inner connections, how seriously can we take the apparent spontaneity of the spoken discourse? My suggestion would be that we take this not as a fault of the dialogues, but rather as the first instance of Plato's irony. This may be Plato's supreme irony—the evocation of truth through artificiality.But that is already going too fast. I want to begin by looking at the words and deeds of Socrates and Phaedrus, without considering yet what Plato might be doing as the author of the dialogue. My first interpretive principle will be to take the drama at face value, as naturalistic, temporal, and even commonplace—two friends go for a walk in the countryside to listen to speeches.Immediately, however, the commonness is disrupted. The city, the commonwealth, is left behind. This is certainly uncommon for Socrates, who never leaves the city walls.2 Furthermore, the language of the text indicates a thematization of, out-of-placeness, strangeness. Rather than being accused of already violating my one hermeneutical principle, it should be noted that this indication of strangeness comes through the words [End Page 264] and deeds of the characters, not through a retrospective recovery of the dialogue as a whole. From the beginning the reader encounters a tension between the commonplace and the unusual.3Nevertheless, the impetus to move outside of the city is commonplace enough. Phaedrus has a speech that Socrates wants to hear. Before Socrates is told what this speech is about, he indicates that nothing would please him more than "hearing how you [Phaedrus] and Lysias passed the time" (227b). After Phaedrus, in his excitement, gives away the topic of the speech—"an attempted seduction of a handsome boy—but not by a lover!" (227c)—Socrates seems even more eager to hear the speech. Does Socrates already see what is to come? Is he merely excited to hear a speech, or is he excited about challenging the beautiful Phaedrus' excitement about a speech that defends an unworthy principle—"that one should gratify the one who does not love rather than the one who does" (227c)?After leaving the city and finding a comfortable place for their speech, for, Phaedrus reads his copy of Lysias' speech for Socrates. The gist of Lysias' speech, as Phaedrus has already announced, is that a young lover should associate himself with, and gratify, a non-lover rather than one who is in love. One central theme of the speech, which will be important for thinking about irony, is that of self-mastery. The recurring motif in Lysias' speech is that the lover is not in control of himself, while the non-lover is. Therefore (the non-lover argues) associating with a lover is unpredictable, and will most likely result in harm to the beloved. The non-lover claims that his self-control will prevent and preclude unforeseen harm. This slippage, from self-mastery to mastery of the situation, is decisive. We would be wrong to interpret Socrates' two speeches as wholesale rejections of everything in Lysias' speech. Socrates cannot reject self-control outright. His consistent concern with rules out simply espousing lack of control. Yet the measuredness of Socratic practice does not entail the... (shrink)

In an effort to give a "personal account of the impact of Whitehead on one reader" and to promote the enthusiasm of others who have not yet discovered Whitehead, Jordan takes off to give his readers an aerial view of the Whiteheadian panorama, flying high enough to avoid becoming entangled in the Whiteheadian word thicket below. This is not to say that Jordan ignores Whiteheadian terminology. On the contrary he has enhanced Whitehead's famous mute appeal for an imaginative leap with (...) a string of ingenious metaphors which serve well to explicate Whitehead's key technical terms and concepts. The result is actually more of a commentary and exposition than is advertised in the introduction. The final chapters come closer to the autobiographical emphasis promised in the introduction. There Jordan makes some general observations on Whitehead's language, his method, and the place of reason in his thought. He affirms the importance and modern relevance of Whitehead as a whole in spite of some misgivings about Whitehead's theism in an age of justifiable skepticism. The importance of the book is its metaphors and images. At last someone has made a responsible effort to explicate Whitehead in everyday terms. Obviously this involves distortions, but the book has no pretensions about its authority and is coupled with an invitation to read Whitehead himself and his more technical commentators. There are no footnotes.--S. O. H. (shrink)

The contents of this book addresses the importance of the Quran's aim of disseminating knowledge about human self recognition through various fresh and imaginative ideas. This is a quest for tracing human identity through the ages using the Quran's divine revelations. The author addresses the question "Who am I?" through her interests in science, philosophy, art and religion. Comparisons of the Quranic teachings are matched with proven scientific knowledge, philosophical ideas and artistic theories. Whenever possible views from other contemporary religions (...) are included. This is a challenging and thought provoking book for the readers. (shrink)

A comprehensive anthology of Kierkegaard’s writings that offers an unmatched introduction to one of the most original and influential modern philosophers This is the most comprehensive anthology of Søren Kierkegaard’s works ever published in English. Drawn from the volumes of Princeton’s authoritative Kierkegaard’s Writings series by editors Howard and Edna Hong, these carefully chosen selections represent every major aspect of Kierkegaard’s extraordinary output, which changed the course of modern intellectual history with its mix of philosophy, psychology, theology, and literary criticism. (...) The anthology reveals the most important themes of his work, especially what it means to exist and to be human, and captures the unique character of his writings, with their shifting pseudonyms, complex dialogues, and powerful combination of irony, satire, sermon, polemic, humor, and fiction. A superb introduction and guide to the Danish philosopher, The Essential Kierkegaard vividly demonstrates why his work continues to speak so directly to so many readers. Traces the full span of Kierkegaard’s writings, from his early journals to his final work Features generous selections from all of Kierkegaard’s most important works, including Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Works of Love, and The Sickness unto Death Presents selections from lesser-known writings, including Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions and The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air Includes an introduction to Kierkegaard’s writings and explanatory notes for each selection. (shrink)

Parker obviously has a warm fondness and a deep empathetic understanding of this period of history, and they are offered to the reader in every carefully worked sentence. In a narrative style that presents the human dimension as well as the central ideas of the Presocratics, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Parker imaginatively reconstructs the phenomenological, empirical, and the homely rationale for their theories. He depicts the Presocratics as organized around the question "What is the universe made of?" and Socrates around (...) "What is Truth, Justice, Goodness?" There is a chapter giving a profile of Athens and Sparta. The three chapters on Plato cover the theory of forms, the Republic, and the Laws. The four chapters on Aristotle, besides the biographical inclusions, cover a scheme of his works, his view of nature, The Ethics, The Politics, and his lasting impact on the rest of intellectual history. The book ends with a brief treatment of Hellenism and a conclusion that takes its cue from the awe and excitement of Keats in On First Looking into Chapman's Homer. Altogether it is a simplified yet sympathetic, thoughtful, and sensitive introduction.--S. O. H. (shrink)

National Artificial Intelligence (AI) strategies articulate imaginaries of the integration of AI into society and envision the governing of AI research, development and applications accordingly. To integrate these central aspects of national AI strategies under one coherent perspective, this paper presented an analysis of Germany’s strategy ‘AI made in Germany’ through the conceptual lens of ordoliberal political rationality. The first part of the paper analyses how the guiding vision of a human-centric AI not only adheres to ethical and legal (...) principles consistent with Germany’s liberal democratic constitutional system but also addresses the risks and promises inherent to the ordoliberal problematization of freedom. Second, it is scrutinized how the strategy cultivates the fear of not achieving technological sovereignty in the AI sector. Thereby, it frames the global AI race as a race of competing (national) approaches to governing AI and articulates an ordoliberal approach to governing AI (the ‘third way’), according to which government has to operate between the twin dangers of governing too much and not governing enough. Third, the paper analyses how this ordoliberal proportionality of governing structures Germany’s Science Technology & Innovation Policy. It is shown that the corresponding risk-based approach of regulating AI constitutes a security apparatus as it produces an assessment of fears: weighting the fear of the failure to innovate with the fear of the ramifications of innovation. Finally, two lines of critical engagement based on this analysis are conducted. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“An Immoderate Taste for Truth”: Censoring History in Baudelaire’s “Les bijoux”E. S. Burt (bio)In May 1949, a French Court of Appeals reversed an 1857 decision condemning six poems from Les fleurs du mal for obscenity, in a signal case of a public lifting of a ban against some lyric poems. 1 Among the several interesting features of this case not the least is the decision to proceed against the (...) work in the first place. For lyric poetry does not appear an attractive target for censorship. Its subject matter and formalism remove it far enough from the experience of most readers that Gustave Flaubert, fresh from his troubles with the court over Madame Bovary, could express his surprise at the government’s attack: “This is new,” he wrote to Baudelaire, “this pursuit of a volume of verse.” While Flaubert’s comment was in point of fact inaccurate, he puts his finger on a problem worth considering. 2 Here we have a work that must seem naturally exempt from state intervention, by virtue of a deliberate retreat from risky political subjects, and it nonetheless did get censored by the state. Can anything be learned about “normal” state censorship from this exceptional case? [End Page 19]A key factor in the government’s decision to pursue the book, according to the prosecutor Pinard, was that these poems would prove accessible to a large audience: 3 “An immoral book that had no chance of being read or understood would not be pursued” [1208], he states. In his argument, as in the judgment by the court that the condemned poems “lead necessarily to the exciting of the senses by a coarse realism offensive to modesty” [1182], the assumption is that the work is extraordinarily available, its pictures immediately referable to ordinary experience. In the six condemned poems, language is judged to be not a veil but a tool, and a sex tool at that. “Despite an effort of style” [1182], the poetic situation—in most of the poems that of the boudoir—is painted in a language insufficiently flowery. 4A further interesting feature in the case is that when it comes up again, under DeGaulle’s Fourth Republic, the court summarily dismisses the 1857 judgment of coarse realism as just one possible interpretation, and a forced one at that. Instead, the 1949 court finds that the poems are self-referential, symbolic entities that do not represent ordinary experience:If some pictures, on account of their originality, were able to alarm some minds upon first publication and appeared to the first judges as offensive to morality, such an appraisal, attaching itself only to a realistic interpretation of the poems and neglecting their symbolic meaning, has proved to be of an arbitrary character, unratified by public opinion or by the judgment of the literary world.[St. John-Stevas 249]The shocking representations of 1857, outraging morality, are now understood to deliver the Wordsworthian “shock of mild surprise” by which we recognize the original work of art. In 1949, the poems are precious artifacts; their language is not realistic but symbolical; its sensuous forms reveal an inner, spiritual meaning.A crucial resemblance can be discerned between the actions taken by the two courts: both make their judgments in terms of a “reading pact,” a set of “artificial rules” [1206] that are presumed to govern reading and to have currency in the context. Les fleurs gets policed in the name of this generic purity, with the prosecutor Pinard calling “the judge... a sentinel who must not let the border be crossed” [1206] and the 1949 decision confirming the opinion of the literary world that the supposed transgression against public morality was in point of fact a transformation in the rules regulating the narrow confines of lyric poetry. 5This concern that texts be framed by a reading pact aimed at constraining their interpretation is worth considering in any discussion of censorship that wants to move from the level of pragmatics to that of theory. It leads to queries about the possibility of getting rid of state censorship entirely and about the state’s interest, as guardian and overseer of the archive, in the institutionalization and... (shrink)

Mr. Brumbaugh gives several accounts in the course of his work of the main purpose of his study, and the emphasis falls now one way and now another. Readers may easily be misled by the opening sentence of the introduction, which suggests that Plato's mathematical illustrations are pointers to "diagrams which Plato had designed, and were intended to accompany and clarify his text." If that is what Mr. Brumbaugh intended, he has failed to make out his case. There is no (...) direct evidence that Plato designed diagrams; and there is some good inferential evidence to the contrary. It would be surprising, for example, if Plato's diagrams had survived that long, that Aristotle should have described the Divided Line in terms of an arithmetical progression and ignored Plato's express indication of proportion between the upper and lower segments. Mr. Brumbaugh himself faces this passage and admits that "no continuous tradition connects the figures of Hellenistic scholars with Plato's original design." But it really does not matter. If we design diagrams in the light of our knowledge of Plato's mathematical imagination, it is most certainly a help to the interpretation of the passages concerned. This, as a matter of fact, seems to be Mr. Brumbaugh's main reason for ascribing the diagrams to Plato, and while the conclusion does not follow, the premiss is correct; and the premiss, not the conclusion, is the main point at issue. (shrink)

In Neal Stephenson’s fictional novel, Diamond Age (1995), the protagonist Nell acquires a prototype of what we might today recognise as a highly sophisticated e-reader with a voice-assistant. This e-reader, the “Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer”, uses artificial intelli- gence to serve as Nell’s personal teacher. What is key to the Primer is how it is designed to respond to Nell. The Primer has a theory of Nell – her needs, her real-world situation, her abilities – and it tailors its (...) lessons for her. The Primer is a highly personalised artificially intelligent device. For many readers – myself included – the Primer was a utopian vision of the bespoke digital tutors of the future. The appearance of new media and technologies in the early 2000s all pointed to the near-term reality of devices like Primers. The real-life experience of personalised digital media, though, is so far from Stephen- son’s vision that it is hard to imagine we will ever get there. Nell’s time with the Primer develops her intellectually, emotionally, and physically. Our “bespoke” media experience, by contrast, is more likely to turn us in on ourselves rather than guide us to live well in our societies. Personalised media is making us more like Narcissus: our consumption is driven by personal choices and automated algorithms that reflect what we already want to hear, see, and consume, and we are captivated. Central to our understanding of the problems with the personalisation of digital media are filter bubbles and echo chambers. These phenomena are used interchangeably by some, but in distinct ways by others. I take the position that filter bubbles and echo chambers are distinct phenomena, but ones that raise similar epistemic worries. I begin with a general discussion of filter bubbles and echo chambers, and I introduce the concept of “selective exposure” as central to both phenomena. There is minimal uniformity across uses of the terms “filter bubble” and “echo chamber”. Consequently, I divide the later discussion into two more precise topics: homophily and polarisation. I conclude with some future-looking comments about responsibility and the epistemic risks posed by digital personalisation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Fragments RAILING AGAINST REALISM: PHILOSOPHY AND TO THE LIGHTHOUSE by S. P. ROSENBAUM The argument of Graheim Parkes's "Imagining Reality in To the Lighthouse" is described by its author as "a railing against the realist position" (p. 35) as he understands it primarily in my article "The Philosophical Reedism ofVirginia Woolf." ' Apart from the question of whemer railing is a useful way of conducting an inquiry (...) into literature and philosophy, Parkes's discussion raises several important issues about these connections. The way diey are raised, however, involves various mistedces and muddles that make a brief reply to his eurticle difficult. To begin with a small reveeding example, Parkes asserts that I miss the irony in Virginia Woolfs use of die letters P, Q, and R to describe Mr. Ramsay's problems of diought (p. 41). Here is what I wrote: "By representing Mr. Ramsay 's thinking as proceeding in die very genered form of conventional logical symbols, Virginia Woolf is wittily extending the standard letters used to symbolize die conditional type of argument, If P men Cf (p. 339, with italics added this time). Parkes's misreading of my text does not inspire confidence when he turns to Virginia Woolfs fiction or G. E. Moore's philosophy. On a more significant issue, Parkes complains that I boggle his mind by saying diat philosophically, Moore influenced Virginia Woolf more man anyone else, whereas Platonic ideas abound in her books (p. 35). Of course they do, but not very much in her epistemology, which was the subject of my eurticle.2 What Peirkes does not mention is that Plato was also a profound influence on Moore's philosophy. One of die reasons Moore's influence on Bloomsbury was so strong is that he reinterpreted Plato for them. In her images and ideas Virginia Woolf was influenced direcdy dirough her reading of Plato etnd also indirectly through the work of Plotinus and Moore. These influences are not easily sepeurated, which is why studies of Platonic emd Neoplatonic influences in her work that ignore Moore's significance are so incomplete. 89 90Philosophy and Literature Peirkes claims mat die evidence of Moore's influence on Virginia Woolf is slight (p. 34), and then he concerns himself with the putative influences of German philosophers for whom mere is no evidence at all. In the fifteen years since I wrote my article, the biographical evidence for Moore's influence has continued to accumulate as Virginia Woolfs letters, memoirs, emd dieiries were published. From her first novel, in which Principia Etnica is quoted emd briefly discussed, down to die recently discovered revised version of her last memoir, in which she reaffirms her deep respect for Moore,3 the indications of Moore's significance for Virginia Woolf ought to convince any disinterested reader. It cannot be dismissed with a sneer about "the voguish fascination of the Bloomsbury Group..." (p. 34), especially from someone proposing to study yet again the depth psychology of her fiction via Nietzsche and Heidegger (P- 44). Nothing I say here, of course, will persuade Parkes of the value of philosophical realism for understanding To the Lighthouse because diat philosophy, as he conceives of it in his article, consists of straw. To tedce just one exeimple, Peirkes appeeurs to believe Moore's epistemology etrgues "diat things and persons are what they are independently of human consciousness" (p. 37). There is no space here to explain philosophical realism again to Parkes, odier than to note that it is not inconsistent with the veirious concerns (to use Peurkes's terminology) about "transpersonal imagination" or "participation in phenomena" that he finds so interesting in the novel. But what about die novel? For readers indifferent to whether Moore or Russell, Nietzsche or Heidegger are to be found in To the Lighthouse, the relevant question is what such philosophical interpretations medce of it. To them I ceui only say, reread the novel and then ask yourselves if an account of it diat says nothing about die value of art and almost nodiing about the value oflove bears much resemblance to your reading experience. Parkes thinks the portrait of Mr. Ramsay is unsympathetic because he is criticized emd mocked... (shrink)

The approach used by physics is based on the identification and study of ideal objects, which is also the basis of biophysics, in combination with von Neumann heuristic modeling and functional fractionation according to R.Rosen is discussed as a tool for studying the properties of consciousness. The object of the study is a kind of line of analog systems: the human brain, the vertebrate brain, the invertebrate brain and artificial neural networks capable of reflection, which is a key (...) property characteristic of consciousness. Reflection in the broad sense of the word, understood as an internal representation of the external world, is characteristic of a wide range of animals, and some of them (bumblebees, fish) even demonstrate reflection in the narrow sense of the word, understood as an inner self-representation. This complex behavior is realized by miniature brains of ~1 million neurons. The use of simple recurrent neural networks (RNNs) to obtain answers to general questions is illustrated. For example, it has been shown a small RNS is able to pass delayed matching to sample (DMTS) test, forming an individual dynamic representation of the received stimulus, allowing decoding by a special external neural detector.. It has been demonstrated in the reflexive game “even-odd”, the RNS has a huge advantage over a multi-layered neural network, with the same and a larger number of neurons – reflection defeats regression. It was found that the asymmetry of outcomes in the odd-even game, which was explained by various causes, including psychological ones – “it’s easier to catch up than to run away”, is reproduced in the game of two RNNs. Obviously, there are no psychological causes here and the advantage of the player playing for “even” is explained by the more complex strategy of the “odd” player – he needs to predict the opponent’s move and choose the opposite one. (shrink)