Cet article présente et discute les textes du débat qui opposa, entre 1913 et 1914, Karl Jaspers et Ludwig Binswanger à propos du thème de la « méthode structurale » en psychopathologie (K. Jaspers, Allgemeine Psychopathologie, 1913 ; et « Kausale und “verständliche” Zusammenhänge zwischen Schicksal und Psychose bei der Dementia praecox – Schizophrenie » ; L. Binswanger, « Bemerkungen zu der Arbeit Jaspers’ “Kausale und “verständliche” Zusammenhänge zwischen Schicksal und Psychose bei der Dementia praecox (Schizophrenie)” (...) », 1913 ; et « Psychologische Tagesfragen innerhalb der klinischen Psychiatrie », 1914). L’enjeu est de montrer la diverse manière dont les deux auteurs adoptent la phénoménologie à partir de leur réception de la psychanalyse freudienne au début des années 1910. (shrink)

[314] En examinant les malades mentaux, on a l’habitude de distinguer symptômes objectifs et symptômes subjectifs. Les symptômes objectifs sont tous les processus dont la manifestation est perceptible aux sens : les réflexes, les mouvements et le visage susceptibles d’être enregistrés et photographiés, les excitations motrices, les extériorisations langagières, les productions écrites, les actions, le mode de vie, etc. ; appartiennent en outre aux symptômes objectifs toutes les opérations mes...

Der Psychiater und Philosoph Karl Jaspers hinterließ eine große fachliche und persönliche Korrespondenz, die historisch vom Untergang des Kaiserreichs bis zur Etablierung der Bundesrepublik reicht. Diese kritische und kommentierte Edition vermittelt ein umfassendes Bild dieses Denkers. Briefpartner dieses Bandes:Gustav Bally, Kurt Beringer, Ludwig Binswanger, Eugen Bleuler, Max Born, Albert Fraenkel, Viktor E. Frankl, Robert Gaupp, Wolfgang Gentner, Hans Walter Gruhle, Willy Hellpach, Jakob Klaesi, Ludwig Klages, Kurt Kolle, Ernst Kretschmer, Arthur Kronfeld, Willhelm Mayer-Gross, Alexander Mitscherlich, Rudolf Nissen, (...) Franz Nissl, Curt Oehme, Wolfgang Pauli, Oskar Pfister, Hans Prinzhorn, Werner Scheid, Gerhard Schmidt, Kurt Schneider, Johannes Heinrich Schultz, Albert Schweitzer, Hugo Spatz, Georg Stertz, Hans Jörg Weitbrecht, Carl Friedrich v. Weizsäcker, Viktor v. Weizsäcker, Albrecht Wetzel, Karl Wilmanns, Richard Woltereck, Jürg Zutt. (shrink)

Rêve et existence occupe une place singulière à l'intérieur du corpus binswangerien, de ce vaste ensemble d'articles, conférences et ouvrages par lesquels la Daseinsanalyse avait déjà atteint son plein développement en 1954, au moment où parut la première traduction en français de ce texte. Si dans les années vingt le psychiatre suisse avait consacré ses efforts à la question du statut épistémologique de la psychologie et de la psychiatrie, avec cet essai de 1930 il exprimait pour la première fois l'ambition (...) philosophique de conjuguer l'analytique phénoménologique de Heidegger avec la psychopathologie. (shrink)

La plupart des études actuelles sur la « psychiatrie phénoménologique » séparent assez nettement les approches historiques, philosophiques et cliniques. Cet article vise à poser la problématique d’une histoire épistémologique qui dégage les enjeux des questions à l’origine du modèle méthodologique que Binswanger élabora pour la psychiatrie dès les premières décennies du XXe siècle. Dans ce but, on a choisi de se concentrer sur un ouvrage : Changements dans la conception et l’interprétation du rêve depuis les Grecs jusqu’au présent . (...) Il offre en effet un panorama du contexte psychiatrique et psychologique dans lequel Binswanger traite de la méthodologie en psychopathologie. Mais il montre aussi le rôle que le questionnement du rêve a joué pour la réception épistémologique de la phénoménologie philosophique par le psychiatre qu’est Binswanger.For the most part, nowadays studies in the field of « phenomenological psychiatry » draw a sharp distinction between historical, philosophical, and clinical approaches. This paper aims at opening up the field for an epistemological history, which brings out the problems at stake at the origin of the methodological model that Ludwig Binswanger elaborated for psychiatry in the first decades of the 20th century. For this reason we focus on a Binswager’s work of 1928 : The Dream : Changes in its Concept and Interpretation from Greeks to the Present. This work introduces us to the psychiatric and psychological context within which Binswanger dwells upon the problem of methodology in the field of psychopathology. But it also shows us the role that the questioning of dream played for Binswanger’s epistemological reception of philosophical phenomenology. (shrink)

RésuméCet article examine la manière dont Michel Foucault se rapporte à la psychologie et à la psychopathologie phénoménologiques dans les années 1950, à la lumière des nouvelles sources documentaires que nous avons aujourd’hui à notre disposition. Notre contribution se concentre en particulier sur le manuscrit inédit de l’un des cours donnés par Foucault à l’université de Lille entre 1952 et 1954 : le cours sur « Binswanger et la phénoménologie ». L’analyse de ce cours, conçu par Foucault dans le (...) contexte d’une réflexion philosophique sur le problème anthropologique de la psychopathologie, nous permettra enfin de restituer à Foucault la place qui lui revient dans le domaine de la « philosophie de la psychiatrie ». (shrink)

« Cet article a pour but d’interroger, selon une perspective à la fois historique et épistémologique, le lien que le courant phénoménologique de la psychopathologie a tissé avec la recherche typologique en psychologie et psychiatrie à partir des années vingt. Tout en évoquant les problématiques spécifiquement philosophiques inhérentes aux démarches de typification, j’analyse ces démarches en me concentrant sur les enjeux et les desiderata caractérisant certains des projets les plus influents qui, dans le contexte de la psychopathologie germanophone, (...) se sont rapprochés de la phénoménologie afin de trouver un point de repère méthodologique. En particulier, j’insiste sur le modèle théorique élaboré par Ludwig Binswanger, puisqu’il a été parmi les premiers à poser de manière systématique la question de la rationalité intrinsèque de la connaissance clinique, et à affronter le problème de la relation entre général et singulier qui se présente lorsqu’un “cas” est décrit et analysé dans son “exemplarité”. ». (shrink)

In zwanzig Beiträgen behandelt der vorliegende Sammelband Karl Jaspers in seiner historischen und aktuellen Bedeutung als Psychiater und Philosoph. Das Panorama der verschiedenen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen, die dabei zu Wort kommen und aufeinander Bezug nehmen, reicht von Psychiatrie, Medizingeschichte, Allgemeinmedizin, Philosophie und Soziologie über Zeitgeschichte, Literaturwissenschaft und Kulturgeschichte bis zur Filmwissenschaft. Immer geht es um ein ganzheitliches Menschenbild in programmatischer Orientierung an einer Zielgruppe, die auch den Nicht-Spezialisten umfaßt. Der Band gliedert sich übersichtlich in ”Zugänge“, ”Interpretationen“ und ”Beziehungsfelder“.

Karl Jaspers zählt zu den bedeutendsten Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Obwohl es bereits eine international etablierte Jaspersforschung gibt, haben die meisten seiner Werke jedoch noch keinen angemessenen Eingang in die historische und systematische Lehre der Philosophie gefunden. Diese Aufsatzsammlung gibt erstmals einen Einblick in die wichtigsten Begriffe seines philosophischen Denkens. Zu diesen Begriffen gehören Begriffe wie Grenzsituation, Freiheit, Menschenbild, Kommunikation, Philosophischer Glaube, Chiffre, Böses, Wahrheit, Vernunft, Gehäuse, Wissenschaft, Logik, Sprachphilosophie, Psychopathologie, Psychologie der Weltanschauung, Ethik, Einsamkeit, Erziehung, Politik, Universität, (...) Achsenzeit, Philosophia perennis und interkulturelle Philosophie. Einige dieser Begriffe wurden von Jaspers geprägt und gingen dauerhaft als neue Begriffe in die Philosophie, die Psychologie und die Psychopathologie ein. Die anderen Begriffe knüpfen zwar dem Wortlaut nach an die klassische Tradition der europäischen Philosophie an, wurden von Jaspers jedoch im Sinne einer Weltphilosophie umgestaltet und erweitert. Dieser Sammelband ist nicht nur ein einführendes Kompendium für Studierende der Philosophie, der verschiedenen Theologien der Weltreligionen sowie der Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften. Er kann auch philosophisch Interessierten den Zugang zur Philosophie von Jaspers erleichtern. (shrink)

Assistive systems based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) are bound to reshape decision-making in all areas of society. One of the most intricate challenges arising from their implementation in high-stakes environments such as medicine concerns their frequently unsatisfying levels of explainability, especially in the guise of the so-called black-box problem: highly successful models based on deep learning seem to be inherently opaque, resisting comprehensive explanations. This may explain why some scholars claim that research should focus on rendering AI systems understandable, rather (...) than explainable. Yet, there is a grave lack of agreement concerning these terms in much of the literature on AI. We argue that the seminal distinction made by the philosopher and physician Karl Jaspers between different types of explaining and understanding in psychopathology can be used to promote greater conceptual clarity in the context of Machine Learning (ML). Following Jaspers, we claim that explaining and understanding constitute multi-faceted epistemic approaches that should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary ones as in and of themselves they are necessarily limited. Drawing on the famous example of Watson for Oncology we highlight how Jaspers’ methodology translates to the case of medical AI. Classical considerations from the philosophy of psychiatry can therefore inform a debate at the centre of current AI ethics, which in turn may be crucial for a successful implementation of ethically and legally sound AI in medicine. (shrink)

Throughout his life, German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) recorded his experiences and reflections in diaries and correspondence. This comprehensive biography is the first to explore these extensive and candid private writings that illuminate not only Jaspers’ life and relationships but also the ideas he proposed in Way to Wisdom, The Question of German Guilt, and many other published works. Suzanne Kirkbright provides a sensitive and intimate portrait of the philosopher whose work on truth, personal integrity, and the capacity for (...) communication contrasted acutely with the erosion of such values in Germany in his lifetime. She describes how Jaspers’ Jewish wife, Gertrud, influenced his thinking, the loss in 1937 of his professorship at Heidelberg University, and his relationship with such celebrated colleagues as Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt. Kirkbright examines the unshakeable ethical content of Jaspers’ philosophy and demonstrates his unique and scrupulous personal adherence to the philosophical principles he espoused. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8.4 (2001) 337-338 [Access article in PDF] On Kimura's Écrits de psychopathologie phénomenologique John Cutting This book is a French translation of six articles that the Japanese psychiatrist, Kimura Bin, wrote in the 1970s and 1980s. There is the usual long introduction in such books by the translator. There is also the mandatory explanation of the whole matter as a postface by philosopher Henry (...) Maldiney as if the meaning of anything these days has to be in the form of a sandwich.The first article by Kimura Bin deals with the meaning of certain Japanese words pertaining to self and inter-subjectivity. The critical Japanese word is aida, which means something like interpersonal bonding and is that primordial state of the human being that founds both everyday sociality and the individual self, the latter both in its external and internal composition and orientation: "From time immemorial, the Japanese understood interpersonal social existence, the being between, life in the aida of itself and of others, as the essential trait of an individual human. The interpersonal aida is in some sense the quintessence of known individuality." Schizophrenia, for Kimura, stems from a disturbance in this aida at the most fundamental level, and all its manifestations follow from this.The second article is entitled "Time and Anxiety (Angoisse)." This sets out his major psychopathological thesis—judging from these six articles—which is that schizophrenia and depressive illness differ fundamentally in their temporality. In schizophrenia the subject is geared toward the future: "Subjects with a schizophrenic tendency give sufficient proof in their daily life of a marked inclination to imagine future possibilities or ideas whose feasibility is impossible or implausible." In depressive illness there is a preoccupation with the past: "The lived time of the melancholic type of person has a preponderance towards the past, or, more precisely, towards lived being up to the present."The third article, entitled "Schizophrenic Temporality," amplifies this thesis and introduces his terminology for these, respectively, as the Latin terms, ante festum and post festum. The French translation gives the meaning of the latter as "apres la fête" and "trop tard"—after the holiday, too late. (I shall deal with the potpourri of languages involved below.) This article is the most elaborate, and in it Kimura attempts to derive the core characteristics of the two nosological entities from these two underlying anomalous temporalities.The fourth article is about borderline states, a nosological entity that I have no sympathy for, and I shall not discuss it.The fifth article is entitled "Reflection and Self in Schizophrenia." Again, it concerns a fundamental difference between the mode of reflection in schizophrenia and that in depressive illness, but I cannot say, despite numerous readings, [End Page 337] that I understand it. The reason for this may be my poor French, an inadequate translation, or a confused formulation in the first place, or all three. The gist of it seems to be that in schizophrenia the "other" is a "stranger" projected by the thinking self, whereas in depressive illness the "other" is a "familiar" inhabitant of the sociality adherent to this condition.The sixth article, "Pathology of Immediateness," is an attempt to seek philosophical, theoretical, psychopathological, and even nosological and biological backing for what Kimura has set out earlier, particularly in the third article. Hegel, Lacan, Bergson, Heidegger, Derrida, and Husserl are brought in as philosophical support. Blankenburg and Binswanger provide psychopathological backing. A third prong is the nosological tradition, prevalent in Germany and Japan in the twentieth century, of promoting the concept of an atypical or third type of psychosis with a biological resemblance to epileptic psychosis. All this is then brought together and complicated by a discussion of language and 'mediation' to support the notion that there is a third psychopathological principle—in addition to the ante festum pertaining to schizophrenia and the post festum pertaining to depressive illness—which is that of an intra festum: a preoccupation with the now, characteristic of atypical psychoses with an epileptic basis.These articles tax one's linguistic and conceptual repertoire to the... (shrink)

Can existential themes, such as anxiety, the will to die, or our simultaneous will to live forever be logically described? Does a literary language or philosophical and psychiatric term exist that can express phenomena nonreferential to the external world? In short, does a genre exist that can redefine the relationships between symbol and meaning? Drawing upon various theoretical perspectives developed by Michel Foucault, Ludwig Binswanger, Gaston Bachelard, and Karl Jaspers, this paper discusses the ability to depict life as (...) we are living it, whether it is a product of mental illness or a matter of normal schizophrenic imaginings. (shrink)

This article explores the phenomenological analytics strategies ofmentally ill subject. With the help of phenomenological method the ontological conditions for the existence of the subject in a clinical discourse of philosophizing of twentieth century and meaning of its existence were revealed. The use of phenomenological descriptions provided an opportunity to describe how the mentally il lsubject is represented. It is shown that the world of feelings of the mentally ill can be understood with the assistance of methodology, based on the (...) Husserl's studies of human existence mode. The author disparated the methodological positions of phenomenology of L. Binswanger, M. Boss and Karl Jaspers about the studies of mentally ill subjects. In the submitted paper these methodologies are specified in clinical areas of philosophizing of Dasein-analysis and phenomenological psychiatry. L. Binsvanher's Dasein-analysis is considered as a synthesis of phenomenology, psychoanalysis and existential ideas transformed into a new paradigm. It is revealed that L.Binsvanher considers the reason of the mental illness of the subject as a narrowed horizon in which the subject builds its possible projects. Boss methodology is based not only on the phenomenological reduction for understanding of essential, but on the articulation of the organic unity of separate subject existence with being of others and being in general. Psychiatric pathology is considered as a consequence of the loss of openness and freedom. Jaspers phenomenology as a thorough description of the subjective experiences of patients is synthesized with method of comprehension. Involvement of phenomenology enabled the reconstruction of the inner world of the mentally ill subject through the study of the way he is going through categories of time, space, materiality and other categories. The article reveals that phenomenology for many professionals today is an alternative to the physiological direction of psychiatry. (shrink)

2013 sees the centenary of Jaspers' foundation of psychopathology as a science with the publication of his magnum opus the Allgemeine Psychopathologie (General Psychopathology), Many of the issues concerning methodology and diagnosis are today the subject of much discussion and debate. This volume brings together leading psychiatrists and philosophers to discuss the impact of this volume, its relevance today, and the legacy it left.

Este estudo dedica-se à teoria da verdade tal como se apresenta nas obras de Ricoeur entre 1947 e 1960. Procura-se sublinhar o vaivém entre uma compreensão ontológica da verdade, marcada antes de mais pelo pensamento de Karl Jaspers (1947), e uma compreensão fenomenológica da verdade centrada na teoria do juízo (1960). Contudo a análise da tensão entre a unidade do verdadeiro e a multiplicidade das filosofias permite elaborar o conceito de verdade como comunicação e de verdade como objecto de (...) esperança. Procura-se então mostrar o fundamento desta esperança bem como a dimensão pela qual ela ultrapassa o universo da filsosofia. A conclusão sublinha que os desenvolvimentos ulteriores de Ricoeur (1960-1989) sobre a hermenêutica do símbolo, da metáfora e da narrativa ganham em serem relidos no horizonte das tensões do problema da verdade. /// Cette étude est consacrée à la théorie de la vérité telle qu'elle se présente dans l'oeuvre de Ricoeur entre 1947 et 1960. On cherche à souligner le va-et-vient entre une compréhension ontologique de la vérité initielement influencée par la pensée de Karl Jaspers 1947, et une compréhension phénoménologique de la vérité centrée sur la théorie du jugement (1960). L'analyse de la tension entre l'unité du vrai et la multiplicité des philosophies débouche cependant sur le concept de vérité comme communication et comme object d'espérence. On cherche alors à montrer le fondement de cette espérance ainsi que la dimension par laquelle elle dépasse l'univers de la philosophie. La conclusion souligne que les développements ultérieurs de Ricoeur (1960-1989) sur l'herméneutique du symbole, de la métaphore et du récit ont tout à gagner à être replacés et relus à l'horizon des tensions du problème de la vérité. /// This study pays special attention to the theory of truth elaborated in Ricoeur's work from 1947 to 1960. It seeks to stress the complication of–on one hand–ontological understanding, at first influenced by Karl Jasper's thought (1947), and–on the other–phenomenological understanding, centered on the theory of judgement (1960). The analysis of the tension between the unity of the true and the multiplicity of philosophies leads however to the concept of truth as communication and as object of hope. It seeks then to show what founds this hope, as well as the dimension by which hope goes beyond the universe of philosophy. In conclusion, it is mentioned that the later developments of Ricoeur's philosophy (1960–1989), e.g. the hermeneutics of symbol, metaphor, and narrative, can be replaced and reread advantageously in the horizon of the tension involved in the problem of truth. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Edmund Husserl’s Influence on Karl Jaspers’s Phenomenology”Jean Naudin (bio) and Jean-Michel Azorin (bio)Keywordsphenomenology, intentionality, intuition, empathy, ambiguitySchwartz and Wiggins’s paper clearly shows that Jaspers’s comprehensive psychiatry draws mainly from Husserl’s phenomenology. This thesis enters a current debate opened by Chris Walker and German Berrios about the influence of Husserlian philosophy on Jaspers’s work. This debate, which emerged at the end of the so-called decade of the (...) brain, could be considered perfectly obsolete. But its topicality relies on taking up the challenge of the scientific bases of comprehension in psychiatric experience. Wiggins and Schwartz perfectly achieve this aim by opposing a theory of seeing and a theory of thinking. Works such as Walker’s are grounded on thinking; they are works about theory. They are not works about experience, but rather epistemological or historical works. In contrast, Wiggins and Schwartz suggest to see, as Jaspers did, and not to think, following Husserl by grounding their psychopathology on intuition and presuppositionlessness. They emphasize Jaspers’s method of “making present” by doing a perfect analysis of the issues of translation of vergegenwärtigung as a co-experiencing of mental processes as if they were directly given. These main principles of direct-givenness, presuppositionlessness, and making present pull the Jaspersian concepts to the Husserlian phenomenological reduction and seem like the foremost principle in Husserlian phenomenology: the intuition of the thing in itself. Whereas Jaspers refuted the principle of eidetic reduction, Wiggins and Schwartz clearly show how much he grounded on the basis of the concept of intentionality, discovered and enlightened during Husserl’s life within the horizon of phenomenological reduction. Actually, it seems that the authors take the side of Jaspers to better support their own vision of psychiatric experience, which they more explicitly argued in Husserlian terms of the later period in some other papers (Schwartz and Wiggins 1985; Wiggins and Schwartz 1988, 1991; Wiggins, Schwartz, and Northoff 1990). However, they take care here to struggle exclusively with the epistemological field of their opponents, considering only Jaspers’s own writings and the Husserlian texts that were accessible to Jaspers when he wrote his psychopathology. There is no room for Kant in Jaspers’s main [End Page 37] principles, and this assumption must lead us to consider the horizon opened by Jaspers, that is, the horizon of a science of meaning essentially built on the lived experiences and the bracketing of any kind of a priori. In contrast to the slight influence of Kant, one idea that emerges is that of the straight impact of Dilthey on both Jaspers and Husserl. We perfectly agree with Wiggins and Schwartz that Jaspers, grounding both on Husserl and Dilthey, arrives at a methodological principle that is all his own, by considering both the connections of the life-stories and the objectivity of symptoms. In other words, we can find the originality and maybe the astonishing modernity of Jaspers in his perfect description of the balance between comprehension and observation, between empathy and its limits, that are obviously found in psychotic processes.We thus focused our comments on the following critiques to Jaspers, although they were already well argued in the brief conclusion of Wiggins and Schwartz: (a) the issue of empathy, (b) the limits of Jaspersian phenomenology, and (c) the merits of its genuine ambiguity.The Issue of Empathy. Indeed we have no reliable scientific mean to guarantee the correctness of our intuitions of the other’s mental life, and this problem might lead one to globally reject the method. The discussion of this problem, classical in the Continental literature since the twenties, led the Continental psychiatrists to unfortunately abandon their own traditions. And it is surprising for a Continental psychiatrist to see this debate coming back into the English-speaking literature. When we address the issue of empathy, we have no easy means to abandon folk psychology. Using philosophical slang weakens the attempt to enlighten its foundations instead of describing its values. The suspicion regarding empathy is partially legitimated by the prejudices of Jaspers himself. As psychiatrists, we have to carry on the Jaspersian research by progressively abandoning it and coming back... (shrink)

Ludwig Büchner wrote one of the most popular and polemical books of the strong materialist movement in the later nineteenth-century Germany, his Kraft und Stoff (Force and Matter) (1855). He tried to develop a comprehensive worldview, which was based solely on the findings of empirical science and did not take refuge in religion or any other transcendent categories in explaining nature and its development, including human beings. When Büchner tried to expose the backwardness of traditional philosophical and religious views (...) in scientific matters, his arguments had some force, but the positive part of his programme was not free of superficiality and naivety. Büchner’s writings helped to strengthen progressive and rational traditions inside and outside philosophy, but they can also serve as the prime example of the uncritical nineteenth- century belief in science’s capacity to redeem humankind from all evil. (shrink)

L’absence de l’amour dans Être et temps a souvent été remarquée. Qu’il s’agisse ou non d’une lacune dans l’analytique existentiale, cette absence est bien ce qui a motivé Ludwig Binswanger à proposer en 1942, dans les Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (Formes fondamentales et connaissance du Dasein humain), une description phénoménologique de l’amour qui s’appuie directement sur les structures existentiales du Dasein telles que les a dégagées Heidegger. Ce faisant, l’ambition de...

Die Frage, ob Karl Jaspers ein Kantianer ist, wird nicht nur kompetente Jasperskenner überraschen, sondern auch die meisten Philosophiehistoriker, die mit der Geschichte der Philosophie der Neuzeit und Moderne vertraut sind. Denn einerseits werden nicht nur die meisten Jasperskenner, sondern auch die meisten Philosophiehistoriker überhaupt, diese Frage zunächst einmal mit einem gewissen Recht verneinen. Denn der überlieferten Lehrmeinung zufolge, war Jaspers kein Kantianer, sondern ein Existenzphilosoph. Andererseits werden vermutlich die meisten Jasperskenner und Philosophiehistoriker zugestehen, dass Kant für Jaspers zumindest (...) einer der wichtigsten Philosophen war, wenn nicht sogar der wichtigste Philosoph überhaupt. Das alleine reicht aber kaum aus, um Jaspers als einen Kantianer aufzufassen. Denn wer Jaspers als einen Kantianer bezeichnet, wird damit nicht nur meinen, dass Jaspers unter allen großen Philosophen immer noch Kant am nächsten stand und ihn am meisten schätze, sondern auch dass er selbst philosophische Auffassungen und Überzeugungen vertreten hat, die dem überlieferten Idealtypus eines Kantianers entsprechen. In diesem idealtypischen Sinne können und dürfen wir zumindest aus heuristischen Gründen z.B. Augustinus, Plotin und Bonaventura als Platoniker sowie Thomas von Aquin, Trendelenburg und Brentano als Aristoteliker bezeichnen. In diesem idealtypischen Sinne können und dürfen wir auch fragen, in welchem Sinne man Jaspers eher als einen Platoniker oder als einen Aristoteliker verstehen kann. Und in diesem Sinne kann man dann auch mit gewissen Fug und Recht fragen, ob Jaspers den wesentlichen Grundzügen seines Philosophierens zufolge ein Kantianer ist. (shrink)

Current research on second-person relations has often overlooked that this is not a new topic. Addressed mostly under the heading of the “I–thou relation,” second-person relations were discussed by central figures of the phenomenological tradition, including Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, but also quite extensively by much lesser-known authors, such as Karl Löwith, Ludwig Binswanger, and Semyon L. Frank, whose work has been undeservedly neglected in current research. This paper starts off by arguing that, in spite of the (...) rightly acknowledged differences between the Husserlian and the Heideggerian approaches to the investigation of the social world, both approaches converge in the claim that the I–thou relation is founded on more basic forms of sociality. In a second step, against the background of Frank’s and Binswanger’s challenges to that claim, I argue that Löwith’s proposal that the I–thou relation is a primordial form of sociality can be vindicated by conceptualizing I–thou relations as close personal relationships (paradigmatically exemplified by companion friendships and romantic partnerships). After assessing how Löwith’s approach to the I–thou relation stands vis-à-vis Heidegger’s and Husserl’s views, I conclude by suggesting how Löwith’s approach can contribute to current research on second-person relations. (shrink)

In seiner ‘Existenzerhellung der Freiheit’ reflektiert Jaspers, das Problemfeld der Freiheit in einem Kontrast zu den Begriffen, Phänomenen und Bedingungen der Unfreiheit und der Grenzen der Freiheit. Dem Problemfeld der Freiheit kann man im Denken und Handeln nur dann gerecht werden, wenn man nicht nur zwischen den verschiedenen Begriffen und Phänomenen der Freiheit unterscheidet, sondern auch zwischen den verschiedenen Begriffen und Phänomenen von Grenzen der Freiheit, wie z.B. durch die allgemeine Naturgesetzlichkeit und die menschliche Natur, durch besondere Bedingungen in Natur, (...) Kultur und Gesellschaft, durch gesundheitliches Befinden und individuelle Persönlichkeit, durch situative Begrenzungen, normative Forderungen und konkrete Grenzsituationen, wie z.B. von Leiden, Kampf, Schuld, Wagnis und Tod zeigen. Jaspers hat sich zum Problemfeld der Freiheit sowohl in seiner Allgemeinen Psychopathologie, in seinen pathographischen Untersuchungen, in seiner Psychologie der Weltanschauung und in einigen seiner philosophischen Schriften geäußert. Im zweiten Band seines frühen Hauptwerkes Philosophie mit dem Titel Existenzerhellung hat er jedoch eine umfassende Abhandlung zu dem komplexen Problemfeld der Freiheit verfasst. Dort behandelt Jaspers fast alle wesentlichen Begriffe und Phänomene der Freiheit bis hin zu seiner Konzeption einer existenziellen Freiheit. Jaspers geht anfangs von einem unbestimmten Begriff der Freiheit aus, dem kein bestimmtes Phänomen entspricht und der deswegen nur Illusionen erzeugen und einem ideologischem Denken dienen kann. Dann aber unterscheidet Jaspers zwischen verschiedenen Begriffen und Phänomenen der Freiheit. Dabei scheint er nicht nur wie die meisten zeitgenössischen Philosophen an Locke und Hume, Kant und Brentano, Wilhelm von Humboldt und John Stuart Mill anzuknüpfen, sondern auch an die Konzeptionen des Selbstbewusstseins bei Hegel, Fichte und Schelling. Da sich Jaspers nicht zuletzt auch mit den Schriften von Kierkegaard und Nietzsche auseinandergesetzt hat, gelangt er zu einer besonders umfangreichen und differenzierten Diskussion des ganzen Problemfeldes der Freiheit in der Moderne. Jaspers hat jedoch nicht nur verschiedene Freiheitsbegriffe und -phänomene unterschieden, sondern er hat auch zu den überlieferten Denkweisen im Form einer existenzphilosophischen Erhellung der Freiheit Stellung genommen. Dabei hat Jaspers’ Stellungnahme anders als viele zeitgenössische Beiträge über Freiheit und Determinimus den deutlichen und bewahrenswerten Vorzug, dass sie die unverfügbare und irreduzible Subjektivität der Willensfreiheit anerkennt. Damit knüpft Jaspers an Kants Einsicht an, dass der Freiheit des menschlichen Willens und ihrer praktischen Wirksamkeit immer nur die subjektive Evidenz inneren Erlebens zukommen kann. Dies unterscheidet sie von der Wahl- und Handlungsfreiheit, die man auch in konkreten Handlungssituationen objektiv feststellen kann. Der Freiheit des menschlichen Willens kommt damit weder die Objektivität empirischer Erkenntnis noch metaphysische Notwendigkeit zu. Die subjektive Evidenz des Erlebens eines freien Willens spricht nach Jaspers jedoch auch gegen einen weltanschaulichen, methodischen oder metaphysischen Determinismus, der sie aufgrund seiner Annahme einer kausal geschlossenen Wirklichkeit leichtfertig für eine bloße Illusion hält. Eine deterministische Weltanschauung oder Philosophie kann der condition humaine zumindest dann nicht gerecht werden, wenn sie die evidente Subjektivität eines freien Willens nicht auf eine plausible Art und Weise integriert. Jaspers’ wird der potentiellen Freiheit des menschlichen Willens dadurch gerecht, dass er ihre unverfügbare und irreduzible Subjektivität versteht und akzeptiert und erst gar nicht den abwegigen Versuch macht, sie durch eine objektivierende Einstellung zu objektivieren, wissenschaftlich zu erklären oder gar zu beweisen. (shrink)

First published in 1965. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

« Événement et vécu » est un article du philosophe et psychiatre suisse Ludwig Binswanger initialement paru en 1931 puis secondairement repris en 1955 dans le deuxième volume des Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze. Notre traduction se base sur la version publiée en 1994 chez Asanger dans les Ausgewählte Werke,...

What Sigmund Freud is to psychoanalysis, Max Weber is to sociology: the founding father, the primary source of idea, invention, and organization upon which the modern practice of the science is based. Karl Jaspers occupies an equally high place in the existentialist movement in philosophy. For many years, these two intellectual giants were close associates. These brilliant and eminently readable essays were written between 1920 and 1962, originally in German. Here they are available in English. Jaspers divides Weber's work (...) into three broad categories--philosophical, scientific, and political. He examines Weber's passionate devotion to the goal of purifying science of all passion, and specifically of making the social sciences an objective, value-free inquiry. He explores Weber's notion of the role of political leadership, and of the crisis of contemporary civilization as experienced in Germany. When one towering intellect writes about another, we enjoy insights into the minds of both. On Max Weber speaks to the philosopher, the sociologist, the political scientist, and the scholar, while it broadens the intellectual horizons of everyone concerned with deeper questions of mind, society, and the human condition.--From publisher description. (shrink)

The main objective of this text is to show that for Karl Jaspers all authentic philosophy is an attempt to express subjectivity in terms of the intersubjective categories of intellect. Subjectivity is understood as a plane of individual experience which ultimately comes down to the consciousness of freedom. Intersubjectivity on the other hand is perceived as a plane of expression of this experience, which can boil down to language. For it is only through the mediation of language that one (...) can illuminate its own being – its connection to the world and transcendence. Thus, the rational expression of experience is the essential condition for self-comprehension of any subjectivity. Ultimately, however, any attempt of rational inquiry reveals itself as insufficient. The human being, in his or her, pursuit of self-comprehension has to reach the boundary of language-based expression and therefore the boundary of all reasoning, where rational knowledge must give way to direct but inexpressible experiencing of what is the absolute source of all being. Thus, in the end, silence is the only true expression of transcendence. (shrink)

Karl R. Popper is “the outstanding philosopher of the twentieth century” (Bryan Magee), even “the greatest thinker of the [twentieth] century” (Gellner). He felt affinity with thinkers of the Age of Reason and developed a new version of rationalism: critical rationalism. As a champion of science and of democracy he was the most influential philosopher of the post-WWII era. He was a close follower of Bertrand Russell and of Albert Einstein in that all three advocated problem-oriented fallibilism (during the (...) peak of the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein who did not), valued commonsense, taking its theories to be approximations to the scientific truths of the day, and considered scientific truths as series of approximations to the absolute truth [Agassi, 1981, 112-16]. In particular, all three viewed science as the bold flight of the imagination checked and tempered by experience [Russell, 1931, 102]; [Einstein, 1949, 680]. Insofar as Russell adumbrated Popper’s philosophy, it may be fair to consider the latter a streamlined version of the former (the way both Berkeley and Hume deemed their philosophies streamlined versions of Locke’s [Hattiangadi, 1985]; [Wettersten, l985]. Russell raised the level of rational discourse in philosophy while remaining within the empiricist tradition; Popper continued and consolidated Russell’s achievements, adding a broad modification of the rationalist tradition [Popper, 1945, Ch. 24], thus forging new ways of philosophizing [Lakatos, 1978, 10]. Many sought a via media between rationalism and irrationalism, between individualism and collectivism, as well as between radicalism and traditionalism. Many sought a via media between empiricism and intellectualism. Popper’s philosophy is the only viable comprehensive rationalist suggestion in these directions (although it is open to modifications, of course), being thoroughly fallibilist and reformist, thus achieving a new and intensified commonsense philosophy, the only one that is integrated.. (shrink)

Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) came from a distinguished Swiss psychiatrist dynasty which had run the internationally-renowned sanatorium Bellevue in Kreuz-lingen for generations. In 1907 he spent a year at the Zurich Burgh lzli under Bleuler and Jung, and indeed it was Jung who took Binswanger with him to Vienna that year for his first visit to Freud.

Zu Hegels verschiedenen Vorlesungen über die «Philosophie des Rechts» gab es bisher jeweils nur eine Mit- oder Nachschrift seiner Schüler. Deshalb ließ sich schwer einschätzen, inwieweit diese die sich ändernden Vorstellungen Hegels über Recht und Staatsverfassung authentisch wiedergaben. Die neu aufgetauchte und erstmals kritisch edierte Nachschrift K. W. L. Heyses stammt aus dem Wintersemester 1822/23, aus dem es bisher die Mitschrift H. G. Hothos gab. Beide ergänzen sich gegenseitig und zeigen, daß Hotho und Heyse Hegels Darlegungen genau verfolgt und in (...) verkürzter Form notiert haben. Damit ist für Hegels Haltung wenige Jahre nach den Karlsbader Beschlüssen eine sicherere Textgrundlage als bisher gegeben. (shrink)

This work offers a selection of the philosophical writings of Karl Jaspers.

Begegnung des Verlegers mit Karl Jaspers, von K. Piper.-Philosophische Autobiographie, von K. Jaspers.- Jaspers und der Staat, von D. Sternberger.- Jaspers als geschichtlicher Denker, von G. Mann.- Jaspers in Frankreich, von J. Hersch.- Karl Jaspers und die italienische Philosophie, von L. Quattrocchi.- Die Philosophie von Karl Jaspers in Japan, von F. Hashimoto.-Karl Jaspers und der Rundfunk, von P. Meyer-Gutzwiller.- Karl Jasper's Lebensdaten.- Bibliographie der Werke und Schriften, von H. Saner [p.[173] -[216]].

Nous pourrions, d?une formule générale, avancer que selon le médecin psychiatre et philosophe Ludwig Binswanger, l?action de la psychothérapie vise à aider le malade à recouvrer quelque chose de la mobilité de son existence au sein des structures, volontiers qualifiées d?existentiales ou de transcendantales, ou encore a priori , de l?être-au-monde et de l?être-avec-autrui. Je m?attacherai à montrer ici que la capacité à endurer l?indéter­mination inhérente à l?ouverture des possibles, à se porter depuis l?au-delà des préfigurations de l?avenir, est (...) comme la condition de l?historicisation de l? ipse , d?une traversée des conditions destinales de l?existence, une traversée de la passivité, commerce dialectique avec elle mais sans telos glorieux. Pâtir l?indétermination pour élaborer sa passivité. Chacun sait que du côté de la philosophie, l??uvre de Binswanger a reçu ses principales impulsions, après l?étude précoce de Kant 1 , de la phéno­ménologie, en particulier celle de Husserl, et de l?analytique existen­tiale de Heidegger. Chez chacun de ceux-ci, Binswanger a cherché les moyens de décrire la mondanéisation du monde dans l?expérience normale et, sur la base des résultats acquis avec ces seuls moyens descriptifs, de mettre au jour les Umwandlungen , les modifications, les « flexions » de l?existence au cours des expériences morbides de ses patients. Encore faut-il voir, si nous. (shrink)

This book presents a concise introduction to the epistemology and methodology of the Austrian School of economics as defended by Ludwig von Mises. The author provides an innovative interpretation of Mises’ arguments in favour of the a priori truth of praxeology, the received view of which contributed to the academic marginalisation of the Austrian School. The study puts forward a unique argument that Mises – perhaps unintentionally – defends a form of conventionalism. Chapters in the book include detailed discussions (...) of individualism, historicism, epistemological positions, and essentialism. The author goes on to discuss Mises’ justification of the fundamental axiom and proposes a conventionalist interpretation. By presenting praxeology as a conventionalist research programme, the author aims to reinvigorate the interaction between the Austrian School, mainstream economics, and the philosophy of science. This comprehensive reconstruction is suitable for economists interested in the history and philosophy of their discipline, as well as for philosophers of science. (shrink)