I present an annotated development of the basic ideas of the Geneva School approach to the foundations of physics and the structures which emerge as mathematical representations of the physically dual notions of state and property.

In this paper, we study the notions related to tree property 1 , or, equivalently, SOP2. Among others, we supply a type-counting criterion for TP1 and show the equivalence of TP1 and k- TP1. Then we introduce the notions of weak k- TP1 for k≥2, and also supply type-counting criteria for those. We do not know whether weak k- TP1 implies TP1, but at least we prove that each weak k- TP1 implies SOP1. Our generalization of the tree-indiscernibility results (...) in Džamonja and Shelah [5] is crucially used throughout the paper. (shrink)

The European patent system allows for the introduction of moral issues into decisions about the granting of patents. This feature has.

This paper provides an entrance into central discussions regarding Kant’s account of property. The first section shows how Kant engages and transforms important, related proposals from Hobbes and Locke as well as how the ‘libertarian’ and ‘liberal republican’ interpretive traditions differ in their readings on these points. Since Kantian theories for a long time didn’t focus on Kant’s Doctrine of Right but instead followed Rawls’s lead by developing Kantian theories grounded on Kant’s (meta-) ethical writings, the second section focuses (...) on property discussions found in the Rawlsian tradition. The final section shows how important contemporary work in the Kantian tradition goes beyond Rawlsian, libertarian, and liberal republican concerns of distributive justice among free and equal citizens, to include questions central to, for example, the philosophy of care, feminist philosophy, philosophy of race, philosophy of sex and love, and environmental philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter defends the property dualism argument. The term “semantic premise” mentioned is used to refers to an assumption identified by Brian Loar that antiphysicalist arguments, such as the property dualism argument, tacitly assume that a statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts is true only if at least one concept picks out the property it refers to by connoting a contingent property of that property. It is argued that, the property (...) that does the work in explaining the possibility of a posteriori identities need not be a first-order property of the referent in question. On his view, the property dualism argument requires only a weaker semantic premise, which allows that the property in question be a higher order property. A refined version of the property dualism argument is formulated, which uses the weaker premise, and defends the argument against various objections. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate the claim that truth is a relational property. What does this claim really mean? What is its import?—Is it a basic feature of the concept of truth; or a distinctive feature of the correspondence theory of truth; or even both? After introducing some general ideas about truth, I begin by highlighting an ambiguity in current uses of the term ‘relational property’ in the truth debate, and show that we need to distinguish two separate (...) ideas: that truth is a relational property, and that truth is an extrinsic property. I go on to examine what both of these ideas are in more detail, and consider what would need to hold for truth to be in either of these categories. I then discern where all the main competitors in the truth debate stand on these issues. In doing so we learn more about these views and what they entail, and build a general picture of what stances different theories of truth take on whether truth is extrinsic or relational. Moreover, in doing this we will be able to answer one of the questions with which we began: whether truth’s being extrinsic or relational is something that, if accepted, lends support to the correspondence theory of truth. We will see that this is not so, and discern some interesting variations between various theories of truth on the issues of whether truth is extrinsic or relational. Following this we will be in a better position to judge whether the notions of extrinsicality or relationality are basic features of the concept of truth. In the final part of the paper I argue that, even if we are not in a position to conclude that they are basic features, they are features that any prospective theory of truth needs to take seriously. (shrink)

In the 1950s and 1960s, prominent institutional economists in the United States offered what became the orthodox theory on the obstacles to commercializing scientific knowledge. According to this theory, scientific knowledge has inherent qualities that make it a public good. Since the 1970s, however, neoliberalism has emphasized the need to convert public goods to private goods to enhance economic growth, and this theory has had global impacts on policies governing the generation and diffusion of scientific research and innovation. We critique (...) the foundational conceptualizations of scientific knowledge as either public or private by examining Germany’s treatment of scientific outputs as club goods. We then compare the relative impacts on social welfare of distinct United States and German approaches to food and agricultural research and innovation. We conclude with reflections on how these findings might contribute to a democratic debate on how best to manage scientific knowledge to enhance social welfare. (shrink)

It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.

Let T be a strongly minimal theory with quantifier elimination. We show that the class of existentially closed models of T{“σ is an automorphism”} is an elementary class if and only if T has the definable multiplicity property, as long as T is a finite cover of a strongly minimal theory which does have the definable multiplicity property. We obtain cleaner results working with several automorphisms, and prove: the class of existentially closed models of T{“σi is an automorphism”: (...) i=1,2} is an elementary class if and only if T has the definable multiplicity property. (shrink)

The common discourse on intellectual property rights rests mainly on utilitarian ground, with implications on the question of justice as well as moral significance. It runs like this: Intellectual property rights are to reward the originators for his/her intellectual labour mainly in monetary terms, thereby providing incentives for originators to engage in future innovative labouring. Without such incentives, few, if not none, will engage in creative activities and the whole human community will, thereby, suffer because of reduced inventions. (...) However, such utilitarian argument on piracy as de-motivation may not be necessarily justified. In fact, intellectual property arrangement is one among different institutions concerning how the society may handle new ideas and creative works. In reality, private ownership over one's intellectual product is merely a modern western concept that is being ' advertised' as being normative, which, by itself, is highly debatable. Alarming still, such normative argument assumes both justness and moral dimensions. This article will analyse whether such argument is philosophically sound. (shrink)

This paper is a defense of the view that existence is a property. Since the view is still a minority one, a fair amount of space is allotted to defending it against objections and counter-arguments. Positive arguments aren’t lacking, however, and emerge in the course of the discussion. Not all of the many positive or negative arguments which follow are wholly original—a fact to be expected in this context—but a fair number are, and both sorts of argument are seamlessly (...) interwoven in the warp and woof of what follows. (shrink)

A central characteristic of living organisms is their agency, that is, their intrinsic activity, both in terms of their basic life processes and their behavior in the environment. This aspect is currently a subject of debate and this article provides an overview of some of the relevant publications on this topic. We develop the argument that agency is immanent in living organisms. There is no life without agency. Even the basic life processes are an intrinsic activity, which we call the (...) organismic level of agency. In addition to this we describe several further levels. These capture different qualities that occur or transform during evolution. In addition to the organismic level, we propose an ontogenetic level, a level of directed agency, directed agency with extended flexibility, and a level that includes the capacities to follow preconceived goals. A further property of organisms is their autonomy. It has been shown that the capacity for autonomy changed during evolution. Here we propose that the two organismic properties autonomy and agency are closely related. Enhanced physiological and behavioral autonomy extends the scope of self-generated, flexible actions and reactions. The increase in autonomy through the evolution of a widened scope of behavioral possibilities and versatility in organisms coincides with extended levels of agency. Especially the human organization, including the sophisticated brain, is the basis for an extended level of agency referring to the capacities to follow preconceived goals. However, it is important for the understanding of the phenomenon of agency not only to assume this latter form, but also to look at the different levels of agency. (shrink)

We prove that Basic Arithmetic, BA, has the de Jongh property, i.e., for any propositional formula A(p 1,..., p n ) built up of atoms p 1,..., p n, BPC $${\vdash}$$ A(p 1,..., p n ) if and only if for all arithmetical sentences B 1,..., B n, BA $${\vdash}$$ A(B 1,..., B n ). The technique used in our proof can easily be applied to some known extensions of BA.

In a lengthy review article, C. Anthony Anderson criticizes the approach to property theory developed in Quality and Concept (1982). That approach is first-order, type-free, and broadly Russellian. Anderson favors Alonzo Church’s higher-order, type-theoretic, broadly Fregean approach. His worries concern the way in which the theory of intensional entities is developed. It is shown that the worries can be handled within the approach developed in the book but they remain serious obstacles for the Church approach. The discussion focuses on: (...) (1) the fine-grained/coarse-grained distinction, (2) proper names and definite descriptions, (3) the paradox of analysis and Mates’ puzzle, and (4) the logical, semantical, and intentional paradoxes. (shrink)

A current trend in bioethics considers genetic information as family property. This paper uses a logical approach to critically examine Matthew Liao’s proposal on the familial nature of genetic information as grounds for the duty to share it with relatives and for breach of confidentiality by the geneticist. The authors expand on the topic by examining the relationship between the arguments of probability and the familial nature of genetic information, as well as the concept of harm in the context (...) of genetic risk. Lastly, they examine the concept of harm in relation to the type of situations w the potential recipient of the information is not the person directly affected by the risk. (shrink)

Can the right to private property be claimed as one of the `rights of mankind'? This is the central question of this comprehensive and critical examination of the subject of private property. Jeremy Waldron contrasts two types of arguments about rights: those based on historical entitlement, and those based on the importance of property to freedom. He provides a detailed discussion of the theories of property found in Locke's Second Treatise and Hegel's Philosophy of Right to (...) illustrate this contrast. The book contains original analyses of the concept of ownership, the ideas of rights, and the relation between property and equality. The author's overriding determination throughout is to follow through the arguments and values used to justify private ownership. He finds that the traditional arguments about property yield some surprisingly radical conclusions. (shrink)

This book gives an account of a full spectrum of property rights and their relationship to individual liberty. It shows that a purely deontological approach to justice can deal with the most complex questions regarding the property system. Moreover, the author considers the economic, ecological, and technological complexities of our real-world property systems. The result is a more conceptually sound account of natural rights and the property system they demand. If we think that liberty should be (...) at the centre of justice, what does that mean for the property system? Economists and lawyers widely agree that a property system must be composed of many different types of property: the kind of private ownership one has over one's person and immediate possessions, as well as the kinds of common ownership we each have in our local streets, as well as many more. However, theories of property and justice have not given anything approaching an adequate account of the relationship between liberty and any other form of property other than private ownership. It is often thought that a basic commitment to liberty cannot really tell us how to arrange the major complexities of the property system, which diverge from simple private ownership. Property and Justice demonstrates how philosophical rigour coupled with interdisciplinary engagement enables us to think clearly about how to deal with real-world problems. It will be of interest to political philosophers, political theorists, and legal theorists working on property rights and justice. (shrink)

This paper supports the personal data platform cooperative as a means of bringing about John Rawls’s favoured institutional realisation of a just society, the property-owning democracy. It describes personal data platform cooperatives and applies Rawls’s political philosophy to analyse the institutional forms of a just society in relation to the economic power deriving from aggregating personal data. It argues that a society involving a significant number of personal data platform cooperatives will be more suitable to realising Rawls’s principle of (...) fair equality of opportunity. (shrink)

The paper argues that members of future generations have an entitlement to natural resources equal to ours. Therefore, if a currently living individual destroys or degrades natural resources then he must pay compensation to members of future generations. This compensation takes the form of “primary goods” which will be valued by members of future generations as equally useful for promoting the good life as the natural resources they have been deprived of. As a result of this policy, each generation inherits (...) a “Commonwealth” of natural resources plus compensation. It is this inherited “Commonwealth” which members of that generation must then pass on to members of the next generation. Once this picture is accepted, the standard bundle of property rights is problematic, for it takes the owner of a constituent of the Commonwealth to have the right to “waste, destroy or modify” that item at will. This paper therefore presents a revised set of property rights which takes seriously the idea that each generation has an equal claim on the resources that nature has bequeathed us, whilst allowing certain effects on those natural resources by each generation, and a degree of exclusive use of those natural resources owned by an individual. (shrink)

New developments in biotechnology radically alter our relationship with our bodies. Body tissues can now be used for commercial purposes, while external objects, such as pacemakers, can become part of the body. Property in the Body: Feminist Perspectives transcends the everyday responses to such developments, suggesting that what we most fear is the feminisation of the body. We fear our bodies are becoming objects of property, turning us into things rather than persons. This book evaluates how well-grounded this (...) fear is, and suggests innovative models of regulating what has been called 'the new Gold Rush' in human tissue. This is an up-to-date and wide-ranging synthesis of market developments in body tissue, bringing together bioethics, feminist theory and lessons from countries that have resisted commercialisation of the body, in a theoretically sophisticated and practically significant approach. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the computer ethics debate on software ownership protection by examining the ontological, methodological, and ethical problems related to property right infringement that should come prior to any legal discussion. The ontological problem consists in determining precisely what it is for a computer program to be a copy of another one, a largely neglected problem in computer ethics. The methodological problem is defined as the difficulty of deciding whether a given software system is a copy of (...) another system. And the ethical problem corresponds to establishing when a copy constitutes, or does not constitute, a property right infringement. The ontological problem is solved on the logical analysis of abstract machines, and the latter are argued to be the appropriate level of abstraction for software at which the methodological and the ethical problems can be successfully addressed. (shrink)

This paper presents a type-free property-theoretic system in the spirit of a framework proposed by Menzel and then supplements it with a theory of truth and exemplification. The notions of a truth-relevantly complex (simple) sentence and of a truth-relevant subsentence are introduced and then used in order to motivate the proposed theory. Finally, it is shown how the theory avoids Russell's paradox and similar problems. Some potential applications to the foundations of mathematics and to natural language semantics are sketched (...) in the introduction. (shrink)

What should a free economic system look like? Socialists have long held that a universal human emancipation requires replacing capitalism with socialism. However, it has recently been argued that Property‐Owning Democracy (POD) safeguards freedom while allowing us to keep key features of capitalism. I challenge that claim by showing that the institutional features that make capitalist workplaces unfree are shared with POD. As a result, POD is insufficient for a free economic system. After discussing a number of objections, I (...) conclude that we should look to more democratic alternatives instead. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the implicational fragment BKof the intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC) without the rules of exchange and contraction has the finite model property with respect to the quasivariety of left residuation algebras (its equivalent algebraic semantics). It follows that the variety generated by all left residuation algebras is generated by the finite left residuation algebras. We also establish that BKhas the finite model property with respect to a class of structures that (...) constitute a Kripke-style relational semantics for it. The results settle a question of Ono and Komori [OK85]. (shrink)

The article scrutinises the semantics of canonical property designators of the forms ‘the property of being F’ and ‘F-ness’. First it is argued that, as their form suggests, the former are definite definitions, albeit of a special sort. Secondly, the prima facie plausible classification of the latter as proper names (which is often met in philosophical writings) is rejected. The semantics of such terms is developed and it is shown how its proper understanding yields important consequences about the (...) concepts expressed by these terms. (shrink)

Justin Holt argues that the Rawlsian requirements for justice are, contrary to Rawls’ own pronouncements, better met by socialism than ‘property owning democracy’, both of them preferring both to just plain capitalism, even with a welfare state tacked on. I suggest that Rawls’s ‘requirements’ are far less clear than most think, and that the only clarified version prefers the capitalist welfare state.

: This paper argues for the consistency of adverse possession in land with a strict Lockean-liberatarian understanding of property rights due to the impermanence of man-made improvements by which unowned property is originally appropriated. This approach to property rights reconciles left- and right-libertarian positions as end points on a continuum of “temporal attitudes” toward property retention. ….

In this paper I develop an argument against a type of Non-Analytic Normative Naturalism. This argument, the Normative Property Dualism Argument, suggests that, if Non-Analytic Normative Naturalists posit that normative properties are identical to natural properties and that such identities are a posteriori, they will be forced to posit that these properties which are both normative and natural have higher-order normative properties of their own.

The pharmaceutical industry has in recent years come under attack from an ethical point of view concerning its patents and thenon-accessibility of life-saving drugs for many of the poor both in less developed countries and in the United States. The industry has replied with economic and legal justifications for its actions. The result has been a communication gap between the industry on the one hand and poor nations and American critics on the other. This paper attempts to present and evaluate (...) the arguments on all sides and suggests a possible way out of the current impasse. It attempts to determine the ethical responsibility of the drug industry in making drugs available to the needy, while at the same time developing the parallel responsibilities of individuals, governments, and NGOs. It concludes with the suggestion that the industry develop an international code for its self-regulation. (shrink)

We introduce and investigate the notion of uniform Lyndon interpolation property which is a strengthening of both uniform interpolation property and Lyndon interpolation property. We prove several propositional modal logics including \, \, \ and \ enjoy ULIP. Our proofs are modifications of Visser’s proofs of uniform interpolation property using layered bisimulations Gödel’96, logical foundations of mathematics, computer science and physics—Kurt Gödel’s legacy, Springer, Berlin, 1996). Also we give a new upper bound on the complexity of (...) uniform interpolants for \ and \. (shrink)

I address Frank Michelman’s recent attempts to dispel the notion that there are deep tensions between a liberal approach to constitution making and a resolute commitment to fighting poverty, i.e., to holding what he calls ‘social liberalism’. He focuses on the prima facie tension between anti-poverty struggle on the part of government and the existence of a property clause in a constitution, a tension that several commentators in South Africa have contended requires removing that clause from its Constitution. In (...) reply, Michelman argues that in the final analysis there need be no principled conflict between the two, which implies that amending the South African Constitution is unnecessary and perhaps even unwise. I provide reason to think that Michelman’s attempted resolution is incomplete, and suggest plausible ways to understand the legal function of a property clause in a liberal constitutional order beyond those Michelman addresses that can also help to resolve the apparent tension between it and a concerted effort to reduce poverty. (shrink)

Mitchell, W.J., An infinitary Ramsey property, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 57 151–160. We prove that the consistency of a measurable cardinal implies the consistency of a cardinal κ>+ satisfying the partition relations κ ω and κ ωregressive. This result follows work of Spector which uses the same hypothesis to prove the consistency of ω1 ω. We also give some examples of partition relations which can be proved for ω1 using the methods of Spector but cannot be proved (...) for cardinals κ>+ without a much stronger hypothesis. (shrink)

We show that the consistency of the theory “ZF + DC + Every successor cardinal is regular + Every limit cardinal is singular + Every successor cardinal satisfies the tree property” follows from the consistency of a proper class of supercompact cardinals. This extends earlier results due to the author showing that the consistency of the theory “\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\rm ZF} + \neg{\rm AC}_\omega}$$\end{document} + Every successor cardinal is regular + Every limit (...) cardinal is singular + Every successor cardinal satisfies the tree property” follows from hypotheses stronger in consistency strength than a supercompact limit of supercompact cardinals. A lower bound in consistency strength is provided by a result of Busche and Schindler, who showed that the consistency of the theory “ZF + Every successor cardinal is regular + Every limit cardinal is singular + Every successor cardinal satisfies the tree property” implies the consistency of ADL(R). (shrink)

John Locke's theory of property is perhaps the most distinctive and the most influential aspect of his political theory. In this book James Tully uses an hermeneutical and analytical approach to offer a revolutionary revision of early modern theories of property, focusing particularly on that of Locke. Setting his analysis within the intellectual context of the seventeenth century, Professor Tully overturns the standard interpretations of Locke's theory, showing that it is not a justification of private property. Instead (...) he shows it to be a theory of individual use rights within a framework of inclusive claim rights. He links Locke's conception of rights not merely to his ethical theory, but to the central arguments of his epistemology, and illuminates the way in which Locke's theory is tied to his metaphysical views of God and man, his theory of revolution and his account of a legitimate polity. (shrink)

Working within Bishop’s constructive framework, we examine the connection between a weak version of the Heine–Borel property, a property antithetical to that in Specker’s theorem in recursive analysis, and the uniform continuity theorem for integer-valued functions. The paper is a contribution to the ongoing programme of constructive reverse mathematics.

캘러브레시와 멜라메드가 전개한 법 분석의 틀은 재산법이나 불법행위법과 같은 개별 영역에서 전통적으로 분석되어 오던 다양한 법적 관계를 통합하는 역할을 하리라 기대된다. 캘러브레시와 멜라메드는 관련 분야의 연구자들이 간과해 왔던 오염 문제를 해결하기 위해 자신들의 모델을 사용하고, 또한 형사 제재 관련 쟁점에 그러한 모델을 적용함으로써 통합적 접근의 효용을 입증하고자 한다.