_ Source: _Page Count 24 Moral theories which include a preference-fulfillment aspect should not restrict their concern to some subset of people’s preferences such as “now-for-now” preferences. Instead, preferences with all contents—e.g. ones which are external, diachronic, or even modal—should be taken into account. I offer a conceptualization of preferences and preference fulfillment which allows us to understand odd species of preferences, and I give a series of examples showing what it would mean to fulfill such (...) preferences and why we ought to do so. (shrink)

It is easy to think of attention as a purely sensorimotor, exogenous mechanism divorced from the influence of an agent’s preferences and needs. However, according to the active inference framework, such a strict reduction cannot be straightforwardly invoked, since _all_ cognitive and behavioural processes can at least be described as maximising the evidence for a generative model entailed by the ongoing existence of that agent; that is, the minimisation of variational free energy. As such, active inference models could cast an (...) (embodied) cognitive mechanism like attention, described in this paper as a relevance filter, as constrained (or enslaved) by these prior preferences for which an agent must seek evidence, whether or not such priors are having direct, real-time neurocognitive effects on the sensorimotor loops that couple the attending agent and her surrounding environment. This duality with respect to the role of priors corresponds to a wider, ongoing debate in the active inference community regarding the framework’s explanatory power. More specifically, the debate centres on whether the notion of a generative model and the priors embedded ubiqitously therein act as a purely useful instrumental tool for scientists aiming to model the behaviours of self-organising entities, or, rather, the brain (and body) is genuinely constituted by a predictive hierarchy within which higher-order dynamics constrain and contextualise activity unfolding at lower levels. With a focus on the second (ontologically realist) construal of active inference presented here, this paper argues that in cognitive systems endowed with attentional schema, higher-order preferences do, indeed, impose a demonstrable and powerful modulating effect on the way attention unfolds. Furthermore, these preferences in question transcend the contingent, task-relevant goals that have already been shown to bias attention. Rather, attention is powerfully tuned by the most-deep rooted priors the agent possesses, such that, when sensory evidence against these priors is observed and free energy spikes, the agent attentionally prioritises the homeostatic restoration of these preferred states over their shorter-term desires. This suggests that, at its core, attention is a goal-driven process, which calls into question the putative dichotomy that exists between endogenous (goal-directed) attention and exogenous (stimulus-driven) attention. What emerges in its place is a symbiotic relationship between attention and preferences, whereby the fulfilment of the latter rests on successful application of the former, and the former derives its function from the organismic need to find evidence for the latter. (shrink)

Subjectivism about meaning in life remains a viable option, despite its relative unpopularity. Two arguments against it in the literature, the first by Susan Wolf and the second by Aaron Smuts and Antti Kauppinen, fail. Pace Wolf, lives devoted to activities of no objective value need not be pointless, unproductive, and futile, and so not prima facie meaningless; and, pace Smuts and Kauppinen, subjectivism is compatible with people being mistaken about how meaningful their own lives are. This paper elaborates a (...) novel subjectivist view according to which becoming more fulfilled makes a life meaningful for a person. Becoming more fulfilled is a process that has being more fulfilled as its endpoint, and, as with any process, it can come to a halt before it is complete. More substantively, becoming more fulfilled by some x is a matter of aiming to do various activities well, where doing them well at least partly constitutes benefiting x, and requires that one be more fulfilled by x than one presently is. Finally, this paper shows why the becoming more fulfilled view is to be preferred to the standard subjectivist theory, the fulfillment view, and how it produces intuitive results. (shrink)

Maximizing want-satisfactionper seis a relatively unattractive aspiration, for it seems to assume that wants are somehow disembodied entities with independent moral claims all of their own. Actually, of course, they are possessed by particular people. What preference-utilitarians should be concerned with is how people's lives go—the fulfilment of their projects and the satisfaction of their desires. In an old-fashioned way of talking, it ishappy peoplerather thanhappiness per sethat utilitarians should be striving to produce.

In this paper, I argue that patient preferences concerning human physical attributes associated with race, culture, and gender should be excluded from public healthcare robot design. On one hand, healthcare should be (objective, universal) needs oriented. On the other hand, patient well-being (the aim of healthcare) is, in concrete ways, tied to preferences, as is patient satisfaction (a core WHO value). The shift toward patient-centered healthcare places patient preferences into the spotlight. Accordingly, the design of healthcare technology cannot simply disregard (...) patient preferences, even those which are potentially morally problematic. A method for handling these at the design level is thus imperative. By way of uncontroversial starting points, I argue that the priority of the public healthcare system is the fulfillment of patients’ therapeutic needs, among which certain potentially morally problematic preferences may be counted. There are further ethical considerations, however, which, taken together, suggest that the potential benefits of upholding these preferences are outweighed by the potential harms. (shrink)

There is a growing tendency for medicine to be used not to prevent or heal illnesses, but to fulfil individual personal wishes such as wishes for enhanced work performance, better social skills, children with specific characteristics, stress relief, a certain appearance or a better sex life. While recognizing that the subject of wish-fulfilling medicine may vary greatly and that it may employ very different techniques, this article argues that wish-fulfilling medicine can be described as a cohesive phenomenon with distinctive features. (...) Following a few examples of well established wish-fulfilling medical practices and a brief definition of the phenomenon, both theoretical aspects and ethical implications of such practices are discussed and the question is raised how wish-fulfilling medicine should be evaluated from an ethical point of view. It is concluded that modern medicine is currently ill equipped to provide reasons why wish-fulfilling medicine should be banned or discouraged. The phenomenon of wish-fulfilling medicine serves as a prime example of the vagueness of the descriptive and the lack of decisive orientation of the normative categories employed in modern medicine. (shrink)

Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace (...) adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it. (shrink)

Game theorists tend to model climate negotiations as a so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’. This is rather worrisome, since the conditions under which such commons problems have historically been solved are almost entirely absent in the case of international greenhouse gas emissions. In this paper, I will argue that the predictive accuracy of the tragedy model might not stem from the model’s inherent match with reality but rather from the model’s ability to make self-fulfilling predictions. I then sketch some possible (...) ways to dispel the tragedy, including (1) recognizing some ways the assumptions of the model fail, (2) taking seriously recent work suggesting that increasing greenhouse gas emissions is not in most nations’ own self-interest, and (3) preferring alternative models like collective risk dilemmas, bargaining games, or cooperative models. (shrink)

Fertility treatment enables involuntary childless people to have genetically related children, something that, for many, is a valuable life project. In this paper, I respond to two sets of objections that have been raised against expanding state-funded fertility treatment provision for existing treatments, such as in vitro fertilisation (IVF), and against funding new treatments, such as uterine transplantation (UTx). Following McTernan, I refer to the first set of objections as the ‘one good among many’ objection. It purports that it is (...) unjustifiable for the state to prioritise the funding of the life project of becoming a parent through fertility treatment provision over the funding of other life projects that people might have. Following Lotz, I refer to the second set of objections as the ‘norm-legitimation’ objection. It maintains that the provision of costly forms of fertility treatment, such as UTx, would legitimise problematic social norms concerning genetic relatedness, reproduction and parenting, and that states should not engage in such a legitimation. In response to these objections, I defend the view that (reproductive) preferences ought to be taken more seriously when discussing fertility treatment provision and parental projects, and that not doing so can be costly, especially for women. The approach defended in this paper seeks to avoid disregarding and policing preferences and to reconcile their fulfilment with political projects aimed at improving the material and social conditions of sub-fertile people: people who, for social or biological reasons (or an intersection of the two), are unable to reproduce unassisted. (shrink)

Machine learning-driven clinical decision support systems (ML-CDSSs) seem impressively promising for future routine and emergency care. However, reflection on their clinical implementation reveals a wide array of ethical challenges. The preferences, concerns and expectations of professional stakeholders remain largely unexplored. Empirical research, however, may help to clarify the conceptual debate and its aspects in terms of their relevance for clinical practice. This study explores, from an ethical point of view, future healthcare professionals’ attitudes to potential changes of responsibility and decision-making (...) authority when using ML-CDSS. Twenty-seven semistructured interviews were conducted with German medical students and nursing trainees. The data were analysed based on qualitative content analysis according to Kuckartz. Interviewees’ reflections are presented under three themes the interviewees describe as closely related: (self-)attribution of responsibility, decision-making authority and need of (professional) experience. The results illustrate the conceptual interconnectedness of professional responsibility and its structural and epistemic preconditions to be able to fulfil clinicians’ responsibility in a meaningful manner. The study also sheds light on the four relata of responsibility understood as a relational concept. The article closes with concrete suggestions for the ethically sound clinical implementation of ML-CDSS. (shrink)

BackgroundFollowing the increased presence of the Right-to-Die Movement, improved end-of-life options, and the political and legal status of aid-in-dying around the globe, suicide tourism has become a promising alternative for individuals who wish to end their lives. Yet, little is known about this from the perspective of those who engage in the phenomenon.MethodsThis study applied the qualitative research approach, following the grounded theory tradition. It includes 11 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Israeli members of the Swiss non-profit Dignitas who contemplated traveling (...) to Switzerland for aid-in-dying.ResultsSeven themes emerged from the data analysis, including health and functioning; feelings regarding survivorship and existence; interacting with the health sector; attitudes regarding death and dying; suicide; choosing death; and choosing suicide tourism. A significant portion of the participants had experienced suicidal thoughts and had even previously attempted suicide, some more than once. Most of them referred to chronic illnesses, functional disability, and social isolation. They understand suffering within the subjective dimension, namely only by the person who is actually subjected to the disease, ailments, and disability. Participants regarded aid-in-dying in Switzerland as positive thanks to its guaranteed outcome: "beautiful death", compared to "disadvantaged dying" which places a burden on the participants' loved ones throughout the prolonged dying. Most of them do not necessarily want to have their loved ones beside them when they die, and they see no significant meaning in dying in a foreign country to which they have no emotional or civil attachment.ConclusionThe desirable approval or tragic refusal by Dignitas to participants' requests for suicide tourism enhances the paradox between the perception of aid-in-dying as a mechanism for fulfilling controlled death and its bureaucratic and materialistic characteristics specifically reflected in a paid, formalized approach to aid-in-dying that cultivate dependency and collaboration. (shrink)

In the present study it was shown that both decision heuristics and social value orientation play important roles in the building of preferences. This was revealed in decision tasks in which participants were deciding about candidates for a job position. An eye-tracking equipment was applied in order to register participants´ information acquisition. It was revealed that participants performing well on a series of heuristics tasks (availability, representativeness, anchoríng & adjustment,and attribution) including a confidence judgment also behaved more accurately than low (...) performers in the fulfillment of the preference tasks. It was also established that the high performers were not as influenced by whether uncertainty was presented in terms of probabilities or in terms of frequencies as was the low performers. With regard to social value orientation the results revealed that decision processing differences were more systematic between cooperators and competitors than between cooperators and individualists. Also, the cooperators did not seem to attend more to proenvironmental goals than to profit goals in the evaluation of the candidates. Finally, it was shown that accountable cooperators invested more time in their decisions than those that were not accountable, and that no such difference was observed between accountable and not accountable competitors or individualists. (shrink)

J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes ‘Ultimism’ – the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality – to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism – the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously – is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism is far (...) more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism. (shrink)

The Fatwā-house, which was within the body of Meshihat in the Ottoman Empire, gave answers to the questions posed to it by focusing on the Hanafi sect and the preferred fatwās of this sect for centuries. These questions and answers were also duly recorded. In this study, based on The Record for the Legal Responses of the Supreme Fatwā Office, which is registered at records numbered 378 in the Meshihat Archive of the Istanbul Mufti, one of the records containing the (...) answers given by the institution. It is an attempt to create an imagination about the scope and sphere of influence of the fatwā activity in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, in the last thirteen years of the state, Fatwā-house has been the addressee of questions from individuals, state and private institution directors, societies, ministries and the Grand Vizier. While some of these questions came from the provinces within the Ottoman borders or from the countries that had an administrative ties with the Ottoman Empire, some of them were submitted to the Fatwā-house by the Muslims of other states from the lost lands or simply because the caliphate center was the official fatwā organ. At the records, there is also a record of the questions coming from muslims who are Ottoman citizens but residing in other countries. Looking at the subjects, it was determined that most of the questions were asked about foundations. In addition, the permissibility of obtaining interest by bank facility or depositing money in the bank, the establishment of modern schools and whether the ways to create resources for these schools are permissible, whether teaching in Latin letters is possible, the provision of life insurance, the importance of cleanliness in the fight against cholera, the fight against innovations (bidʻas) in mosques. It is seen that questions on different issues, from issues such as whether the wife of the lost (mafqud) can be separated by the judge or not; to the issues of whether the fulfillment of judgment can be regarded as the end of the judgment or not. As it is mentioned in some fatwā records at the record book, it is obligatory to decide on fatwā and its fulfillment in the Ottoman Empire with the most authentic and preferred view of the Hanafi sect. The last two fatwā questions mentioned above are handled as examples of giving up the act with the will of the head of state, with the preferred fatwâs discussed in this article. It is only possible with the will of the head of state to make a decision with an opinion other than preferred fatwâ or an other opinion out of the sect. According to the first example, some of those of the citizens of other states outside the Ottoman Empire came to the Ottoman lands for reasons like trade etc. and married to Muslim women there and then left them suffering. This was also true for the wives of men who went to wars and did not return. Although the drawbacks of the Hanafi sect's preferred view, that one should wait until the age of ninety, one hundred, one hundred and twenty, or until the death of their peers, were resolved by appointing a regent from other sects, continuity could not be ensured in this practice either, finding people has not always been possible. For this reason, in the time of Shaykh al-Islam Hayri Efendi, a statement of change was prepared and submitted to the will of the sultan. In the issue of whether the signature of the head of state can be counted as the end of the judgment, another subject in which the will of the head of state is applied, the stages of abandoning the preferred view can be followed much more clearly. In the case of the dismissal of the judge or the expiration of the term of office before the execution of the judgment, especially in the distant provinces of the state, in the case of the judge's dismissal or the expiration of his term, according to the preferred view of the sect, which was based on juristic discretion, the closure of the cases took many years. It is seen that the judgment reached by analogy was submitted to the will of the sultan, with an article added to the script regarding the prepared procedure of reasoning, although there is no preferred view since it is the most suitable opinion for the interests of the people and the necessities of the century due to the increase in complaints. Effective from the time it was approved by the head of state, the execution of the sentence is no longer a requirement for the trial to be completed. The changes in the provisions of these matters also show that, although it was important for the Ottoman State to comply with the preferred view of the Hanafi sect - as in the previous Shaykh al-Islams' fatwās in the form of ma'ruzat - it was considered more necessary to look after the interests of the Muslims and different opinions were enacted and put into practice. (shrink)

There has recently been some literature on the properties of a Health-Related Social Welfare Function (HRSWF). The aim of this article is to contribute to the analysis of the different properties of a HRSWF, paying particular attention to the monotonicity principle. For monotonicity to be fulfilled, any increase in individual health—other things equal—should result in an increase in social welfare. We elicit public preferences concerning trade-offs between the total level of health (concern for efficiency) and its distribution (concern for equality), (...) under different hypothetical scenarios through face-to-face interviews. Of key interests are: the distinction between non-monotonic preferences and Rawlsian preferences; symmetry of HRSWF; and the extent of inequality neutral preferences. The results indicate strong support for non-monotonic preferences, over Rawlsian preferences. Furthermore, the majority of those surveyed had preferences that were consistent with a symmetric and inequality averse HRSWF. (shrink)

We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying the qualified majority property for any given majority threshold. We also characterize the positional spcs satisfying the minimal majority property. We next evaluate the probability that the Borda, the plurality and the antiplurality spcs fulfil the two aforementioned properties under the Impartial and Anonymous Culture assumption in the presence of three and four alternatives for various sizes of the society. Our results show that the Borda spc is the positional spc (...) which better behaves in relation with the qualified majority principle and the minimal majority principle. (shrink)

This study aims to understand how and why emerging adults come into contact with food media messages, and what they perceive as positive and negative outcomes related to food literacy. Seven focus groups, stratified by gender and socio-economic status, with 37 emerging adults aged between 18 and 25 were conducted. Photovoice was used to reflect on participants’ real-life food media experiences. Findings reveal that food media consumption is a combination of actively searching and incidentally encountering. The results suggest that food (...) media messages attract emerging adults’ attention by bringing content in an entertaining, engaging, and appealing way, and featuring popular food personalities. Finally, food media messages were perceived to both enhance and distort food literacy. The results show how food media messages for food literacy interventions can be designed in order to attract emerging adults’ attention and fulfill their specific needs. (shrink)

In contrast to most current approaches to international politics, this work views domestic politics and international relations as inseparable and the role of individual political leaders as key. A core assumption is that political leaders and foreign policy decision makers are motivated to keep their jobs and that they select policies and allocate scarce resources so as to help them fulfill their personal political objectives.

Frames and framing make one dimension of a decision problem particularly salient. In the simplest case, framesprimeresponses (as in, e.g., the Asian disease paradigm, where the gain frame primes risk-aversion and the loss frame primes risk-seeking). But in more complicated situations frames can function reflectively, by making salient particular reason-giving aspects of a thing, outcome, or action. For Shakespeare's Macbeth, for example, his feudal commitments are salient in one frame, while downplayed in another in favor of his personal ambition. The (...) role of frames in reasoning can give rise torational framing effects. Macbeth can prefer fulfilling his feudal duty to murdering the king, while also preferring bravely taking the throne to fulfilling his feudal duty, knowing full well that bravely taking the throne just is murdering the king. Such patterns ofquasi-cyclicalpreferences can be correct and appropriate from the normative perspective of how one ought to reason. The paper explores three less dramatic types of rational framing effects: (1) Consciously framing and reframing long-term goals and short-term temptations can be important tools for self-control. (2) In the prototypical social interactions modeled by game theory, allowing for rational framing effects solves longstanding problems, such as the equilibrium selection problem and explaining the appeal of non-equilibrium solutions (e.g., the cooperative solution in the Prisoner's Dilemma). (3) Processes for resolving interpersonal conflicts and breaking discursive deadlock, because they involve internalizing multiple and incompatible ways of framing actions and outcomes, in effect create rational framing effects. (shrink)

David Lewis presented Convention as an alternative to the conventionalism characteristic of early-twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Rudolf Carnap is well known for suggesting the arbitrariness of any particular linguistic convention for engaging in scientific inquiry. Analytic truths are self-consistent, and are not checked against empirical facts to ascertain their veracity. In keeping with the logical positivists before him, Lewis concludes that linguistic communication is conventional. However, despite his firm allegiance to conventions underlying not just languages but also social customs, he pioneered (...) the view that convening need not require any active agreement to participate. Lewis proposed that conventions arise from “an exchange of manifestations of a propensity to conform to a regularity” (87–8). In reasserting the conventional quality of languages and other practices resting on mutual expectations, Lewis comfortably works within the analytic tradition. Yet he also deviates from his predecessors because his conventionalist approach is comprehensively grounded in instrumentalism. Lewis adopts an extension of David Hume's desire-belief psychology articulated in rational choice theory. He develops his philosophy of convention relying on the highly formal mid-twentieth-century expected utility and game theories. This attempt to account for language and social customs wholly in terms of instrumental rationality has the implication of reducing normativity to preference satisfaction. Lewis’ approach continues in the trend of undermining normative political philosophy because institutions and practices arise spontaneously, without the deliberate involvement of agents. Perhaps Lewis’ Convention is best seen as a resurgent form of analytic philosophy, characterized by “a style of argument, hostility to [ambitious] metaphysics, focus on language, and the dominance of logic and formalization” that solves the dilemma of “combining the analytic inheritance…with normative concerns” by reducing normativity to individuals’ preference fulfillment consistent with the axioms of rational choice. (shrink)

Fulfilling consumer expectations of corporate social responsibility can bring strategic advantage to firms. However, research on the topic is fragmented across disparate disciplines, and a comprehensive framework to connect CSR supply and demand is missing. As a result, firms often supply CSR that does not attract demand, as signified by pessimism about ethical consumerism in recent years and the inconclusive link between corporate financial and social performance. In this study, we propose a framework of strategic CSR management to define how (...) a company’s supply of CSR could meet consumer demand for ethical products by aligning managerial and consumer perspectives. We then investigate empirically whether such a strategic approach, which integrates potential demand in CSR management, would influence consumer choice of products with CSR components. Our hybrid choice modeling allows the inclusion of psychological biases caused by social desirability and cynicism to increase result validity. The findings support the explanatory power of the framework and reveal that consumers prefer some CSR elements while others adversely affect choices. This study advances the understanding of strategic CSR management and its impact on consumer choice and helps managers include the right mix of CSR characteristics in their products to satisfy ethical consumers. (shrink)

Knowledge about human wellbeing is a central part of ethical knowledge. But it is a neglected topic not only in ethics in general, but also in wellbeing theorizing, which has focused on enumerating the basic elements of wellbeing rather than on how to gauge, foster and maintain wellbeing in actual human lives. I consider the prospects for a procedural approach to wellbeing that sees it as depending on a process of continual adjustment between values, preferences, actions and emotions. The value-fulfilment (...) theory of Valerie Tiberius provides a model for such an approach, but needs to be corrected and supplemented in certain respects. I propose a version of the approach that is only partly, but still significantly procedural, and which does not privilege higher-order mental states. Considering the relevance of such an approach for ethics, I finally suggest that (certain forms of) moral agency may be best analyzed as an intersubjective process of adjustment and fulfilment of values and desires (etc.), and as a process of acquiring and exercising collective moral knowing how. (shrink)

Recent discourses about the legitimacy of homeopathy have focused on its scientific plausibility, mechanism of action, and evidence base. These, frequently, conclude not only that homeopathy is scientifically baseless, but that it is “unethical.” They have also diminished patients’ perspectives, values, and preferences. We contend that these critics confuse epistemic questions with questions of ethics, misconstrue the moral status of homeopaths, and have an impoverished idea of ethics—one that fails to account either for the moral worth of care and of (...) relationships or for the perspectives, values, and preferences of patients. Utilitarian critics, in particular, endeavour to present an objective evaluation—a type of moral calculus—quantifying the utilities and disutilities of homeopathy as a justification for the exclusion of homeopathy from research and health care. But these critiques are built upon a narrow formulation of evidence and care and a diminished episteme that excludes the values and preferences of researchers, homeopaths, and patients engaged in the practice of homeopathy. We suggest that homeopathy is ethical as it fulfils the needs and expectations of many patients; may be practiced safely and prudentially; values care and the virtues of the therapeutic relationship; and provides important benefits for patients. (shrink)

To practice medicine and ethics, physicians need wisdom and integrity to integrate scientific knowledge, patient preferences, their own moral commitments, and society's expectations. This work of integration requires a physician to pursue certain goals of care, determine moral priorities, and understand that conscience or integrity require harmony among a person's beliefs, values, reasoning, actions, and identity. But the moral and religious pluralism of contemporary society makes this integration challenging and uncertain. How physicians treat patients will depend on the particular beliefs (...) and values they and other health professionals bring to each instance of shared decision making. This book offers a framework for practical wisdom in medicine that addresses the need for integrity in the life of each health professional. In doing so, it acknowledges the challenge of moral pluralism and the need for moral dialogue and humility as professionals fulfil their obligations to patients, themselves, and society. (shrink)

In celebration of the centennial of the Institute of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Leuven, a series of lectures was organized to outline the evolution of various philosophical disciplines in the time span 1889-1989. The lcture on ethics was an attempt to depict the transition from foundational and universalist ethics into a hermeneutical type of ethics that is anti-foundational and particularistic. Such can be interpreted as a transition from modernity into post-modernity,or from ethics into post-ethics : it is the (...) abandonment of the belief that ethics might offer a rational legitimation of ethical principles, or that such principles might be shown to be universal dictates of reason. Several historical and philosophical aspects of this criticism of rationalistic ethics are traced and evaluated, in discussion with authors such as Nussbaum, Rorty, Walzer, and Lévi-Strauss. — 1. The post-modern rehabilitation of moral sensitivity correctly criticizes the poverty of a moral life that is only based on principles. However, it is shown that even loyalty to a particular person or group can only be of an ethical nature ifsome universality is presupposed. — 2. The post-modern rehabilitation of tradition is based on two arguments: moral judging can only occur within a particular way of life, and this particularism is the most efficient anti-dote against totalitarian powers of rationalization and homogenization. Nevertheless, it is evidenced that the universalism of human rights is needed to safeguard such particularism. — 3. Other motives in the criticismof a universalist ethical theory derive from the Wittgensteinian or Heideggerian rejection of humanism as a form of subjectivism or anthropocentrism. The final conclusion is that the particularity of ethos has an important role to playin the development of our moral sense, but that this role is essentially heuristic. Thisparticularity is the experiential matrix for a responsibility that is nevertheless of a universal nature. Ethics can never be equated with the articulation of a particular way of life, or ethos, because it needs the tension between facts and values. Without such atension it is reduced to a positivism of culture. The foundational questions should not be abandoned. They are not rationalistic abstractions precluding experience, but they are the reminders that our norms are norms, i.e. tasks to be fulfilled and not just actualsocial sentiments and preferences. (shrink)

Memory of event outcomes is a topic increasingly discussed in the field of event language and cognition. This study approaches how language influences memory of event outcomes from the under-explored perspective of the verb’s “fulfilment type”, a property formulated in Talmy’s event integration theory. This property indicates the extent to which verbs depict fulfilment of intentions. Through two experiments, we explored how verbs’ fulfilment type properties shape the text-based memory of event outcomes according to their perceived likelihood of intention fulfilment. (...) There are two major findings. First, people tend to have “fulfilment preferences” and infer that intention fulfilment is more likely than intention non-fulfilment. Second, intention-unfulfilled event outcomes tend to be remembered better for event descriptions that trigger no fulfilment perferences. This study contributes to event language and memory research by demonstrating how language-generated inferences can influence established memory of event outcomes. (shrink)

Wellbeing describes how good life is for the person living it. Wellbeing comes in degrees. Subjective theories of wellbeing maintain that for objects or states of affairs to benefit us, we need to have a positive attitude towards these objects or states of affairs: the Resonance Constraint. In this article, we investigate to what extent subjectivism can plausibly account for degrees of wellbeing. There is a vast literature on whether preference-satisfaction theory – one particular subjective theory – can account (...) for degrees of wellbeing. This is generally taken to be problematic. However, other subjective theories – namely, desire-satisfaction, judgment- and value-fulfillment theories – do not suffer from the same difficulties. We introduce two models of degrees of wellbeing a subjectivist can employ: the Relative and the Absolute Model, and defend the claim that both models face difficulties. In particular, we argue that a subjectivist theory should describe instances of depression as instances of low degrees of wellbeing. We also argue that a reduction of desires may sometimes improve one’s degree of wellbeing, an idea we call the Epicurean Intuition. We then argue that the Relative Model fails to account for the disbenefit of certain types of depression, while the Absolute Model fails to meet a central commitment of subjectivism – the Resonance Constraint – and is unable to accommodate the Epicurean Intuition. The upshot of the paper is that subjectivist theories cannot account for degrees of well-being in a plausible way. (shrink)

In my work I present a version of the semantics of relative preference for the logic of ought-to-be and for the logic of ought-to-do. I draw the philosophical inspirations for this semantics from Elzenberg’s axiological papers. In the semantics of relative preference I check which deontic principles are valid—especially those which Wolniewicz extracted from Elzenberg’s papers. I also check if it is possible in this semantics to fulfil the condition of the moral dilemma.

Jahi McMath's case has raised challenging uncertainties about one of the most profound existential questions that we can ask: how do we know whether someone is alive or dead? The case is striking in at least two ways. First, how can it be that a person diagnosed as dead by qualified physicians continued to live, at least in a biological sense, more than four years after a death certificate was issued? Second, the diagnosis of brain death has been considered irreversible; (...) in fact, there has never been a case of a person correctly diagnosed as brain‐dead who improved to the point that the person no longer fulfilled the diagnostic criteria. If the neurologist Alan Shewmon is correct that, prior to her cardiac arrest in June 2018, McMath no longer met the criteria for brain death and was actually in a minimally conscious state, this case could have momentous implications for how we think about this diagnosis going forward. In this essay, I will offer a hypothesis that could, perhaps, explain both these aspects of the case. The hypothesis is based on differences in how we distinguish between biological and legal categories. The law tends to prefer to draw bright‐line distinctions between categories, whereas biological categories tend to fall along a spectrum, without sharp distinctions. (shrink)

Although logical empiricism is now mostly decried, their naturalist claim that the content of a theory can be read off from its structure, without any philosophical considerations needed, still supports traditional strategies to escape cases of underdetermination. The appeal to theoretical equivalence or to theoretical virtues, for instance, both assume that there is a neutral standpoint from which the structure of the theories can be analyzed, the physically relevant from the superfluous separated, and a comparison made between their theoretical content (...) and virtues. In my dissertation, I examine the presuppositions upon which such strategies depend. I argue that the methodological principle underlying them, according to which theories with no superfluous structure should be preferred, is unpractical, for what constitutes relevant structure is determined by epistemic considerations about the aim of scientific theories. In chapter 1, I analyze the claim that theories with ordinary bosons and fermions are theoretically equivalent to theories with exotic `paraparticles'. I argue that this claim does not do justice to the latter, as the proof is formulated in a vocabulary parochial to the former and thus favors one of the theory while giving an impoverished version of the second. In chapter 2, I examine recent arguments to the effects that any interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that can offer a no-go theorem against paraparticles possesses an explanatory advantage over other interpretations and should, as such, be favored over others. Given that most physicists consider paraparticles as surplus structure whose non-observation does not require an explanation, I evaluate arguments of both sides and suggest a third way to approach the question. Finally, in chapter 3, I turn my attention to methods for excluding another kind of unphysical structure, mathematical artifacts, from rival dark matter models. Simulations are our only window into what rival models predict about the universe’s structure. But for them to play a useful role in generating knowledge, we need to distinguish reliably between real predictions and artifacts. I argue that robustness analysis fails to fulfill this task. I propose in its place another methodology, that of crucial simulations. (shrink)

Musical life became disrupted in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Many musicians and venues turned to online alternatives, such as livestreaming. In this study, three livestreamed concerts were organized to examine separate, yet interconnected concepts—agency, presence, and social context—to ascertain which components of livestreamed concerts facilitate social connectedness. Hierarchical Bayesian modeling was conducted on 83 complete responses to examine the effects of the manipulations on feelings of social connectedness with the artist and the audience. Results showed that in concert (...) 1, where half of the participants were allowed to vote for the final song to be played, this option did not result in the experience of more agency. Instead, if their preferred song was played (regardless of voting ability) participants experienced greater connectedness to the artist. In concert 2, participants who attended the concert with virtual reality headsets experienced greater feelings of physical presence, as well as greater feelings of connectedness with the artist, than those that viewed a normal YouTube livestream. In concert 3, attendance through Zoom led to greater experience of social presence, but predicted less connectedness with the artist, compared to a normal YouTube livestream. Crucially, a greater negative impact of COVID-19 (e.g., loneliness) predicted feelings of connectedness with the artist, possibly because participants fulfilled their social needs with this parasocial interaction. Examining data from all concerts suggested that physical presence was a predictor of connectedness with both the artist and the audience, while social presence only predicted connectedness with the audience. Correlational analyses revealed that reductions in loneliness and isolation were associated with feelings of shared agency, physical and social presence, and connectedness to the audience. Overall, the findings suggest that in order to reduce feelings of loneliness and increase connectedness, concert organizers and musicians could tune elements of their livestreams to facilitate feelings of physical and social presence. (shrink)

Adults who give proxy consent for medical treatment for adolescents must decide how much weight to give to adolescents' own preferences. There is evidence that some adolescents choose treatments different from what adults see as most reasonable. It is argued that adolescents choose according to age-specific values, i.e. values they hold, as adolescents, and which fulfil important developmental needs. Because not fulfilling these needs may do serious psychological damage, it is urged that proxies give weight to these values, up to (...) the limit where it would endanger or profoundly limit future life. (shrink)

Derek Parfit's monumental 1984 book Reasons and Persons contains a little appendix called "What Makes Someone's Life Go Best," a mini-essay on well-being that has taken on a life of its own apart from the body to which it is attached. This paper serves as a critical guide to that appendix. Topics include: the nature of pleasure and pain and its relation to theories of well-being; the unrestricted desire-fulfillment theory and the problem of remote desires; whether a person's actual (...) preferences should determine their counterfactual well-being; summative vs. global desire-fulfillment theories; the single-life repugnant conclusion; and objective vs. subjective vs. hybrid theories of well-being. Opinions being defended include: that Parfit's solution to the problem of remote desires fails; that his view on actual preferences and counterfactual well-being is right; that his arguments for global over summative desire-fulfilment theories fail; and that the single-life repugnant conclusion should be accepted. (shrink)

This Article provides a comprehensive, critical overview of proposals to use happiness surveys for steering public policy. Happiness or “subjective well-being” surveys ask individuals to rate their present happiness, life-satisfaction, affective state, etc. A massive literature now engages in such surveys or correlates survey responses with individual attributes. And, increasingly, scholars argue for the policy relevance of happiness data: in particular, as a basis for calculating aggregates such as “gross national happiness,” or for calculating monetary equivalents for non-market goods based (...) on coefficients in a happiness equation. But is individual well-being equivalent to happiness? The happiness literature tends to blur or conflate important concepts: well-being, subjective well-being, happiness, utility, satisfaction. A preference-realization account of well-being denies the equivalence of happiness and welfare, since someone can have preferences for non-mental attributes, such as health, autonomy, goal-fulfillment, knowledge or the quality of her relationships. It is critical, therefore, to differentiate two potential policy roles for happiness surveys. First, the survey response may provide prima facie evidence of the respondent’s preference-utility: the extent to which her preferences are realized. Second, it may indicate her experience-utility: the quality of her mental states. The Article clarifies these two, very different, ideas. It then criticizes, in turn, the preference-utility and the experience-utility defenses of the policy relevance of happiness surveys. Enthusiasm about happiness is premature. (shrink)

Is the assessment of a view of life only a matter of personal preference? I argue that there is more than personal preference. I defend the position that a view of life must be useful for the ascription of meaning and therefore needs to fulfil the requirements of the process of ascribing meaning. In this article I analyse this process and its requirements and deduce from them a set of criteria by which views of life can be assessed.

In this paper I wish to examine in detail the arguments which Spinoza uses in a very brief section of the Ethics, the lemmas following Proposition 13 of Part II. My aim in this analysis will be twofold: to attempt a preliminary sketch of the nature of a physical system in Spinoza’s view, and to clarify what Spinoza means by speaking of certain items as “individuals.” At least a partial fulfillment of the first aim is a necessary condition for (...) the second, since most of what Spinoza has to say about individuation in the Ethics and elsewhere is expressed in terms of individual bodies. His own solution of the mind-body problem entails that there will be correlative statements true at the ideational level; but, unfortunately, he usually leaves such correlations to his reader. I use the term “ideational” herein in preference to “mental” to avoid any dualistic connotation. Ideational and extensional levels for Spinoza refer to a dualism of denoting complexes, but not to a dualism of objects denoted by these. (shrink)

Diagnosis theory reasons about incomplete knowledge and only considers the past. It distinguishes between violations and non-violations. Qualitative decision theory reasons about decision variables and considers the future. It distinguishes between fulfilled goals and unfulfilled goals. In this paper we formalize normative diagnoses and decisions in the special purpose formalism DIO(DE)2 as well as in extensions of the preference-based deontic logic PDL. The DIagnostic and DEcision-theoretic framework for DEontic reasoning DIO(DE)2 formalizes reasoning about violations and fulfillments, and is used (...) to characterize the distinction between normative diagnosis theory and (qualitative) decision theory. The extension of the preference-based deontic logic PDL shows how normative diagnostic and decision-theoretic reasoning — i.e. reasoning about violations and fulfillments — can be formalized as an extension of deontic reasoning. (shrink)

The present work includes a discussion about the Kantian ideal of progress and its repercussions in the construction of a cosmopolitan education, by virtue of weighing its validity and the challenges it faces in contemporary times. The manuscript analyzes the Kantian postulates about progress to clarify the guidelines of a cosmopolitan education. The document is structured thanks to the bibliographic study and the consequent systematic review of an exploratory type and the help of the hermeneutical method. The approach to the (...) subject begins with the analysis of the enlightened ideals of a cosmopolitan, universal, humanizing education project aimed at fulfilling the ultimate purposes of reason, as the preferred path for human improvement and social progress. At the end of this work, the incompatibility between that ideal of Kantian cosmopolitan education, which promised freedom and self-control, and the current system that promotes an idea of ​​progress far from these principles is made evident. (shrink)

The first part of my investigation of the Christian love command and biological research on altruism is organized around three key themes whose different forms both in the theological and in the sociobiological context are investigated: The awareness of expanding inclusiveness concerns the issue of extending love or altruistic behavior beyond the most immediate neighbor, even to enemies. The awareness of excessive demand concerns the question of the ability of the human being, to fulfill an excessive demand placed by the (...) command of love or by altruistic admonitions. Threshold awareness finally concerns the question whether love or altruism constitutes a step on the way to a “new human” and a “new world.”In the second part I introduce two models for the relationship between Christian religion or theology and sociobiology. The model by Ralph Wendell Burhoe is characterized by a functional approach toward religion, which is the crucial factor within culture for motivating human beings to act altruistically toward nonrelated individuals. This functional analysis of religion is a constructive contribution to a scientific description of the world. The other model, by Philip Hefner, is theologically oriented and emphasizes the intrinsic character of altruistic love, which has its origin in God and whose anthropological preconditions are elucidated in sociobiological research.The goal of this investigation is to show that a better mutual understanding is preferable to a total incorporation of the investigated domains into each other. (shrink)

The standard view in current philosophy of creativity says that being creative has two requirements: being novel and being valuable. The standard view on creativity has recently become an object of critical scrutiny. Hills and Bird have specifically proposed to remove the value requirement from the definition, as it is not clear that creative objects are necessarily valuable or creative people necessarily praiseworthy. In this paper, I argue against Hills and Bird, since eliminating the element of value from the explanation (...) of creativity hinders the understanding of the role that creative products play in actual epistemic practices, which are fundamentally normative. More specifically, I argue that the terms ‘creativity’ and ‘creative’ function as thick epistemic concepts when employed by competent epistemic agents in practice, that is, these concepts have both a descriptive and an evaluative content that cannot be disentangled from one another. Accordingly, I suggest that philosophers should prefer thick accounts over thin accounts of creativity. A thick account of creativity is one that endorses the standard view at its basis, but further develops it in two ways: by stressing the entanglement of the value and novelty requirements; by permitting to encompass a range of domain-specific characterizations of such entanglement for different epistemic situations. In order to take the first steps in the development of such a thick account of creativity, I look at the domain of scientific practices as a case in point, and try to spell out what the thickness of creative instances typically entails here. Namely, I identify the worthy novelty of creative models and methods with their potential to clarify a tradition, with fruitfulness, and with the fulfilment of exploratory aims. (shrink)

In “Happiness Is the Wrong Metric,” Amitai Etzioni largely argues that human beings are motivated by more than just their own happiness, whether conceived in terms of pleasant experiences or fulfilled preferences, and that the state should attend to more than merely people’s happiness. He contends that people are often disposed to seek out, and that public policy ought to promote, what is morally right and good. While not disagreeing with this thrust of Etzioni’s position, I maintain in my contribution (...) that it is too narrow. There is a large range of goods that people tend to pursue, and that social and political institutions should plausibly foster, which are reducible to neither happiness nor morality. They are values that are instead well captured by the concept of what makes a life meaningful. If Etzioni is correct that the state ought to enable people to live morally upright lives, then it has no less reason to enable them to live meaningful ones, too. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.1 (2001) 37-57 [Access article in PDF] Gersonides on Providence: A Jewish Chapter in the History of the General Will Steven Nadler The notion of the "general will" has proven to be one of the more influential and at the same time enduringly perplexing concepts in the history of ideas. Its most famous appearance is of course, in Rousseau's political philosophy as the (...) expression, ideally embodied in the sovereign's commands, of what is in the common or public interest. The general will (la volonté générale) is, Rousseau says, the will of "the body of the people," that is, "the will that one has a citizen" for the common good. It thus stands in contrast to the "particular will" (la volonté particulière), the expression of one's individual and particularistic preference.1 In this political context, what gives the general will its generality is the universality of interest it represents. Its scope extends to all citizens and it specifies what is in the best interest of the members of the body politic as a whole. Although the general will may or may not coincide with each and every individual's private interest, all citizens are, as a matter of fact, properly served by its fulfillment.In his book The General Will Before Rousseau, Patrick Riley demonstrates how this central idea of eighteenth-century political thought actually has its origins in seventeenth-century theological debates over divine, not human, justice. The mystery [of the origins of the general will] is solved when one realizes that the term volonté générale was well established in the seventeenth-century, though not primarily as a political idea. In fact, the notion of "general will" was originally a theological one, referring to the kind of will that God (supposedly) had in deciding who would be granted grace sufficient for salvation and who would be consigned to hell. The [End Page 37] question at issue was: if "God wills that all men be saved"--as St. Paul asserts in a letter to his disciple Timothy--does he have a general will that produces universal salvation? And if he does not, why does he will particularly that some men not be saved? 2Part of the problem to which the appeal to God's general will was thought by some to afford a solution was the apparent injustice in the distribution of grace. Grace seemed to fall abundantly upon those who were not deserving of it and unprepared to use it properly and insufficiently, and all too rarely upon those who, it was believed, were most worthy of it. Malebranche, for one, believed that God wills, with a general volition, that all people be saved; other factors, however, hinder that "simple" volition from being carried out. But this question about divine aid was simply one element in a larger body of questions--extending across the realms of both nature and grace--about evil in God's creation: why is there sin, suffering, and imperfection in the world if the world was created and is governed by a wise, just, and omnipotent God? As Riley shows--and as I shall briefly review--the notion of the general will was employed by some early modern theologians in an attempt at theodicy, that is, an explanation or justification of God's ways in the face of such a conundrum.My aim in this paper is to take Riley's project one step further. I show that the use of the generality of divine purpose and effect that one finds in seventeenth-century theological discussions of the problem of evil appears in a similar form in an even earlier theodicean context. In his account of divine providence and especially in his explanation of why in this lifetime righteous people suffer and wicked people prosper, the fourteenth-century rabbi and philosopher Levi ben Gershom--Gersonides (or, to use his Hebrew acronym, RaLBaG)--appeals to the generality of the ways of nature established by God much... (shrink)

Ethical non-naturalists posit a sui generis realm of moral and evaluative properties, while ethical naturalists identify moral and evaluative properties with natural or descriptive properties. First, I explore the standard arguments in favor of an ethical non-naturalist account of goodness, specifically the open-question argument. Then, I examine Philippa Foot’s criticism of the open-question argument and her alternative neo-Aristotelian theory of goodness. Foot’s account, I argue, is vulnerable to a revised version of the open-question argument. Finally, I suggest two ways that (...) Foot can escape the revised open-question argument: Either via a classical naturalist account, inspired by Thomas Aquinas, that identifies goodness with the fulfillment of a thing’s function, or by characterizing her account as a version of non-reductive naturalism akin to non-reductive physicalism in philosophy of mind. In either case, I argue that Foot’s neo-Aristotelian naturalism is preferable to ethical non-naturalism concerning the property of goodness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Who Needs Classical Music? Cultural Choice and Musical Value by Julian JohnsonWilliam M. PerrineJulian Johnson, Who Needs Classical Music? Cultural Choice and Musical Value. Oxford University Press, 2002.In Who Needs Classical Music? Cultural Choice and Musical Value, British musicologist and composer Julian Johnson defends the value of classical music in a commercialized culture fixated on the immediate gratification of popular music. At 130 pages divided into six chapters, (...) Johnson’s book is a reasonably accessible and engaging presentation of his topic. This short book contains relevant and sometimes controversial insights of interest to professional music educators. In this review I will provide a brief summary of the author’s primary arguments accompanied by critical commentary.Johnson argues that commercial forces in our society limit serious reflective discourse on music. The marketplace treats music as a commodity which derives its value from relative commercial success. In this context, classical music is relegated to one possible cultural choice among many legitimate options and is in danger of losing its distinctive features as an art form that transcends commercial concerns. Preference for particular musical products becomes an identity marker for an individual’s place within society, and criticism of a particular style of music is perceived as a personal attack. The process of turning classical music into a commodity has been aided by critics who have condemned the Western [End Page 96] canon as elitist, patriarchal, and arrogant. These critics have instead advocated a democratization of culture, placing greater emphasis on the validity of popular art forms and active participation in music-making rather than the more passive contemplation. Johnson describes this as a “pseudo-democratic” attack which encourages downward social mobility. When combined with the omnipresence of commercial culture, this approach undermines individual musical value by assuming the equal validity of all aesthetic judgments. Democracy is damaged when, refusing to discriminate between cultural products, society fails to recognize human individuality and excellence.Johnson is at his strongest when he argues for the importance of classical music fulfilling its function as art. The author argues that different types of music fulfill different functions. In contemporary society music is valued and chosen for how it is used. Music is described as “good” when it functions to provide background music for activities or when it successfully complements or enhances the listeners’ moods. Focusing solely on social use or reception, however, tends to neglect objective differences in the formal structure of music. This is the point at which Johnson begins to distinguish between classical and popular music. Popular music is composed to ensure a uniformity of affect, and deliberately avoids formal or harmonic complexity. As an aspect of popular culture, it is tied to contemporary fashion trends and rapidly becomes obsolete. Like other types of fashion, music becomes a means for expressing a current position within a larger social and cultural space. It is the music of youth; its commercial saturation of the culture blurs the boundaries between youth and adulthood. Johnson claims that the process of commercialization leads to a bland standardization. Classical music can also function as a type of popular music when it submits itself to market processes, but in doing so the music loses its distinctive features.In his discussion on popular music, Johnson presents what might be his most controversial claim: that popular music serves a pornographic function. He defines pornography as “the process by which the humane is reduced to the status of things” (p. 59) and argues that popular music takes pleasure in debasing humanity by reducing individuals to material commodities and denying the spiritual. This contention echoes Allan Bloom’s concern in The Closing of the American Mind that rock music desensitizes and debases youth by destroying imagination and deadening their capacity for passion and wonder. The strength of this language undermines Johnson’s contention in his introduction to the paperback edition that he is not trying to set up a binary opposition between art and popular music in which the classical is “better.” Moreover, if pornography is a form of dehumanization and is a legitimate concern in music, it is important to point out that such a charge is not exclusive to... (shrink)

The specific objectives of the study were 1) To create a “ke-kame-tu” formula (15-60-25), 2) To create nuggets as a PMT product based on the ke-kame-tu formula, 3) To analyze the proximate content, amino acids, zinc, calcium, phosphorus and magnesium of PMT products, 4) To determine the preferred PMT product based on the acceptance test by toddlers. The making of the “ke-kame-tu” formula (15-60-25) used a randomized block design (RAK) with one treatment and three replications. The PMT product was made (...) using the ke-kame-tu formula (15-60-25) and the acceptability test used 30 toddler panelists. Analysis of protein, calcium, phosphorus and magnesium (HPLC/AAS and spectrophotometry). To determine the acceptability of the PMT product, a limit of ≥50% of toddlers stated that they liked it was used. Nuggets made using a modified recipe with the addition of 100 grams of ke-kame-tu formula. The results of the protein analysis were 16.60%, calcium 0.07 mg%, phosphorus 0.15 mg%, magnesium 0.02 mg%, zinc 1.95 mg%. If toddlers consume 100 grams of this nugget, it will be able to meet the nutritional needs, especially protein for toddlers aged 6-11 months by 110.6%, 1-3 years by 83% and 4-6 years by 66.4%. The results of the trial on toddler panelists showed that all toddlers liked the nuggets served. If we looked at carefully at the protein content of this nugget with complete essential amino acid content, it is very possible to substitute the fulfillment of toddler protein requirements. Consumption of toddler protein according to needs will achieve optimal nutritional status, in other words, the problem of stunting can be prevented and dealt with. (shrink)

This article presents the criteria and measurement tools employed when assessing quality of life for children and adolescents. The notion of ‘quality of life’ is dynamic, in that quality of life changes as a function of age, stage of development, level of reflection, the undertaking of new tasks, and the adoption of new roles. How we assess the subjective quality of life of children and adolescents depends on the level of development and quality-of-life criteria specific to a given period. For (...) younger children, the fulfilment of basic needs - i.e. emotional needs, such as the need to feel safe or valued by others - is especially relevant. For older children, family and health are important, but so are peer-acceptance and school achievements. For adolescents, personal considerations such as the sense of self, autonomy, interpersonal relationships, having friends, possibilities of development and prospects for the future, are all important. It is possible to measure quality of life even in small children, but doing so requires that we pay attention to the specifics of their development, the scope of their personal experiences, and their ability to express their assessments. Hence an approach that makes use of an attractive format is to be preferred. Knowledge of the specific quality-of-life criteria involved enables researchers to construct adequate tools, and to use their results to help bring about improvements in quality of life and the promotion of healthy living. (shrink)

In his important new book National responsibility and global justice, David Miller presents a systematic challenge to existing theories of global justice. In particular, he argues that cosmopolitan egalitarianism must be rejected. Such views, Miller maintains, would place unacceptable burdens on the most productive political communities, undermine national self-determination, and disincentivize political communities from taking responsibility for their fate. They are also impracticable and quite unrealistic, at least under present conditions. Miller offers an alternative account that conceives global justice in (...) terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Primary responsibility for securing such rights for an individual lies with his or her state, but in so far as these rights go unprotected, responsibilities for fulfilling them may fall on outsiders. While less ambitious that cosmopolitan egalitarian justice, Miller argues that his own view would nevertheless enable us to articulate what is most morally objectionable about our current world. In this article it is argued that none of Miller's critiques of cosmopolitan egalitarianism is effective, and that while certainly preferable to the status quo, a world governed by Miller's principles is not an attractive ideal. (shrink)

The question is why it is that objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may come apart. Answering this question requires an analysis of the nature of fear in the public sphere since feeling safe means to feel that one avoids the frightening, i.e. the threats or dangers that one perceives in the world. Döring argues that the fact-resistance fear might display in the public sphere is due to the characteristic function that fear fulfills in this sphere. In the (...) public sphere, fear is typically embodied by “fear narratives,” i.e. by real-life structuring stories of local groups which thereby respond to feelings of powerless fear and insecurity. By specifying what the threat is and how to deal with it in the right way, fear narratives reduce felt insecurity. Because of this and by thus enabling a feeling of superiority which may even turn the fear narrative into a narrative of enthusiastic heroism, fear in the public sphere does itself satisfy subjective preferences. This is why objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may come apart. The question is how we could and should handle this. (shrink)

Background: Pediatric guidelines recommend that children and adolescents participate in a developmentally appropriate way in end-of-life decision making. Shared decision making in pediatrics is unique because of the triadic relationship of patient, parents, and physician. The involvement of the patient may vary on a continuum from no involvement to being the sole decision maker. However, the effects of child participation have not been thoroughly studied. The aims of this literature review are to identify studies on end-of-life decision making in pediatrics, (...) to explore patient participation, and to assess the effects of such participation. Methods: Five databases—PubMed, PsycInfo, Medline, CINAHL, and Sociological Abstract—were searched for empirical studies on end-of-life decision making in pediatrics. Selected articles fulfilling the criteria were assessed for type of decision, participants’ characteristics, reports on participation of the minor patient, and outcome. Results: Fifty-seven articles on end-of-life decision making in pediatrics were identified. The majority of papers (n = 43, 75%) investigated parents’ and clinicians’ perspectives, while only 14 articles (25%) included perspectives of children and adolescents. Twenty-two articles (39%) reported some details on various forms of children's participation (e.g., receive information, plan care details, consulted before or after a decision was made). Positive (e.g., respect for patient's preferences) and negative (e.g., conflict due to diverging opinions) effects of children's participation in end-of-life decision making were reported. Conclusions: This systematic review highlights the need for research to identify factors that contribute to a favorable participation of minors in decision-making processes, as well as strategies to solve possible conflicts. More research should take into account the dynamics in the triadic process of decision making and emphasize children and adolescents’ perspectives. A better understanding of how to meaningfully involve children and adolescents in end-of-life decision making could facilitate the practice of patient participation in pediatrics. (shrink)

Sorensen provides a panoramic view of paradoxes of theoretical and practical rationality. These puzzles are organized as apparent counterexamples to attractive principles such as the principle of charity, the transitivity of preferences, and the principle that we should maximize expected utility. The following paradoxes are discussed: fearing fictions, the surprise test paradox, Pascal’s Wager, Pollock’s Ever Better wine, Newcomb’s problem, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Kavka’s paradoxes of deterrence, backward inductions, the bottle imp, the preface paradox, Moore’s problem, Buridan’s ass, Condorcet’s (...) paradox of cyclical majorities, the St. Petersburg paradox, weakness of will, the Ellsberg paradox, Allais’s paradox, and Peter Cave’s puzzle of self-fulfilling beliefs. (shrink)