Contemporary medicine, it is argued here, employs reductive explanations, but at the same time resists wholesale reduction to ‘deeper’ biochemical and physical fields or theories. In its own reductive explanations, to be sure, medicine borrows causal concepts from other fields and so necessarily shares certain explanatory goals with those deeper fields. However, because medicine has additional, distinctive goals as well as a special subject matter and problems (it is a practical science), the field of medicine is ultimately irreducible.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.1 (2005) 1-7 [Access article in PDF] Clinical Practice, Science, and the Unconscious Douglas McConnell Neil Pickering Keywords psychotherapy, cognitive science, neuroscience, computational view of mind. This volume of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology is devoted to questions about the unconscious mind. The philosophical complexities and difficulties associated with the unconscious are many and, despite widespread confusion and disagreement as to the nature of (...) the unconscious mind, it is used as a concept informing psychotherapy. It is therefore not surprising that papers in a special edition on the unconscious might be weighted heavily toward uncovering a justifiable conceptual niche for the unconscious and elaborating on some of the main conceptual connections. Although this makes for a slightly more philosophical edition of PPP than usual, those perhaps less interested in philosophy and more interested in actual psychiatric practice can incorporate the concepts and insights developed in these papers into their practice as they see fit.The three main articles take three quite distinct approaches to the unconscious. Schechtman (2005) addresses the need for a theory of personal identity to incorporate the unconscious and presents one that does so by developing some central Lockian intuitions. Church (2005) investigates whether the kinds of things happening in the unconscious can be explained by cognitive operations not normally associated with consciousness, specifically, spatial structuring of experience. McConnell and Gillett (2005) clarify some of Lacan's ontology of the mind where the language encountered and used by the subject provides the structure for their unconscious.The aim of this introduction is to ask and try to answer a question that logically precedes those raised in the articles in the light of the therapeutic use of the unconscious. When dealing with psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic concepts in an Anglo-American context, the struggle that psychoanalysis has had and continues to have in a psychiatric domain ruled by science is never far from the spotlight. Indeed Hinshelwood (2005) also picks up the importance of this conflict when replying to McConnell and Gillett. It seems to be historically true that the unconscious has fallen out of favor in scientific and psychiatric circles (it is no surprise that psychiatric training is largely based in "hard," that is, biological and biochemical science) particularly over the last 50 years or so. But is the scientific skepticism to be found about the use of the unconscious well-founded? And how does the continued utilization [End Page 1] of the unconscious by the therapist fit into current practice given this skepticism? Psychotherapy and the Unconscious In psychotherapy, the therapist and the client together construct a story that explains why the client is having some form of difficulty in his or her life. The stated aim is to enable the client to overcome this difficulty by gaining an understanding of what has generated it. Doing so may be a first step to dealing with that conflict. For example, an office worker who is scared of the boss and whose life at work is a misery as result may come to think that the boss is a reminder of some threatening figure from childhood and that the reaction is a regression to infantile behavior. Knowing this, the fear of the boss can be revisited—perhaps reconfigured, perhaps overcome—and life may improve. In the process of therapy, the relation of the figure from childhood to the boss is made conscious. But it was still operative before it was made explicit, even though the client did not realize it and some would say that the client's unconscious had somehow buried the memory from childhood or hidden from the client the relation of this memory of a threatening figure to the boss.A description of the content of the unconscious is, then, an intentional description involving the client's thought life, one made to help an individual understand otherwise unintelligible (to that individual) feelings, beliefs, desires, actions, and so on. Subjects' intentions are their normatively structured mental representations of, and attitudes toward, the world (e.g., "He is my boss"; "I am afraid of him"). An intentional unconscious description then takes an intentional form... (shrink)

This discussion is grounded in Aristotelian–Thomistic realism and takes the position that nursing is a practical science. As an exposition of the title statement, distinctions are made between opinion and truth, and the speculative, productive and practical sciences. Sources of opinion and truth are described and a discussion follows that truth can be achieved through knowing principles and causes of the natural kind behind phenomena. It is proposed that humans are the natural kind behind nursing phenomena. Thus, (...) human nature provides proper principles (the truth) of nursing practice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Measurement, Pleasure, and Practical Science in Plato's Protagoras HENRY S. RICHARDSON 1. INTRODUCTION TOWARDS THE END OF THE PROTAGORAS Socrates suggests that the "salvation of our life" depends upon applying to pleasures and pains a science of measurement (metr$tik~techn~).Whether Plato intended to portray Socrates as putting forward sincerely the form of hedonism that makes these pleasures and pains relevant has been the subject of a detailed (...) and probably interminable debate, to which this paper will not directly contribute. By contrast, it seems to be supposed by almost all who have written on the topic that this hedonism, whoever is espousing it, puts forward pleasure as a single, homogeneous yardstick of value to serve as the basis of a supremely simple standard of choice. This standard simply directs one to seek the maximal amount of pleasure. The underlying supposition is that the hedonism put forward in the Protagorasallows one to define a maximum because all goods are commensurable. But, as I shall emphasize in the sequel, hedonism does not imply commensurability, nor does commensurability imply hedonism. The interpretive thesis of this essay is that the common presumption that the dialogue's hedonism carries commensurability with it has impeded our ability to understand the Protagor~'s relation to the other dialogues, and has distorted the fundamental purpose of Socrates's practical science. These matters are of more than textual interest. My reasons for trying to remain neutral as to the longstanding debate about attributing the dialogue's hedonism are not limited to wanting to avoid quagmires and remove confusions that have resulted from unwarranted interpretive assumptions. To many, the Protagorasis of tremendous importance as an early articulation of a calculative ideal for ethical or practical decisionmaking, whether or not Plato or Socrates was committed to that ideal. Looking [7] 8 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY x99 o back at the Protagorasfrom our twentieth-century perspective encourages the expectation that we might find there some argument for the crucial features of such a calculative ideal, as we have come to understand it. One such feature, prominent especially in the classical utilitarians, is that of the commensurability of goods, which in turn allows the precise definition of a maximizing rule. If the Protagoraspresented a calculative conception involving commensurability, then we might expect to find in the dialogue some argumentfor the rational necessity of commensurability. My claim will be that since there is no compelling evidence that the idea of commensurability is found in the dialogue, there is'hardly likely to be an argument for it there. In fact, it is of philosophical interest to see how far the arguments against weakness of will and for the unity of virtue (whoever is making them) can proceed without relying upon commensurability; This way of putting the philosophical points at issue here underlines the relative modesty of what I am claiming about commensurability. I argue that there is nothing in the dialogue that requires us to see commensurability as part of its hedonism, that the arguments proceed without relying upon commensurability, and that in some respects the problem of understanding the relationship of the Protagorasto Plato's other dialogues is eased if we refrain from attributing any commensurability here. I will show that a clearer picture of what is doing the argumentative work in the last secdon of the dialogue will result if we thus separate commensurability from hedonism, and that an illuminatingly different way of understanding the role of the science of measurement is thereby suggested. None of this amounts to a compelling argument that the idea of commensurability is not to be found in the dialogue. Rather, my case simply undermines the positive reasons for finding the idea there. Apart from the greater clarity which separating hedonism and commensurability allows, this modest negative case links up with the deeper philosophical moti,~ation I have mentioned by casting cold water on any hopes that the Protagorascould be made to yield an argument specifically linking commensurability to rationality. In one respect, my interpretive strategy is akin to that of commentators who have attempted to ease the tension between the Protagorasand the Gorgias by arguing that the form of hedonism... (shrink)

This paper discusses a classic Aristotelian understanding of science, nature, and methods of inquiry and proof. It then discusses nursing as a practical science and provides some demonstrations through the application of classical methods. In the Aristotelian tradition an individual substance is a unity of form and matter: form being the intelligible universal that becomes the concept, while matter is the principle of individuation. Science is mediate intellectual causal knowledge. Inquiry uses hypothetical argument, and proof that (...) is from valid syllogistic reasoning with true premises provides necessity and certitude. This proof requires knowledge of the natural kind that gives origin to the attributes under investigation. The variability of nature is overcome by reasoning on the supposition of the end.Within the classical understanding of speculative and practical science, nursing is a practical science. As a science, nursing investigates the principles and causes of its subject, be that human beings, health or nursing behaviours as knowable nursing operations. The goal is knowledge of practice for the sake of practice, but nursing as a science is not operable. Nursing practice, that is nursing art or technologies, must complete the science. Reasoning on the supposition of the end, for example of cardiac compensation, allows one to identify necessary activities and physical states. Three causal demonstrations about decubiti show that demonstrations are possible. Classical science would teach us that the practical science of nursing studies human nature in order to identify principles and causes of health and principles and causes of nursing operations themselves. It also requires that the science ends in practical operation. Thus, proper decisions and individual actions in particular patient situations must complete nursing science. (shrink)

This is an attempt to take a look at chemistry from the point of view of practical realism. Besides its social–historical and normative aspects, the latter involves a direct reference to experimental research. According to Edward Caldin chemistry depends on our being able to isolate pure substances with reproducible properties. Thus, the very basis of chemistry is practical. Even the laws of chemistry are not stable but are subject to correction. At the same time, these statements do not (...) necessarily make Edward Caldin a predecessor of practical realism. The latter has other predecessors, like Rom Harré’s policy realism or Sami Pihlström’s pragmatic realism. Chemistry is an experimental science. The experiment is a purposeful and critically theory-guided constructive, manipulative, material interference with nature according to Rein Vihalemm, the founder of practical realism. Chemistry is physics-like science but just partly so. This is an important point in the context of the current paper. (shrink)

In essays reaching from 1959 to 2003 Wilhelm Hennis reconnects political theory to the tradition of politics as a 'practical science'.

ISBN-13: 978-0-8229-4317-4 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-8229-4317-4 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Science — Philosophy. 2. Science — Social aspects. 3. Values. 4. Science and civilization. I. Carrier, Martin. II. Howard, Don, professor. III. Kourany ...

Through a detailed reconstruction of the process of moral habituation, which includes both a desiderative and an intellectual aspect, I demonstrate in this essay that Aristotelian practical science does not make people practically wise on a ground and personal level, but teaches moral educators how to produce basically good men in and through practice. In particular, the formation of the correct wish for happiness is the natural culmination of desiderative habituation, and intellectual habituation that develops personal practical (...) wisdom is mainly a process of moral apprenticeship under senior statesmen. My analyses of the aspects of moral habituation should reveal that even in his practical science, that is, in a kind of theory pursued for the sake of practice, Aristotle still maintains the clear distinction between theoretical and practical intelligence and shows deep insights into the peculiarity of the latter. (shrink)

This is an attempt to take a look at chemistry from the point of view of practical realism. Besides its social–historical and normative aspects, the latter involves a direct reference to experimental research. According to Edward Caldin chemistry depends on our being able to isolate pure substances with reproducible properties. Thus, the very basis of chemistry is practical. Even the laws of chemistry are not stable but are subject to correction. At the same time, these statements do not (...) necessarily make Edward Caldin a predecessor of practical realism. The latter has other predecessors, like Rom Harré’s policy realism or Sami Pihlström’s pragmatic realism. Chemistry is an experimental science. The experiment is a purposeful and critically theory-guided constructive, manipulative, material interference with nature according to Rein Vihalemm, the founder of practical realism. Chemistry is physics-like science but just partly so. This is an important point in the context of the current paper. (shrink)

This discussion is grounded in Aristotelian–Thomistic realism and takes the position that nursing is a practical science. As an exposition of the title statement, distinctions are made between opinion and truth, and the speculative, productive and practical sciences. Sources of opinion and truth are described and a discussion follows that truth can be achieved through knowing principles and causes of the natural kind behind phenomena. It is proposed that humans are the natural kind behind nursing phenomena. Thus, (...) human nature provides proper principles (the truth) of nursing practice. (shrink)

“What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and (...) the foundation of morals. This new edition of Practical Reflection contains the original 1989 text along with a new introduction and is the latest entry in The David Hume Series of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Reissues, which keeps in print previously published indispensable works in the area of cognitive science. (shrink)

This article offers several contributions to the interdisciplinary project of responsible research and innovation in data science and AI. First, it provides a critical analysis of current efforts to establish practical mechanisms for algorithmic auditing and assessment to identify limitations and gaps with these approaches. Second, it provides a brief introduction to the methodology of argument-based assurance and explores how it is currently being applied in the development of safety cases for autonomous and intelligent systems. Third, it generalises (...) this method to incorporate wider ethical, social, and legal considerations, in turn establishing a novel version of argument-based assurance that we call ‘ethical assurance.’ Ethical assurance is presented as a structured method for unifying the myriad practical mechanisms that have been proposed. It is built on a process-based form of project governance that enlists reflective innovation practices to operationalise normative principles, such as sustainability, accountability, transparency, fairness, and explainability. As a set of interlocutory governance mechanisms that span across the data science and AI lifecycle, ethical assurance supports inclusive and participatory ethical deliberation while also remaining grounded in social and technical realities. Finally, this article sets an agenda for ethical assurance, by detailing current challenges, open questions, and next steps, which serve as a springboard to build an active (and interdisciplinary) research programme as well as contribute to ongoing discussions in policy and governance. (shrink)

Many commentators suppose that the principles of Aristotle’s Politics are received from his theoretical works. Yet this way of understanding the Politics does not sufficiently appreciate Aristotle’s division of sciences, and it obscures the relevance of his political reflections for our time. We argue that Aristotle’s treatment of the polis and all it entails does not require his natural science and the principles of theoretical fields. Instead, despite wording that recalls theoretical treatises, Aristotle is careful to develop his political (...) argumentation without any such dependence. (shrink)

The article examines how the epistemologies of Islam and modern science are reconciled in the writings of the contemporary Turkish Sunni Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen (b. 1938), one of the once most influential yet vastly controversial religious leaders in contemporary Turkey. Through a close reading of his texts on science, the article analyzes how Gülen defines the scientific practice as an ethical act of reading the universe with heart and mind, and as a path in which one can (...) fully grasp the magnificence of God. Framing with references to Sufism, Gülen also explains science as a domain where Islamic ethics can be practiced. The article shows that Gülen’s project of Islamization of science is not limited to the domain of knowledge, but rather comprises a comprehensive cultural transformation led by a new epistemic approach to contest the secular hegemony in the country. Therefore, Gülen’s politics of Islam at large should be understood as a project of transforming the episteme, or the hegemonic regime of knowledge, in society, from secular to Islamic. However, the article also notes, somehow paradoxically, in his harmonization of the Sufi notions with secular science, Gülen cannot escape from being captured by the very epistemology of the modern science. (shrink)

An examination, by a diverse field of experts, of Pickering's mangle theory and its applicability (or lack thereof) beyond the limited cases he presented in the ...

Many irreconcilable accounts of ratio legis in legal science, often concerned with legal interpretation, suffer from being disconnected from practical reasoning. Different theories of legal interpretation which result in one-sided views of ratio legis are by-products of one-sided semantics. The first part of the chapter diagnoses this problem by providing a model of three types of one-sided semantics—upstream, midstream and downstream—and explaining how they translate into respective accounts of legal interpretation and ratio legis. The second part of the (...) chapter presents an alternative to one-sided semantics in legal theory. The alternative account which combines semantics and practical reasoning in legal theory is based on Brandom’s inferential pragmatism. The usefulness of inferential pragmatism in legal theory with regard to the problem of ratio legis is tested and followed by extending an inferentialist account of ratio legis provided by Canale and Tuzet. A model of agent’s actions and reasons, and their impact on the reasoning of interpreters and decision-makers is the essential part of this extension. (shrink)

Wisdom, long a topic of interest to moral philosophers, is increasingly the focus of social science research. Philosophers have historically been concerned to develop a rationally defensible account of the nature of wisdom and its role in the moral life, often inspired in various ways by virtue theoretical accounts of practical wisdom (phronesis). Wisdom scientists seek to, among other things, define wisdom and its components so that we can measure them. Are the measures used by wisdom scientists actually (...) measuring what philosophers have in mind when they discuss practical wisdom? I argue that they are not. Contemporary measures of wisdom and its components may pick out some necessary prerequisites of practical wisdom, but they do not measure a philosophically plausible practical wisdom or its components. After explaining the argument and defending it against objections, I consider its implications. Should wisdom scientists ignore the philosophical conception of practical wisdom in favor of other conceptions, revise their methods to try to measure it, or continue the interdisciplinary study of practical wisdom without expecting to measure it? I make a preliminary argument for the third option. (shrink)

Like any discipline, bioethics is a developing field of academic inquiry; and recent trends in scholarship have been towards more engagement with empirical research. This ‘empirical turn’ has provoked extensive debate over how such ‘descriptive’ research carried out in the social sciences contributes to the distinctively normative aspect of bioethics. This paper will address this issue by developing a practical research methodology for the inclusion of data from social science studies into ethical deliberation. This methodology will be based (...) on a naturalistic conception of ethical theory that sees practice as informing theory just as theory informs practice – the two are symbiotically related. From this engagement with practice, the ways that such theories need to be extended and developed can be determined. This is a practical methodology for integrating theory and practice that can be used in empirical studies, one that uses ethical theory both to explore the data and to draw normative conclusions. (shrink)

This idea that what is distinctive of intentional performances (or at least of those intentional performances that amount to skilled actions) is one’s practical knowledge in it —i.e., knowledge of what one is doing while doing it— famously traces back to Anscombe ([]1963] 2000). While many philosophers have theorized about Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge (e.g., Setiya (2008), Thompson et al. (2011), Schwenkler (2019), O’Brien (2007)), there is a wide disagreement about how to understand it. This paper investigates (...) how best to understand practical knowledge for it to play the desired explanatory role in a reductive theory of intentional action, of intention-in-action, and of control-in-action. I argue that practical knowledge ought to be construed as a dynamic knowledge state and that structured practical senses (Pavese 2015) are needed to model it. (shrink)

During his stay in Padua ca. 1592–1610, Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) was a lecturer of mathematics at the University of Padua and a tutor to private students of military architecture and fortifications. He carried out these activities at the Academia degli Artisti. At the same time, and in relation to his teaching activities, he began to study the equilibrium of bodies and strength of materials, later better structured and completed in his Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences of 1638. This paper examines (...) important details of four works dating to the Paduan period: Breve instruzione dell’architettura militare; Trattato di Fortificazione; Le Mecaniche; Le operazioni del compasso geometrico et militare. The two works on military architecture and fortifications were compiled from notes taken by students, and are not by Galileo’s hand, but are still illustrative of his work and thinking at the time. (shrink)

The "Practice Turn" in the Contemporary Socio-Human Sciences The paper provides an overview of the current situation in the socio-human sciences, which is characterised by attempts to overcome traditional one-sided approaches and look for new alternatives. One of the latest alternatives to traditional approaches in the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences is the "practice turn". It is the turn to another, non-traditional approach to practice but also to Aristotelian phronesis. The author gives an account of three main tenets (...) of this turn with reference to both ancient Greek and modern conceptions of practice. (shrink)

“What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, _Practical Reflection_ develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the (...) foundation of morals. This new edition of _Practical Reflection_ contains the original 1989 text along with a new introduction and is the latest entry in The David Hume Series of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Reissues, which keeps in print previously published indispensable works in the area of cognitive science. _ _ _ _. (shrink)

Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Logic and Philosophy of Science, 157, 2007, 197-240. Published version available at: http://www.springerlink.com/content/q9402gv46t415504/fulltext.pdf.

The philosophy of Wittgenstein is an unrivalled guide to the labyrinth of misleading pictures and intellectual illusions to which we are all prone, particularly when we try to think clearly about the topics that comprise the field of psychology. Wittgenstein and Psychology: A Practical Guide is a textbook exposition of Wittgenstein's insights to a scientific psychology. This book both introduces psychology students to the role and value of philosophical studies and enables philosophy students to see how Wittgenstein's insights reach (...) out beyond the domain of philosophy to reinvigorate a science. (shrink)

Interpolation has become one of the standard properties that logicians investigate when designing a logic. In this paper, we provide strong evidence that the presence of interpolants is not only cogent for scientific reasoning but has also important practical implications in computer science. We illustrate that interpolation in general, and uniform splitting interpolants, in particular, play an important role in applications where formality and modularity are invoked. In recognition of the fact that common logical formalisms often lack uniform (...) interpolants, we advocate the need for developing general methods to engineer a specification logic so that some critical uniform interpolants become available. (shrink)

_Tracing practical reason from its origins to its modern and contemporary permutations_ The Greek discovery of practical reason, as the skilled performance of strategic thinking in public and private affairs, was an intellectual breakthrough that remains both a feature of and a bug in our modern world. Countering arguments that rational choice-making is a contingent product of modernity, _The Greeks and the Rational_ traces the long history of theorizing rationality back to ancient Greece. In this book, Josiah Ober (...) explores how ancient Greek sophists, historians, and philosophers developed sophisticated and systematic ideas about practical reason. At the same time, they recognized its limits—that not every decision can be reduced to mechanistic calculations of optimal outcomes. Ober finds contemporary echoes of this tradition in the application of game theory to political science, economics, and business management. _The Greeks and the Rational_ offers a striking revisionist history with widespread implications for the study of ancient Greek civilization, the history of thought, and human rationality itself. (shrink)

Philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have grown interested in the daily practices of scientists. Recent studies have drawn linkages between scientific innovations and more ordinary procedures, craft skills, and sources of sponsorship. These studies dispute the idea that science is the application of a unified method or the outgrowth of a progressive history of ideas. This book critically reviews arguments and empirical studies in two areas of sociology that have played a significant role in the 'sociological turn' (...) in science studies: ethnomethodology and the sociology of scientific knowledge. In both fields, efforts to study scientific practices have led to intractable difficulties and debates, due in part to scientistic and foundationalist commitments that remain entrenched with social-scientific research policies and descriptive language. The central purpose of this book is to explore the possibility of an empirical approach to the epistemic contents of science that avoids the pitfalls of scientism and foundationalism. (shrink)

Practical reasoning often strikes philosophers as ungrounded. It seems to them that desires are to be justified by reasoning that proceeds from, inter alia, further desires, and these further desires are to be justified by reference to still further desires. Avoiding circularity and infinite regress requires justification to terminate in desires that are themselves unjustified, and thus, from the point of view of reasons, simply arbitrary. If techniques of justification merely transmit reason-giving force from premises to conclusions, then if (...) the premises are arbitrary, not different in this respect from whims, the conclusions will be arbitrary as well. (shrink)

Em um artigo intimamente relacionado a este, mostramos que o estudo mais maduro de Peirce sobre a retórica especulativa, em Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing, nos convida a refletir e apreender o fenômeno da retórica em sua totalidade. Seguindo pistas aristotélicas, Peirce – implicitamente – diferencia três aspectos categoriais da ação retórica, diferenciando entre sua potencialidade [δύναμις] e perfeição [ἐντελέχεια] como uma faculdade instintiva de tornar signos eficazes em uma utópica arte universal, sua atualidade como um discurso prático (...) normativo historicamente eficaz e que molda a prática retórica [τέχνη], referida como retórica comum; e sua formalidade, articulada pela investigação puramente teórica [θεωρία] das condições necessárias da eficiência dos signos em geral, intitulada Retórica Especulativa. Assim como nosso modo de ser com os outros em um mundo comum de compartilhamento de propósitos, a retórica, tanto para Aristóteles quanto para Peirce, constitui uma forma semiótica do summum bonum, cujo cultivo é essencial para o crescimento da razoabilidade concreta em qualquer comunidade política e na civilização como um todo. No presente artigo, começamos reconstruindo o relato da retórica de Peirce, no quadro de sua classificação das ciências práticas, e depois mostramos como esse relato da retórica como uma faculdade enraizada no “Instinto Gráfico” confirma a análise que apresentamos no trabalho anterior. Na seção final, tentaremos esboçar em que sentido a importância de conceber a retórica como uma δύναμις com uma ἐντελέχεια específica, ou “potencialidade-ideia” do aperfeiçoamento do desenvolvimento, pode nos ajudar a apreciar o papel histórico emancipatório que Peirce atribui às Ciências Normativas. (shrink)

The biological sciences provide ample opportunity and motivation for feminist interventions. These sciences are seen by many as an authority on human nature and are highly relevant to many issues of social justice and public policy. Feminist philosophy of biology focuses on the ethical and epistemic adequacy and responsibility of biological claims. This work is critical in the sense of identifying epistemically and ethically irresponsible knowledge claims, research practices, and dissemination of biological research regarding sex/gender, including ways that sex/gender interacts (...) with other social categories. In this chapter we describe classic themes in feminist philosophy of biology, with particular regard to research practices and metaphysical assumptions. We then go on to argue that these classic themes remain salient in contemporary neuroscientific investigations of human emotion and in feminist research on the evolution of human behavior. (shrink)

In the 1980s, philosophical, historical and social studies of science underwent a change which later evolved into a turn to practice. Analysts of science were asked to pay attention to scientific practices in meticulous detail and along multiple dimensions, including the material, social and psychological. Following this turn, the interest in scientific practices continued to increase and had an indelible influence in the various fields of science studies. No doubt, the practice turn changed our conceptions and approaches (...) of science, but what did it really teach us? What does it mean to study scientific practices? What are the general lessons, implications, and new challenges? This volume explores questions about the practice turn using both case studies and theoretical analysis. The case studies examine empirical and mathematical sciences, including the engineering sciences. The volume promotes interactions between acknowledged experts from different, often thought of as conflicting, orientations. It presents contributions in conjunction with critical commentaries that put the theses and assumptions of the former in perspective. Overall, the book offers a unique and diverse range of perspectives on the meanings, methods, lessons, and challenges associated with the practice turn. (shrink)

The value-free ideal in science has been criticised as both unattainable and undesirable. We argue that it can be defended as a practical principle guiding scientific research even if the unattainability and undesirability of a value-free end-state are granted. If a goal is unattainable, then one can separate the desirability of accomplishing the goal from the desirability of pursuing it. We articulate a novel value-free ideal, which holds that scientists should act as if science should be value-free, (...) and we argue that even if a purely value-free science is undesirable, this value-free ideal is desirable to pursue. (shrink)

Science educators and those who investigate science learning have tended, for good reason, to focus their attention on students' conceptual development, Such a focus is, however, too narrow to provide full and proper understanding of the complexities of original science learning. Recently developmental cognitive psychologists have called on the work of postpositivistic philosophers of science, especially Thomas Kuhn, to bolster their research into conceptual development in science acquisition. What these psychologists have not recognized is that (...) Kuhn's position is actually a derivative of Wittgenstein's methodological nominalism, a viewpoint far more favorable to behaviorism than cognitive psychology. After drawing out some of the consequences of this fact for the developmental cognitive psychologist program for studying science learning, we suggest our own radical alternative. Drawing on Floden, Buchmann and Schwille's idea of “Breaking with Everyday Experience” we propose an alternative notion of original science learning in terms of Alfred Schutz's modification of Williams James' many worlds thesis. The many worlds thesis will allow us to better understand students' difficulty in learning idealized worlds such as science, worlds that represent a discontinuous break with ordinary everyday practical experience. (shrink)

As with other fields of applied ethics, philosophers engaged in business ethics struggle to carry out substantive philosophical reflection in a way that mirrors the practical reasoning that goes on within business management itself. One manifestation of the philosopher’s struggle is the field’s division into approaches that emphasize moral philosophy and those grounded in the methods of social science. I claim here that the task for those who come to business ethics with philosophical training is to avoid unintentionally (...) widening the gap between philosophical theory and business management by emphasizing the centrality of practical wisdom to both good managment and to the moral life. Distinguishing my own approach from recent emphases on phronesis in management literature, I draw on the concepts of social practice and of narrative to tie practical reasoning to a company’s unique story. Practical reason, social practices and narrative are employed together to give an account of the art of management at Patagonia. The essay hopes to both provide a way for philosophers engaged with business ethics to see family resemblances between their practices and those of business management and to offer a pedagogical example useful for those in any discipline interested in viewing businesses ethically. (shrink)

Summarizing this century's major debates over realism and the rationality of scientific knowledge, Joseph Rouse believes that these disputes oversimplify the ...

The political dimension of science has gained a particular interest in most recent decades for areas of knowledge like the Philosophy of science, as well as for political studies of science, history of science, among others. One reason for this development is that we are more conscious the results obtained by a scientist are a product of the interaction and interrelation of epistemic and none epistemic values. This dynamic is one of the factors which make progress (...) in science possible and reflects, at the same time, its integrity. Based on the contributions provided by Philip Kitcher, I shall characterize in this paper the two forms to treat scientific knowledge from a philosophical perspective. I shall argue, following Kitcher, that the scientific practice and social aspects of knowledge are not two different and disconnected things, but a unity of reasons which enable the progress of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Following publication of the influential Flexner Report on medical education in 1910, the US built a health care system on a foundation of science that, by the end of the 20th century, provided some of the best medical care in the world. Now, at the start of the 21st century, we are in real danger of destroying those impressive achievements. The primary reason is the failure over many years to change our increasingly dysfunctional health insurance system. Chief among its (...) problems is reduced access to medical services as growing numbers of Americans lose health insurance altogether, and coverage for the rest is eroding. (shrink)

This paper examines the nature of Aristotelian phronesis , how it is attained, and who is able to attain it inside the polis . I argue that, for Aristotle, attaining phronesis does not require an individual to perfect his practical wisdom to the point where he never makes a mistake, but rather it is attained by certain individuals who are unable to make a mistake of this kind due to their education, habituation, and position in society.