Beyond the Pleasure Principle is Freud's most philosophical and speculative work, exploring profound questions of life and death, pleasure and pain. In it Freud introduces the fundamental concepts of the "repetition compulsion" and the "death drive," according to which a perverse, repetitive, self-destructive impulse opposes and even trumps the creative drive, or Eros. The work is one of Freud's most intensely debated, and raises important questions that have been discussed by philosophers and psychoanalysts since its first publication (...) in 1920. The text is presented here in a contemporary new translation by Gregory C. Richter. Appendices trace the work's antecedents and the many responses to it, including texts by Plato, Friedrich Nietzsche, Melanie Klein, Herbert Marcuse, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler, among many others. (shrink)

ABSTRACTJacques Lacan studied Chinese classics and received much inspiration from Zhuangzi. This paper concentrates on the comparative study of morality in those two thinkers from three connecting levels, namely, nature as the source of ethical codes, reason as the means to arrive at the ethical state, and pleasure as the ultimate purpose of morality. The investigation into the topic is enlightening for posthuman morality. Zhuangzi’s idea of the poetics of oneness inspires the Lacanian concept of the Real and ushers (...) us into a new territory to rethink animal rights. (shrink)

Aesthetic hedonism is the view that to be aesthetically good is to please. For most aesthetic hedonists, aesthetic normativity is hedonic normativity. This paper argues that Kant’s third Critique contains resources for a nonhedonic account of aesthetic normativity as sourced in autonomy as self-legislation. A case is made that the account is also Kant’s because it ties his aesthetics into a key theme of his larger philosophy.

_Beyond the Pleasure Principle_ is Freud’s most philosophical and speculative work, exploring profound questions of life and death, pleasure and pain. In it Freud introduces the fundamental concepts of the “repetition compulsion” and the “death drive,” according to which a perverse, repetitive, self-destructive impulse opposes and even trumps the creative drive, or Eros. The work is one of Freud’s most intensely debated, and raises important questions that have been discussed by philosophers and psychoanalysts since its first publication in (...) 1920. The text is presented here in a contemporary new translation by Gregory C. Richter. Appendices trace the work’s antecedents and the many responses to it, including texts by Plato, Friedrich Nietzsche, Melanie Klein, Herbert Marcuse, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler, among many others. (shrink)

This paper considers Freud's 1920 text, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in light of Jacques Derrida's critical commentary on it in The Post Card. Against the deconstructive reading that highlights the performative aspects of Freud's speculative remarks, David-Ménard reads Freud's theory of the death drive as an epistemological and experimental hypothesis necessary for giving an account of the complexity and diversity of the clinical phenomenon of repetition in psychoanalysis. Though the death drive never appears locatable as such in the (...) various examples given by Freud, it is nonetheless accessible in the constellation of differences produced by traumatic dreams, children's games, etc. (shrink)

In this critical personal narrative Harris explores some of the gaps between conceptions of feminist thought and feminist practice. Harris focuses on an analysis of race, class, and desire divisions within feminist sexual politics. She suggests a queer black feminist theory and practice that calls into question naturalized identities and communities, and therefore what feminism and feminist practices might entail.

Because he introduces a nonplastic element in his definition of the plasticity of mental life—that is, elasticity—Freud ruins the possibility of thinking what he precisely wishes to think, the plastic coincidence between creation and destruction of form. The characterization of the death drive as “elastic” deprives it of its plastic power and of its capacity to resist the pleasure principle. If we are not able to prove that the destruction of form has and is a form, if form (...) is always on the side of Eros and of pleasure, it becomes impossible to prove that there is anything beyond the pleasure principle. (shrink)

The arguments of each chapter demonstrate that there is no neutral perspective from which to analyse aesthetic qualities. Such qualities cannot be described as their very perception involves evaluation. In short, the chapters focus on those aspects of a first person perspective that can be considered inter-personal in the sense that they are susceptible of intentional calibration and enculturation. That said, not all chapters approach the theme from the same perspective nor with the same targets in mind. For example, approaching (...) the notion of inter-subjectivity with the intention of defending this possibility against the objection of relativism will yield a different treatment than championing inter-subjectivity in order to reject cultural arrogance, or overly reductive analyses of aesthetic qualities. Yet all chapters converge on the possibility of objectivity grounded in inter-subjectivity. (shrink)

That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, (...) Philippa Foot, R M Hare, Gilbert Harman, Immanuel Kant, J. L. Mackie, and Jean-Paul Sartre are among the many philosophers addressed. (shrink)

In this volume, G. Marian Kinget's classic work, On Being Human, can be read for the first time in light of a second, previously unpublished work, Pleasure And Pain. Taken together, these two works offer a new generation of readers a comprehensive picture of the insights, principles, and goals of humanistic psychology. On Being Human, Kinget's pioneering work, which arose from the original humanistic revolution in psychology, systematically describes the characteristics that make human beings different from all other forms (...) of life. In this work, Kinget explores man in his full nature not solely as a biological organism modified by experience and culture. She presents a person as a symbolic entity capable of pondering his existence, and lending it meaning and direction. Man is the only animal who knowingly exists in space and time, manifesting transcendental and metaphysical concern throughout history and culture. On Being Human presents the fundamentals of any valid approach to psychology as well as to other fields concerned with the individuality of the human being. It describes the specific human capacities for reflective thought and declarative language, and it discusses the unique ability of humans to devise culture and question origins. Pleasure and Pain considers the interdependence of human pleasure and pain. This idea, which leads to unnecessary fears and unwarranted expectations, goes unrecognized in a contemporary western society focused on the accumulation of pleasure without any awareness of the duality of the pleasure-pain experience. Kinget refutes the widespread fallacy that fun lies in the means, when it actually lies in the subject, and she discusses the human potential for autonomous "management" of the pleasure-pain dimension of human existence. (shrink)

In the Critique of Judgment Kant repeatedly points out that it is only the pleasure of taste that reveals to us the need to introduce a third faculty of the mind with its own a priori principle. In order to elucidate this claim I discuss two general principles about pleasure that Kant presents, the transcendental definition of pleasure from § 10 and the principle from the Introduction that connects pleasure with the achievement of an (...) aim. Precursors of these principles had been employed by Kant and others in empirical psychology. But how can such principles of empirical psychology be transferred to transcendental philosophy? I suggest that Kant accomplishes this by deriving the connection of pleasure with achievement of an aim from the transcendental definition and the assumption that faculties have interests. I finally reconstruct § 11 as a ‘regressive argument’ from the peculiarities of the pleasure of taste to the need to acknowledge a new faculty. (shrink)

This article begins with the question, is mind prefigured in life? Andreas Webber and Francisco Varela argue that the autopoietic model in combination with Jonas's theory of metabolism provide a more robust model than Kant's account of natural teleology in the third critique, and thus it is able to make a claim to, at least, a pre-figuration of human freedom. I argue that Freud's illustration of the death drive via the analogy of the cell in Beyond the Pleasure (...) class='Hi'>Principle provides a valuable counter-example to Jonas's conception of metabolism and exposes the type of metaphysical assumptions that the Kantian project was so averse to. My intention here is not to reify either Jonas or Freud's claims on the determinative nature of natural causation; rather it is to argue that each exists as valuable heuristic tools. Any causal determinative judgment on the nature of natural teleology must be exercised with nothing less than a Kantian level of caution as the implication of placing the value of the coherence of our conceptual structures over the actual mechanical processes of the natural world confronts us with the direct risk of misrecognition on a massive scale. (shrink)

Are humans at their core seekers of their own pleasure or cooperative members of society? Paradoxically, they are both. Pleasure-seeking can take place only within the context of what works within a defined community, and central to any community are the evolved codes and principles guiding appropriate behavior, or morality. The complex interaction of morality and self-interest is at the heart of Geoffrey M. Hodgson’s approach to evolutionary economics, which is designed to bring about a better understanding of (...) human behavior. In From Pleasure Machines to Moral Communities, Hodgson casts a critical eye on neoclassical individualism, its foundations and flaws, and turns to recent insights from research on the evolutionary bases of human behavior. He focuses his attention on the evolution of morality, its meaning, why it came about, and how it influences human attitudes and behavior. This more nuanced understanding sets the stage for a fascinating investigation of its implications on a range of pressing issues drawn from diverse environments, including the business world and crucial policy realms like health care and ecology. This book provides a valuable complement to Hodgson’s earlier work with Thorbjørn Knudsen on evolutionary economics in Darwin’s Conjecture, extending the evolutionary outlook to include moral and policy-related issues. (shrink)

More rejects Stoic and Christian asceticism, Dr. Konvitz tells us, in favor of pleasure and pleasant experiences as a proper expression of natural reason so long as the exercise of personal pleasure does not hurt others or have unpleasant aftereffects. The denial of pleasure is only justified when it is done for the higher good of society. Such sacrifice of pleasure ultimately will be rewarded by God. More distinguishes between illusionary pleasures and the higher forms of (...) intellectual and moral pleasures. Professor Konvitz suggests that More’s views on pleasure constitute a new and extraordinary way of viewing the world. John Stuart Mill was influenced by More’s insights in the definition of utilitarian principles that Mill himself would enunciate in his own writings and in his discussion of human liberty. (shrink)

The Principle of Universality asserts that a part retains its intrinsic value regardless of the whole in which it is a part or even whether it is part of a whole. The idea underlying this principle is that the intrinsic value of a thing supervenes on its intrinsic properties. Since the intrinsic properties remain unchanged so does the thing’s intrinsic value. In this article, I argue that, properly understood, the Principle of Universality can handle seemingly troublesome intuitions (...) about the relative intrinsic value of a vicious person having pain and his having pleasure. I specifically argue that the intuition that the former state is better is explained by the nature of the basic intrinsic-value states, which involve a person having a level of well-being and desert at a time. One implication of this is that given the nature of such basic intrinsic-value states, pleasure and pain are not value-bearing parts of virtuous and vicious attitudes. (shrink)

This article analyzes the application of creative visualization in the ethics of Ancient Greek Cynicism. The author concentrates on visualizations of 2 fundamental ethical principles (vicious chase of pleasures and virtuous radical temperance) and their relevance to modern society. The author comes to a conclusion that Cynics visualized the first principle through the image of a never-ending wheel of slavery and a concrete illness – dropsy, whereas the second one was visualized through the image of remedy for the above (...) mentioned disease and slavery as well as images of the result of taking that remedy, that is, permanent health, freedom and happiness. The both visualizations bear an evident creative character. The other important conclusion is that those visualizations are not relevant to contemporary society. Yet, being prototypes of relevant modern visualizations of hasty chase of pleasures and mild temperance, they retain significance to that society. (shrink)

The focus of our research has been the definitions of pleasure in Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy. For that purpose we worked on identifying the principles upon which this issue has been built. In this context we made a comparison between intellectual pleasure and sensual pleasure. We came to the conclusion that the former is better than the latter. This in turn helped us make the distinction between the pleasure that occurs to us before the soul’s separation from (...) the body and the other which is after the separation. Hence we were able to recognize that man cannot obtain real happiness in this world, tarnished with vice, or only a little. That little happiness is absolutely incomparable with real happiness which occurs only after the separation of the soul from the body. (shrink)

We distinguish between the Aristotelian conception under which pleasure is understood as the feeling of the accomplished exercise of the active tendencies of a living being, and a conception according to which the search for pleasure or the removal of uneasiness determines every activity. Freud is considered as a representative of this second conception and more often than not he presents himself in that way. However, we find conclusive statements in Freud’s work according to which the principle (...) of pleasure, considered as a quantitative reduction of the stimulation level, presupposes the search for a sufficiently high energetic level which tends to reach a specific and functional discharge and not any discharge as such. In this context, Freud speaks about Bindung, a notion which points both to physiological stability and the symbolic appropriation of felt anxieties. (shrink)

The beginning of Plato's Philebus contains a puzzling argument: Socrates says that pleasures are different, and that this somehow supports the contention that not all pleasures are good (contrary to what the hedonist interlocutor, Protarchus, maintains). His argument has a bad reputation in the literature, and more to the point it is confusing. This paper sheds light on Socrates' argument by making use of principles from contemporary metaphysics. I argue that Socrates thinks of pleasure as exhibiting the structure that (...) metaphysicians today associate with determinables and determinates. Specifically, he thinks that what makes each pleasure a pleasure is a unique profile, which simultaneously differentiates it from other pleasures. As a result, the kind, 'pleasure', is really a relational principle of coherence between the different kinds of pleasure. I argue that, based on this metaphysical picture, we can see why Socrates thinks that it is possible that some pleasures are bad, contrary to hedonism. Beyond making sense of the dialectic in the Philebus, my paper advances a growing literature on the interesting metaphysical views developed in this section of Plato's dialogue. (shrink)

What would happen if pleasure were made the organizing principle for social relations and sexual pleasure ruled over all? Radical French libertines experimented clandestinely with this idea during the Enlightenment. In explicit novels, dialogues, poems, and engravings, they wrenched pleasure free from religion and morality, from politics, aesthetics, anatomy, and finally reason itself, and imagined how such a world would be desirable, legitimate, rapturous--and potentially horrific. Laying out the logic and willful illogic of radical libertinage, this (...) book ties the Enlightenment engagement with sexual license to the expansion of print, empiricism, the revival of skepticism, the fashionable arts and lifestyles of the Ancien Régime, and the rise and decline of absolutism. It examines the consequences of imagining sexual pleasure as sovereign power and a law-unto-itself across a range of topics, including sodomy, the science of sexual difference, political philosophy, aesthetics, and race. It also examines the roots of radical claims for pleasure in earlier licentious satire and their echoes in appeals for sexual liberation in the 1960s and beyond. (shrink)

Although the desire to be free from God springs from humanity’s wish to enjoy pleasure without restraint, Lacan observes that humans remain neurotic and unhappy. That is because the prevailing “dead of God” form of atheism relies on the denial of a father/god, a negation that inadvertently replicates the logic of religion. Lacan, by contrast, grounds his atheism in a theory of pleasure that recognizes the role of “unpleasure” in breaking the tedium of easy, unlimited gratification. Turning to (...) Greek tragedy, Lacan shows how the ancient world used the gods as creators of “unpleasure” to generate human _jouissance_. The figure of Antigone, in particular, shows how the divine function can fulfill “the true formula of atheism,” which is not “God is dead,” but rather, Lacan affirms, that “_God is unconscious_.”. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Hume’s claims about the nature of moral sentiments (mainly in T 3.1.2) using as a foil the Kantian challenge to all material practical principles: they are all of the same type, being based on self-love and making all choices, including moral ones, hedonically fungible. The paper explores Hume’s views on pleasure as constitutive of moral sentiment as an answer to that challenge arguing that for him only pleasure is essentially valuable for beings like (...) us. It thus grounds a notion of value which, through a “progressive or dynamic” view of human nature, informs a conception of moral pleasure – a “taste in character traits” – as a distinctive type of pleasure that is not amenable to a mere quantitative criterium to guide moral choice. Keywords: Hume’s moral philosophy, moral sentiments, human nature, Kant. (shrink)

There are a number of problems associated with the classic notion of beauty understood as an experience of perceptual form. These problems are that there is an apparent incompatibility between beauty’s objectivity and subjectivity; and an incompatibility between the two self-evident theses that (i) there are no principles of beauty and (ii) there are genuine judgements of beauty. There is also the problem of explaining the possibility of a disinterested pleasure. To solve these problems I draw upon the work (...) of Glyn Humphreys & Dietmar Heinke (1998) according to whom the processing of ‘between-object’ relations draws upon view-dependent primitives and the processing of ‘within-object’ relations draws upon view-invariant primitives. I argue that if what we experience as aesthetic form or beauty is some kind of play on the processes involved in processing within-object-relations during the course of perceiving certain objects, then the apparent problems of beauty would be resolved. I speculate that perhaps the perception of certain objects employs perceptual principles in an unprecedented way or in a way which epitomizes their normal operation. The idea is that when perception is employed in such a way that our attention is drawn from the object recognized to the experience of perception as something like a solution to a problem (that is, to the experience of the construction of within-object relations), then we experience what we know of as aesthetic form and beauty. (shrink)

In the Philebus, Plato considers pleasure to be part of the good life. Always despises pleasure, Plato, however, no longer insists on extreme rationalism, instead, he reconciles reason and pleasure with the fundamental principle of ‘measure’ In the Philebus, Plato considers ‘measure (μέτρον)’ to be of the highest value. He not only argues for the concrete application of ‘measure’ in the sensual world, but also confirms the metaphysical ground of ‘measure’. Many scholars have discussed the application (...) of ‘measure’ from different perspectives, but the deep logical principle of ‘measure’ has not been clarified clearly yet. Actually, the thought of ‘measure’ involves the relationship between ideas and sensual things. On the basis of the redefinition of this relationship, Plato proposes that a life that mixes reason and pleasure is a good one. On the one hand, ‘measure’ gives a certain rationalistic color to pleasure, and on the other hand, ‘measure’ protects pleasure from being replaced by reason. In this way, Plato turns to moderate rationalism, pioneers the principle of ‘measure’ in dealing with ethical issues, and draws a line between the gods and man. (shrink)

I give an argument for veganism by drawing parallels between a) bestiality and animal fighting, and b) animal product consumption. Attempts to draw principled distinctions between the practices fail. The wrong-making features of bestiality and animal fighting are also found in animal product consumption. These parallels give us new insight into why popular objections to veganism, such as the Inefficacy Argument, are inadequate. Because it is often difficult to enact significant life changes, I hope that seeing the parallels between animal (...) product consumption and acts we are already so strongly motivated to avoid can help us abstain from animal products. (shrink)

The specificity of tantric soteriology consists of a combination of three basic principles - unity, salvation, and bliss. This article explores the principle of salvation. Spiritual liberation implies the final overcoming of obstacles hindering the new worldview. Unlike the principle of unity, the principle of salvation focuses on difference, not on identity, drawing a sharp line between the desired state of liberation and the present state of dependence. The main obstacles to spiritual liberation are expressed in the (...) well-known triad “avidyā - karma - saṃsāra”. The principle of salvation appears in Tantrism in two interrelated forms, the ascetic and śaktic ones. Both of them agree with each other in rejection of spiritual ignorance. Spiritual ignorance is the main “negative goal”; without deliverance from it there is no freedom. The state of ignorance is existential one and endowed with powerful protective “forces”. The principle of salvation implies the deliverance not only from everything that is usually considered negative, but also of “positive” things. In the śaktic mode of the principle of salvation, it is assumed that an incorrect view of reality is eliminated by a correct view of it. Due to the fact that, according to the tantric adepts, the energies of the divine Śakti act in the world, the understanding of this fact leads the adept to stop perceiving himself as a dependent being even in the midst of an infinite variety of processes and events of the world. Life is then perceived as an unconditioned, spontaneous “divine play”, a stream of divine pleasure. Ascetic form can be reduced to an ontological interpretation of the principle of salvation, and śaktic form to a cognitive one. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of the attribution to Epicurus of the classification of pleasures into 'kinetic' and 'static'. This classification, usually regarded as authentic, confronts us with a number of problems and contradictions. Besides, it is only mentioned in a few sources that are not the most reliable. Following Gosling and Taylor, I believe that the authenticity of the classification may be called in question. The analysis of the ancient evidence concerning Epicurus' concept of pleasure is made (...) according to the following principle: first, I consider the sources that do not mention the distinction between 'kinetic' and 'static' pleasures, and only then do I compare them with the other group of texts which comprises reports by Cicero, Diogenes Laertius and Athenaeus. From the former group of texts there emerges a concept of pleasure as a single and not twofold notion, while such terms as 'motion' and 'state' describe not two different phenomena but only two characteristics of the same phenomenon. On the other hand, the reports comprising the latter group appear to derive from one and the same doxographical tradition, and to be connected with the classification of ethical docrines put forward by the Middle Academy and known as the divisio Carneadea. In conclusion, I argue that the idea of Epicurus' classification of pleasures is based on a misinterpretation of Epicurus' concept in Academic doxography, which tended to contrapose it to doctrines of other schools, above all to the Cyrenaics' views. (shrink)

In the second chapter of Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill writes: It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

Many commentators have remarked upon the striking points of correspondence that can be found in the works of Freud and Nietzsche. However, this essay argues that on the subject of desire their work presents us with a radical choice: Freud or Nietzsche. I first argue that Freud’s theory of desire is grounded in the principle of inertia, a principle that is incompatible with his later theory of Eros and the life drive. Furthermore, the principle of inertia is (...) not essentially distinct from his later theory of the death drive. Consequently, Freud’s theory of desire can only be interpreted consistently as a monism of the death drive. I then analyze Nietzsche’s attempt to ground his theory of desire in the concept of the will to power. I argue that Nietzsche’s view of desire is fundamentally opposed to the key elements of Freud’s theory of desire: the principle of constancy, the Freudian definition of the drive, and the pleasure principle. Next, I explicate the stakes of this opposition by analyzing the social consequences of each view for morality and justice. I argue that the Freudian subject seeks to dominate the social other, and that there is an insurmountable conflict between the satisfaction of desire and the demands of social life. Consequently, Freud’s view allows only for a negative conception of the social good in which morality is defined as the intrinsically impossible task of eliminating evil, and justice can be achieved only through the equal distribution of instinctual frustration. Finally, I argue that in Nietzsche’s theory of desire there is no essential conflict between individual desire and social life. The Nietzschean subject desires to manifest power in the form of activity that is independent of external agents, not to dominate the other. Consequently, Nietzsche’s view allows for the possibility of a positively defined concept of the social good in which morality is the affirmation and enhancement of every subject’s happiness, and justice can be achieved through the promotion and protection of an equality of power among subjects. (shrink)

This piece, which was revised greatly subsequent to the publication of the Methods of Ethics, appears in this collection in its original form. In it, Sidgwick distinguishes between Universal Hedonism and Egoistic Hedonism, the former espoused by Bentham, who nonetheless approves of individual self‐interest, which he regards as inevitable. Mill attempts to forge a connection between the psychological and ethical principles that he and Bentham share, maintaining that, since each person seeks her own happiness, she ought to seek the happiness (...) of others. Sidgwick endeavours to dissociate universal hedonism from the egoistic notions that appear in both Bentham and Mill's positions. (shrink)

In this article I bring together Jacques Derrida and Luce Irigaray's engagements with Sigmund Freud's vexed attempt to step beyond the pleasure principle. Derrida's speculations on the name, the house and the practice of Freud find him inadvertently rewriting the conditions of the autobiographical as that which erases as much as inscribes, while Irigaray requires a sexually different modelling of what we call language if the experience of the girl is to be addressed. Yet Irigaray uncannily repeats the (...) teleological gesture of laying claim to a legacy, diagnosed in Freud by Derrida, even as this legacy is newly imagined as that of the feminine to which Freud remained blind. I then interweave these revised stakes of the fort-da game as they are expressed in two experimental films; Lynn Hershman Leeson's feature Conceiving Ada (USA, 1997) and Hussein Chalayan's short Absent Presence (UK/Turkey, 2005). One self-consciously concerns the recovery of ‘lost’ women from history (da!), the other investigates the treatment of the foreigner staged with an all-female cast (in which the instability of foreign objects can secure no fortification for the scientific subject). The films differently engage fantasies concerning genetics, and differently engage the projection of a legacy as teleological ambition. Privileging Derrida's transformation of the pleasure into the postal principle as that which invokes ‘Tele–without telos’, I ask after the transmissibility of this ambition. (shrink)

We establish the thesis that in moral education, particularly in the first years of the child’s development, unreflexive acts or unreflexiveness in certain behaviours of adults is a condition for the development of the personality structure and virtues that enable autonomous ethical reflection and a relation to the Other. With the notion of unreflexiveness we refer to resolvedness in the response of adults when it is necessary to establish a limit, or cut, in the child’s demand for pleasure, as (...) well as to resolvedness as one of the structurally essential elements in behaviours with which the adult subordinates the child to the symbolic order or language. In philosophy, a symptomatic position in this context is represented by Kant’s theory of education. On the basis of the “traditional” concept of “negative education”, and through Freud’s and Lacan’s psychoanalytic concepts, we identify two principles that should, in contemporary times, be an essential part of the moral educational behaviours of adults: the principle of a delimited response to the child’s demand for the satisfaction of pleasure, and the principle of reasoned, reflected, but nevertheless certain, persevering, resolved unreflexiveness in the subordination of the child’s desire to the symbolic order . On the basis of the preceding analysis, we highlight certain consequences of this structure of the subject for the contexts of particular theoretical discussions and for school practice. (shrink)

Aggregation-friendly moral theories such as classical utilitarianism are forced to invest a great deal of ingenuity in damping out and modulating the effects of welfare aggregation. In Mill's treatment, the problem famously appears as the puzzle of how the Principle of Liberty is meant to be compatible with the Principle of Utility, and there have been a great many attempted interpretations of his solution, all, in my view, unsatisfactory. I will first reconstruct Mill's generally unnoticed account of the (...) psychological implementation of higher pleasures; this will allow me to explain what the distinction between higher and lower pleasures was, and how Mill was introduced lexical preference orderings into his theory. Then I will show how the underlying psychological theory permits Mill to argue for the lexical priority of liberty over the goods which liberty allows us to obtain. Finally, I will turn to the Millian considerations omitted from the argument I will have reconstructed. By way of explaining why they are so difficult to accommodate, I will consider why Mill might have abandoned his projected sciences of character. I will take my leave by asking what Mill's failure to turn his implementation analysis of the higher pleasures into an argument expressing the importance of individuality and originality means for us. (shrink)

The principle with which Hume accounts for the seemingly unaccountable pleasure that we take in tragic drama is placed in its theoretical context, and the various metaphors that Hume uses in describing this principle are examined. These metaphors are then brought to bear on an interpretative controversy concerning the result of Hume's principle for the subordinate passion. It is argued that, while Hume's considered position should have been that this passion is destroyed at the end of (...) the process, it is most likely that Hume did not consider the question very carefully, so as to form a definite answer in his own mind. (shrink)

Feeling, for any animal, is a faculty of comparing objects or representations with regard to whether they promote its vital powers or hinder them. But whereas these comparisons presuppose a species-concept in non-rational animals, nature has not equipped the human being with a universal principle or life-form that would determine what agrees or disagrees with it. As humans, we must determine our mode of life for ourselves. Contrary to other interpretations, I argue that this places the human capacity for (...) pleasure and displeasure outside of nature and in a realm of spirit. (shrink)

Music impinges upon the body and the brain and has inductive power, relying on both innate dispositions and acquired mechanisms for coping with the sounds. This process is partly autonomous and partly deliberate, but multiple interrelations between several levels of processing can be shown. There is, further, a tradition in neuroscience that divides the organization of the brain into lower and higher functions. The latter have received a lot of attention in music and brain studies during the last decades. Recent (...) developments in neuroimaging techniques, however, have broadened the field by encompassing the study of both cortical and subcortical processing of the sounds. Much is still to be investigated but some major observations seem already to emerge. The domain of music and emotions is a typical example with a major focus on the pleasure that can be derived from listening to music. Pleasure, however, is not the only emotion that music can induce and the mechanisms behind its elicitation are far from understood. There are also mechanisms related to arousal and activation that are both less differentiated and at the same time more complex than the assumed mechanisms triggering basic emotions. It is tempting, therefore, to bring together contributions from neuroscience studies with a view to cover the possible range of answers to the question of what pleasurable or mood-modifying effects music can have on human beings in real-time listening situations. (shrink)

I argue (contra Guyer et al.) that in the Critique of Judgment Kant espouses a formal, intentional theory of pleasure, and reconstruct Kant's arguments that this view can both identify what all pleasures have in common, and differentiate among kinds of pleasure. Through his investigation of aesthetic experience in the Critique of Judgment, I argue, Kant radically departs from his views about pleasure as mere sensation in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, and provides a (...) view of pleasure whereby we can understand pleasure itself to be ruled by an a priori principle. (shrink)

Dr. Bergler has written eighteen books already on psychological/psychiatric themes. The present work, in which he refers back frequently to the earlier ones, is not very deep and a fairly easily read exposition of some of the author’s favourite themes. He is particularly attached to the notion that the human mind seeks to hurt itself, and takes pleasure in so doing. This is called ‘psychic masochism’, or the seeking of pleasure–in–displeasure. The difficulty with the terminology of analytic authors (...) is that sometimes they extend a technical term so widely that it ceases to be helpful. Maybe something like this has happened in this work. There seems to be no doubt about our psychic masochistic tendencies, or the pleasure–in–displeasure phenomenon. But what are we to make of the author’s assertion that the “basic neurosis” is psychic masochism based on oral regression, or that “psychic masochism takes first place among all possible inner defences”? The present work is unlikely to achieve a permanent place in analytic literature, but it does shed a helpful ray of light here and there in the darkness of the unconscious mind. (shrink)

According to the contralife argument, because both contraception and natural family planning entail at least a contralife motivation to have marital intercourse but avoid pregnancy, both should be forbidden—a conclusion rejected by the natural law tradition and Church teaching, which forbid contraception but permit NFP. This paper argues that the principle of double effect can be applied to explain why contraception is forbidden but NFP is permissible. This double-effect analysis evaluates the good effect of procreation and unity against the (...) bad effect of lustful sexual pleasure. This paper argues that contraception fails to meet the conditions of the PDE, because it intends sexual pleasure in isolation from procreation and unity and is therefore forbidden. Conversely, NFP meets the conditions of the PDE because, as with all permissible sexual intercourse, it intends sexual pleasure in conjunction with procreation and unity and is therefore itself permissible. (shrink)