In current debates, many philosophers of science have sympathies for the project of introducing a new approach to the scientific realism debate that forges a middle way between traditional forms of scientific realism and anti-realism. One promising approach is perspectivism. Although different proponents of perspectivism differ in their respective characterizations of perspectivism, the common idea is that scientific knowledge is necessarily partial and incomplete. Perspectivism is a new position in current debates but it does have its forerunners. Figures that are (...) typically mentioned in this context include Dewey, Feyerabend, Leibniz, Kant, Kuhn, and Putnam. Interestingly, to my knowledge, there exists no work that discusses similarities to the phenomenological tradition. This is surprising because here one can find systematically similar ideas and even a very similar terminology. It is startling because early modern physics was noticeably influenced by phenomenological ideas. And it is unfortunate because the analysis of perspectival approaches in the phenomenological tradition can help us to achieve a more nuanced understanding of different forms of perspectivism. The main objective of this paper is to show that in the phenomenological tradition one finds a well-elaborated philosophy of science that shares important similarities with current versions of perspectivism. Engaging with the phenomenological tradition is also of systematic value since it helps us to gain a better understanding of the distinctive claims of perspectivism and to distinguish various grades of perspectivism. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Husserl's Cartesianism Heidegger's Ontological Critique References and Further Reading.

This essay was written on the basis of what I call a ‘happy misunde rstanding’, which is already conspicuous in the first paragraph below. Most misunderstandings have negative consequences. But in this case I was delighted to learn that I was mistaken in believing that phenomenology was just getting going in South Africa, when actually there have been phenomenologists there since before World War II! Why I and my colleagues editing the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology were ignorant of this and failed (...) to include an entry on South Africa I am not yet able to explain, but I was at least able to apologise for this omission at the recent meeting. Beyond the firstclass quality of the presentations that I heard, the colleagues on the program were typically younger than I have seen in meetings of other groups recently and also a higher proportion were women, both factors auguring well for the future. I have not tried to hide my misunderstanding in the following essay and do hope to see two delegates at the meeting of the Organization of Phenomenological Organizations in Australia next year. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of previously unpublished papers dealing with the neglected "phenomenological" dimension of the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, which it compares and contrasts to the phenomenology of his contemporary Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and to that of Edmund Husserl and his 20th century followers. Issues discussed include: phenomenological method, self-consciousness, intersubjectivity, temporality, intentionality, mind and body, and the drives. In addition to Fichte, authors discussed include: Hegel, Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, and Ricur.

Robert Sokolowski, a priest of the Archdiocese of Hartford, has taught philosophy at The Catholic University of America since 1963. He has written six books and numerous articles dealing with phenomenology, philosophy and Christian faith, moral philosophy, and issues in contemporary science. He has been an auxiliary chaplain at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C., since 1976 and was named monsignor in 1993.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Emergence of Phenomenology Amid Varieties of Rationalism Phenomenology in Brief From Logic to Phenomenology A Phenomenological Theory of Knowledge Intuition of Essences Intuition of Meanings A Phenomenological Critique of Empiricism and Rationalism.

In exploring the nature of excess relative to a phenomenology of the limit, _Testing the Limit _ claims that phenomenology itself is an exploration of excess. What does it mean that "the self" is "given"? Should we see it as originary; or rather, in what way is the self engendered from textual practices that transgress—or hover around and therefore within—the threshold of phenomenologial discourse? This is the first book to include Michel Henry in a triangulation with Derrida and Levinas and (...) the first to critique Levinas on the basis of his interpolation of philosophy and religion. Sebbah claims that the textual origins of phenomenology determine, in their temporal rhythms, the nature of the subjectivation on which they focus. He situates these considerations within the broader picture of the state of contemporary French phenomenology, in order to show that these three thinkers share a certain "family resemblance," the identification of which reveals something about the traces of other phenomenological families. It is by testing the limit within the context of traditional phenomenological concerns about the appearance of subjectivity and ipseity that Derrida, Henry, and Levinas radically reconsider phenomenology and that French phenomenology assumes its present form. (shrink)

This, for the most part, is a collection of informative and original interpretations and readings of Husserl and Husserlian themes based on a 1985 lecture series.

In exploring the nature of excess relative to a phenomenology of the limit, Testing the Limit claims that phenomenology itself is an exploration of excess. What does it mean that "the self" is "given"? Should we see it as originary; or rather, in what way is the self engendered from textual practices that transgress—or hover around and therefore within—the threshold of phenomenologial discourse? This is the first book to include Michel Henry in a triangulation with Derrida and Levinas and the (...) first to critique Levinas on the basis of his interpolation of philosophy and religion. Sebbah claims that the textual origins of phenomenology determine, in their temporal rhythms, the nature of the subjectivation on which they focus. He situates these considerations within the broader picture of the state of contemporary French phenomenology (chiefly the legacy of Merleau-Ponty), in order to show that these three thinkers share a certain "family resemblance," the identification of which reveals something about the traces of other phenomenological families. It is by testing the limit within the context of traditional phenomenological concerns about the appearance of subjectivity and ipseity that Derrida, Henry, and Levinas radically reconsider phenomenology and that French phenomenology assumes its present form. (shrink)

Sebbah’s noteworthy book is perhaps the first sustained inquiry into the relationship between three thinkers in the French phenomenological tradition, two of whom are well known in the Anglophone world (Levinas, Derrida) and one of whom (Henry) is gradually better understood by English-speaking audiences. That all three are arrayed together in this study makes it a pioneering enterprise and one that allows the English reader to apprise the worthiness of Henry’s association with his better-known compatriots.The strongest and most (...) extensive portions of the text focus on the three named figures in its subtitle, and in Part I Sebbah justifies his focus on these three in terms of a “family resemblance” (6–7) that they bear: Each in his own way practices phenomenology in the mode of excess, an excess that not only emerges in the style of each man’s writing but more fundamentally betrays a testing “of the limit, the limit through whose transgression alone excess can be what it is” (4). Rather. (shrink)

This book features a theoretical depiction of the Italian phenomenological tradition. It brings together the main Italian phenomenologists of the present to discuss the positions and theories of the most important Italian phenomenologists of the past. Those profiled include Antonio Banfi, Sofia Vanni Rovighi, Enzo Paci, Dino Formaggio, Giuseppe Semerari, Enzo Melandri, Paolo Bozzi, Carlo Sini, Giovanni Piana and Paolo Parrini. This collection shows not only the variety of perspectives but also the inner consistency, peculiarity and originality of (...) the tradition. Moreover, the contributors connect continental and analytical traditions, the scientific approach and existentialism. Italian phenomenology, the rise of which dates back to Antonio Banfi’s writings on Husserl in 1923, proves to be from its very beginning, a relational philosophy. It is a philosophy that is capable, precisely by means of its method, of developing actual forms of communication and exchange among the different sciences. This book will provide graduate students and researchers with unique insights into the Italian school of phenomenological thought. (shrink)

The present paper provides the first reconstruction of the discussion between Martin Heidegger and Maximilian Beck, a former member of the Munich Circle of Phenomenology—a discussion that revolved around Beck’s interpretation of the “fundamental ontology” of Being and Time. Based upon the still unpublished correspondence between Heidegger and Beck, the essay first reconstructs their relation and then offers a meticulous discussion of Beck’s major criticism of Heidegger, i.e., “correlativism,” and the latter’s response to it in his courses of 1928.

There is a broad consensus that the study of social institutions is one of the fundamental concerns of the social sciences. The idea that phenomenology has ignored this topic is also widely accepted. As against this view, the present paper aims at demonstrating that especially Schutzian phenomenology—that is, the social-phenomenological tradition started by Alfred Schutz and continued by Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger, among others—provides rich insights on the nature and workings of social institutions that could contribute to (...) enriching the current social-scientific debate on the issue. In order to show this, the authors attempt to unearth and systematically reconstruct Schutz’s and Berger and Luckmann’s insights on social institutions and to confront them with current approaches. (shrink)

It is argued that results from first-person methodologies are unacceptable for incorporation into a fundamental philosophical theory of the mind unless they satisfy a necessary condition, which I introduce and defend. I also describe a narrow, nonphenomenal, first-person concept that I call minimal content that satisfies this condition. Minimal content is irreducible to third-person concepts, but it is required for an adequate account of intentionality, representation, and language. Consequently, consciousness is implicated in these as strongly—but differently—than it is in our (...) phenomenal states. Minimal content provides a foundation for an objective philosophical theory of the mind and language. (Some support for these claims is given here. They are extensively argued for in my The Primacy of the Subjective.). (shrink)

This chapter explores the relevance of insights drawn from the Continental tradition of PhenomenologyPhenomenology for the solution of the long-standing “species problem” in the philosophy of biology. Returning to the roots of Continental PhenomenologyPhenomenology in the work of Edmund HusserlHusserl, Edmund, rather than to its later developments, the paper situates the discussion of the species concept in relation to the concepts of “intentionality” andIntentionalitythe “life-worldLife-world” as developed by HusserlHusserl, Edmund. Current conflicts surrounding the interpretation of the meaning of “species” (...) in biological discourse are described in terms of two different intentional “thematizings” of the life-worldLife-world, both of which satisfy theoretical scientific interests. One of these deals with the interest in the synchronic classificationClassification of the world. The other concerns the diachronic historical development of life. It is argued that this Phenomenological analysis give a more satisfactory interpretation of the species problem than that which has been generated by conflicts between advocates of “individualist” and “class” conceptions of natural species. The larger goal of this chapter is to highlight the importance of Jean Gayon’s work in developing a dialogue between Continental and Analytic approaches to the philosophy of biology. (shrink)

The work begins by asking the questions of how contemporary phenomenology is concerned with music, and how phenomenological descriptions of music and musical experiences are helpful in grasping the concreteness of these experiences. I then proceed with minor findings from phenomenological authorities, who seem to somehow need music to explain their phenomenology. From Maurice Merleau-Ponty to Jean-Luc Nancy and back to Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, there are musical findings to be asserted. I propose to look at (...) class='Hi'>phenomenological studies of the musical aspects of existence as they appear in various philosophical works bringing together different accounts of music and aesthetics and pointing towards phenomenological study as a methodology for everyday aesthetics. While there are many different areas of music phenomenology such as studies of sound and listening, studies in perception of musical works, in experience of artistic creation, in singing and playing musical instruments, and phenomenology of transcendent or religious horizons of the experience of music, it is most promising—I suggest—to look at phenomenological studies of music from the perspective of everyday happenings and discoveries of musical aspects of life. Thus, I attempt to display the uses of phenomenology in finding musical aspects of everyday existence as well as in describing and illuminating the art of music. A look at Roman Ingarden’s and Mikel Dufrenne’s most intuitive and promising ideas will be broadened with a perspective from Don Ihde and Arnold Berleant. (shrink)

Schutzian Phenomenology and Hermeneutic Traditions links Alfred Schutz to the larger hermeneutic tradition in Continental thought, illuminating the deep affinity between Schutzian phenomenology and hermeneutics. The essays collected here explore a broad spectrum of Schutzian themes and concerns, from Schutz’s concrete affinities to hermeneutic traditions, his interpretationism and the pragmatist nature of Schutz’s thought, to questions concerning the role of the media and music in our understanding of the life-world and intersubjectivity. The essays go on to explore the practical (...) applicability of Schutz’s thoughts on questions regarding economics, literature, ethics and the limits of human understanding. Given its emphasis on the application of Schutzian ideas and concepts, this book willbe of special interest to a wide range of readers in the social sciences and humanities, who are interested in the application of phenomenology to social, political, and cultural phenomena. (shrink)

Current relational phenomenologies of the Holy Mass remain on a fundamentally horizontal level. Here I develop a phenomenology of the Holy Mass and of Eucharistic devotion that explores the spiritual as well as the ethical transformations attendant on individuals of faith who engage in these practices. On the one hand, I hold as premise the traditional and magisterial teachings of the Church on the Sacrament and its devotion. On the other hand, I make use of the phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas, (...) interpreting him in line with the minority but not unsubstantial spiritual reading of his work. After first summarizing Church teaching on the Mass and the Eucharist, I point out how the relational approach to a phenomenology of the Eucharist has been misapplied to the Sacrament. I then point out shortcomings in the phenomenology of two other Catholic writers on the Eucharist, Jean-Luc Marion and Michael Purcell. Finally, I develop a more adequate phenomenology of the Mass and the Eucharist, bringing together the spirituality and the ethics of the individual and of the Church as an ethical people. (shrink)

This paper seeks to understand the place of phenomenology within the Christian philosophical tradition. Contrary to common conceptions of phenomenology, and in spite of Husserl’s own description of phenomenology as an “a-theistic” project, this paper will attempt to interpret the complex relationship of Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology to the religious tradition ultimately as a function of that very tradition. In so doing, this paper will explore the philosophical concept of “vocation” in Husserl’s usage, its application to the (...) intended role of phenomenology as an agent of moral and religious “renewal,” and the role played by the concept of tradition in Husserl’s thought, which demands explicit reflection on Husserl’s own relation to the tradition. This will allow the possibility of re-envisioning the overall sense of phenomenological discussion and its place within the tradition of philosophy, particularly in the relation of Husserlian phenomenology to the Anselmian project of “faith seeking understanding.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 422-423 [Access article in PDF] Robin Small, editor. A Hundred Years of Phenomenology: Perspectives on a Philosophical Tradition. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001. Pp. xxix + 191. Cloth, $79.95.The stated aim of this collection of thirteen essays (mostly new—four are reprints) by philosophers resident in Australia is to offer selective perspectives on the phenomenological tradition, correcting misunderstandings and highlighting (...) aspects overlooked in standard commentaries. Presumably, it also wants to exhibit contemporary Australian writing in the phenomenological tradition, and situate phenomenological claims in terms graspable by analytic philosophers.Robin Small's introduction, taking Husserl's conception of eidetic intuition as fundamental, sketches the rise of phenomenology. The collection is then divided into three parts. Part One ("Approaching the Sources") focuses on the sources of phenomenology (Husserl and Heidegger) and opens with a thoughtful essay by Max Deutscher, reprinted from the Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1980), which is replied to by Maurita Harney. Three further, not particularly distinguished, essays deal with the issues of realism, relativism, [End Page 422] and the relation between Ryle and Husserl. Part Two ("Following the Tradition") deals with new themes arising in Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida, while Part Three ("Making Connections") explores the relation between phenomenology and other disciplines, chiefly sociology, anthropology, and literature. A final essay by Jocelyn Dunphy Bloomfield examines the relevance of phenomenology in the Australian context.The collection is interesting but uneven. Some of the essays are out of date: Small's essay on Ryle and Husserl originally appeared in 1981 and Purushottama Bilimoria's paper, "Heidegger and the Japanese Connection," first published in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (1991), is in need of updating given the upsurge of interest in Husserl in Asia in recent years. Deutscher's "Husserl's Transcendental Subjectivity" is helpful in that it introduces Husserl's transcendental idealism through unusually prosaic analogies. He suggests that the transcendental attitude can be grasped in familiar experiences such as "keeping silence" during an awkward or embarrassing moment or adopting a detached or removed stance. An actor on stage can express anger without being angry. The transcendental attitude is such a detached spectator attitude; it is the capacity we have to judge and appraise ourselves (8). Moreover, it is in this attitude that we come to recognize our commitments to others. Deutscher resists the temptation to separate radically the ordinary living in the world from the detached contemplation of it. There never can be total but only intermittent detachment from the life-world; nevertheless the transcendental epoché is important in that it allows us the chance to gain self-awareness about our situation, about our "forms of life." While Deutscher does a terrific job demystifying one of Husserl's central and much misunderstood concepts, he is at risk of oversimplifying and worse of psychologizing Husserl's insights.Richard Campbell's essay on Heidegger's conception of truth as aletheia is also particularly noteworthy in that it is a philosophically sophisticated attempt to cut through Heidegger's somewhat inflated jargon and expresses his central intuitions about truth. Campbell goes to some trouble to elucidate and disambiguate what Heidegger is saying. Furthermore, he believes Heidegger is wrong in his interpretation of Plato; Plato is doing precisely the opposite of what Heidegger says he is doing. Deutscher's essay on Sartre, informed by an analytic rigor and sensitivity to ambiguity, gives a very clear account and partial defence of the relations between positional consciousness of the object and non-positional self-consciounsess. He is critical of Sartre's sweeping concept of the "in itself" and points out that in reality there are many diverse "in-itselves" with different real properties. Crittenden, too, has an interesting essay on Sartre's conception of "the look." Sartre understands the other as the one who looks at (and thereby seeks to objectify me) whereas for de Beauvoir, the other (in the particular case: woman) is the looked at and objectified. The article on sociology and phenomenology attempts to show the relation between their methods... (shrink)

In this book, Mohanty develops a new interpretation of the nature of Indian philsophical thinking. Using the original Sanskrit sources, he examines the concepts of consciousness and subjectivity, theories of language and logic, and meaning and truth, and explicates the concept of theoretical rationality which underlies the Indian philosophies. Mohanty brings to bear insights from modern western analytical and phenomenological philosophies, not so much for comparative purposes, but rather to interpret Indian thinking and to highlight its distinctive features.

The issue of how to read and interpret the Qur’ān has been the subject of Islamic sciences such as Kalām, Fiqh and Taṣawwuf. Each discipline has put forward an interpretation methodology according to its point of view. While interpreting the verses, the Ṣūfīs who are members of Taṣawwuf also produced some methodological concepts for several reasons. They interpreted the Qur’ān with the sign (ishāra), a method of interpretation suitable for the characteristics of Taṣawwuf. The ishāra is a secondary method of (...) interpretation compared to tafsīr (the Qur’ānic exegesis). In this context, the ishārī tafsīr is the interpretation of the verses by kashf and ilhām. It is also the narration of the signs claimed to exist in the verse. However, while the ṣūfīs wanted to explain their inferences regarding the verses on the one hand, they had to hide them on the other hand. These attitudes led to the paradox of statement-concealment as a problem peculiar to the ishārī tafsīr. The goal of this study is to evaluate the tradition of ṣūfī tafsīr / exegesis in terms of this paradox. One of the aims of this study is also to determine the tools that the ṣūfīs use for some reasons in interpreting the Qur’ān and how they conceptualize them. In this perspective, the function of symbolic means such as letter and sign in Taṣawwuf has been emphasized. The formation of a number of methods and instruments specific to ishārī interpretation and the influence of Ibn al-ʿArabī on this method have been discussed. To achive the objectives of this paper, this research article conducted a detailed literature review. As a method, the phenomenological approach and historical methodology have been used in order to present the ṣūfīs interpretation methodology objectively. The concept analysis method has used in order to exhibit a detailed analysis of some concepts directly related to the subject of the study. There are many studies about ishārī tafsīr, the method of interpretation of the Qur’ān by the ṣūfīs in Turkey and abroad. These works are mostly of classical-style works based on determining the nature and position of the ishārī tafsīr or discussing the ishārī interpretation style of a ṣūfī mufassir. For example, Yaşar Kurt’s work titled Ni’metullah Nahcivânî ve Tasavvufî Tefsiri, Mehmet Okuyan’s work named Necmuddin Daye ve Tasavvufi Tefsiri are doctoral theses on this subject. If we need to mention some studies directly related to the subject and the purpose of our article; they are as follows: Among the works written today are Yunus Emre Gördük’s Tarihsel ve Metodolojik Açıdan İşârî Tefsir, Davut Ağbal’s book titled İbn Arabî’de İşârî Tefsir, some communiqués in the book published by Kuramer under the name of Kur’an’ın Bâtınî ve İşârî Yorumu. Ekrem Demirli’s article “Kuşeyrî’den İbnü’l-Arabî’ye İşârî Yorumculuk Hakkında Bir Değerlendirme” is one of the sources of this research. As for the works written in the past; early ṣūfīsm classics, al-Ghazālī’s and Ibn al-ʿArabī’s writings, some boks on the methodology of Qur’ānic interpretation written by scholars such as al-Dhahabī and al-Zurḳānī can be given. The findings and results obtained inthe light of this study are: The ṣūfis have named their experiences they wanted to express, as ishāra. They have wanted to declare their feelings as a result of the spiritual states they were in while reading or listening to the Qur’ān. At the same time, they tried to hide their feelings with the concern of not being understood, not being accepted, being accused or harming those who did not taste the same pleasure. The desire to explain their enthusiastic feelings and experiential knowledge on the one hand and the need to conceal them on the other, seemingly have caused a paradox. Therefore, they have made use of some conceptual tools while interpreting the Qur’ān and used a covered language. In this framework, Ibn al-ʿArabī and his successors have a different position and style. Ibn al-ʿArabī’s approach to the Qur’ān has been named as theoretical ṣūfī tafsīr instead of ishārī ṣūfī tafsīr from now on. His main instrument is iʻtibār / taʻbīr as a way of ta’wīl. His followers such as Kāşhānī, Nakhčiwānī and Brūsawī have been influential in the spread and acceptance of the ishārī interpretation activities. This article fills the gap in the literature. Because it is a methodological analysis and an evaluation of the terms and methods that ahl al-taṣawwuf have produced in order to explain or conceal some of their thoughts about the verses, it will also make a contribution to the ishārī tafsīr literature. Although the article is presented as a result of a careful and detailed research, there are some missing points in it. Thus, further studies that will contribute positively to the debates on the legitimacy of the ishārī tafsīr and its method can be produced. (shrink)

Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for pheno- menological considerations. Often however the term ‘phenomenology’ is being used simply as a synonym for ‘folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this (...) claim, we criticize Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory as well as Strawson's recent contribution in this journal, and argue that a phenomenological analysis of the nature of self-awareness can provide us with a more sophisticated and accurate model for understanding both phenomenal consciousness and the notion of self. (shrink)

It is time to bring the rich resources of these traditions into the contemporary debate about the nature of self. This volume is the first of its kind.

One does not just live in a crisis: a crisis calls for action. Etymologically, from the Greek krisis, it is a turning point or a moment of decision. It not only alters perception; it alters the demands for living. It stands out from the everyday. If we follow Gail Weiss (2008), we could say that a crisis is a moment when the ground called “ordinary life” is interrupted in such a way that it no longer functions as an out-of-awareness backdrop (...) but itself becomes the visible figure. But what happens when the ground is already permeated by crises, large and small? How should we think about crisis when we cannot call upon a simple binary—times of crisis and somehow livable normal times? How to think, conceptually, about those communities who live with what is variously termed “slow death” (Berlant 2011), “slow violence,” (Nixon 2011) or “chronic crisis” (Vigh 2008) that make the everyday a source of such continual threat that crisis and non-crisis shade into one another? I ask these questions in the context of my twenty-year history of research in African American communities in which families are caring for children with disabilities and chronic illnesses. (shrink)

First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s monumental _Phénoménologie de la perception _signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available to a new generation of readers. _Phenomenology of Perception _stands in the great phenomenological tradition (...) of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. Yet Merleau-Ponty’s contribution is decisive, as he brings this tradition and other philosophical predecessors, particularly Descartes and Kant, to confront a neglected dimension of our experience: the lived body and the phenomenal world. Charting a bold course between the reductionism of science on the one hand and "intellectualism" on the other, Merleau-Ponty argues that we should regard the body not as a mere biological or physical unit, but as the body which structures one’s situation and experience within the world. Merleau-Ponty enriches his classic work with engaging studies of famous cases in the history of psychology and neurology as well as phenomena that continue to draw our attention, such as phantom limb syndrome, synaesthesia, and hallucination. This new translation includes many helpful features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty’s discursive Table of Contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive Translator’s Introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining key terms of translation, an extensive Index, and an important updating of Merleau-Ponty’s references to now available English translations. Also included is a new foreword by Taylor Carman and an introduction to Merleau-Ponty_ _by Claude Lefort. Translated by Donald A. Landes. (shrink)

This paper attempts to reconcile two ideas that seem fundamentally opposed to one another: the reality of the self and the doctrine of no-self. Buddhism offers a form of spiritual equanimity that turns on the denial of a self. Nonetheless, there seem to be good reasons to hold onto the reality of the self. The existence of a self enables us to account for praise and blame, the hopes for oneself that motivate actions, and attachments to the selves of others (...) in bonds of love and affection. I show how it may be possible to reconcile the reality of the self with a particular interpretation of the no-self doctrine by engaging with the work of thinkers from the phenomenological tradition such as Merleau-Ponty, Zahavi, Gallagher, and Petitmengin. (shrink)

As a distinctive philosophical tradition, phenomenology was founded by Husserl and then developed further — into the domain of technology — by Husserl's most original and important student, Heideg ger. Let us begin with this standard view and then develop..

Husserl focused perhaps more than any other philosopher on the relationship between philosophy and psychology. This problem was important to him because the European project of universal science must include sciences of consciousness that address questions of meaning, value and purpose so crucial for humanity. This paper provides a sketch of the later Husserl’s thinking on this issue in order to clarify the relationships among transcendental philosophy as the mother of the sciences, psychology as the foundational mental science, and the (...) various regional sciences of persons. Radicalizing and extending the transcendental tradition to free philosophy from naturalism, Husserl developed methods and fundamental concepts for understanding consciousness in its distinctive world constituting function. In parallel fashion, Husserl traced the historical failures of psychology to its naturalistic philosophy, from which he liberated the discipline by means of phenomenological reflections on the intentional property of its subject matter. This pure focus on mental processes resulted in the clarification of the transcendental phenomenological foundation of psychology as well as a recognition of the paradoxical manner in which psychological processes are both world constituting and mundanely present in the lives of persons. The apperceptive synthesis of transcendental consciousness and mundane embodiment in the identification of the person is proposed as essential for a non-naturalistic, intentional psychology, which provides appropriate concepts and the method of intentional analysis for such sciences of persons as sociology, history, literary studies, and religious studies. The problems, means, and inevitable inadequacies of communicating transcendental insights in language are discussed. Analysis of the complexity of living persons discloses their transcendental dimension in the manifolds their mundane activities and in their products, including use, cultural, and art objects as well as social institutions. Attention is drawn to resources in phenomenology beyond Husserl and in the genuine psychological intuitions of non-phenomenologists for generating non-naturalistic, phenomenologically grounded person sciences. (shrink)

Phenomenology, currently the most active philosophical movement on the European scene, has shown persistent concern for psychological problems and principles, and for the science of psychology in general. This concern has taken the form of various attempts to amend psychology according to phenomenological precepts and methods with the intent of providing it with a new metaphysical basis. Recent examples of this trend are the textbook of Snygg and Combs and the two books published in France by the philosopher, Merleau-Ponty.

The global crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic has considerably accelerated the adoption of teleconsultation—a form of consultation between patient and health care professional that occurs via videoconferencing platforms. For this reason, it is important to investigate the way in which this form of interaction modifies the nature of the clinical encounter and the extent to which this modification impacts the healing process. For this purpose, I will refer to insights into the clinical encounter as a face-to-face encounter drawn from the (...) phenomenology of medicine (R. Zaner, K. Toombs, E. Pellegrino). I will also take into account a criticism that has been expressed by various contemporary phenomenologists (H. Dreyfus, T. Fuchs, L. Dolezal, H. Carel), namely, that due to the lack of physical proximity to the other in all types of online encounters, such encounters lack significant features that are present in face-to-face encounters, with the most important of these being the possibility of attaining an empathetic perception of the other and a sense of embodied risk. As these elements are essential features of the clinical encounter, the aim of this paper is to determine whether teleconsultation exhibits these features. To do that, I will integrate phenomenological philosophy with qualitative research drawing materials from both the philosophical tradition, particularly with respect to the concepts of the face-to-face encounter and embodied risk (A. Schutz and H. Dreyfus), and qualitative research study regarding patient experiences of teleconsultation. I will argue that teleconsultation does involve both the possibility of perceiving the other empathetically and the possibility of experiencing a sense of embodied risk. (shrink)