This chapter describes non‐standard philosophy, derived from non‐philosophy, and shows how this discipline and its use can be relevant to the discussion of innovation. The challenge of rebuilding innovation involves developing new processes and new ways of thinking. Multiple challenges, but also opportunities, arise when it comes to (re)thinking innovation with a non‐standard innovation attempt. The first concerns thinking innovation, without which the proposal is neither willing nor able to take root. Non‐standard innovation must be (...) a quasi‐scientific discipline. Because it is not a question of drawing up a new thought that is incapable of proving its interest or reduced to a proposal that does not have practical application. Non‐standard innovation cannot be entrusted solely to the field of organization management. It can only be understood as a form of overcoming, a radicalization or an accomplishment of innovation. (shrink)

L'auteur consacre sa réflexion à l'amplification et à l'achèvement de la non-philosophie, en combinant science et philosophie qui sont considérées comme des variables définissant un espace ondulatoire et particulaire de l'opération de penser.

I review some theoretical ideas in cosmology different from the standard “Big Bang”: the quasi-steady state model, the plasma cosmology model, non-cosmological redshifts, alternatives to non-baryonic dark matter and/or dark energy, and others. Cosmologists do not usually work within the framework of alternative cosmologies because they feel that these are not at present as competitive as the standard model. Certainly, they are not so developed, and they are not so developed because cosmologists do not work on them. It is a (...) vicious circle. The fact that most cosmologists do not pay them any attention and only dedicate their research time to the standard model is to a great extent due to a sociological phenomenon . We might well wonder whether cosmology, our knowledge of the Universe as a whole, is a science like other fields of physics or a predominant ideology. (shrink)

POSTURES ET PRATIQUES DE L'HOMME Libéralisme, philosophie non-standard et pensée japonaise Jordanco SEKULOVSKI Nous, les sans-philosophie ASIE Japon -/- La philosophie véhicule des distinctions dualistes dont la conflictualité affaiblit gravement notre sentiment de solidarité humaine ; affronter la philosophie sur son propre terrain mène à une impasse, toute objection à son règne métaphysique devant, pour être reçue, se formuler dans les termes mêmes de la métaphysique... Il s'agit donc de changer de terrain, ou de chemin... L'auteur s'appuie sur le kâta (...) japonais qui forme la base des techniques de soi et façonne la pensée et les pratiques sociétales : une alternative crédible à la pensée-monde occidentale aujourd'hui dans l'impasse. -/- - format : 135 x 215 cm ISBN : 978-2-343-00792-2 • septembre 2013 • 222 pages EAN13 : 9782343007922 EAN PDF : 9782336322865. (shrink)

En associant philosophie et logique, cet ouvrage apporte un éclairage sur l'évolution de la logique de l'époque d'Aristote à nos jours. Il présente les différents formalismes des logiques non-standard en expliquant tout d'abord les besoins de ces logiques puis leurs descriptions syntaxiques et sémantiques. A l'aide d'exercices, il offre un panorama de ces logiques qui sont complexes à " utiliser " pour modéliser des connaissances permettant ainsi aux lecteurs d'appréhender ce domaine.

Internal sets and the Boolean algebras of the collection of the internal sets are of central importance in non-standard analysis. Boolean algebras are the algebraization of propositional logic while the logic applied in non-standard analysis (in non-standard stochastics) is the first order or the higher order logic (type theory). We present here a first order logic algebraization for the collection of internal sets rather than the Boolean one. Further, we define an unusual probability on this algebraization.

Abraham Robinson has twice been the initiator of trends in the foundations of mathematics which have later become recognized as profound and important, although they were generally ignored at first: metamathematical problems of algebra and non-standard analysis. This book considers the second topic; before we begin analysis—especially a treatment of the classical theorems of calculus—we need basic results from logic, model theory in particular. Robinson then sketches non-standard arithmetic and proceeds to develop the usual properties and relations of differentiability and (...) integrability of functions, convergence; he then examines general topology in this new context and fortified with these results develops "modern" functional analysis in some detail: measure theory and functions of a real variable, functions of a complex variable, normed and linear spaces, topological groups and some harmonic analysis. The last two chapters cover selected topics in analysis drawn principally from applied mathematics and the history of the calculus with special reference to infinitesimals. Robinson views the development of non-standard mathematics as the renaissance of ideas about infinitesimals as serious topics of mathematical study. Robinson primarily has confined himself to analysis and not attempted to cover non-standard algebraic systems; several important results of Alling concerning non-standard arithmetic and rings of continuous functions appeared too late to be included. Of course, the real test of non-standard analysis will come in allowing us to prove new theorems about standard analysis, but although Robinson does not attempt to do this here—although he has obtained results in this direction—other mathematicians have already begun to do so: the future of this new branch of mathematics already looks secure.—P. J. M. (shrink)

"Stains" can serve as a metaphor for the role allotted to meaninglessness not only by partisans of the deterritorializing force of "brute matter", but also by diagnosers of symbolic incompleteness. For both, the blindspot that will lead to the disturbance of a given regime of meaning must be determined through a smear or glitch which that regime cannot sublate: the mark of a Real stripped of systematising mediation. However, we argue that it is all too easy to allow the stringency (...) of this Real to be undermined by the inflation in its name of merely contingent empirical instances. Such blockages to theoretical and artistic practice can be removed with the aid of the articulation of incompleteness and inconsistency implied by François Laruelle's conception of the Real as non-consistent but hypercomplete "radical immanence". À rebours of Laruelle himself, different types of meaninglessness can then be distinguished, de-metaphorized, and conceptualized as "noise". (shrink)

Much of contemporary philosophy of mind is marked by a dissatisfaction with the two main positions in the field, standard materialism and standard dualism, and hence with the search for alternatives. My concern in this paper is with two such alternatives. The first, which I will call non-standard materialism, is a position I have defended in a number of places, and which may take various forms. The second, panpsychism, has been defended and explored by a number of recent writers. (...) My main goals are: (a) to explain the differences between these positions; and (b) to suggest that non-standard materialism is more plausible than panpsychism. (shrink)

The kilogram prototype is an object manufactured in late nineteenth century to serve as the standard unit of mass worldwide. Since then, the kilogram definition has been determined by this unique object, making it a peculiar case in metrological studies. However, after realizing that the prototype’s mass was unexpectedly changing, scientists are seeking a new way to define the kilogram in pure mathematical terms.

Twenty years after cultivating a new orientation for aesthetics via the concept of non-photography, François Laruelle returns, having further developed his notion of a non-standard aesthetics. Published for the first time in a bilingual edition, _Photo-Fiction, a Non-Standard Aesthetics_ expounds on Laruelle’s current explorations into a photographic thinking as an alternative to the worn-out notions of aesthetics based on an assumed domination of philosophy over art. He proposes a new philosophical photo-fictional apparatus, or philo-fiction, that strives for a discursive (...) mimesis of the photographic apparatus and the flash of the Real entailed in its process of image making. “A bit like if an artisan, to use a Socratic example, instead of making a camera based off of diagrams found in manuals, on the contrary had as his or her project the designing of a completely new apparatus of philo-fiction, thus capable of producing not simply photos, but photo-fictions.” One must enter into a space for seeing the vectorial and the imaginary number. Laruelle’s philo-fictions become not art installations, but “theoretical installations” calling for the consideration of the possibility of a non-standard aesthetics being of an equal or superior power to art and philosophy, an aesthetics in-the-last-instance that is itself an inventive and creative act of the most contemporary kind. (shrink)

Introductory collection of writings by a creative and subversive thinker, ranging from the origins of “non-philosophy” to its evolution into what Laruelle now calls “non-standard philosophy.” The question “What is non-philosophy?” must be replaced by the question about what it can and cannot do. To ask what it can do is already to acknowledge that its capacities are not unlimited. This question is partly Spinozist: no-one knows what a body can do. It is partly Kantian: circumscribe (...) class='Hi'>philosophy's illusory power, the power of reason or the faculties, and do not extend its sufficiency in the shape of by way of another philosophy. It is also partly Marxist: how much of philosophy can be transformed through practice, how much of it can be withdrawn from its “ideological” use? And finally, it is also partly Wittgensteinian: how can one limit philosophical language through its proper use? This introductory collection of writings by creative and subversive thinker François Laruelle opens with an introduction based upon an in-depth interview that traces the abiding concerns of his prolific output. The eleven newly translated essays that follow, dating from 1985 to the present, range from the origins of “non-philosophy” to its evolution into what Laruelle now calls “non-standard philosophy.” Two appendices present a number of Laruelle's experimental texts, which have not previously appeared in English translation, and a transcript of an early intervention and discussion on his “transvaluation” of Kant's transcendental method. (shrink)

Summary The historical development of the non-standard analysis is sketched. With the help of this mathematical branch infinite and infinitesimal quantities are placed in an extension of the real numbers and so find their justification. In this way an old mathematical and philosophical problem is solved in the 20th century, but not in such a manner, mathematicians with classical „standard methods thought of.

In this short paper, I outline a non-standard account of what it feels like to have an intuition. According to this account, intuitive contents are ontologically ambiguous. Because intuition alone is liable to persuade us of both motivated inferences and necessary truths, it is not a reliable source of evidence. However, we would not be able to grasp the concept of necessity without intuitions. Hence, I do not think it is any good to ignore or quarantine our intuitions when forming (...) judgments. (shrink)

In his Mathesis rationis Leibniz discounted out of hand four categorical propositions that would have considerably broadened the resultant syllogistic logic. He did this despite the facts both that he had devised a suitable manner for expressing the latent quantification over terms, and that he had reasoned adequately to determine which of the syllogisms in the resulting broadened logic were valid. Leibniz's reasons for discounting these non-standard propositions are shown to be inadequate, and the resultant syllogistic logic is outlined.

In this paper we study a new operator of strong modality ⊞, related to the non-contingency operator ∆. We then provide soundness and completeness theorems for the minimal logic of the ⊞-operator.

It has been shown that quantum mechanics in its orthodox interpretation violates four different formulations of causality principle endowed with empirical meaning. The present work aims to highlight how even a realistic non-standard interpretation of the theory conflicts with causality in its Cartesian formulation of the principle of the non-inferiority of causes over effects. Such an interpretation, which attributes some form of weak physical reality to the wave function (called empty wave, regarded as a zero-energy wave-like phenomenon), is a sort (...) of precursor of the more recent so-called wavefunction realism. We also discuss a more radical realistic interpretation according to which physical properties can also be assigned to non-metaphysical relative nothing, seen as the simple absence of a particle such as a photon, but not of its corresponding state (no-photon), which is considered real. By interpreting the wave function collapse as a consequence of an interaction with empty waves or of a detection of the no-photon, we will highlight how more real physical effects can derive from lower causes, including relative nothing. Finally, we will show how these interpretations, while violating Cartesian causality in its two variants, do not seem to affect the validity of the principle of a rational explanation that nothing can derive from (absolute) nothing, which does not seem satisfied by the orthodox interpretation. (shrink)

This inquiry aims to enrich conversation regarding school reform. The author asks about what other discourses are possible when the action-oriented question of how to ‘act’ is a major approach to ‘fix’ current educational problems. Drawing from Taoist philosophy of wuwei (non-action), the author provides a frame to review current school reform movement. Political philosophy of wuwei highlights non-interference or non-intervention governance. Laozi discusses his theory of governance that a sage leader should take and explicates the paradox of (...) non-action: By not doing, everything is done. The paradox of wuwei complicates dialogues in the field of curriculum theory by opening spaces for taking effortless actions in the midst of standardization and accountability reform movement. (shrink)

This paper considers non-standard analysis and a recently introduced computational methodology based on the notion of ①. The latter approach was developed with the intention to allow one to work with infinities and infinitesimals numerically in a unique computational framework and in all the situations requiring these notions. Non-standard analysis is a classical purely symbolic technique that works with ultrafilters, external and internal sets, standard and non-standard numbers, etc. In its turn, the ①-based methodology does not use any of these (...) notions and proposes a more physical treatment of mathematical objects separating the objects from tools used to study them. It both offers a possibility to create new numerical methods using infinities and infinitesimals in floating-point computations and allows one to study certain mathematical objects dealing with infinity more accurately than it is done traditionally. In these notes, we explain that even though both methodologies deal with infinities and infinitesimals, they are independent and represent two different philosophies of Mathematics that are not in a conflict. It is proved that texts :539–555, 2017; Gutman and Kutateladze in Sib Math J 49:835–841, 2008; Kutateladze in J Appl Ind Math 5:73–75, 2011) asserting that the ①-based methodology is a part of non-standard analysis unfortunately contain several logical fallacies. Their attempt to show that the ①-based methodology can be formalized within non-standard analysis is similar to trying to show that constructivism can be reduced to the traditional Mathematics. (shrink)

This paper presents an analysis of the sorites paradox for collective nouns and gradable adjectives within the framework of classical logic. The paradox is explained by distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative representations. This distinction is formally represented by the use of a different mathematical model for each type of representation. Quantitative representations induce Archimedean models, but qualitative representations induce non-Archimedean models. By using a non-standard model of \ called \, which contains infinite and infinitesimal numbers, the two paradoxes are shown (...) to have distinct structures. The sorites paradox for collective nouns arises from the use of infinite numbers, whereas the sorites paradox for gradable adjectives arises from the use of infinitesimal numbers. Each paradox can be traced to a different source of vagueness. The sorites paradox for collective nouns is caused by \, and the sorites paradox for gradable adjectives is caused by \ \. If correct, this analysis implies that infinite and infinitesimal numbers are cognitively real, and that they play a role in the semantic interpretation of natural language. (shrink)

This work is a study in the new field of paraconsistent logics. The authors attempt to give a formal characterization of the notions of indeterminate possible worlds and inconsistent possible worlds. The characterization works by constructing the non-standard worlds out of combinations of standard possible worlds either by taking those statements as true in a non-standard world which are true in both of two standard worlds, which generates indeterminate worlds, or by taking those statements as true in a non-standard world (...) which are true in either of two standards worlds, which generates inconsistent worlds. (shrink)

This paper presents an axiomatization of the principle of maximizing expected utility that does not rely on the independence axiom or sure-thing principle. Perhaps more importantly the new axiomatization is based on an ex ante approach, instead of the standard ex post approach. An ex post approach utilizes the decision maker's preferences among risky acts for generating a utility and a probability function, whereas in the ex ante approach a set of preferences among potential outcomes are on the input side (...) of the theory and the decision maker's preferences among risky acts on the output side. (shrink)

This study brings the thoughts of Derrida into conversation with François Laruelle’s non-philosophy or non-standard philosophy. Laruelle argued that Derrida is a philosopher of difference, thereby grouping Derrida together with Heidegger and Deleuze as philosophers of difference. The argument of this article is to explore Derrida’s work, bringing it into conversation with Laruelle’s non-philosophy and non-standard philosophy. This article is focussed specifically on Derrida’s democracy to come in line with Laruelle’s democracy of thought. The context of (...) this discussion is the end of philosophy or the closure of philosophy, and the opening of this closure for a democracy is yet to come – or whether the ideas of the end of philosophy or the closure of philosophy (metaphysics) are philosophical materials for Laruelle’s science of philosophy or non-philosophy. Laruelle does not seek a democracy to come, but understands these different thoughts as democracy of thought: all thoughts equal and unifacially turned not towards a democracy to come, but a future. (shrink)

A standard view in philosophy of mind is that qualia and phenomenal character require consciousness. This paper argues that various experimental and clinical phenomena can be better explained if we reject this assumption. States found in early visual processing can possess qualitative character even though they are not in any sense conscious mental states. This non-standard interpretation bears the burden of explaining what must be added to states that have qualitative character in order to yield states of sensory awareness (...) or sensory experience. I argue that the study of selective attention reveals resources that can be useful in that project. Two traditional objects are briefly considered. (shrink)

This essay argues that a radical, non-standard, philosophical concept of the human is one that is consistently used both towards itself and others: it is an amplified concept that applies itself non-philosophically, that is, generically. Our purpose here, consequently, is to outline how Laruelle's work can be seen as performing something other than an inflation or deflation of either side of one fixed philosophical dyad ; rather, it can be seen as unilateralising the couple, that is, expanding the meaning of (...) the two alongside the One Real that resists any lone philosophical version's attempt to commandeer that meaning. It is the performative mutation that counts, not the terms of the dyad. As such, this essay also contends that what Laruelle explicitly does with philosophy – namely its de-authorisation and democratisation – is also what must be done, by implication, in a non-standard philosophical radicalisation of the human. Nonstandard philosophy does not know what the human is, but this negative capability is precisely what allows it to expand, performatively, the meaning of the human in its ongoing search to discover what the human may be. (shrink)

Katerina Kolozova is a Macedonian philosopher whose publications from last two decades aim to analyze various topics using François Laruelle’s “non-philosophy” or “non-standard philosophy.” Non-philosophy could be roughly described as radicalized deconstruction: Laruelle claims that not everything can be grasped by a philosophy: for Laruelle, “philosophy is too serious an affair to be left to the philosophers alone.”1 Non-philosophy opposes the “principle of sufficient philosophy” through which philosophy determines and decides what is (...) real. According to Laruelle, the ultimate limit of philosophical thought and its self-proclaimed sufficiency lies in its inherent tendency to close itself in a transcendental system of autofetishist conceptions, which presume that one can grasp the Real (“The Real is neither capable of being known or even ‘thought,’ but can be described in axioms. [...] Even ‘immanence’ only serves to name the Real which tolerates nothing but axiomatic descriptions or formulations.”) by a philosophical thought, or that the Real could be mediated only through human thought. Laruelle criticizes this tendency of philosophy, which is usually expressing itself through the structure of “philosophical Decision.” (“To philosophize is to decide Reality and the thoughts that result from this, i.e. to believe to be able to order them in the universal order of the Principle of Reason [Logos].”) Katerina Kolozova use Laruelle’s non-philosophy to explore more explicitly political topics. In the Cut Of Th e Real (2014), she criticized certain dogmatism of poststructuralist philosophy and feminist theory, namely their symptomatic rejection of the Real and the One. In Toward a Radical Metaphysics of Socialism (2015) and The Lived Revolution (2016) Kolozova presented a rereading of Marx, whose work she found relevant for the critique of speculative philosophical dimension of the capitalist economy, embodied in the 2008 global finance crisis, and in the latter book, she explored the possibility of a new political solidarity, based on “bodies in pain.” Kolozova doesn’t call to philosophically reconstruct Marx’s thought for the current situation, but she goes back to Marx with the help of Laruelle’s non-Marxism, contrary to the usual approach of Marxist philosophers, who often try to create certain philosophical system of Marx’s work. Together with Eileen A. Joy, Kolozova edited the anthology After the “Speculative Turn” (2016), which addressed recent realist and materialist tendencies in feminist philosophy. In her most recent book, Capitalism’s Holocaust of Animals (2019), Kolozova aimed to explore broader philosophical foundations of neoliberal capitalism, and its dealing with nonhuman animals and their suffering. According to Kolozova, “We have to start by coming to terms with what we did to the animals in the constitutive act of philosophy and via proxy to all those dehumanised that belong to the species of man ‘by courtesy’ only.” . (shrink)

This article investigates the application of Philip Pettit's concept of freedom as non-domination to the issues of educational standards and the negotiated curriculum. The article will argue that freedom as non-domination shines a critical light on governmental practice in England over the past two decades. Joshua Cohen's proposal of an ideal deliberative procedure is offered as a potential mechanism for the facilitation of debating contestations between stakeholders over the curriculum. Cohen places particular importance on the participants being ‘formally and substantively (...) equal’ in the proceedings and being able to ‘recognize one another as having deliberative capacities’. It will be argued that formal and substantive equality between children and responsible adults is highly problematic due to the ‘considerable interference’ teachers and adults have to make in children's lives. However, the article does offer examples of children's deliberative capacities on the issue of the curriculum. (shrink)

Contemporary caution of anachronism in intellectual history on the one hand, and currently momentous theoretical emphasis on subjectivity on the other, are two prevailing circumstances that set puzzling constraints for studies in the history of philosophical psychology. Together these circumstances call for heightened awareness of our own interpretive presuppositions as historians: the former urges against assuming ideas, motives, and concepts that may be alien in the historical intellectual setting under study and the latter suggests caution in relying on our intuitions (...) regarding subjectivity due to the specific and historicallycontingent characterisations subjectivity has attained in the contemporary philosophy of mind. In face of these enticements our paper explores subjectivity as a non-textual standard of interpretation. Taking into account recent methodological discussion and examples of denials of the relevance of subjectivity for historical theories, we argue that historical work should be conceived as a reflective investigation into what is and what is not genuinely historical. In particular, we show how subjectivity can function as a pre-conceptualized feature of the world that has an effect on our concept formation. (shrink)

The editorial aims to unveil the attracting force of Laruelle's non-philosophy for scholars from different disciplines and artists. It shows how a new "democratic order of thinking" permits non-philosophy to enclose domains that have long been considered as opposites: philosophy, science, religion and the arts. Conceived as parameters of thought of the same right and without privileges, these variables can be superposed in a process of creative invention. The performative force of non-standard thinking, which can take different (...) forms of philo-fiction, science fiction, art fiction, Christo-Fiction etc., dismantles the decisional gestures and the sufficiency claims of philosophy, science and religion, and thus permits a regeneration as well as a choral orchestration in a "minimalistic symphony". In this sense, non-philosophy invites us every day to the "movable feast", that it is. (shrink)

. This paper follows the journey of two small fluid units throughout the nineteenth century in Anglo-American medicine and pharmacy, explaining how the non-uniform “drop” survived while the standardized minim became obsolete. I emphasize two roles these units needed to fulfill: that of a physical measuring device, and that of a rhetorical communication device. First, I discuss the challenges unique to measuring small amounts of fluid, outlining how the modern medicine dropper developed out of an effort to resolve problems with (...) the “minimometer,” which measured minims. Second, I explain how drops, utilized in “the open drop method” of administering general anesthesia, effectively communicated a gradual process and epistemically valuable heuristic to the audience of practitioners, whose attention to individual medical outcomes was important for verifying the proper dosage. The standardized minim was never able to achieve success as the drop’s intended replacement; the non-uniform drop better served the relevant epistemic goals within the practical contexts for which these units were designed. The surprising historical trajectory of drops should cause us to question the common equivocation of “standardization” with “progress” in the history and philosophy of measurement. This study also exemplifies how examining non-standard measurement practices can be instructive for better understanding the role and function of standardization within epistemology of measurement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"What Is Philosophy?"The Status of World Philosophy in the ProfessionRobert C. SolomonThe question "What is philosophy?" is both one of the most virtuously self-effacing and one of the most obnoxious that philosophers today tend to ask. It is virtuously self-effacing insofar as it questions, with some misgivings, its own behavior, the worth of the questions it asks, and the significance of the enterprise itself. It is (...) obnoxious when it refuses to question its own behavior but instead takes that same behavior as the exclusive standard to delegitimize any other activity that dares to call itself "philosophy." Thus, for most of this century, Anglo-American and most European philosophers have simply ignored the rich philosophical traditions of Africa, Asia, Latin and Native America, and the rest of the world. Some leading African American and African European philosophers have dismissed "ethnophilosophy" as "not philosophy," presumably to protect their own analytic credentials. Universities as far flung as Singapore, Sierra Leone, and New Delhi have prided themselves on their fidelity to Oxbridge philosophy. It seems that the globalization of free market economics goes with the globalization of one brief moment in philosophy, with similarly devastating effects on local cultures and the rich varieties of human experience.Philosophy might be thought of as made up of two components: critical thinking and passionate vision. But "critical thinking" does not necessarily imply the hermeneutics of suspicion, skepticism, or intellectual paranoia—all too often the trademarks of the bright young professional philosopher. One can be "critical," that is, reflective, while at the same time be committed, even devoted, to an idea or a way of thinking. The emphasis on passionate vision, however, is just as essential, and any philosophy that doesn't include both components just isn't worthy of the name. Without passionate vision, we get that utterly eviscerated focus on forms of argumentation—philosophia minimalia—devoid of "empirical" content (that is to say, content) and, as far as most people are concerned, devoid of any interest. Without critical reflection, we get gullibility and the worst of New Age philosophy, accepting of any kind of nonsense, just because it stirs the passions. But simply to assume that philosophy must be as rigorously self-questioning as modern European and Anglo-American philosophy is a subtle form of ethnic chauvinism. It eliminates from the realm of philosophy not only African ethnophilosophy and Latin and Native American and South Pacific mythology but a good deal of the philosophy of religion, the basis (for better or worse) of the development of Western philosophy over much of the past two thousand years. [End Page 100]I have just withdrawn from a recent dispute, in a respectable and supposedly eclectic philosophy journal, in which my worst fears in this regard were rather bluntly confirmed. I had made the point mentioned above—rather matter-of-factly, I thought—that if (analytic) philosophy dismisses or ignores modes of thinking that are not obviously self-critical and are presented poetically instead of by way of positions to be argued for, then a good deal of the world's philosophy, including a good deal of Western philosophy, would be left out of the arena. The journal's board reacted indignantly, to put it mildly, to the suggestion that anything should count as "philosophy" that was not sufficiently self-critical in just this sense. But what about the millennium or so of religious philosophy in the West? Does anyone believe that thinkers like Anselm, or Alvin Plantiga for that matter, are seriously skeptical of the truth of Christianity, as they go through their admittedly brilliant argumentative routines? For that matter, to what extent is the emphasis on logical form and argument subjected to scrutiny in contemporary analytic philosophy? (As one of the foremost practitioners of that art commented, "Metaphilosophy makes me sick.")Some of the hostility to world philosophy, to be sure, turns on the conflict between philosophy and religion, which may have its origins in ancient and medieval philosophy but emerges full-blown with the Enlightenment and its campaign against "superstition." But many people and a good many cultures do not distinguish between philosophy and religion. If we consider the word "philosophy... (shrink)

Following François Laruelle's nonstandard philosophy and the work of Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, Luce Irigaray, and Rosi Braidotti, Katerina Kolozova reclaims the relevance of categories traditionally rendered "unthinkable" by postmodern feminist philosophies, such as "the real," "the one," "the limit," and "finality," thus critically repositioning poststructuralist feminist philosophy and gender/queer studies. Poststructuralist (feminist) theory sees the subject as a purely linguistic category, as _always alread_y multiple, as _always already_ nonfixed and fluctuating, as limitless discursivity, and as constitutively detached (...) from the instance of the real. This reconceptualization is based on the exclusion of and dichotomous opposition to notions of the real, the one (unity and continuity), and the stable. The non-philosophical reading of postructuralist philosophy engenders new forms of universalisms for global debate and action, expressed in a language the world can understand. It also liberates theory from ideological paralysis, recasting the real as an immediately experienced human condition determined by gender, race, and social and economic circumstance. (shrink)

This study explores the phenomenon of the so-called “third reading” of propositional attitude reports. This reading, which was originally explored in the dissertation of J. Fodor (1973) and has since become one of the significant problems in the formal semantics of natural languages, differs from the more well-known de re and de dicto readings by being an intermediate case. If the de re interpretation can be referred to as transparent specific, and the de dicto interpretation as opaque non-specific, then the (...) third reading is transparent non-specific. Fodor's standard solution has been the subject of much discussion in the literature and has given rise to a series of widely accepted counterexamples that are thought to demonstrate the limitations of Fodor's solution. At the same time, alternative approaches to the explication of these readings also suffer from formal shortcomings (for example, some of them did not satisfy the requirement of meaning compositionality, which is a basic requirement in formal semantic literature). This study points out that the analysis of all complex cases of the third reading did not fully take into account their syntactic structure. This remained unnoticed due to the ellipsis in many of these cases. It is shown that a restoration of the ellided syntactic structure makes it possible to analyze all hard cases as basic ones using the classical standard analysis proposed by Fodor supplemented by the principles of admissibility of substitution of L-equivalent expressions in intensional contexts (known since G. Frege and R. Carnap). In the final part of the work, it is demonstrated how exactly the main complex cases of the “third reading” are explicated in terms of the standard approach. (shrink)

This book provides a critical introduction to François Laruelle’s writings on photography, with a particular focus on his two most important books on photography: The Concept of Non-Photography and Photo-Fiction, a Non-Standard Aesthetics. By unpacking and contextualising these works, this study provides a useful starting point for students and scholars who want to better understand Laruelle’s larger project, which he calls “non-philosophy”, or more recently, “non-standard philosophy”. With clear and concise explanations of the basics of non-philosophy, Laruelle (...) and Non-Photography demonstrates how Laruelle's thought challenges standard, philosophical approaches to photography, and culminates in a novel theory of "non-photography.". (shrink)

[a chapter in a volume edited by DENNES (Maryse), Ó MAIOLEARCA (John), SCHMID (Anne-Françoise) (dir.), a Philosophie non-standard de François Laruelle , p. 127-135 La révolte ou la rébellion immanente est sans but, parce que sa seulesource et sa seule tendance est de se protéger contre la violence de l’aliénation,afin de défendre l’homme-en-homme qui est déterminé par sa vulnérabilitéradicale. Toute lutte politique émane du diktat de la rébellion immanente,celle du vécu radicalement solitaire. La lutte est une singularité radicale ce quine (...) veut pas dire qu’elle ne puisse pas établir solidarité ou qu’elle soitindividualiste. (shrink)

In _The Dictionary of Non-Philosophy_, the French thinker François Laruelle does something unprecedented for philosophers: he provides an enormous dictionary with a theoretical introduction, carefully crafting his thoughts to explain the numerous terms and neologisms that he deems necessary for the project of non-philosophy. With a collective of thinkers also interested in the project, Laruelle has taken up the difficult task of creating an essential guide for entering into his non-standard, non-philosophical terrain. And for Laruelle, even the idea of (...) a dictionary and what a dictionary is become material for his non-philosophical inquiries. As his opening note begins, “Thus on the surface and within the philosophical folds of the dictionary, identity and its effect upon meaning are what is at stake.”. (shrink)