Attitudes toward sow husbandry differ between citizens and conventional pig farmers. Research showed that moral values could only predict the judgment of people in case of culling healthy animals in the course of a disease epidemic to a certain extent. Therefore, we hypothesized that attitudes of citizens and pig farmers cannot be predicted one-on-one by moral values. Furthermore, we were interested in getting insight in whether moral values can be useful in bridging the gap between attitudes toward (...) sow husbandry of citizens and pig farmers. Based on a questionnaire, it was found that pig farmers and citizens, when considered as one group, shared the valuation of most moral values. However, when studying the four clusters of citizens with different attitudes toward sow husbandry, determined in a previous study, a variation in valuation of the moral values between the clusters of citizens and farmers came to the fore. This means that moral values are interpreted differently by groups of people when forming attitudes toward sow husbandry. The results of our study give an indication of which moral values are weighed differently between clusters of citizens and pig farmers. This information can be useful in future research on attitudes toward animal husbandry in order to understand why attitudes differ between groups of people. Besides, our results can be useful for the pig sector and citizens to learn to understand each other’s attitudes. With this understanding it is possible to invest in a husbandry system that can build on societal support. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Teachers are regularly blamed–especially in times of moral panic–for failing to set a good example and teach proper moral standards to their pupils. As well as familiar issues about moral values and the legitimacy of different modes of moral pedagogy this also raises the question of the degree of connection between a teacher's private and personal values, attitudes and behaviour and his or her professional conduct and responsibilities. Two common responses to these problems–paternalism and liberalism–are (...) here criticised and an alternative perspective on the moral role of the teacher is sought, drawing on communitarian insights into the nature of moral and other values and their function in human affairs. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the Netherlands, patients have the legal right to make a request for euthanasia to their physician. However, it is not clear what it means in a moral sense for a physician to receive a request for euthanasia. The aim of this study is to explore the moral values of physicians regarding requests for euthanasia. MethodsSemi-structured interviews were conducted with nine primary healthcare physicians involved in decision-making about euthanasia. The data were inductively analyzed which lead to the emergence (...) of themes, one of which was about values regarding end-of-life decisions.ResultsFour clusters of values related to euthanasia requests are described: values related to 1) the patient; 2) the family; 3) the physician; and 4) life and death. The data show that the participants value patient autonomy as a necessary but not sufficient condition for meeting a euthanasia request. A good relationship with the patient and the family are important. For the physician, the values physician autonomy, responsibility, understanding the patient and relief of suffering play a role. Life as an intrinsic good and a peaceful death are also important values.ConclusionThis study shows that next to patient autonomy and the relationship with the patient and the family, it is important for the participants to act in accordance with their professional values and to do justice to values related to life and death. The awareness of going against the intrinsic value of life is crucial, even if performing euthanasia may result in a feeling of relief or gratitude afterwards. (shrink)

Recent work on empathy has focused on the phenomenon of feeling on behalf of, or for, others, and on determining the role it ought to play in our moral lives. Much less attention, however, has been paid to ‘feeling-with.’ In this paper, I distinguish ‘feeling-with’ from ‘feeling-for.’ I identify three distinguishing features of ‘feeling-with,’ all of which serve to make it distinct from empathy. Then, drawing on work in feminist moral psychology and feminist ethics, I argue that ‘feeling-with’ (...) has unique moral value over and above ‘feeling-for.’ I end by rebutting some likely objections to the claim that ‘feeling-with’ is morally valuable. (shrink)

Central to the debate on the moral relevance of shame is whether we take others’ assessments of our moral shortcomings seriously. Some argue that viewing shame as a social emotion undermines the moral standing of shame; for a moral agent, what is authoritative are his own moral values, not the mere disapproval of others. Adam Smith's framework sheds some light on the contemporary debates in philosophy on the moral value of shame. Shame is (...) mostly a social emotion but has moral value for Smith. This is because we desire sympathy and share an ongoing social practice of morality with others. Smith developed the underpinnings of an account for a sympathetic basis of shame. An agent is evaluated through the sympathetic process to determine whether he/she has lived up to shared norms and morality. Shame emerges from the understanding that we ought not to be favorably thought of by others, the impartial spectator, or by our own conscience. We want to avoid shame for two reasons: first, we want to receive praise which gives pleasure, blame and blameworthiness operate by giving pain. Secondly, we are pleased with the sympathy of others. According to Smith, shame is a very painful emotion. Given our dread of pain and love of pleasure, we are motivated to be not blamed or blameworthy. We want to be favorably thought of so as not to be, or feel, shamed. Our dread of blameworthiness and our desire for sympathy motivates us to be a person who acts according to the norms and morality of society. Shame has a moral value both as a social emotion and when it arises from our conscience; however, Smith was also aware that there are limits to shame as a moral value, which arises from misjudgments of spectators. (shrink)

How can one establish if a corporate code of ethics is ethical in terms of its content? One important first step might be the establishment of core universal moral values by which corporate codes of ethics can be ethically constructed and evaluated. Following a review of normative research on corporate codes of ethics, a set of universal moral values is generated by considering three sources: (1) corporate codes of ethics; (2) global codes of ethics; and (3) the business (...) ethics literature. Based on the convergence of the three sources of standards, six universal moral values for corporate codes of ethics are proposed including: (1) trustworthiness; (2) respect; (3) responsibility; (4) fairness; (5) caring; and (6) citizenship. Relying on the proposed set of universal moral values, implications are discussed as to what the content of corporate codes of ethics should consist of. The paper concludes with its limitations. (shrink)

Ethical culture construction is beneficial to maximize policy following behavior and avoid accidents of coal miners in an economic downturn. This paper examines the congruence between coal mine ethical culture values and miners’ moral values and the relationship with PFB. To shed light on this relationship, supervisor moral values act as a key moderator. We build on the initial structure of values to measure ECVs, MVs, and SMVs. At the same time, available congruence was defined to describe the (...) relationship between the two values. Drawing upon a survey of 267 miners in Chinese large state-owned coal mining enterprises, results revealed that ECVs–MVs congruence had a linear relationship with intrinsic PFB and a non-linear relationship with extrinsic PFB. These findings demonstrate that SMVs had a moderating effect on the relationship between ECVs–MVs congruence and extrinsic PFB. Thus, we continued to calculate the available congruence scope in tested enterprises. Furthermore, this study gives relative management proposals and suggestions to improve miners’ moral standards and to reduce coal mine accidents. (shrink)

As it comes to animal ethics, broad versions of contractualism are often used as a reason for excluding animals from the category of those with moral value in the individualistic sense. Ideas of “reciprocity” and “moral agency” are invoked to show that only those capable of understanding and respecting the value of others may have value themselves. Because of this, possible duties toward animals are often made dependent upon altruism: to pay regard to animals is (...) to act in an other-regarding manner instead of mutual benefit. There are three main versions of altruism in animal ethics. The first one of these is the most traditional, and emphasises benevolence as a source of moral regard. The second concentrates on the notion of value, and claims that animals have value in the individualistic sense despite being incapable of moral agency. The third resists overt theory-dependency, often included in the second version, and concentrates more on the elements of “context” and “identification”. Out of these, a combination of the last two is identified as the most fruitful basis for altruistic animal ethics. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for the following thesis: racial and ethic groups differ in their per capita intrinsic moral value. My argument rests on the notion that autonomy is a ground for intrinsic moral value and the notion that there are individual and group differences in autonomy. I then argue that the implications of this per capita difference between racial and ethnic groups are in some cases significant in that they are relevant to both public (...) policy and private action. (shrink)

Within moral psychology, theories focusing on the conceptualization and empirical measurement of people’s morality in terms of general moral values –such as Moral Foundation Theory- (implicitly) assume general moral values to be relevant concepts for the explanation and prediction of behavior in everyday life. However, a solid theoretical and empirical foundation for this idea remains work in progress. In this study we explore this relationship between general moral values and daily life behavior through a conceptual (...) analysis and an empirical study. Our conceptual analysis of the moral value-moral behavior relationship suggests that the effect of a generally endorsed moral value on moral behavior is highly context dependent. It requires the manifestation of several phases of moral decision-making, each influenced by many contextual factors. We expect that this renders the empirical relationship between generic moral values and people’s concrete moral behavior indeterminate. Subsequently, we empirically investigate this relationship in three different studies. We relate two different measures of general moral values -the Moral Foundation Questionnaire and the Morality As Cooperation Questionnaire- to a broad set of self-reported morally relevant daily life behaviors (including adherence to COVID-19 measures and participation in voluntary work). Our empirical results are in line with the expectations derived from our conceptual analysis: the considered general moral values are poor predictors of the selected daily life behaviors. Furthermore, moral values that were tailored to the specific context of the behavior showed to be somewhat stronger predictors. Together with the insights derived from our conceptual analysis, this indicates the relevance of the contextual nature of moral decision-making as a possible explanation for the poor predictive value of general moral values. Our findings suggest that the investigation of morality’s influence on behavior by expressing and measuring it in terms of general moral values may need revision. (shrink)

Abstract:This article argues that the important organizational values to study are organizational moral values. It identifies five moral values (honest communication, respect for property, respect for life, respect for religion, and justice), which allow parallel constructs at individual and organizational levels of analysis. It also identifies dimensions used in differentiating organizations’ moral values. These are the act, actor, person affected, intention, and expected result. Finally, the article addresses measurement issues associated with organizational moral values, proposing that (...) content analysis is the appropriate measurement technique to be used for an organization-level conception of moral values. (shrink)

What would it take for an artificial agent to be treated as having moral value? As a first step toward answering this question, we ask what it would take for an artificial agent to be capable of the sort of autonomous, adaptive social behavior that is characteristic of the animals that humans interact with. We propose that this sort of capacity is best measured by what we call the Embodied Turing Test. The Embodied Turing test is a test (...) in which intelligence is operationally defined in terms of autonomous, adaptive interaction with the environment and with other animals. Three versions of the Embodied Turing test were performed with a SONY AIBO robot. Human participants were asked to differentiate between AIBO in a human-controlled mode and AIBO in a software-controlled mode. Our results indicate that the human participants were guessing at how AIBO was controlled. Our data reveals that people do not have enough experience with robots to accurately evaluate its behavior. This indicates that today’s humans do not have enough experience with artificial agents to treat them as morally valuable. (shrink)

AI research is being challenged with ensuring that autonomous agents learn to behave ethically, namely in alignment with moral values. Here, we propose a novel way of tackling the value alignment problem as a two-step process. The first step consists on formalising moral values and value aligned behaviour based on philosophical foundations. Our formalisation is compatible with the framework of (Multi-Objective) Reinforcement Learning, to ease the handling of an agent’s individual and ethical objectives. The second step (...) consists in designing an environment wherein an agent learns to behave ethically while pursuing its individual objective. We leverage on our theoretical results to introduce an algorithm that automates our two-step approach. In the cases where value-aligned behaviour is possible, our algorithm produces a learning environment for the agent wherein it will learn a value-aligned behaviour. (shrink)

Business moral values are defined as the personal moral values held by individuals who are engaged in business interactions. Direct supervisors may play an important role in shaping the business moral values of their subordinates. Using 264 supervisor— subordinate dyadic data from Taiwanese organizations, the study investigated the relationships among supervisor business moral values, subordinate business moral values, subordinate organizational commitment, job performance, and attendance. The results indicated that supervisor business moral values were positively (...) associated with subordinate business moral values, and that the latter mediated the relationship between the former and subordinate outcomes. Implications for business moral values research are discussed. (shrink)

One of the most important roles of schools is to enable students to become good citizens, capable of participating in the public affairs of society. However, the term ‘good citizens’ evokes different interpretations and definitions in different value systems. Using the methods of quantitative content analysis and narrative analysis, this paper aims to identify the dominant moral values of a good citizen that are conveyed by Malaysian moral education textbooks. The findings demonstrate that ‘responsibility’ is the dominant (...) value for shaping a good citizen in Malaysia. The value of responsibility in the textbooks embraces not only the meanings of self-obligation and accountability, but responsibility is also defined as an individual's sense of self-discipline in their behaviour that enables them to avoid conflict and strive for harmonious social order. The other important values are “Respect”, “Helpful”, “Hard-working” and “Caring”. This study provides an example of how a multi-ethnic nation state like Malaysia promotes these moral values through its educational curriculum, for political legitimacy and forging national unity. (shrink)

Moral foundations theory has provided an account of the moral values that underscore different cultural and political ideologies, and these moral values of harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity can help to explain differences in political and cultural ideologies; however, the extent to which moral foundations relate to strong social ideologies, intergroup processes and threat perceptions is still underdeveloped. To explore this relationship, we conducted two studies. In Study 1, we considered how the moral foundations (...) predicted strong social ideologies such as authoritarianism and social dominance orientation as well as attitudes toward immigrants. Here, we demonstrated that more endorsement of individualizing moral foundations was related to less negative intergroup attitudes, which was mediated by SDO, and that more endorsement of binding moral foundations was related to more negative attitudes, which was mediated by RWA. Crucially, further analyses also suggested the importance of threat perceptions as an underlying explanatory variable. Study 2 replicated these findings and extended them by measuring attitudes toward a different group reflecting an ethnic minority in the United States, and by testing the ordering of variables while also replicating and confirming the threat effects. These studies have important implications for using MFT to understand strong ideologies, intergroup relations, and threat perceptions. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to discuss two types of moral judgment, the ascription of moral value and of moral worth. Such judgments attribute evaluative properties to persons. There can be little doubt that such judgments are frequently passed and that, though many people find them distasteful, they are indispensable to the effective operation of a morality. To take seriously the slogan ‘Judge not lest ye be judged’ is to treat morality as a private, personal matter, (...) which is solely a person’s own concern. But so taken, the slogan invites indiscriminate mutual condonation of, and so connivance at, immorality. I therefore ignore possible objections to such judgments on the grounds of their supposed illegitimacy. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

By reflecting upon ordinary morality, Aurel Kolnai observed that the constituents of human life are already valued pre-morally. Asking himself how morality could be understood against this background, Kolnai implicitly reflected about the question what makes us moral. By developing a neo-Kolnaian conception of ordinary morality and by making use of the phenomenological method, I argue that man’s moral consciousness is built on the foundation of primordial positive values but that it takes on its proper negative and emphatic (...) character only in the face of aggressive threat to those values. Ethical phenomenology, then, reveals that morality concerns the preservation, protection and improvement of this valuable mode of life. We emphatically experience the valuable when it is in need of protection. This also explains the primarily imperative or negative character of morality. Likewise, moral rules and principles primarily express the concern not to break or transgress them and this precisely because they say to uphold and thereby protect the existing good. Additionally, vice and virtue suitably fall within this view. As morality is about what we do and refrain from doing, thus about our actions and conduct, it is also about our moral character. Repeated compliance with the existing good results in the ascription of virtue, repeated noncompliance in vice. Thus, I argue, in the spirit of Kolnai, that ordinary morality should be, and earns to be, taken much more seriously and less sceptically. In particular, a phenomenology that tries to describe and learn from morality as it is, has much more to offer than is claimed by contemporary moral philosophy, all too often disregarding phenomenology and the search for relevant descriptions of ethical phenomena. (shrink)

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1919 Edition.

The distinction between moral values and others is not an easy one. There are easy extremes: the value that one places on his neighbor's welfare is moral, and the value of peanut brittle is not. The value of decency in speech and dress is moral or ethical in the etymological sense, resting as it does on social custom; and similarly for observance of the Jewish dietary laws. On the other hand the eschewing of unrefrigerated (...) oysters in the summer, though it is likewise a renunciation of immediate fleshly pleasure, is a case rather of prudence than morality. But presumably the Jewish taboos themselves began prudentially. Again a Christian fundamentalist who observes the proprieties and helps his neighbor only from fear of hellfire is manifesting prudence rather than moral values.1 Similarly for the man with felony in his heart who behaves himself for fear of the law. Similarly for the child who behaves himself in the course of moral training; his behavior counts as moral only after these means get transmuted into ends. On the other hand the value that the child attaches to the parent's approval is a moral value. It had been a mere harbinger of a sensually gratifying caress, if my recent suggestion is right, but has been transmuted into an end in itself. · 1. Bernard Williams, Morality , pp. 75-78, questions the disjointedness of these alternatives. I am construing them disjointedly. W.V. Quine, Edgar Pierce professor emeritus of philosophy at Harvard University, is the author of many influential works, including The Roots of Reference. "A Postscript on Metaphor," his previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, appeared in the Autumn 1978 issue. The present essay is being published in a festschrift, Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankenna, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt. (shrink)

A study of moral values is a study of the values relevant to character and conduct. Since conduct consists of actions and character is exhibited in and inferred from actions, the phrase “values relevant to actions” would perhaps suffice. The term “values” needs little amplification. But it is necessary to observe that there are on the face of it two sets of values relevant to actions, namely those which actions themselves possess, so that we differentiate them as good and (...) bad actions—a differentiation which may be made by a spectator in regard to a process in which he himself takes no part; those asserted implicitly by an agent in his action considered as an interference with the course of events. In the most obvious and typical cases this second set of values attach themselves, not to actions, but tothe environment of action as modifiable by it; in particular, to states or events which action may help to maintain or bring about. Thus the act of tidying a room implies a preference under the given circumstances for a tidy rather than an untidy room. (shrink)

There appear to be various respects in which the outdoor environment has been regarded as significant for education in general and moral education in particular. Whereas some educationalists have considered the environment to be an important site of character development, others have regarded attention to conservation and sustainable development as pressing moral educational concerns in a world of widespread human environmental abuse. The following paper argues that approaches to environmental education that proceed by way of character education or (...) environmental ethics may yet fall short of the central goal of promoting intrinsic appreciation of nature and the outdoors, and explores an alternative strategy focused on exposure to the arts. (shrink)

It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy (...) is not merely morally permissible, but morally valuable. Here I provide a defense of envy's moral value. I argue that feelings of envy are integral to the value that moral agents place on the goods and talents that they judge to be central to a worthwhile life. (shrink)

이 논문에서 나는 현대 메타윤리학에서 신감성주의가 흄의 자연주의의 어떠한 점을 전수 받았는지 보여주기 위해 흄의 철학에서 ‘자연’의 의미를 분석하고, 흄이 ‘개방적(liberal)자연주의’를 통해 도덕을 위한 공간을 어떻게 마련하는지 보여주고자 한다. 이를 위해, 둘째, 나는 흄의 자연주의의 주된 측면이 환원적 시각을 유지하는 과학적 자연주의라는 해석에 반대한다. 이를 보이기 위해 나는 그의 인간학의 주된 주제를 구성하는 것이 무엇인가에 주목한다. 내가 이 논문에서 주장하고자 하는 핵심은 흄의 인식론과 윤리학 둘 다가 ‘약한’ 자연주의 또는 ‘개방적 자연주의’로 특징져 질 수 있다는 것이다. 흄의 인식론과 윤리학을 ‘약한 (...) 자연주의’로 해석하는데 중요한 역할을 하는 부분이 『인성론』 제 2권 정념론이다. 정념이라는 본성을 중심으로 사회적·생물학적 존재로서의 인간에 초점을 맞춘 생활세계 인식론을 이해하면 흄의 『인성론』 제 1, 2, 3 권의 자연주의의 일관성을 이해할 수 있다. 흄에 따르면 우리가 세계에 대해 갖는 믿음은 습관이나 자연적 성향에 따라 인과적으로 결정되는 자연적 사실이기 때문에 그것은 다른 자연적 사실들처럼 정당화의 문제가 아니라 습관, 자연적 성향, 상상력과 같은 인간본성의 원리에 의해 설명된다. 이로써 극단적 회의주의는 인간본성의 원리에 호소하는 존재론적 자연주의에 의해 해소된다. 이에 더하여 정념을 통한 일상인들의 사회적 상호작용에 초점을 맞추는 그의 정념론 또한 자연주의이다. 윤리학에서 흄의 자연주의 전략은 허치슨의 도덕감 정론을 따르지만 허치슨의 선천적인 내재적 도덕감의 존재를 부정하고 도덕감의 발생기제를 자연적 윈리인 공감에 호소하는 것이다. 끝으로 나는 도덕의 자연화 전략에 관해 자세히 살펴보기 위해 도덕적 평가에 대한 흄의 입장을 살펴본다. 가치가 세계 그 자체에 있는 것이 아니라 우리 마음속에 존재한다는 흄의 입장을 우리는 투사주의(projectivism)라 부를 수 있다. 그러나 투사주의에서 말하는 것처럼 도덕판단이 그 자체로는 옳고·그름이라는 속성을 갖고 있지 않는 세계에 우리의 비인지적 느낌을 투사한 것이고, 그와 같은 비인지적 느낌의 옳고 그름은 그와 같은 느낌에 대해 행위자의 승인·불승인이라는 고차 태도(higher-order attitude)에 의존한다면 도덕의 보편성과 도덕판단의 규범성을 어떻게 말할 수 있는가? 이에 관한 답을 나는 최근에 흄의 도덕감정론을 발전시킨 프린츠의 입장을 검토해 보고 그 한계점을 보인 후, 흄의 관습적 규약론에서 찾고자 한다. (shrink)

The theme of this paper is that while there are four seemingly contradictory classes of statements in the Tao de Ching regarding moral values and the Taoist sage, these statements can be interpreted to be consistent with each other. There are statements which seemingly state or imply that nothing at all can be said about the Tao; there are statements which seemingly state or imply that all value judgements are relative; there are statements which appear to attribute (...) class='Hi'>moral behaviour to the Taoist sage and there are statements which appear to attribute amoral or immoral behaviour to the Taoist sage. A consistent interpretation of these different statements can be found first by qualifying the assertion that the Tao is not capable of description to the less absolute assertion that nothing absolutely true can be said about the Tao; second, by arguing that the statements that appear to make all values relative refer to the correlativity of concepts, not the equality of values. Moreover, since the statements that appear to attribute moral behaviour to the sage are, by virtue of their predominance in the text, well justified and that by virtue of their paucity in the text, it is plausible to seek an alternate interpretation for the statements that seem to attribute amoral or immoral behaviour to the sage. Finally, the way in which the sage can be seen as good without attributing goodness to the Tao is by distinguishing between the way the sage appears to the observer who is outside of the Tao and the way in which the sage appears to himself. This latter distinction takes the form of the sage as appearing to display the quality of goodness in itself but not goodness for itself. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that in at least some interesting cases, the moral value of a narrative work depends on the aesthetic properties of that artwork. It does not follow that a work that is aesthetically bad will be morally bad (or that it will be morally good). The argument comprises four stages. First I describe several different features of imaginative engagement with narrative artworks. Then I show that these features depend on some of the aesthetic properties (...) of those works. Third, I argue that these same features of imaginative engagement are morally salient, by virtue of inviting more or less sophisticated and reflective moral responses. Finally, I show that the overall moral value of an artwork depends in part on whether or not the prescribed response is simple or complex, passive or reflective. (shrink)

Geography is experiencing a ‘moral turn’ in its research interests and practices. There is also a flourishing interest in animal geographies that intersects this turn, and is concurrent with wider scholarly efforts to reincorporate animals and nature into our ethical and social theories. This article intervenes in a dispute between Michael Dear and Richard Symanski. The dispute is over the culling of wild horses in Australia, and I intervene to explore how geography deepens our moral understanding of the (...) animal/human dialectic. I begin by situating the inquiry into ethics and animals in geography. Next, I provide a synopsis of Dear and Symanski's comments on ‘animal rights’, followed in turn by discussions of moral value and value paradigms. I then introduce a value paradigm termed geocentrism as a geographical account of our moral relations to animals. Finally, I discuss the wider significance of this debate for geographical ethics, moral philosophy and social theory. (shrink)

Solutions to the problem ofprotecting informational privacy in cyberspacetend to fall into one of three categories:technological solutions, self-regulatorysolutions, and legislative solutions. In thispaper, I suggest that the legal protection ofthe right to online privacy within the USshould be strengthened. Traditionally, inidentifying where support can be found in theUS Constitution for a right to informationalprivacy, the point of focus has been on theFourth Amendment; protection in this contextfinds its moral basis in personal liberty,personal dignity, self-esteem, and othervalues. On the other (...) hand, the constitutionalright to privacy first established by Griswoldv. Connecticut finds its moral basis largelyin a single value, the value of autonomy ofdecision-making. I propose that an expandedconstitutional right to informational privacy,responsive to the escalating threats posed toonline privacy by developments in informationaltechnology, would be more likely to find asolid moral basis in the value of autonomyassociated with the constitutional right toprivacy found in Griswold than in the varietyof values forming the moral basis for the rightto privacy backed by the Fourth Amendment. (shrink)

Those who have had the benefit of a reasonably lengthy familiarity with the philosophy of religion, and more particularly with the God question, may be so kind to a speaker long in exile from philosophy and only recently returned, as to subscribe, initially at least, to the following rather enormous generalization: meaning and truth, which to most propositions are the twin forces by which they are maintained, turn out in the case of claims about God, to be the centrifugal forces (...) by which they disintegrate. In simpler language, the greater the amount of intelligible meaning that can be given to the idea of God, the less grounds there would appear to be for assuming let alone asserting, that God exists, at least as a being distinguishable from all the things in this empirical world which are the source of the range of meanings available to us; on the other hand, the more we insist that God exists, a being over and above the things that make up this empirical world the less the amount of commonly available meaning we appear to be able to apply to God. Or, to put this in a manner which might obviate an obvious objection to it; either everything we know is tout ensemble, God, and then nothing in the world that we know is distinctively divine; or else nothing in this world is God, and then nothing that we appear to be able to know is God. That same formulation will work, it should be noted, even if we substitute for ‘things in the world’, ‘an aspect or aspects of things in the world’. (shrink)

Prior work has found that moral values that build and bind groups—that is, the binding values of ingroup loyalty, respect for authority, and preservation of purity—are linked to blaming people who have been harmed. The present research investigated whether people's endorsement of binding values predicts their assignment of the causal locus of harmful events to the victims of the events. We used an implicit causality task from psycholinguistics in which participants read a sentence in the form “SUBJECT verbed OBJECT (...) because…” where male and female proper names occupy the SUBJECT and OBJECT position. The participants were asked to predict the pronoun that follows “because”—the referent to the subject or object—which indicates their intuition about the likely cause of the event. We also collected explicit judgments of causal contributions and measured participants' moral values to investigate the relationship between moral values and the causal interpretation of events. Using two verb sets and two independent replications (N = 459, 249, 788), we found that greater endorsement of binding values was associated with a higher likelihood of selecting the object as the cause for harmful events in the implicit causality task, a result consistent with, and supportive of, previous moral psychological work on victim blaming. Endorsement of binding values also predicted explicit causal attributions to victims. Overall, these findings indicate that moral values that support the group rather than the individual reliably predict that people shift the causal locus of harmful events to those affected by the harms. (shrink)