Introduction -- A default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism (...) -- The linguistic argument -- Materialism and monism -- A comment on reduction -- The impossibility of an objective phenomenology -- Asymmetry and reduction -- Equal-status monism -- Panpsychism -- The inescapability of metaphysics -- Agnostic materialism, part 2 -- Ignorance -- Sensory spaces -- Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration -- The hard part of the mind-body problem -- Neutral monism and agnostic monism -- A comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on -- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism -- Mentalism -- Strict or pure process idealism -- Active-principle idealism -- Stuff idealism -- Immaterialism -- The positions restated -- The dualist options -- Frege's thesis -- Objections to pure process idealism -- The problem of mental dispositions -- Mental -- Shared abilities -- The sorting ability -- The definition of mental being -- Mental phenomena -- The view that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena -- Natural intentionality -- E/c intentionality -- The experienceless -- Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects -- Experience, purely experiential content, and n/c intentionality -- Concepts in nature -- Intentionality and experience -- Summary with problem -- Pain and pain -- The neo-behaviorist view -- A linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior -- A challenge -- The Sirians -- N.N. Novel -- An objection to the Sirians -- The Betelgeuzians -- The point of the Sirians -- Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain -- Unpleasantness and qualitative character -- The weather watchers -- The rooting story -- What is it like to be a weather watcher? -- The aptitudes of mental states -- The argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space -- The argument from the conditions for language ability -- The argument from the nature of desire -- Desire and affect -- The argument from the phenomenology of desire -- Behavior -- A hopeless definition -- Difficulties -- Other-observability -- Neo-behaviorism -- The concept of mind. (shrink)

In his preface to Mental Reality the author cautions that much of what appears in the book has surely been said before, noting that he has probably forgotten some of his own debts. However, the pages that follow turn out to be paradoxically original and unsurprising; original, against the contemporary background of all too many thick-but-thin disquisitions on the same subject, and unsurprising owing to the author's respect for such authority as mind might claim in the matter of (...) self-understanding. The broad perspective, set forth in the first chapter, is something of a common-sense and realist psychology not unlike what one might find in Reid or in William James. It is tested by post-Wittgenstein, post-Ryle philosophies of mind, but is not chastened by them. Gone is the theater of experience, but experience itself suffers neither neurophysiological nor metaphysical impertinences! (shrink)

Mental Reality is concerned with three questions: is reference to non-mental phenomena central and indispensable for an effective account of the nature of mental phenomena? ; is reference to publicly observable phenomena central and necessary for an effective account of every, or even some, mental phenomena? ; and is reference to behaviour essential to any adequate account of all, or almost all, mental states and occurrences?. Galen Strawson’s summary answer to these questions is, on (...) the whole, negative, but there are several qualifications. The view he defends is experiential realism. Experiential realism asserts that experience is contentful and experience is what it is like to be who and what one is. Experience is necessarily conscious experience, and one sense of the meaning of the problematic term “consciousness” is the ordinary, everyday, waking consciousness, as distinct from dream-state consciousness. As Strawson uses the word, “conscious” in the expression “conscious experience” is pleonastic. The other alternative is for the term “conscious” to be central and “experience” becomes pleonastic. This is a matter of strategy, and depends on the audience. Strawson’s audience is the contemporary theorist in the philosophy of mind rather than the phenomenologist, and then only those theorists who insist on reductive or eliminative materialism, or those varieties of functionalism in which consciousness is incidental and ontologically, epistemologically, or explanatorily irrelevant. (shrink)

The Problems of Mental Causation. Functionalism in the philosophy of mind identifies mental states with their dispositional connections with other mental states, perceptions and actions. Many theories of the mind have sailed under the Functionalist flag. But what I take to be essential to Functionalism is that mental states are individuated causally: the reality of mental states depends essentially on their causal efficacy.

Materialism does not function in philosophy simply as a popular metaphysical thesis about the nature of the world; it is also often put forward as a solution to some alleged problem involving the relation between mind and body. Galen Strawson is a professed materialist, but it is a defining theme of his book that materialism, as presently understood, cannot serve in this latter function: not only does it not solve the mind-body problem, it exacerbates it. Not that Strawson’s purpose is (...) to offer some alternative solution to the problem; rather, much of his book is best seen as an example of how a traditional philosopher of mind might practice his trade once the mind-body problem is set aside because of its difficulty. (shrink)

This book is psychiatry's reply to the diverse group of antipsychiatrists, including Laing, Foucault, Goffman, Szasz and Bassaglia, that has made fashionable the view that mental illness is merely socially deviant behaviour and that psychiatrists are agents of the capitalist society seeking to repress such behaviour. It establishes, by the use of evidence from historical and transcultural studies, that mental illness has been recognised in all cultures since the beginning of history and goes on to explore the philosophical (...) and medical basis for psychiatry's diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. Finally, it tackles two issues where psychiatry has recently been seen as at odds with the values prevailing in society: involuntary hospitalization and the insanity defence. The Reality of Mental Illness does not pretend to offer simple answers to the complex problems it discusses, but will leave the reader with a much greater understanding of psychiatry's aims, practices and problems. (shrink)

Transcultural comparisons taking the differences and commonalities into consideration in the fields of mental health and ill mental health have always been a focus of scientific interest. The ‘East’ and ‘West’ comparisons in this regard, could be the one most widely deliberated. ‘East and West’, as a human-made conceptual construct, has evolved to signify many social, cultural, political, economic and psychological realities and meanings, beyond its geographical references. Such conceptualizations both reflect and re-construct our realities. -/- Beyond the (...) inequalities and discrepancies in resources, the ‘East and West’ dualism has an impact on mental health theory and praxis in a many different ways. The range, content, patterns and expression of psychopathology and psychiatric symptomatology; the explanatory models of mental disorders; the diagnostic and classification systems; the psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutical interventions; the role of family and psychosocial support systems; basic conceptualizations of mental health and disease are some of the main areas of diversity. -/- This chapter, after briefly discussing the historical roots of the conceptualization of ‘East and West’, will be focused on the relations of mental health and ill mental health with this and related conceptualizations. It is concluded that, in this day of globalization, to improve the quality of psychiatric theory and praxis within a framework of high ethical standards, a paradigm focusing on the unity in diversity and embracing a non-dualistic, non-categorical, and non-hierarchical humanistic approach to cultural differences would bring all the colours of humanity and therefore psychiatry onto the canvas. (shrink)

The majority of commentators agree on one thing: Our network approach might be the prime candidate for offering a new perspective on the origins of mental disorders. In our response, we elaborate on refinements (e.g., cognitive and genetic levels) and extensions (e.g., to Axis II disorders) of the network model, as well as discuss ways to test its validity.

This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? -/- In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William (...) Wimsatt, arguing that biological research on mental disorders supports the inference that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, mood disorders, and anxiety disorders) are real theoretical entities, and that the evidence supporting this inference is causal and abductive. In explicating the nature of such entities, I argue that real mental disorders are natural kinds insofar as they are natural classes of abnormal behavior whose members share the same causal structure. I present this position in terms of Richard Boyd’s homeostatic cluster property theory of natural kinds, and argue that this perspective reveals limitations of Hacking’s account on the looping effects of human kinds, which suggests that the objects classified by psychiatrists are unstable entities. I subsequently argue that a subset of mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia and Down syndrome) are mental illnesses insofar as they are disorders caused by a dysfunctional biological process that leads to harmful consequences for individuals. I present this analysis against Thomas Szasz’s argument that mental illness is a myth. -/- In addressing issues of psychiatric classification, my analysis focuses on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952, and is currently in its fourth edition. After examining the history of DSM in the twentieth century, and in particular, DSM’s shift to an atheoretical and purely descriptive system in the 1980s, I consider the relative merits of descriptive versus causal systems of classification. Drawing on Carl Hempel’s analysis of taxonomic systems in psychiatry, I argue that a causal classification system would provide a superior approach to psychiatric classification than the descriptive system currently favored by DSM. (shrink)

Although there is a high degree of consensus in the existing literature regarding the importance of respect in mental health care, a realistic appraisal suggests that there is something of a disconnect between what is espoused in policy documents and what actually occurs in practice. As a result, this article seeks to explore and advance our understanding of the phenomenon of respect in mental health care and draws on real practice situations to illustrate this schism. To this end, (...) the authors present three case studies that focus on the following: “use of seclusion,” “respecting professional boundaries,” and “horizontal workplace violence.” The authors advance the, perhaps for some, provocative argument that it is relatively easy to write/speak about respect, while the reality of communicating respect to others is more difficult, challenging, and makes significant demands on the individual psychiatric/mental health nurse. (shrink)

My three main points are: Mental disease is a metaphor, but mental illness is not. Feeling ill and having a physical illness are logically related. If there were no such thing as feeling ill, there would be no such thing as suffering from a physical illness. Yet there is no logical connection between feeling ill and being mentally ill. Mental illness is manifested in various forms of behaviour, for example, suspiciousness, elation, depression, etc.; if a form of (...) behaviour is to count as mental illness, it has to be an insane form; yet it is possible to be mentally ill without being insane and it is possible to be insane without being mentally ill. (shrink)

This dynamic collection provides an overview of the relationship between linguistic form and interpretation as exemplified by the most influential of these ...

The main concepts of the free energy (FE) neuroscience developed by Karl Friston and colleagues parallel those of Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology. In Hobson et al. ( 2014 ) these include an innate virtual reality generator that produces the fictive prior beliefs that Freud described as the primary process. This enables Friston's account to encompass a unified treatment—a complexity theory—of the role of virtual reality in both dreaming and mental disorder. In both accounts the brain (...) operates to minimize FE aroused by sensory impingements—including interoceptive impingements that report compliance with biological imperatives—and constructs a representation/model of the causes of impingement that enables this minimization. In Friston's account (variational) FE equals complexity minus accuracy, and is minimized by increasing accuracy and decreasing complexity. Roughly the brain (or model) increases accuracy together with complexity in waking. This is mediated by consciousness-creating active inference—by which it explains sensory impingements in terms of perceptual experiences of their causes. In sleep it reduces complexity by processes that include both synaptic pruning and consciousness/virtual reality/dreaming in REM. The consciousness-creating active inference that effects complexity-reduction in REM dreaming must operate on FE-arousing data distinct from sensory impingement. The most relevant source is remembered arousals of emotion, both recent and remote, as processed in SWS and REM on “active systems” accounts of memory consolidation/reconsolidation. Freud describes these remembered arousals as condensed in the dreamwork for use in the conscious contents of dreams, and similar condensation can be seen in symptoms. Complexity partly reflects emotional conflict and trauma. This indicates that dreams and symptoms are both produced to reduce complexity in the form of potentially adverse (traumatic or conflicting) arousals of amygdala-related emotions. Mental disorder is thus caused by computational complexity together with mechanisms like synaptic pruning that have evolved for complexity-reduction; and important features of disorder can be understood in these terms. Details of the consilience among Freudian, systems consolidation, and complexity-reduction accounts appear clearly in the analysis of a single fragment of a dream, indicating also how complexity reduction proceeds by a process resembling Bayesian model selection. (shrink)

Value, Reality, and Desire is an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false--there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent - they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are causally efficacious. Values, quite literally, affect us. These are (...) not particularly fashionable theses, and taken as a whole they go somewhat against the grain of quite a lot of recent work in the metaphysics of value. Further, against the received view, Oddie argues that we can have knowledge of values by experiential acquaintance, that there are experiences of value which can be both veridical and appropriately responsive to the values themselves. Finally, these value-experiences are not the products of some exotic and implausible faculty of "intuition." Rather, they are perfectly mundane and familiar mental states - namely, desires. This view explains how values can be "intrinsically motivating," without falling foul of the widely accepted "queerness" objection. There are, of course, other objections to each of the realist's claims. In showing how and why these objections fail, Oddie introduces a wealth of interesting and original insights about issues of wider interest--including the nature of properties, reduction, supervenience, and causation. The result is a novel and interesting account which illuminates what would otherwise be deeply puzzling features of value and desire and the connections between them. (shrink)

I'd like to say a few things about the quality of life of people like me. We can have – and now I do have – a good quality of life, but we still have to fight for it. We have to take back control of our lives from the KEEPERS, from the professionals.

Most jurisdictions require that a mental capacity assessment be conducted using a functional model whose definition includes several abilities. In England and Wales and in increasing number of countries, the law requires a person be able to understand, to retain, to use or weigh relevant information and to communicate one’s decision. But interpreting and applying broad and vague criteria, such as the ability ‘to use or weigh’ to a diverse range of presentations is challenging. By examining actual court judgements (...) of capacity, we previously developed a descriptive typology of justifications used in the application of the Mental Capacity Act criteria. We here critically optimise this typology by showing how clear definitions—and thus boundaries—between the criteria can be achieved if the ‘understanding’ criterion is used narrowly and the multiple rationales that fall under the ability to ‘use or weigh’ are specifically enumerated in practice. Such a typology-aided practice, in theory, could make functional capacity assessments more transparent, accountable, reliable and valid. It may also help to create targeted supports for decision making by the vulnerable. We also discuss how the typology could evolve legally and scientifically, and how it lays the groundwork for clinical research on the abilities enumerated by the MCA. No data are available. This paper does not report any original data. (shrink)

As earthquakes expose geological faults, so mental conflict reveals tendencies to rupture within the mind. Dissension is rife not only between people but also within them, for each of us is subject to a contrariety of desires, beliefs, motivations, aspirations. What image are we to form of ourselves that might best enable us to accept the reality of discord, or achieve the ideal of harmony? Greek philosophers offer us a variety of pictures and structures intended to capture the (...) actual and the possible either within a reason that fails to be resolute, or within a split soul that houses a play of forces. Reflection upon them alerts us to the elusiveness at once of mental reality, and of the understanding by which we hope to capture and transform it. Studying in turn the treatments of _Mental Conflict_ in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, A.W. Price demonstrates how the arguments of the Greeks are still relevant to philosophical discussion today. (shrink)

This paper compares the free energy neuroscience now advocated by Karl Friston and his colleagues with that hypothesised by Freud, arguing that Freud's notions of conflict and trauma can be understood in terms of computational complexity. It relates Hobson and Friston's work on dreaming and the reduction of complexity to contemporary accounts of dreaming and the consolidation of memory, and advances the hypothesis that mental disorder can be understood in terms of computational complexity and the mechanisms, including synaptic pruning, (...) that have evolved to reduce it. (shrink)

Although there is a high degree of consensus in the existing literature regarding the importance of respect in mental health care, a realistic appraisal suggests that there is something of a disconnect between what is espoused in policy documents and what actually occurs in practice. As a result, this article seeks to explore and advance our understanding of the phenomenon of respect in mental health care and draws on real practice situations to illustrate this schism. To this end, (...) the authors present three case studies that focus on the following: “use of seclusion,” “respecting professional boundaries,” and “horizontal workplace violence.” The authors advance the, perhaps for some, provocative argument that it is relatively easy to write/speak about respect, while the reality of communicating respect to others is more difficult, challenging, and makes significant demands on the individual psychiatric/mental health nurse. (shrink)

A book review on Keith A. Chandler’s The mind paradigm: A Unified Model of Mental and Physical Reality.

The Idea of the World offers a grounded alternative to the frenzy of unrestrained abstractions and unexamined assumptions in philosophy and science today. This book examines what can be learned about the nature of reality based on conceptual parsimony, straightforward logic and empirical evidence from fields as diverse as physics and neuroscience. It compiles an overarching case for idealism - the notion that reality is essentially mental - from ten original articles the author has previously published in (...) leading academic journals. The case begins with an exposition of the logical fallacies and internal contradictions of the reigning physicalist ontology and its popular alternatives, such as bottom-up panpsychism. It then advances a compelling formulation of idealism that elegantly makes sense of - and reconciles - classical and quantum worlds. The main objections to idealism are systematically refuted and empirical evidence is reviewed that corroborates the formulation presented here. The book closes with an analysis of the hidden psychological motivations behind mainstream physicalism and the implications of idealism for the way we relate to the world. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of psychosocial and mental health theory and practice as it has emerged in contexts of war, post-war, and transitional situations. It identifies several models that have guided much of this work until now, critically examines their underlying assumptions, and posits a series of limitations inherent in the dominant paradigm of post-traumatic stress disorder, especially as applied in the aftermath of political violence. It argues that psychosocial work as part of reparations processes must be designed (...) and enacted within specific historical, cultural, sociopolitical contexts, with singular individuals and their particular communities. This perspective permits more effective ways of responding to and working within the diversity of challenges facing societies seeking to reconstruct in the wake of war and other forms of organized political violence. An alternative framework for this work is proposed, which must be articulated and shaped in practice by individuals, families, and groups in their neighborhoods, communities, and societies. Exhumations and reburials, in two distinct contexts, are examined as sites for psychosocial work within reparation processes. The paper concludes by describing ongoing questions that challenge psychosocial workers hoping to contribute to reparations work. (shrink)