Este artigo aponta alguns dilemas e desafios colocados ao trabalho do historiador, hoje, pela longa tradição histórica cientificista herdada do século XIX, que pôs a História e Literatura em campos disciplinares rigorosamente separados. Através da análise dos procedimentos de composição e criação literária de João Guimarães Rosa em seu livro Grande Sertão:Veredas, este artigo procura argumentar em torno do valor de textos literários como textos que podem ajudar os historiadores na suplantação daqueles dilemas e desafios.

Among contemporary epistemologists of testimony, David Hume is standardly regarded as a ‘global reductionist’, where global reductionism requires the hearer to have sufficient first-hand knowledge of the facts in order to individually ascertain the reliability of the testimony in question. In the present paper, I argue that, by construing Hume’s reductionism in too individualistic a fashion, the received view of Hume on testimony is inaccurate at best, and misleading at worst. Overall, Hume is much more willing to regard testimonial (...) acceptance as a natural response to testimony than has traditionally been thought. In particular, Hume believes that indirect evidence of human nature and of the social world around us, can take the place of first-hand evidence of the track record of individual speakers or specific classes of testimony. In developing this interpretation of Hume’s views on testimony, the present paper draws on discussions found in the Treatise, the Enquiry, and in Hume’s writings on historical knowledge. In der zeitgenössischen Debatte um den erkenntnistheoretischen Status zeugnisbasiertenWissens wird gern auf David Hume als den Urheber eines „globalen Reduktionismus“ verwiesen, demzufolge der Zeugnisempfänger über ausreichend empirische Belege für die Verlässlichkeit des betreffenden Zeugnisses verfügen muss. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass die in der Literatur vorherrschende Meinung ein übertrieben „individualistisches“ Bild von Humes Reduktionismus zeichnet; dadurch wird Humes Position in der gegenwärtigen Debatte ungenau und bisweilen irreführend wiedergegeben. Bei genauerer Betrachtung erweist sich Hume als ausgesprochen aufgeschlossen gegenüber dem Akzeptieren fremden Zeugnisses und sieht darin eine Art Grundmuster im testimonialen Umgang mit anderen. Insbesondere konzediert Hume, dass indirekt erworbenes Wissen um die menschliche Natur und die soziale Welt an die Stelle direkter Belege für die Verlässlichkeit einzelner Zeugen treten kann. Die im vorliegenden Aufsatz entwickelte Neuinterpretation stützt sich auf den Treatise, den Enquiry und auf Humes Schriften zum Problem der historischen Erkenntnis. (shrink)

Man in Continuation at this Earth of a Nature of Reality throughout the Universe - By Tradition of that Reality from its original Universe of Force is an unchanged, high-quality reprint of the original edition of 1894. Hansebooks is editor of the literature on different topic areas such as research and science, travel and expeditions, cooking and nutrition, medicine, and other genres. As a publisher we focus on the preservation of historical literature. Many works of historical writers and (...) scientists are available today as antiques only. Hansebooks newly publishes these books and contributes to the preservation of literature which has become rare and historical knowledge for the future. (shrink)

Mongolian traditional botanical knowledge has been rarely researched concerning the ethnobotany theory and methodology in the last six decades ). However, most of the known literature of indigenous knowledge and information regarding the use of local wild plants among Mongolian herders was first documented by several botanical research of Russian researchers in Mongolia through the 1940s and 1950s. One of the most comprehensive works was completed by A. A. Yunatov, which is known as “Fodder Plants of Pastures and (...) Hayfields of the People’s Republic of Mongolia”. Yunatov’s research sampled forage plants in Mongolia from 1940 to 1951 and subsequently published a study in 1954. The original transcript of FPM was later translated into Chinese and Mongolian during 1958 and 1968. In addition to morphological characteristics, distribution, habitat, phenology, palatability, and nutrition of forage plants, Yunatov`s record collected local names, the folk understanding and evaluation of the forage, as well as other relevant cultural meanings and the use of local wild plants in FPM through interviews. The book contains the most precious records created in the 1940s and 1950s on folk knowledge of the Mongolians' wild plants in Mongolia. It was composed of 8 chapters and 351 pages in total. The fifth chapter of FPM, entitled “The systematic overview of forage plants,” making up 272 pages. The order and content of the book-oriented along with profiles of specific plants. Yunatov collected detailed information on plants, such as the local name, morphology, distribution, habitats, ecological characteristics, and phenology. He also discussed the palatability of livestock, particular forage use, other usages, and chemical composition. Through careful reading and understanding of all three versions of the book ), the FPM-listed information of edible plants was categorized using ethnobotanical dependent analysis. The list of edible plants was ranked based on purposes and ethnobotanical inventories as per methodology and analysis used in the ethnobotany research. FPM listed 35 species are part of 15 families and 25 genera of wild edible plants. Most species belong to Liliaceae and Allium. Naturally grown grain and some food substitutes come from the starchy organs, such as seeds, bulbs, roots, and rhizomes of 12, accounting for 34.28% of all species. Wild vegetables come from the parts of a young plant, tender leaves, young fruits, lower leg of stems, and bulbs of 9 species, accounting for 25.71% of all species. There are only three species of wild fruits, accounting for 8.57% of all edible plant species. Tea substitutes consist of leaves, roots, follicle, and aboveground parts of 8 wild plant species, accounting for 22.85% of all species. Seasonings from the wild were made of the elements such as seeds, rhizomes, tender leaves of 7 species, accounting for 20.00% of all species. Similarities and differences are noticeable in utilizing wild edible plants among Mongolian populations living in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia. Six species of wild edible plants listed in FPM have been proven to be collected and consumed by Mongolians from the Genghis Khan era in the twelfth century to the present day. This proved that the Mongolians have a tradition of recognizing and utilizing wild plants, demonstrating historical and theoretical value. Seven species of plants mentioned in this book were closely correlated to the locals' processing of traditional dairy products, meat, and milk food. Yunatov was not an ethnobotanist, but his accurate documentation of interviews and surveys with Mongolians represents valuable information about the collection and consumption of local wild plants during 1940–1951 in Mongolia. His research mission meant to focus on forage grass, the feed plant that sustained livestock, while he also recorded plants consumed by humans. His records on the edible parts and intake methods of some plants are incomplete. Still, it provided ethnobotanical materials of a remarkable scientific value and a living history of ethnobotany in Mongolian regions. Even by today`s standards, it will be challenging to obtain first-hand information of the richness and to the extent of Yunatov’s research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 85 scientious search for principles of method (and of peace) may have been one of the reasons why he was suspect in England, as were the Ramist "methodists." In any case, it is quite clear now that Hobbes was not a materialist, not even when he was writing De Corpore. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, CallJornia Pierre Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary selections. Translated with an Introduction (...) and notes by Richard H. Popkin. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Pp. xliv q- 456.) This new edition of selections from Pierre Bayle's famous Dictionnaire will be welcomed by historians and philosophers alike. In it we find a representative sample from the book that was both the inspiration and despair of much of eighteenth-century thought, and that still presents modem man with both questions and methodological acid that makes it difficult to find or accept "truth." The young readers who will meet Pierre Bayle for the first time in these pages will find him to be the skeptical philosopher, the ribald, sometimes lewd, even pornographic storyteller, the detached scholar who prowled through the history and the ideas of men, dissolving all certainty by analyses that peeled off layer after layer of belief until the core itself was exposed as naive or ridiculous. Had Professor Popkin done nothing more than provide us with these excellently chosen selections from the Dictionnaire, we would all be in his debt, for he gives us a chance easily to bring this important work to the attention of our students. But this volume is considerably more than simply a selection. Professor Popkin's Introduction is an important statement in the controversy over Bayle's personal beliefs and involvemeat. For more than two decades a large literature has portrayed Bayle in many different guises: for some he was still the skeptic who intentionally forged the weapons with which Voltaire and his colleagues assaulted the Judeo-Christian traditions of European men; at the other extreme he was a devout Huguenot who merely wanted to do for the Calvinist world what Bishop Huet and other Catholic skeptics did for the Catholic one, namely to prove the necessity of accepting the Christian beliefs on faith since absolute knowledge was impossible. Professor Popkin has learned Bayle's methodology too well to allow himself to be trapped by a simple explanation. He refuses to identify Bayle with a Kierkegaard or a Lamennais whose ideas would dissolve under Bayle's pen just as did Pascal's and Jurieu's. But where are we to find the secret of this man who lived out his life as a member of the French Reformed Church in Amsterdam while he unfolded the absurdity or naivet~ of every intelligible Christian theology? The problem becomes more perplexing when we note his obvious sympathy for both Manicheanism and Judaism. Could he have been the last of the Cathars or a secretly converted Jew? Popkin calls attention to Bayle's interest in and affection for Maimonides' work which he translates "Guide for the perplexed", but which could be translated "Guide for those who have lost their way" or in our parlance, "the derailed." In a way Bayle's Dictionnaire was itself a "Guide" for men in trouble with their beliefs. But Bayle's approach to this problem must be understood in light of his own discussion of religion "of the heart" and religion "of reason." Like Madame Labrousse, Popkin is much impressed by the simplicity of Bayle's last words, written on the day he died, in which he described himself as "a Christian philosopher convinced of and pierced with the mercies of God.... " The statement omits all the im~ portant theological propositions of Christian theology as well as any emotional feeling. We must see Pierre Bayle as an erudite, unemotional man whose "religion had no expressed or expressible content.., but was only in the heart in some quiet unemotional way.... " Popkin sees him as "a quite Erasmian scholar, living out his days in the city of Erasmus, examining man's intellectual heritage and intellectual world.., by patient erudition [undermining] man's intellectual frame of reference while remaining secure and tranquil in his unemotional religion of the heart." Since... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE LOVE WHICH LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE KNOWS NOT: NUSSBAUM'S EVASION OF CHRISTIANITY L. GREGORY JONES Loyola College Baltimore, Maryland WITH THE PUBLICATION in 1986 of The Fragilty of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum established herelf as a central figure on the intellectual stage.1 The book is elegantly written and eloquently argued, one of those rare books whose depth of insight is coupled with an ease of expression. Equally at home in (...) the scholarship of both classical antiquity and contemporary philosophy, The Fragility of Goodness stimulated conversations and arguments among a wide range of scholars. At the same time, however, there were hints that Nussbaum's philosophical insights and classical acumen did not extend to a knowledge of Christian texts, much less a willingness to engage with them. For example, in a note to the Introduction of the book, Nussbaum observes : When we do not try to see [the Greeks] through the lens of Christian beliefs we can not only see them more truly; we can also see how true they are to us-that is, to a continuous historical tradition of human ethical experience that has not been either displaced or altered by the supremacy of Christian (and Kantian) teaching. (FG, p. 15) As such a quotation indicates, Nussbaum vastly oversimplifies 1 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 554 pp., $19.95pb. Further citations to this work will be made parenthetically in the text with the abbreviation FG. 323 324 L. GREGORY JONES Christian theology and/or Christian teaching, not only in relation to " the Greeks " but also about such questions as vulnerability, tragedy, and friendship. That this is the case becomes more explicit in her recent book Love's Knowledge, a collection of essays about the relationship between philosophy and literature.2 Here it becomes clear that Nussbaum's project attempts to retrieve an Aristotelian ethics that would displace not only Kantian or Utilitarian ethics but also Christian ethics. But whereas Nussbaum explicitly criticizes Kantian and Utilitarian positions on both methodological and substantive grounds, she evades engagement with Christian thought. In order to understand how and why this is the case, it is necessary first to explicate in greater detail her Aristotelian position as it develops in The Fragility of Goodness and then Love's Knowledge. In The Fragility of Goodness Nussbaum addresses three central issues : ( 1) the role in " the human good life " of activities and relationships that are, in their nature, especially vulnerable to reversal; (2) the relationship among such components as friendship, love, and political activity in a good life; and (3) the relationship between self-sufficiency and the more ungovernable parts of the human being's internal makeup (see FG, pp. 6-7). Nussbaum proceeds to explore these issues through analyses of diverse Greek tragedies as well as some of the central texts of both Plato and Aristotle. Her approach, she indicates in that book, is Aristotelian; she thinks that Aristotle's central question, "How should a human being live?", should be the central question that frames any ethical inquiry-as opposed, say, to the questions put by Kant or Mill that focus on what one should do. Moreover, she contends that an Aristotelian approach engages the intuitions and beliefs of an interlocutor or reader in a " reflective dialogue " with a 2 Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 432 pp., $42.50. Further citations to this work will be made parenthetically in the text with the abbreviation LK. NUSSBAUM'S EVASION OF CHRISTIANITY 325 series of complex ethical conceptions presented for exploration (FG, p. 10). But it is not only her approach that is Aristotelian; so also is the substance of her ethical position. Nussbaum prefers a commitment to the complexities of particularity (which she considers characteristic of the tragedians and Aristotle) to the quest for self-sufficiency (a nuanced version of which she finds in Plato). Likewise, she describes Aristotle and the tragedians as appreciative of the ethical, and indeed rational, significance of the emotions and prefers this to Plato's ostensible rationalism. Thus Nussbaum's perspective in The... (shrink)

The subject of this study will be to analyze the contribution of an important figure of the period known as the period of new ilm al kalām in the history of kalām, which started in the mid-nineteenth century and included the first periods of the Republic. This person is Mehmet Şerafettin Yaltkaya (1880-1947). Yaltkaya stands out with his original aspects such as being both a school and a madrasa student, representing his scholar and government bureaucrat personality together and strongly, and (...) his open support for the changes and transformation periods of Republican Turkey. It is known that difficult and troubled times in history have been the source of the emergence of rich intellectual movements. Yaltkaya was also nourished by such a political and intellectual hinterland. As is known, the changes in Western thought in the nineteenth century led to the emergence of atheist and materialist worldviews, which was one of the important reasons that caused us to open a new era in kalām. It has even been interpreted that the Ottoman scholars' work on the criticism of materialism was the main reason for the opening of this new era in kalām. In this regard, before discussing Yaltkaya's point of view and his contributions, we have tried to briefly discuss the historical conditions, changes and transformations of the new period of kalām, accompanied by the views of some of its representatives, which will help us to recognize the period. Secondly, we have endeavored to deal with the main dynamics of Şerafettin Yaltkaya's theological views, especially his scholarly and actional aspects that came to the fore in the course of his life, and in particular his up to date understanding of isbāt al-wājib regarding the existence of God and the social theory of kalām (ictimaī ilm al-kalām) about which the debates intensified. As far as we have been able to determine, Yaltkaya's theological views are actually a multiple-polarized structure that draws from all schools of kalām, philosophy, and Sufism. His interest in different disciplines of Islamic sciences and his curiosity in modern sciences also contributed to his vigorous personality. On the other hand, it must be said that he was also influenced by Western intellectuals and evaluated the possibilities of reason and instinct. Yaltkaya's support for Ottoman modernization and Republic reforms are among the significant aspects of Yaltkaya, both an Islamist and a kind of cultural nationalist. He made great contributions to the world of scholarship and thought of his time with his knowledge and works in different disciplines such as kalām, philosophy, literature, sufism history of sects and history of medicine. In addition, we believe that his lectures on kalām, philosophy and history of sects in important high schools and universities that were newly opened at the time and his position as the second head of the Presidency of Religious Affairs supported the background of his ideas that we highlight in this article. We have determined that Yaltkaya, who criticized the theological views of the traditional scholars, was also closely familiar with and influenced by Western scholars and philosophers who were his contemporaries. (shrink)

This volume provides a very important contribution to the growing literature on the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey. The discussion throughout is informed by careful scholarship, knowledge of historical backgrounds, and critical insight into the importance of the topics examined.

Antognazza (“The Benefit to Philosophy”, “The Distinction in Kind”), Dutant (“The Legend”), and I (“Knowledge Before Gettier”) have argued for the historical falsity of the claim that, prior to Gettier’s famous counterexamples of sixty years ago, the so-called ‘traditional’ conception of knowledge was the justified true belief (JTB) conception. This note addresses a related historical question that, rather surprisingly, has not yet been addressed in the philosophical literature; to wit: when did this claim first appear in (...) this literature? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Literature: Why It Matters by Robert EaglestoneAihua ChenEaglestone, Robert. Literature: Why It Matters. Polity Press, 2019. 123pp.Is literature a worthy topic of study in an era fixated on science, technology, and information? This has become a subject of debate in recent years, especially as enrollment in college literature courses has declined. J. Hillis Miller has noted that “all who love literature are collectively anxious today about whether literature (...) matters” (13), insisting that it does since it has “three essential human functions: social critique, the pleasure of the text, and allowing a materialization of the imaginary or an endless approach to the unapproachable imaginary” (31). Other literary scholars concur with Miller, though from differing perspectives, including Dennis J. Sumara in Why Reading Literature in School Still Matters (2002) and Mark William Roche in Why Literature Matters in the 21st Century (2004). In his recent monograph, Literature: Why It Matters, Robert Eaglestone joins this discussion, offering a timely and judiciously formulated manifesto in defense of literary studies that is groundbreaking in the way it treats literature as a living object whose study can inspire ongoing conversation. Eaglestone presents his argument in four segments: “What is Literature?” “Studying Literature,” “Why Does Literature Matter?” and “What Does Literature Teach?”In his first chapter, Eaglestone reveals the limitations of traditional approaches to defining literature as fiction and narrative, that is, as something “made up.” He argues instead that literature is undefinable and exists as a kind of “living conversation” (6). For Eaglestone, literature, like a conversation, is a form of communication among many parties. In this case, the conversation engages the text, the reader, and the author in discussions of nearly everything. Learning about literature involves understanding the form of that discussion in the same way one comes to understand how speakers create meaning in dialogue with one another. And like conversation, readers’ creative response to a literary text fully engages their minds, their hearts, their feelings about the past, and their hopes for the future. In Eaglestone’s view, literature is “not timeless but time-full.” It involves “a past, visible in various ways, including the historical context of a work and the ‘family trees’ of influence and genre; a person (it’s always read now); and a future (that would be you, joining [End Page 118] the conversation)” (20). As in actual conversation, questions of equality and freedom matter a great deal since “literature is a crucial part of our constant dialogue about humanity’s ever-changing self-understanding — not about what we are but about who we are” (22).In the second chapter, Eaglestone asks questions concerning how we go about “Studying Literature.” Here, he extends the metaphor introduced in the preceding chapter of literature constituting a living conversation. He puts forward four ways of pursuing literary studies: as dialogue and dissensus, as a different model of education, as a kind of “knowledge-in-action,” and as craft and activity. For Eaglestone, literary study is an ongoing dialogue whose “aim is to help develop a continuing dissensus about the texts we study in order to root, explore and develop our own selves and distinctiveness” (29–30). He cites critics as diverse in outlook as F. R. Leavis, Q. D. Leavis, John Crowe Ransom, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Arthur Applebee in support of his claims. He further invokes Brazilian educationalist and activist Paulo Freire’s notions of critical pedagogy in forming the view that literary studies offer a different model of education. Rather than following the “banking” model of accruing knowledge and then dispensing it to students, Freire “insists that teaching must be a dialogue” (32). Eaglestone argues that literary study conforms to the image at the center of Freire’s vision of a different form of education because “in a discussion of literature, each person, teacher or student, brings themselves, their own ideas, creativity and understanding, to the discussion and, through dialogue, they invent new knowledge” (33). As for literary studies as a kind of “knowledge-in-action,” Eaglestone invokes American educational theorist Arthur Applebee’s study, Curriculum as Conversation (1996), further underscoring the importance of metaphor spotting and close reading in carrying out this sort of critical... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 29.1 (2005) 1-23 [Access article in PDF] Literature and Evolution: A Bio-Cultural Approach Brian Boyd University of Auckland Many now feel that the "theory" that has dominated academic literary studies over the last thirty years or so is dead, and that it is time for a return to texts.1 But many more outside literary studies—in fields as diverse as anthropology, economics, law, psychology, and religion—have recently (...) come to recognize that the deep past that shaped our species can help to explain our present and recent past. Since a bio-cultural model of the human can only be richer than a solely cultural model, and since it implies neither genetic determinism nor limitation to the status quo, I want to argue for a bio-cultural or evolutionary approach to literature, first in very general terms, and then through a few aspects of a single familiar example, Hamlet.2 Such an approach, I suggest, can offer both a more comprehensive theory of literature and a closer investigation of literary texts. I Traditional views of literature tended to see it as reflecting nature, especially human nature, all the way from Plato's discomfort with, or Aristotle's admiration for, mimesis to Shakespeare's or Stendhal's images of art as holding the mirror up to nature. Common-sense traditional views of art and literature have easily shaded into transcendental views, widespread because religious beliefs have been so pervasive and because both artists and their patrons in state or church benefit by nurturing a sense of awe at art's putatively divine origins and power.In the twentieth century, first in sociology, anthropology, and even [End Page 1] psychology, then by the 1960s in the combination of these with Saussurean linguistics that produced structuralism and its aftershocks, and therefore impacted on literature, there has been a rejection of human nature as a given and a stress on human nature as the product only of culture and convention. "Theory," or what the Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism more pointedly calls cultural critique, rightly critiques traditional common-sense and transcendental views of art, pointing out that the nature, human nature, or supernature that art or literature was supposed to reflect was merely what was assumed of these things from within a local cultural perspective.3 Roland Barthes, for example, criticized "the mystification which transforms petit-bourgeois culture into a universal nature."4 Modern Theory also rejects the individual as another bourgeois or capitalist or Western notion, as when Fredric Jameson echoed Barthes's Death of the Author by announcing the Death of the Subject.5 Criticism since the 1960s "has denied, on theoretical grounds, the relevance of the single historically definable author."6However, as many have lately realized, there are problematic ethical consequences of both the denial of human nature and the denial of the individual. After such denials, on what basis do we then claim equal rights for all humans, and on what basis do we assign responsibility for particular actions?7 If there is no "single historically definable author," does that mean that someone penning a racist screed cannot be held accountable?A critique of unquestioned Western assumptions about human nature was needed, but the post-1960s critique was shortsighted: it has not looked nearly far enough. While structuralism and its more or less rebellious offspring were continuing the lineage of early twentieth-century social sciences, the natural sciences were moving in the opposite direction, towards the first comprehensive scientific attempt to understand human nature in the context of evolution and human, animal, and artificial cognition and behavior.In the humanities there has of late been widespread skepticism about science. Some postmodernists have what they deem "a sophisticated appreciation of the futility of proof and the relativity of all knowledge claims." But, as Daniel Dennett comments, "this opinion, far from being sophisticated, is the height of sheltered naïveté, made possible only by... ignorance of the proven methods of scientific truth-seeking and their power."8 Science does not generate only true answers: ideas proposed within it can of... (shrink)

The paper aims to reconstruct Heidegger’s historical-intentional assumptions in his ontological interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The paper presents young Heidegger’s project of the “metaphysical-teleological interpretation of consciousness.” The project indicates the direction of his further ontological interpretation of transcendentalism: Heidegger stands up to the traditional, well known neo-Kantian interpretation of the Critique, and offers a new conception of ontological knowledge and cognition. According to this conception, cognition is grounded in transcendental imagination where a threefold synthesis (...) takes place. Heidegger’s original temporal interpretation of transcendental schematism is also recalled to stress the significance of his new ontological approach to Kant’s theoretical philosophy. (shrink)

Much historical investigation has been conducted into the Victorians' fear of moral decline at the end of the nineteenth century. In part, concerns about the future of human morality and ethics were intimately connected with the rise of materialist science that appeared to be permeating every facet of human life and civilization. Uniquely, Alan Rauch's work moves this investigation back in time to examine the fear of moral decline in the early years of the Victorian era. Rauch posits that (...) in this period there was, on the one hand, a cultural recognition of the importance of the growth of “knowledge” production, often of the scientific kind. Such knowledge was considered to be useful in making technological advances that would improve human life. Yet, on the other hand, there was also concern that too much emphasis on the “getting and spending” of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, would lead to materialism, atheism, and, thus, a loss of moral and ethical standards.Arguing that novels in this period reflected and responded to the larger cultural movements of the time, Rauch takes up a discussion of five novels: Jane Loudon's The Mummy , Mary Shelley's Frankenstein , Charlotte Bronte's The Professor , Charles Kingsley's Alton Locke , and George Eliot's The Mill on the Floss . Each of these novels, he argues, attempts to balance the need of British society to recognize the usefulness of scientific knowledge with the desire to retain traditional morals and values: “The challenge for the novelist was to create societies that responded to these inevitable developments without succumbing to a cynical dismissal of moral responsibility” . Before beginning his discussion of the novels, each of which gets a chapter, Rauch includes a useful introduction to the process of the dissemination of knowledge in this period that attends to the rise of encyclopedias, the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, and popular works for children. In each instance he shows how knowledge was paired with moral responsibility in this wider literary milieu. Rauch then moves on to show how novelists were clearly as fascinated as other writers by scientific and technological advances. They were also as worried as other groups in society that such progress could cause humans to lose their sympathy and concern for others, their spirituality, their ability to cooperate with members of other classes, their ability to grow and change for the better as physical, moral, and religious beings, and their respect for the natural world. The novelists Rauch discusses seem to argue that a balance may be struck between scientific knowledge and morality, maintaining the advantages of both.While the last chapter, on The Mill on the Floss, takes the reader beyond Rauch's time frame of the early Victorian period, his aim here is to show how the depiction of the relationship between science and morality in the novel must necessarily change after Darwin. Rauch argues that, unlike the earlier novelists, Eliot “constructed a world where scientific knowledge is, prima facie, the appropriate measure of the material world, and moral knowledge must bend to accommodate it” . Still, despite her acceptance of the laws of nature, Eliot, according to Rauch, still looked for a way to maintain human free will and moral duty. The introduction of this post‐Darwinian writer, in contrast to the earlier writers, raises the question of whether there were other novelists attempting to reconcile science and morality in this way in the later period and, if so, how they went about it.Rauch's main argument is convincing and contributes to the work to date on the relationship between literature and science and, more generally, to the recognition of the importance of science as a powerful cultural force in nineteenth‐century society. The book would certainly have benefited, however, from a much stronger gender analysis. Of the five novels treated, four are by women. The Victorian association of women with the moral, spiritual, and religious world, together with the female authorship of the majority of novels under discussion, leaves the reader to ponder the relationship between Rauch's main thesis and the gender of his chosen novelists. This is particularly relevant as Rauch argues that only Kingsley's novel fails in its endeavor to “link science with tradition” and attributes that failure to his insistence on “invoking religion” rather than a moral tradition that is not necessarily connected with the Church . Are women novelists alone responsible for successful explorations of the relationship between morality and scientific knowledge? Do the men who explore this relationship always fail? Considering his choice of novelists, this is an issue Rauch ought to have explored. (shrink)

In the paper I point out to some problems of the traditional epistemology, i.e. epistemology oriented to search the foundations of cognitive evaluation. The epistemology of that kind which makes up the world outlook of science, I oppose the cultural studies reflection in a scientific knowledge practiced within one of the humanities domains of knowledge, for example, the theoretical history of science, which is limited in its cognitive tasks to the descriptive, reconstructive and explanatory study of science.

In Social Empiricism, Miriam Solomon proposes a via media between traditional philosophical realism and social construction of scientific knowledge, but ignores a large body of historical literature that has attempted to plough just that path. She also proposes a standard for normatively appropriate consensus that, arguably, no theory in the history of science has ever achieved, including her own ideal type—plate tectonics. And while valorizing dissent, she fails to consider how dissent has been used in recent decades as (...) a political tool to challenge scientific evidence on diverse issues, including the link between tobacco and cancer and the reality of anthropogenic global warming. (shrink)

In this study, Muarrij al-Sadusi (d. 204/820 or later) and his Kitāb al-amthāl which he wrote in the field of proverbs, are focused on. In this context, first of all, Muarrij’s life, scientific and literary personality are mentioned, his teachers and students are pointed out, and information about his works is given. Then, Kitāb al-amthāl was discussed; It was examined in terms of its content, classification and commentary method, and its contribution to the proverb literature. After spending part of his (...) life in the desert and learning Arabic from Bedouin Arabs, Muarrij came to Basra and educated himself by taking lessons from various teachers in fields such as hadith, lineage and history, especially linguistics. Also, in addition to Kitāb al-amthāl, he wrote works such as Kitābu Hazf min nesebi Quraysh, Kitāb al’-Anvâ’, Ansâbu Şaybân, Cemâhîru'l-kabâ'il, Garîbü'l-Qur'ân, Kitābu al-Maʿânî and Maʿânî al-Qurʾân also sheds light on his competence in many fields. Although Muarrij is a scholar who has written works in various fields, he has come to the fore mostly in linguistic sciences. In this context, qualities such as being the greatest of linguists, a scholar in Arabic, and the leader of grammarians have been attributed to him. It was also said that he was a star among Halil ibn Ahmed’s students who knew vocabulary and poetry well. Unfortunately, only two couplets of Muarrij, who is said to have been a poet and the author of many poems in addition to his knowledge of poetry, have survived to the present day. It has been stated that these two couplets are the best poems ever written on the subject on which they were written. Muarrij’s Kitāb al-amthāl is the second book written in the field of proverbs that has survived to the present day. In addition to proverbs, this book contains Arabic words, unfamiliar words, itbaʿ type words, poems, hadiths and a verse from the Quran. Although the author usually explained the unfamiliar words, he included in his work by bringing witnesses from the poem, he rarely mentioned the parable in which it was included. While it is seen that he used the hadiths and itbaʿs in his book as proverbs, he brought the verse of the Quran as a witness to the meaning of a word. The author mentioned many poems in his work, used poems as a source of istishhad for the explanation of unfamiliar words while explaining proverbs or to show that the proverbs he mentioned in his work were mentioned in poems. Apart from these, it is also seen that he included poems without any purpose and did not provide an explanation for them. For a long time, in the writing of proverbs books, the historical method, which corresponds to including events and stories related to the proverbs, or the lexical method, which envisages commenting on the strange words in the text, touching on the nuances between word groups, including grammatical analysis and making istishhad for them, have been followed. Kitāb al-amthāl, which was written by using the lexical method of these two methods, is accepted as the first work that has survived to the present day written with the lexical method in proverb literature. It can be said that Muarrij’s identity as a grammarian and lexicographer was effective in writing the work with this method. Due to these features, Kitāb al-amthāl is a book that has played a pioneering role in the formation of some understandings and traditions in proverb literature. As a matter of fact, it is the first book of proverbs in which a proverb was classified according to the time and geography in which it appeared, the hadiths that became proverbs were included for the first time, the tradition of accepting itbâʿs as proverbs was started. Kitāb al-amthāl is a work that is accepted in the proverb literature and continues the understandings it puts forward. This is demonstrated by the fact that scholars such as Abu Ubayd al-Qasım, Al-Mufaddal ibn Salama, Abu Bakr ibn Anbari, Abu Hilal al-Askari and Maidani, who wrote books on the subject, quoted and benefited from this book in their works. In addition, when the quotations and transfers made by the mentioned scholars from Kitāb al-amthāl are compared with the current version of the work, it is concluded that some of the transfers are not present in the work we have or are incomplete. This situation reveals that Kitāb al-amthāl was more voluminous and comprehensive and has not survived to the present day in its original form. (shrink)

This volume explores the early Jewish understanding of divine knowledge as divine presence, which is embodied in major biblical exemplars, such as Adam, Enoch, Jacob, and Moses. The study treats the concept of divine knowledge as the embodied divine presence in its full historical and interpretive complexity by tracing the theme through a broad variety of ancient Near Eastern and Jewish sources, including Mesopotamian traditions of cultic statues, creational narratives of the Hebrew Bible, and later Jewish mystical (...) testimonies. Orlov demonstrates that some biblical and pseudepigraphical accounts postulate that the theophany expresses the unique, corporeal nature of the deity that cannot be fully grasped or conveyed in some other non-corporeal symbolism, medium, or language. The divine presence requires another presence in order to be transmitted. To be communicated properly and in its full measure, the divine iconic knowledge must be "written" on a new living "body" which can hold the ineffable presence of God through a newly acquired ontology. Embodiment of Divine Knowledge in Early Judaism will provide an invaluable research to students and scholars in a wide range of areas within Jewish, Near Eastern, and Biblical Studies, as well as those studying religious elements of anthropology, philosophy, sociology, psychology, and gender studies. Through the study of Jewish mediatorial figures, this book also elucidates the roots of early Christological developments, making it attractive to Christian audiences. (shrink)

Undoubtedly, Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) is one of the most important subjects affecting the development of Islamic thought for about thirteen centuries. Not only Islamic law; however, with his fundamental contributions to the doctrine, he continues to influence a very large environment in the Islamic geography today. In fact, this effect has been attractive enough to create a depth that permeates the daily lives of societies from economics to law, from education to health, beyond these mere theoretical and practical dimensions (...) of religion. Essentially, the interpretation of Islam systematized by Abū Ḥanīfa in the context of a religious philosophy and method has been the subject of a heated discussion and evaluation under different Islamic paradigms since the very first time. Today, the issue has gained a different dimension in parallel with the increasing tensions in all aspects of the Islamic world. Apart from the interest shown to him in the context of organized religion, Abū Ḥanīfa has been a means of reaction to the Arab religion and politics attitude on the one hand, and on the other hand he has been made the object of conflict, harmony and incompatibilities in the context of modernization. The research is limited to studies conducted in Turkey between 2000 and 2020 years on Abū Ḥanīfa. The research is based on the assumption that these studies dealt with Abū Ḥanīfa almost completely detached from her sociological and historical personality and confronted with a theoretical problem. In the study, a theoretical analysis of the mentioned literature has been made and a theoretical proposal has been made for the studies in the field. With the research, it is aimed to make a theoretical contribution to the Abū Ḥanīfa literature. For this purpose, the general theoretical view of these studies is tried to be understood by scanning the books, articles and symposium papers covering these years. In this framework, some semantic packages that manifest themselves widely in the studies are determined, and thus the unchanging concrete reflections of the phenomenon problematized in the research are tried to be understood. The data in the study are evaluated in the context of phenomenological sociology of knowledge. From the earliest times to today, Abū Ḥanīfa is not only about the theological perception of people; besides, he has drawn an image surrounded by the limitations drawn by their socioeconomic, cultural, political and ideological circles. On the other hand, it can easily be seen that the approaches reflected in the literature about Abū Ḥanīfa, whether they come from the Hanafi school or have matured within another tradition of thought, are almost entirely shaped in a macro-theological, suprahistorical, universalist and nomothetic perspective. It can also be said that these studies have not attempted to open themselves up to new discussions in theoretical terms. In the years that were the subject of the research, Abū Ḥanīfa was the subject of periodicals and symposiums conducted within a program rather than copyrighted works. The literature, which is clearly observed to be confronted with a theological contraction, is progressing with a more doctrine debate today. It is understood that relatively less practical areas of discussion have emerged with the motive of responding to developments in the Islamic world and on a global scale, ignoring Abū Ḥanīfa 's sociological background. Handing over to Abū Ḥanīfa, disciplinary populism, sectarian marginalization, romanticization and ideological commodification are important meaning packages reflected in the literature. The main concern of all this semantic reality is to build an order based on the knowledge stock in the tradition against the breaks and traumas in the social structure. However, this approach to explain Abū Ḥanīfa has revealed some theoretical problems. In another respect, the perspectives that dominated the literature made such generalizing attitudes inevitable. As a result, with this theoretical point of view, Abū Ḥanīfa has been turned into a historical problem in related studies in general. Finally, in this study, a historical, idiographic perspective emphasizing the specificity to the social event is proposed for the literature of Abū Ḥanīfa. In this context, the article draws attention to the phenomenological sociology of knowledge that takes the understanding of each event in its own reality as opposed to macro approaches. (shrink)

Much has been written about indigenous knowledge and intellectual property rights in fields like anthropology and law. However, it remains an under-examined topic in business and management literature. In this article, we review the emerging contentious discourse, definitional issues and underlying assumptions of the western IPR and indigenous knowledge management systems. We highlight the similarities and differences between the two approaches. We argue that adopting a view that law is socially constructed with ethical underpinnings helps sort out the (...) thorny issues related to indigenous knowledge ‘expropriation’. To do this, we draw on the role of ethical norms in the historical evolution of IPRs regimes. Finally, grounded in Stakeholder Theory, we conclude with a discussion of managerial implications. (shrink)

Introduction. Starting from R. Merton’s pioneer works, social studies of science have been a major part of Western intellectual and scientific life. The total number of periodicals on the subject, that is over 20, illustrates the point best. Meanwhile Russian social studies of science are far less intensive. Moreover Western studies of social constructivist type still haven’t received sufficient coverage in Russian scientific literature. Our article is an attempt to somewhat reverse the situation. The aim of the article is to (...) analyze social constructivism evolution in the English speaking countries starting from Berger and Luckmann’s seminal work “The Social Construction of Reality” in 1966; to classify social constructivist versions of science together with their most prominent traits. Methods. When considering the problem, the author uses Y. Hacking’s schematic definition of social construction, P. Kitcher’s scheme of “socio-historical cluster” and M. Baghramian’s “objectivist conception of science”. Scientific novelty of the research. The analysis provides reasons for social constructivism popularity during the “science wars”; specifies social ontology and epistemic status of scientific knowledge in moderate versions of social constructivism; specifies some discourse peculiarities of radical versions of social constructivism (the consequence of somewhat unusual reception of continental tradition) and its view of the science. Results. The basic results are: a) certain convergence of ontological positions in analytic and moderate versions of social constructivist type, b) controversial issues of social (historical) approach to scientific explanation and c) controversial issues of postmodern rhetoric in radical versions. Conclusions. Social studies of science play an important role in science and society, the critical comments towards social constructivist versions notwithstanding. (shrink)

In this article I argue that it is the task of philosophy of history to elucidate the practice of history. Therefore philosophy of history must stick to the analysis of the debates of historians and neither literary theory nor aesthetics can function as "models: for philosophy of history. This is so because historians present reconstructions of a past reality on the basis of factual research and discuss these reconstructions primarily in terms of factual adequacy. The fact that these discussions seldom (...) lead to a consensus constitutes a basic feature of "doing history" to be analyzed by its philosophy.An analysis of the "Historikerstreit" leads, first, to the observation that traditional objectivism and relativism can not account for the fact that historians do debate at all. Second, it leads to the observation that according to most historians judgements of value are supposed to fall outside the scope of rational debate. This conviction is traced back to deeprooted but outdated conceptions of rationality. To get beyond objectivism and relativism "internal realism" is proposed and connected to the notion of practical identity. The fact-value distinction is re-analyzed in this framework of "internal realism" and put to work in the "Historikerstreit." Third, it is argued that the theory of "speechacts" and the notion of "horizon of expectation" can be connected to "internal realism" in order to give a more adequate elucidation of the normative aspects of historiography. Fourth, and along the way, I maintain that historians can profit from "internal realism" because the scope of their discussion would be widened so as to include the traditionally implicit normative issues involved. (shrink)

The class condition of women in contemporary Igbo society in particular and Africa in general, which is characterized by her peripherialization in the scheme of state building and knowledge production, has led to the need for the re-examination of her representation in specific cultural contexts in Africa prior to the major historical events (partition and colonization) in the continent. There is no doubt that the partition and colonization of Africa led to a pragmatic shift in local paradigms, and (...) the significance placed on the agencies of cultural transmission. This need to re-examine women s representation in cultures and societies in Africa has become imperative in order to make, where possible, a factual representation of women s place in specific cultural realities. This realization gives impetus for this paper. This article re-examines the perception that women have nothing to do with two key peace symbols—oji (kolanut) and ofo (staff of authority and justice)—in Igbo culture as has been presented in the literature on Igbo culture. Using a case study typology, the study uses Nanka in Anambra State, south-eastern Nigeria as the study area. It identifies the place of the Earth goddess in oji and ofo ritual performances and concludes that, as a key participant in these rituals, gender is mainstreamed in the usages of oji and ofo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:God’s Knowledge of the World: Medieval Theories of Divine Ideas from Bonaventure to Ockham by Carl A. VaterBenjamin R. DeSpainVATER, Carl A. God’s Knowledge of the World: Medieval Theories of Divine Ideas from Bonaventure to Ockham. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2022. xi + 294 pp. Cloth, $75.00Carl Vater skillfully blends historical and constructive concerns in his study of medieval theories of (...) the divine ideas. The book, first, makes a significant contribution to the body of scholarly resources on medieval philosophy by systematically mapping out the complex intellectual history of the divine ideas between the years 1250 and 1325. Throughout the work Vater displays a staggering command of the relevant literature, figures, and ideas from this period of philosophical development. Second, he provides a robust defense and promotion of John Duns Scotus’s theory of the divine ideas, which he regularly insists is the best theory. Through careful analysis of the often subtle differences in medieval articulations of the divine ideas to answer the questions of how God knows and produces creatures, Vater makes the case that Scotus avoided certain pitfalls in earlier theories that rely on a flawed understanding of relations influenced, principally, by Avicenna’s notion of essence.The book itself is divided into five parts with each systematically detailing a particular theory, beginning with the “imitability theory” represented by Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Bonaventure—the one figure, in Vater’s narrative, capable of escaping Scotus’s subsequent critiques. According to Vater, the imitability theory is defined by several notable characteristics, including that the divine ideas are “secondary objects of the divine intellect when it knows the divine essence,” that they perform both cognitive and causal roles, that they are relations, and that there are many of them. The “infinite intellect theory” critiques the imitability theory for depending on a notion of relations that is mistaken for supposing that relations can be known before the terms of the relation are themselves known. In this section, Vater examines the works of Peter John Olivi and his student Petrus de Trabibus. The third part considers what Vater calls the “objectum cognitum theory” developed by James of Viterbo. Here, according to Vater, we encounter the first signs, following Olivi and de Trabibus’s critique of the imitability theory, of the shift away from identifying the divine ideas with relations to defining them as creatures themselves. This shift culminates in the “creatura intellecta theory” introduced by Richard of Mediavilla, but it is not properly developed until Scotus, who concludes that “God knows relations because he knows possible creatures.” The section ends with an analysis of Scotus’s influence on the theories of early Thomists and Scotists, including John of Paris, Thomas of Sutton, and Henry of Harclary. In the fifth part, Vater turns to the “nominalist theory” of Peter Auriol and [End Page 373] William of Ockham. Although both Auriol and Ockham offer accounts of the divine ideas, these are, as Vater says, little more than nods to the Augustinian tradition that ultimately amount to a rejection of the divine ideas.Vater’s approach to these medieval theories has many strengths. By not only classifying the prominent theories during this period but also systematically organizing his interpretation of each respective author, he is able to create a comparative framework for assessing the central issues at play in the divine ideas, such as their status, definition, cognitive and causal roles, plurality and unity, exemplarity, and the question of nonexistent possibles, and he traces variations in each area to identify where change, development, and critique are actually occurring within this seventy-five years of intellectual history. He also is attentive to figures often overlooked in larger narrations of medieval philosophy, and he locates their contributions to the varied development of the divine ideas. More importantly, however, Vater is able to maintain coherence in his evaluation of these complex, intertwining layers of medieval philosophical reflection by constantly returning to the overarching theme of relations in the movement from identifying the divine ideas with relations to approaching them as creatures themselves. Vater is correct when he notes that the divine ideas form a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Michael Murray THE CONFLICT BETWEEN POETRY AND LITERATURE While Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur are widely regarded as engaged in a common hermeneutic enterprise, the greater radicality of Heidegger must fracture such a view. This difference shows up in a striking manner in the conflict between the concept of poetry and the concept of literature. After elucidating its significance, I shall explore a new sense of fiction that reinscribes the (...) conflict and invites us to interpret a canto of Wallace Stevens. Let us enter Gadamer's dispute with Heidegger where he declares: "It is true... I can appeal to the 'transcendental' sense of Heidegger's Being and Time. But where else I call on Heidegger — in that I seek to think 'understanding" as a 'happening7 — [my thought] is turned in an entirely different direction." That direction, Gadamer goes on to explain, arose "out ofthe need for self-clarification that came over me as a philologist and interpreter of philosophical texts." To which he adds trenchantly: "My point of departure is not the complete forgetfulness of Being, the 'night of Being,' rather on the contrary — I say this against Heidegger as well as Buber— the unreality of such an assertion. That also holds good for our relation to the tradition." ' This last statement is directed against the encompassing project of Heidegger's later work, his epochal history ofBeing from Anaximander to Nietzsche. This ontological history or aletheia process is charted in terms of the figure of day and night that come so easily in German where the West is das Abendland. Heidegger hyphenates this name (Abend-land) in order to bring forward its status as land of the evening. The historical 59 60Philosophy and Literature evening in question points us back toward the dawn of the West in early Greek thought, poetry, and life, and to its second weaker beginning in the Classical period, and thence ahead to die darkening ofthe modern world, marked by the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth, the massification of man, and the resentment of the creative — a darkening that has passed into its night and approaches its midnight now in the age of the Gestell or total framework. As such this time betokens the possibility of a second dawn nourished by the memory of the first, though it cannot be a return. Elsewhere Heidegger elaborates this late modern situation in Hölderlinian terms as the Age between the No Longer and the Not Yet. What is thought by the time of die Between and by the language of the lighting-concealing history-of-Being is, according to Heidegger, what really specifies the hermeneutic situation of modern man, poetry, and society. While Gadamer accepts the nineteenth- and twentieth-century discovery ofhistoricity, and tries to advance insights of Heidegger along with his own to clarify the conditions of humanistic knowledge, he rejects the consummative eschatology of Hegel but no less the catastrophic eschatology of Heidegger. As he emphatically declares: "I do not believe at all that we live Tietween' two worlds.... Only the prophet who already sees the promised land would have, in my estimation, the possibility of saying the like. I remember, instead of this, the one world I only know, and which in all decay has lost far less of its evidence and cohesion than it talks itselfinto."2 Of course Heidegger himself insists upon a relation to tradition, reiterated in the asseveration of his later years "that everything essential, everything great arises from man's rootedness in his homeland and tradition."3 Nevertheless, one must say that the revolutionary renewal of Heidegger that presupposes the revolutionary break is not the renewal for which Gadamer speaks. To Ulustrate this divergence of Gadamer from Heidegger we may ponder the concept of the classic. This example occupies an important place in the argument of Truth and Method because the experience of the classic is recognized as combining a genuine historical efficaciousness with a normative significance in the formation of the Western literary tradition (TM, pp. 253ff). In a more recent paper Gadamer explains die "peculiar contemporaneity" that accrues to classic works of literature by reason of tiieir Wirkungsgeschichte or effective-history.* First, they occupy "a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 134-135 [Access article in PDF] Allen Speight. Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xii + 154. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $18.95. Hegel's notorious use of literary references in his Phenomenology of Spirit has been a source of numerous interpretive difficulties, sparking disagreements not only about the actual referents of Hegel's literary allusions, but also—and (...) more importantly—about the meaning and purpose of such allusions. In this insightful, highly readable new book, Allen Speight challenges the stale orthodoxies that have pitted the Phenomenology's systematic/philosophical readers against its literary/historical ones, and offers an innovative interpretation that takes seriously the work's literary structure and allusions, while also giving due consideration to its systematic philosophical aims. Combining the rich sensibility of a literary mind with the careful rigor of a philosophical mind, Speight deftly shows how Hegel's Phenomenology is a work whose very aim, in part, is to transcend the traditional, but often limiting, dichotomy between philosophy and literature.As Speight explains it, the general purpose of this book is to make "a contribution to understanding the philosophical project of the Phenomenology and why that project requires Hegel's appropriation of literary works and forms as it does" (9-10). The book's philosophical point of departure is the critical mass of recent scholarship that sees Hegel's epistemological task in the Phenomenology as essentially Sellarsian in its critique of the "Myth of the Given." For Speight, the Hegelian critique of the myth of the given implies that all knowledge claims are essentially corrigible and socially mediated, and this implies—in turn—that any attempt to draw rigid lines of demarcation between a purely "systematic" and a purely "historical" or "anthropological" approach to philosophy and its problems must ultimately fail. From this interpretive vantage point, Speight holds, a strong case can be made for the essentially literary character of Hegel's Phenomenology, and the essentially philosophical purpose of his literary allusions. As Speight is careful to acknowledge, his own distinctive approach to the Phenomenology is not meant to rule out other, divergent emphases or interpretations, but only to provide "a way of better understanding the role that literature plays within the philosophical enterprise of the work as a whole" (18).Speight begins to deliver the details of his promised "better way" by investigating what he calls the "literary turn" or the seemingly sudden "eruption of the literary" that starts to motivate the Phenomenology's transition from the section on "Reason" to the section on "Spirit." For Speight, the shapes of Active Reason that are crucial in this transition begin to raise a new set of problems concerning human agency. Furthermore, it is not at all a coincidence that Hegel's heightened concern with agency at this juncture of the Phenomenology [End Page 134] is accompanied by an unmistakable burst of literary references. Rather, it is an indicator of Hegel's careful, deliberate, and self-conscious strategy of using literature to make a philosophical point about agency, since it is literature—according to Speight's Hegel—that gives us privileged access to the philosophical problems of agency and their potential resolution.For Speight, Hegel's use of tragedy gives us special insight into the retrospectivity of all human action; his use of comedy points to the theatricality (or what we might call the socially mediated expressivity) of all human action; and his use of the romantic novel points to the necessity (and eventually opens up the possibility) of the forgiveness implied by all human action. While Hegel had already made use of both tragedy and comedy in the Reason section of the Phenomenology, it is only in the Spirit section, Speight argues, that these literary-philosophical shapes are taken up (e.g., in Antigone and Rameau's Nephew) in a historically self-conscious way that can lead (via the "beautiful soul" novel) to the possibility of forgiveness and thereby instigate the transition to the Religion section.Speight's "better way... (shrink)

Codicology, also known as ‘the archaeology of the book’, is the study of manuscripts as physical objects. It is a discipline that studies manuscripts with a predominantly historical orientation. This essay explores the sequel to the most famous literature before and after Islamic epic story and the link between Islamic signs and literature review. The greatest pre-Islamic mysteries in the history of Moslem literature and its religious effects were disused, which were solved by manuscript studies and some case studies. (...) The research method is based on the position story and finding the Islamic signs of the research to confirm the Islamic signs in the history and its changes over time. Therefore, in this research, religious symbols in the history of literature have been studied. The authors try to reach a new knowledge regarding the foundations of this school by tracing the history of religious literature. Furthermore, the connection between culture and religious literature is made by examining the Islamic religion mysteries sample. The symbolism and explanation of codes and elements in art works have been studied and the role of myths and metaphors in semantic analysis and religious concepts has been discussed. Finally, the effect of the Islamic events in literature review and art development is discussed.Contribution: This study provides further insights into the relationship between theology and literature through a historical literature review. (shrink)

There is an obvious parallel between foundationalism, which ignores history in working out the conditions of knowledge, and radical relativism, which contends that by virtue of its own historical character there is no way to choose among different interpretations, all of which are “equally good.” Might it not be, rather, that the recent historicist attack on the very idea of rationality is as damaging as foundationalist objections against the plurality of conceptual schemes or frameworks? Can philosophy maintain the (...) traditional distinction between the form and content of knowledge, between rationality and historicity _ between doxa and episteme? (shrink)

THE LENGTHENING SHELF of books on the special problems of historical knowledge reminds us that few obiter dicta have worn quite as badly as Santayana's remark that those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it. Though it epitomizes a recurrent mood of impatience with those who refuse to acknowledge our own favorite analogies between present problems and past disasters, yet it leaves one feeling uneasily committed to a set of underlying presuppositions which one would not (...) care to make explicit. Is the historical process of itself really repetitive? How many great historical changes have been brought about—as in the Renaissance—by those who did know history and wished to repeat its classic forms? Or is it possible, as Santayana suggests, that knowledge of history brings release from otherwise ineluctable forces and their consequences? What in Santayana's time seemed a radical denial of the commonplace notion of inevitable progress now appears as the most conservative of nineteenth-century attitudes: the belief that historical reality is there, weaving and reweaving its tangled web, subject like the laws of nature to discovery and perhaps exploitation, but remaining a field of real entities and forces whether discovered or not. Santayana's dictum is of a piece with all those claims which begin, "History shows that...." But few historians or philosophers now have much sympathy even with the possibility of such claims. Were there significantly repetitive patterns of major events, historical knowledge would indeed make the present an elaborate form of déjà vu. Yet historians above all are reluctant to claim that their subject is a manual of politics or of anything else. Call any current event "another Munich," and any historian worth his salt will list seventeen important respects in which that event does not, and even could not resemble Chamberlain's ill-starred agreement. (shrink)

This paper re-introduces the georgic ethic and the role it has historically played in debates about new agricultural practices. Public engagement, participatory research, and greater local involvement in crafting new means to work the land flood the literature of agrarian studies. Putting the experience- and place-based georgic into that discourse can help deepen its character and future possibilities. The paper draws from recent sociological research into the acceptance and resistance to new practices to show the georgic’s explanatory, descriptive utility in (...) studies of those controversies. It also highlights how agricultural and environmental ethicists can draw from the georgic tradition for its prescriptive and normative possibilities to put practitioners back into the agricultural policy process and to draw more firmly from the notion that knowledge of the environment is constituted in practices of living in it. Placing the language and terms of the georgic ethic more centrally into public conversations about agricultural ethics and policy can enrich those conversations by structuring them with attention to experience, place-based values, and the moral space of interaction between humans and the land. (shrink)

In the formation of the acquis of the science of fiqh, many scientific figures have been associated with the methods of the Imams of the sect and their views, which are passed on to the next generations. In the history of the Ḥanafī mad̲h̲hab, there are many scholars whose works, views or just their names have survived. The views of the scholars who are at the forefront of this work can be accessed through their works. The opinions of some scholars (...) who did not have works, or whose works have not survived, can be found in the jurisprudential corpus of other scholars. Unfortunately, there are many scholars whose works and opinions have not survived, and only their names are mentioned. This study focuses on the Ḥanafī jurist al-Baqqālī (d. 452/1060), whose scholarly personality, position in jurisprudence and works have not survived to the present day, although his name is mentioned in fiqh literature. The article analyses various sources and evidence for the identification of al-Baqqālī. The main argument of the article was clarified by examining fiqh books, which are among the authoritative sources of the Ḥanafī fiqh corpus, rather than works of ṭabaḳat, and by scanning digital resources. The determination and presentation of the scholarly personality of al-Baqqālī and his jurisprudential views are the distinctive feature of this article. Baqqālī was recognised as an influential jurist within the Ḥanafī fiqh tradition and was considered one of the mashāʼịḵẖ (eminent jurists). However, detailed information about him could not be found. However, considering the available evidence, it is proven that al-Baqqālī, who stands out with the attribution of al-Baqqālī, is not al-Baqqālī whose views are consulted in the Ḥanafī mad̲h̲hab and among the possibilities that arise, the views that predominate in the identification of al-Baqqālī's identity are given. For this reason, it is emphasised that Baqqālī is a figure that requires further research and study. It is emphasised that this article can contribute to the understanding of the Ḥanafī fiqh tradition. Baqqālī's jurisprudential views on some matters of worship and transaction reflect important debates. Although al-Baqqālī adhered to the basic principles of the Ḥanafī mad̲h̲hab, he occasionally developed original ijtihād against the general views of the imams or the mad̲h̲hab. Baqqālī's original jurisprudence and jurisprudential views occupy an important place in the sect's literature. He was particularly influential in matters of fatwa and left his views to later jurists. Such a study aims to solve a scholarly problem in the fields of the history of science and the history of fiqh. Clarifying the identities and specialisms of those involved can help to ensure historical and scientific clarity. The purpose of this article is to contribute to the accumulation of historical and scientific knowledge by seeking to learn more about this issue and to reduce uncertainties. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.2 (2003) 119-134 [Access article in PDF] The Constitution of Rhetoric's Tradition Maurice Charland Rhetoric is not a discipline. That is to say, as a domain of theoretical and practical knowledge, rhetoric is weakly institutionalized, lacking a centralized arbiter and standardized set of procedures for establishing truth claims. It also lacks the basic characteristics that Michel Foucault defines as disciplinary, for while we can identify (...) "groups of objects, methods, their corpus of properties considered to be true, the interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and tools," these are neither universally admitted, nor do they "constitute a sort of anonymous system, freely available to whoever wishes, or whoever is able to make use of them, without their being any question of their meaning" (1972, 222). On the contrary, despite the fact that rhetoric is usually figured as offering practical and, indeed, positive knowledge, the meaning of its terms is always being questioned and at stake. While we might, by considering terms loosely, seek to identify rhetoric in terms of objects such as "persuasion," or "discourse," these are not exclusively its province. Furthermore, the ends of rhetoric are themselves unclear. Is rhetoric really the art of discovering the available means of persuasion? Or is it an art of citizenship? Or a method of enquiry? It has at times been defined as each. Consequently, none of these methods can fix its identity. At most, we can say that "rhetoric," as a domain of knowledge, signals a commitment to the idea of agency in discourse.Rhetoric, while not disciplinary, nevertheless "hangs together" as a domain of knowledge even though it does not cohere conceptually. It is, or comes close to being, a "discursive formation." That is to say, we can identify a field that produces statements concerning discourse and its operations, which is characterized by certain regularities that articulate with the term rhetoric itself. The first such regularity is the gesture of negation. Rhetoric refuses philosophy (or acts out having been refused by philosophy). [End Page 119] Rhetoric further is defined against other intellectual genres: rhetoric is not poetics, is not political science, is not ethics, though it may "speak" to them. Ultimately, though, this tells us very little about the nature of rhetoric's difference, for while refusal is effective in positing the existence of a boundary between rhetoric and other domains, the location of that boundary and what it contains remains unspecified. Rhetoric must also be attributed an at least provisional sense. This is accomplished by rhetoric's second gesture, which initially appears more substantial. Rhetoric is framed in terms of the positivity of a foundational "tradition." Indeed, the gesture toward tradition is ubiquitous. Consider, for example, both the title and principles of organization of Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg's (1990) anthology, George Kennedy's (1998) recursion to the idea of "tradition" even as he attempts to present rhetoric as a natural and cross-cultural phenomenon, recent feminist works that explicitly address "the tradition," 1 the routine citation of Classical authorities and examples, the recurrence of "new" rhetorics, including Burke's dramatism, Perelman's theory of argumentation, as well as Barthes' semiotics, which are offered as supplements to tradition's lacks, and, finally, the energy devoted to the study of the history of rhetoric. The rhetorical tradition, as something bequeathed or put in play by ancient teachers, appears to offer rhetoric a substance, a literature, and a set of problems, particularly through variants of two other principles of discursive formation identified by Foucault, commentary and the author-function. Even so, the gesture toward tradition does not imply the existence of a historically rooted and fixed corpus or model: "Tradition" is a vague term, there is no unproblematic canon of texts to be commented upon, and tradition itself, rather than Aristotle, Plato, or Cicero, stands as "author." What we debate is the meaning of the "tradition," the uneasy relationship between Socrates and Sophists, Plato and Aristotle, but as positions rather than personae. Furthermore, in the name of rhetoric, ancient and modern texts are often read against the grain, and what is... (shrink)

— Y.K. Karaosmanoglu: "General, this party has no doctrine...".— Mustafa Kemal: "Of course it hasn't, my son; if we had a doctrine, we would paralyze the movement”.The many studies, articles, essays, conferences and seminars dedicated to the personality and the work of Mustafa Kemal are still far from having exhausted an area of knowledge with many facets, a historical reality with unending extensions. By studying the apologetic literature about the civilizing hero and a historiography which is limited to (...) the relatively neutral description of the rich career of an individual, it can be noted that there are very few writings inspired by the desire not only to analyze, to explain and to understand but also to think through the Kemalist revolution. (shrink)

The study of legal transplants provides a vital critical supplement to mainstream theories about legal change. Legal transplants are not exceptional or isolated occurrences, despite the economic, social, political and cultural barriers that separate the world’s legal systems. This Article goes beyond traditional approaches to the study of transplants by substituting the figurative language of transplants with explicit theory about how legal change is produced. It first provides a brief account of what the literature on legal transplants has achieved so (...) far in terms of "macro" explanations of legal change currently available. It then argues that legal transplants as social acts performed by individuals call for a study of the "micro" level of engagement with legal change by individuals. The key notion that is advanced to explore this dimension is the notion of mediated action, which denotes action that is performed by individuals making use of features of the environment as tools to interact in a specific setting. The notion of mediated action was first introduced in cultural-historical psychological investigations of the social formation of the mind. As social acts, legal transplants represent instances of mediated action. The last part of this Article highlights how legal transplants raise questions of justice and discusses briefly how the new approach to the study of transplants advocated here relates to them. (shrink)

Summary Ian Hunter's early work on the history of literature education and the emergence of English as school subject issued a bold challenge to traditional accounts that have in the main focused on English either as knowledge of a particular field or as ideology. The alternative proposal put forward by Hunter and supported by detailed historical analysis is that English exists as a series of historically contingent techniques and practices for shaping the self-managing capacities of children. The challenge (...) for the field is to advance this historical work and to examine possible implications for English teaching. (shrink)

No single collection of biblical or Midrashic writings has ever been explicitly cited as a direct source for the Qurʾān. However, as the final divine scripture in the historical continuum of monotheistic religions, the Qurʾān exhibits a clear textual and chronological relationship to the biblical traditions of Judaism and Christianity. Its stories are intertwined with narratives that evoke biblical and Midrashic sources. This connection has motivated some Muslim scholars, particularly narrative exegetes such as Ibn Kathīr, al-Ṭabarī and al-Qurṭubī, to (...) interpret the Qurʾānic text by drawing on biblical and post-biblical knowledge, often referred to as Isrāʾīliyyāt.Contribution: With its treatment of this connection, this article will show that biblical lore has played a crucial role in exegesis of the Qurʾānic scripture, helping the exegetes provide meaning to obscure Qurʾānic verses, uncover its ambiguous figures and expand its stories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rembrandt and LearningRalph A. Smith (bio)IntroductionIt appears to be a defining characteristic of Rembrandt’s works—as important as the brushstrokes, the underdrawing, the types of ground and the paints used—that they move people exceedingly. [T]hey help us feel something of what the artist may have felt about youth, old age, friendship, isolation, and love.—Anthony Bailey[For] Rembrandt, imperfections are the norm of humanity, which is why he will always speak across (...) centuries to those for whom art might be something other than the quest for ideal form.—Simon SchamaArt can arouse the senses, touch the feelings, and stir the passions. In exercising these formidable powers, the artist should respect certain limits of good taste and moral propriety. Rembrandt possessed unequal skill in depicting the passions in original ways without breaking the code. Well, hardly ever.—Gary SchwartzThe National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Rembrandt Project was designed to apply state-of-the-art digital technology to the development of the multiple competencies needed for understanding and appreciating [End Page 101] Rembrandt and his time. As educational consultant to the project, I was given the assignment of conceptualizing a framework that would accommodate and illuminate the project’s purposes. This meant that I not only had to refamiliarize myself with seventeenth-century Dutch art and culture and with the national and state standards for the visual arts but also acquaint myself with the standards for socials studies; both sets of standards occupy a prominent place in the project and are the subject of the third section of this article. The overarching viewpoint from which I approached my assignment, however, was that of the humanities, a topic to which I turn first. Furthermore, since the project’s foremost concern is with masterpieces of the visual arts, I thought it apposite to address briefly some issues in aesthetics, especially those that relate to experiencing artworks appropriately. Having surveyed the project from the perspectives mentioned, I then ask to what extent it was successful in avoiding the pitfalls that often frustrate the implementation of novel ideas and methods.1The HumanitiesThe following interpretation of the humanities is condensed from the writings of two distinguished philosophers, Albert William Levi and Walter Kaufmann, and the historian Paul Gagnon. Levi, an early member of the National Council for the Humanities and for most of his career a distinguished professor of the humanities at Washington University, was once asked to define the essence of the humanities. He replied that the purposes of the humanities are to encourage persons to “to think critically, to communicate successfully, and to walk proudly with [their] tradition.”2 Noteworthy in this terse statement is its emphasis on the procedural aspects of the humanities, that is, their effects on human actions and attitudes. Such emphasis accorded well with the tradition of the Middle Ages, which construed the humanities as skills of organizing and understanding human experience. Levi, however, also acknowledged the Renaissance conception of the humanities as subject matters, thereby paying tribute to the endeavors of Renaissance scholars who devoted themselves to recovering and transmitting the literary texts of antiquity. A strong believer in historical continuity, Levi synthesized the Medieval and Renaissance traditions by proposing that the humanities be understood as skills of communication, continuity, and criticism. These skills have their substantive grounding in languages and literatures, history, and philosophy, the latter conceived as critical reflection.3 After pondering Levi’s interpretation, I added another “c,” the arts of creation, to his troika. Thus, the humanities can be understood as indispensable to human experience because they are the arts of creation, communication, continuity, and criticism.Another view of the purposes of the humanities and their relevance to the project can be found in the writings of the historian Paul Gagnon. He [End Page 102] stressed the importance of preparing the young for citizenship, personal cultivation, and vocation within a curriculum committed to the values of equity and competence.4 Gagnon interpreted the study of history as providing critical checks on reality, imparting insights into the various ways in which persons have used historical knowledge to find their place in the flow of events, and... (shrink)

From an intensive academic study based primarily on Machiavelli's works, critical arguments arise in this text that undermine not only the current-day political mind-set, framework, and practices, but also the views established academically, up to the point where the "body politic" formed by the Western classical tradition is dissipated and dispersed. Comprised in a contrary unconventional manner similar to Machiavelli, the basic essential factors of history, religion, power, and authority were formulated as the four main chapters in this work by (...) Nevio Cristante. From it, one can readily see the flaws today in the false praise in nostalgic historical hubris, the forgetting of a brand of religion that is essential for healthy politics, the overlooking of coercive forces that reduce politics to power, and the loss of true authority. In this book, Cristante comprises Machiavelli as a virtuous, unprecedented, "extreme humanist," in stark contrast to the common incessant interpretations of him being a "teacher of evil," a "diabolical," "soulless" political advisor. A subversive satirical interpretation of The Prince has been formed herein, extending from the generated knowledge of history and the history of Machiavelli's own experience. From the vivacious and unraveling Italian Renaissance, a cogent force prompted Machiavelli to create his literary works in order to form an educational cure for the deteriorating human condition, of his time, and any time. There is in Machiavelli, a differing sense of newness from that which is commonly known today, which circumvents its worth in this distinct educative interpretation. Machiavelli goes back in time in order to produce lessons applicable to correct the shortages in his, and every, present-day. With a divergent view of the works of art and literature outlined in this analysis, Machiavelli's education becomes revived today in creating a virtuous political, spiritual, and cultural dynamism as a battle-cry to repel the ignorance and great misfortunes in our human condition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Contemplative Studies and the Liberal ArtsAndrew O. FortContemplative Studies—meaning both standard “third-person” study of contemplative traditions in history and various cultures as well as actual “first-person” practice of contemplative exercises as part of coursework—is a new field in academia, and aspects have been controversial in some quarters, seen as not completely compatible with the rigorous “critical inquiry” of liberal arts study. While there are agendas within contemplative studies (CS) (...) that go beyond the traditional questions and issues of liberal education, I want to argue that CS has, for a number of reasons, a place right at the heart of such inquiry. CS can be approached from many disciplines, including psychology, medicine, and neuroscience, as well as literature and visual, fine, and performing arts, but here I will focus on its place in liberal arts generally, and in religious studies specifically.1Given my specific focus, I will skip defining some broad terms frequently used in and beyond CS (such as “religion,” “spirituality,” or “meditation”), but, in view of my topic, I do need to say a few words about what I mean by “contemplation” and “liberal arts.” “Contemplation” refers to ways of knowing and focusing attention, often but certainly not always part of a religious tradition. It includes a wide variety of practices: sitting or walking meditation, various other kinds of “mindfulness” practices, yogic postures, visualizations, silent prayer and group chanting, reflective self-inquiry, observing nature, and many others. “Liberal arts” or “liberal education” has many qualities and purposes, but the ones most relevant here include (1) reflective self-awareness, recognizing and critiquing one’s beliefs and assumptions; (2) respectful and empathetic understanding of others (what I call “mental migration” into other worldviews); (3) understanding that humans are socially and culturally conditioned, existing in and shaped by historical contexts; and (4) learning about various ways of thinking or modes of inquiry.Contemplative studies clearly has the goals of enhancing both self-awareness and “mental migration” into other worldviews, and an expected outcome would be ongoing critical reflection on such learning. CS should and does value the analytic study of contemplative states and traditions: scientifically, historically, culturally, and personally. While few would disagree that scientific inquiry, historical study, and knowledge of sociocultural context are significant when learning about contemplative traditions, [End Page 23] there is more dispute about the value of actual “first-person” contemplative practice, both for scholars and for students in academic courses, either during or outside class. Some of my fellow essayists in this volume and many others have argued eloquently that firsthand personal experience is an important way of illumining these traditions as well as alternative ways of knowing and valuing more generally.I will begin by offering a series of connected reasons why the latter view should resonate for a liberal arts teacher, then raise some issues that focus on the practice of contemplative teaching in the classroom.1. There are a variety of ways of knowing oneself or consciousness and the world, and it is important to investigate these various ways, to better understand human existence. In fact, recognizing that there are different kinds of knowing increases one’s capacity for critical analysis.2. Contemplative reflection is one of the ways people come to know themselves and the world, and come to understand the nature of contemplative practice itself.3. Contemplative inquiry has been important to many people in a large number of cultures, so it should be understood through both external study and direct experience, to gain a more accurate (and “lived”) understanding of others’ worldviews and practices.4. Given this broad and long-standing interest, there are, naturally, diverse contemplative traditions and experiences. We should learn how this variety is understood and explained by practitioners (i.e., their personal significance) as well as by scientists (their observable characteristics). Both kinds of study facilitate “mental migration” into others’ worldviews.5. Those within contemplative traditions have a long history of critical analysis and argument about various introspective states, so we should learn about and attend to both the states and the arguments.6. In evaluating what contemplative thinkers say, it is valuable to attend to what and how we... (shrink)

In 1938 Maurice Mandelbaum published his well-known work, The Problem of Historical Knowledge, an insightful study of relativism, judgments of fact and value, causation, and the philosophy of history. Consequent to the publication of this work, the author noted increased interest in these problems, beginning with Carl Hempel’s "The Function of General Laws in History," and R. Collingwood’s posthumous work, The Idea of History, muted interest in the "fact" and "value" problems of the 30s in favor of the (...) kinds of explanation that can be sought or found in history. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dante’s Vision and the Circle of KnowledgeAnthony RodaDante’s Vision and the Circle of Knowledge, by Giuseppe Mazzotta; 328 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, $37.50.Future students of Dante, The Divine Comedy, literature, criticism, the history of ideas, theology, philosophy, and many other disciplines will be in permanent debt to Giuseppe Mazzotta for his keen study of Dante’s Vision and the Circle of Knowledge. While tracing the (...) principal streams of Western thought which irrigate Dante’s fertile genius, Mazzotta reconstructs the intellectual topography of Dante’s Europe and show how “l’altissimo poeta” reorders and refines it and arrives at a radical reformulation of the foundation of knowledge in contrast to the standard philosophical and theological currents of the times. This new vision of the foundation of knowledge is the central concern of The Divine Comedy which for Mazzotta provides a world view no less monumental than the synthesis of the classical and Judeo-Christian traditions of Thomas Aquinas. Perhaps, more so, for he argues Dante’s great epic provides not only an alternative epistemology but one which captures much more adequately the human historical experience.Vico’s insights, a thorough familiarity of Dante’s sources and his alert appreciation of the unique treatment these sources receive in the context of “la commedia divina” supply Mazzotta with a theoretical framework for his own brilliant critical, historical, and etymological analyses. He marshals these researches around his overriding concern to show that inherent within the Comedy is the view of “poetry as nothing less than the foundation of all possible knowledge” (p. 3). Dante’s radical claim is designed to provide an account which accords with the educational and intellectual development of the individual within history. Consequently for Mazzotta, Dante’s poetic (metaphorical) mode attempts to reconcile what must have been an intellectual and moral landscape of hopeless contradictory systems and projects. Dante’s poem [End Page 194] provides a vivid survey of the breakdown of human bonds, human projects, and human justice and suggests a corrective that escaped the methods of reason, as well as those of the mystic’s. Since both of these are at bottom antihistorical, they attempted to deny conflict and uncertainty (Dewey’s ultimate traits of experience).The above comments should suggest both the general appeal as well as, and I must emphasize, the high level of scholarship Mazzotta exhibits in his project which is arranged into three parts. The first part (Chapter 1–5) is devoted to “poetry and the arts of language,” and a quick glance at these chapters reveals that it is concerned with that part of the liberal arts called the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic). In addition to their educational role, the author examines the role and intricate connections these disciplines have to the central social structures of the times. Consequently, these are not mere sterile academic exercises but serious attempts that show the intimate connections between methods of knowing (discourses) and social structures, especially authority in all of its modes (moral, intellectual, political, etc.). Further, by virtue of this, he shows the need for a reexamination of knowledge which does justice to the lived experiences of the individual and to which the second part (Chapters 6–8) is devoted. Briefly, this means coming to terms with language, memory, imagination, dreams and visions, and that great nightmare, human history. It also invokes the aesthetic (poetic/metaphorical) foundations of all knowledge in contrast to the Cartesian dismissal. The claim, however, enlightening for the Comedy, is controversial as a general tenet and demands will be forthcoming for an evaluation, even though there is much good work in philosophy which lends support to it, e.g., Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses, R. G. Collingwood’s The Principles of Art, and Lewis E. Hahn’s A Contextualistic Theory of Perception, etc.In the last part (Chapters 9–11) Mazzotta argues that Dante’s final organizing vision figures the world sub specie ludi. These chapters examine the problems and experiences of order, transgression and exile which for Mazzotta demand a Theologia Ludens whose roots are imbedded deep in Aristotle’s Ethics and expressed by the virtue of eutrapelia, “a... (shrink)

The issue of how to read and interpret the Qur’ān has been the subject of Islamic sciences such as Kalām, Fiqh and Taṣawwuf. Each discipline has put forward an interpretation methodology according to its point of view. While interpreting the verses, the Ṣūfīs who are members of Taṣawwuf also produced some methodological concepts for several reasons. They interpreted the Qur’ān with the sign (ishāra), a method of interpretation suitable for the characteristics of Taṣawwuf. The ishāra is a secondary method of (...) interpretation compared to tafsīr (the Qur’ānic exegesis). In this context, the ishārī tafsīr is the interpretation of the verses by kashf and ilhām. It is also the narration of the signs claimed to exist in the verse. However, while the ṣūfīs wanted to explain their inferences regarding the verses on the one hand, they had to hide them on the other hand. These attitudes led to the paradox of statement-concealment as a problem peculiar to the ishārī tafsīr. The goal of this study is to evaluate the tradition of ṣūfī tafsīr / exegesis in terms of this paradox. One of the aims of this study is also to determine the tools that the ṣūfīs use for some reasons in interpreting the Qur’ān and how they conceptualize them. In this perspective, the function of symbolic means such as letter and sign in Taṣawwuf has been emphasized. The formation of a number of methods and instruments specific to ishārī interpretation and the influence of Ibn al-ʿArabī on this method have been discussed. To achive the objectives of this paper, this research article conducted a detailed literature review. As a method, the phenomenological approach and historical methodology have been used in order to present the ṣūfīs interpretation methodology objectively. The concept analysis method has used in order to exhibit a detailed analysis of some concepts directly related to the subject of the study. There are many studies about ishārī tafsīr, the method of interpretation of the Qur’ān by the ṣūfīs in Turkey and abroad. These works are mostly of classical-style works based on determining the nature and position of the ishārī tafsīr or discussing the ishārī interpretation style of a ṣūfī mufassir. For example, Yaşar Kurt’s work titled Ni’metullah Nahcivânî ve Tasavvufî Tefsiri, Mehmet Okuyan’s work named Necmuddin Daye ve Tasavvufi Tefsiri are doctoral theses on this subject. If we need to mention some studies directly related to the subject and the purpose of our article; they are as follows: Among the works written today are Yunus Emre Gördük’s Tarihsel ve Metodolojik Açıdan İşârî Tefsir, Davut Ağbal’s book titled İbn Arabî’de İşârî Tefsir, some communiqués in the book published by Kuramer under the name of Kur’an’ın Bâtınî ve İşârî Yorumu. Ekrem Demirli’s article “Kuşeyrî’den İbnü’l-Arabî’ye İşârî Yorumculuk Hakkında Bir Değerlendirme” is one of the sources of this research. As for the works written in the past; early ṣūfīsm classics, al-Ghazālī’s and Ibn al-ʿArabī’s writings, some boks on the methodology of Qur’ānic interpretation written by scholars such as al-Dhahabī and al-Zurḳānī can be given. The findings and results obtained inthe light of this study are: The ṣūfis have named their experiences they wanted to express, as ishāra. They have wanted to declare their feelings as a result of the spiritual states they were in while reading or listening to the Qur’ān. At the same time, they tried to hide their feelings with the concern of not being understood, not being accepted, being accused or harming those who did not taste the same pleasure. The desire to explain their enthusiastic feelings and experiential knowledge on the one hand and the need to conceal them on the other, seemingly have caused a paradox. Therefore, they have made use of some conceptual tools while interpreting the Qur’ān and used a covered language. In this framework, Ibn al-ʿArabī and his successors have a different position and style. Ibn al-ʿArabī’s approach to the Qur’ān has been named as theoretical ṣūfī tafsīr instead of ishārī ṣūfī tafsīr from now on. His main instrument is iʻtibār / taʻbīr as a way of ta’wīl. His followers such as Kāşhānī, Nakhčiwānī and Brūsawī have been influential in the spread and acceptance of the ishārī interpretation activities. This article fills the gap in the literature. Because it is a methodological analysis and an evaluation of the terms and methods that ahl al-taṣawwuf have produced in order to explain or conceal some of their thoughts about the verses, it will also make a contribution to the ishārī tafsīr literature. Although the article is presented as a result of a careful and detailed research, there are some missing points in it. Thus, further studies that will contribute positively to the debates on the legitimacy of the ishārī tafsīr and its method can be produced. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo assess the scientific and ethical basis for clinical innovation in psychopharmacology.MethodsWe conducted a literature review, utilizing MEDLINE search and bibliographic cross-referencing, and historical evidence regarding the discovery and development of new medications in psychiatry. Clinical innovation was defined as use of treatments in a clinical setting which have not been well-proven in a research setting.ResultsEmpirical data regarding the impact of clinical innovation in psychopharmacology are lacking. A conceptual and historical assessment of this topic highlights the ethical and (...) scientific importance of clinical innovation. Ethically, it touches a borderline that, in our judgment, is not adequately framed in contemporary mainstream bioethics. Currently, research is viewed as not at all benefiting the patients who participate in it, while clinical care is viewed as being solely for the benefit of patients. Clinical innovation straddles these two worlds, uncomfortably at times. While many argue that clinical innovation should either be avoided or folded into research projects, we argue that clinical innovation is necessary for progress in psychopharmacology research, and that it can prosper best when guided by the following ethical principles: 1.) The treatment should be based on a viable hypothesis. 2.) Whenever possible, one's clinical observations should be reported so they can be evaluated by the scientific community. 3.) One should be willing to report unexpected observations of drug effects. 4.) A high standard of informed consent should be maintained. Again, this proposal goes against the standard view among bioethicists that research and clinical care are categorically opposed activities, as made clear by the either-or dichotomy of the Belmont Report on bioethics. This approach has so polarized our profession into clinicians versus researchers, that many clinicians will not apply new knowledge produced by clinical research until it eventually gets incorporated into formal treatment guidelines, while researchers have little to guide them as to what kind of new knowledge it is most important to provide.SummaryClinical innovation brings out the ambiguities in our current ethical conceptions of research versus clinical care. Yet, historically, clinical innovation has been an important contributor to progress in psychopharmacology. We argue that clinical innovation should not be discouraged, but rather it should occur under certain ethical conditions."Almost everyone can and should do research...because almost everyone has a unique observational opportunity at some time in his life which he has an obligation to record....If one considers the fundamental operations or methods of research, one immediately realizes that most people do research at some time or another, except that they do not call their activity by that name. There are seven operations....In simple language they are counting, sorting, measuring, comparing, nature-study, guess testing, and reappraisal....Guess testing is of course what most people think of when the word research is mentioned; except that it is bad manners to call a guess a guess. It should be called an hypothesis. Let us make one plea. Guessing becomes merely a game unless it is done in the context of a plan for action. It is a waste of time elaborating untestable hypotheses [1]."John Cade. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Japan, France, and East-West Aesthetics: French Literature, 1867-2000Carol S. GouldJapan, France, and East-West Aesthetics: French Literature, 1867-2000. By Jan Walsh Hokenson. Madison and Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2004. Pp. 520. $80.00.Jan Walsh Hokenson's masterful work, Japan, France, and East-West Aesthetics: French Literature, 1867-2000, traces the migration of the Japanese aesthetic into French art, through French literature, and ultimately into Western modernism and postmodernism. Despite the title, this (...) book goes beyond French poetics, for it deals with some philosophical views about knowledge and art, and it offers an extended argument for the value of comparative studies, including comparative philosophy. The author moves easily among the areas of literature, art, and philosophy, all of which she discusses with authority.Her story begins with the birth of 'japonisme,' the term coined by critic Philippe Burty in 1876 to refer to the passion-artistic and commercial-for things Japanese. She identifies three waves of japonisme in French literature: pre-World War I, between the wars, and post-World War II. She leads the reader through each of these waves, detailing the cultural and artistic milieu in each and closely analyzing key figures.For the origins of japonisme, Hokenson takes us to the studio of Parisian engraver, printmaker, and designer Felix Bracquemond in 1856, which was just after the end of Sakoku. Bracquemond, according to the "most persistent legend," [End Page 699] opened a box of Asian ceramics and discovered that they were wrapped in extraordinary materials-layers of Hokusai woodcut prints the likes of which he had never seen. He summoned members of his circle, which included Manet, Degas, and Whistler (pp. 13-15). It is thus through an intriguing historical contingency that this relatively inexpensive, mass-produced art form would become the inspiration for some of the most personal and expensive art works today. More relevant to Hokenson's interest, however, is the fact that these woodcuts would be a seminal force in the direction of French letters.Had Bracquemond not had the vision to see the artistry of these prints or had the shipper used a different packing material, would Western painting and literature have taken a different turn? Would the West have seen impressionism, symbolism, or art nouveau? Would Proust, Claudel, Mallarmé, and others have written different works? From Hokenson's account one gleans that the French avant-garde eye was ready to see Hokusai and others, for artists felt that the mimetic view of art had led them to an impasse. Visual and literary artists were ready to abandon the Renaissance ideals of verisimilitude, perspective, the integrity of space, and the linearity of time. They were ready to accept the fragmentation of picture space, perspectivism, and suggestiveness that were all characteristic of the Japanese aesthetic.She explains how Henri Bergson, with his theories of intuition and subjective time, provided a philosophical foundation for the artistic commitments of the early japonistes. She documents the access many of the japonistes had to Bergson. Bergson, like the japoniste poets and painters themselves, emerged from a French tradition of using subjectivity as a starting point. The reader sees this respect for the subjective interact with various Japanese influences over the course of the twentieth century. The receptiveness to the haiku exemplifies this phenomenon, as it begins from a fleeting, intuitive, personal experience. She points out that "by 2000, the haiku was almost a commonplace in French poetry" (p. 407).Although she says little about what Bergson may have absorbed from the japonistes, she does tell of the little-known influence exerted by the Japanese phenomenologist Kuki Shūzō in 1928 on Jean-Paul Sartre. Both Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir either forgot this relationship or forgot to mention it in their respective narratives about the development of existentialism. Indeed, this was not discovered, Hokenson reports, until the 1980s. She rightly points out that that this changes the usual story about French philosophy in the early twentieth century, for it means that Sartre became acquainted with German phenomenology before 1932 and from someone other than Raymond Aron (pp. 333-334, 343, 474 n. 10). In a fascinating discussion of Kuki's... (shrink)

In this paper, we present an interdisciplinary discussion on the relations between Science–Technology Education and Culture both historical standpoint and nowadays. The idea that a human mind can produce an intellectual revolution within science and its approaches strongly crossed like a paradigm both in the history of sciences and disciplines–literatures : but what about its social impact and science mission, as well? To describe the impact of the disseminated knowledge is a consequent aim. A case study on energy (...) conceptualization and its exhibitions in Society in Context is discussed; their correlations with education, science–techniques, industry and social impacts are discussed, as well. (shrink)

In China, the local communities and various ethnic minorities still hold, sustain and develop traditional medicial knowledge (TMK), innovations, and practices within the original communities. TMK also has pharmaceutical option value, which has attracted interests in commercial use of TMK for pharmaceutical innovation in China. However, the increased use of TMK for non-traditional purposes might lead to a change in the customary treatment of TMK as common goods of relevant communities and peoples, and may lead to significant tension faced (...) by both providers and users of TMK in China. We find there is a significant gap in literature analysing the phenonmenon of domestic biopolitics concerning TMK in China. Closely connected problem is the contradictory relationship between providers and users of TMK, especially between the indigenous and local communities, and corporate and industrial actors. Therefore, urgent research is needed to fill this literature gap. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Lucretian Receptions: History, The Sublime, KnowledgeWilson H. ShearinPhilip Hardie. Lucretian Receptions: History, The Sublime, Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. ix + 306 pp. 4 black-and-white ills. Cloth, $90.Students of Latin literature need no introduction to the work of Philip Hardie. Although he has written on topics across the classical canon, he is perhaps best known as an influential critic of Virgil. His 1986 book, Virgil’s Aeneid: (...) Cosmos and Imperium, which traces the Aeneid’s articulation of Roman imperial ideology in cosmological idiom, remains, whatever one’s position on its arguments, a central monument within recent Virgilian criticism. One achievement of that work is its demonstration of how Virgil’s epic is informed by the writing of his Epicurean precursor, Lucretius. As the volume under review shows, the last quarter-century has only deepened and expanded Hardie’s fascination with Lucretius’ relationship to later authors, above all, Virgil. Lucretian Receptions now joins Hardie’s earlier writing (and Monica Gale’s Virgil on the Nature of Things [Cambridge, 2000]) as a significant English-language resource for mapping Lucretius’ presence in the Latin literature of the late Republic and early Empire. While the work manifests some blindspots—in particular, certain theoretical questions about the shape of Hardie’s critical practice and the nature of his broader project remain unanswered for this reviewer—the strength and insight of its detailed interpretations should make it standard reading for both Lucretians and those interested in the history of Latin literature more generally.With a reach that extends from Homer to Milton, the volume is neither exclusively a treatment of didactic nor of Latin literature; taken as a whole, it tends towards the articulation of a broader strain of Lucretian tropes and themes within ancient poetry, a strain whose tradition is bounded neither by language nor genre and whose chief voices include Homer, Empedocles, Lucretius, Virgil, Horace, and Ovid (as this list makes clear, many “Lucretian” tropes and themes antedate Lucretius himself; Hardie occasionally places Lucretius within a tradition of “Empedoclean” rather than “Lucretian” epos). Not unlike Hardie’s earlier book, which locates the influence of Lucretius’ didactic, natural-scientific poem upon a narrative epic, this work finds textual traces of the Epicurean poet in places where they may be less expected and where, at least historically, some critics have denied them. Thus we find within the volume treatment of the connections between De rerum natura and Virgil’s bucolic poetry or Horace’s lyric alongside the more expected (and well-explored) indications of Lucretius’ impact on the Georgics. Further, as the work’s subtitle hints, it is organized as a collection of topical, thematic essays rather than as a sustained, sequential argument. This arrangement (which betrays the diverse origin of the chapters) allows Hardie to pursue Lucretius and his place in the ancient poetic landscape unconstrained by, if also well aware of, the traditional features—genre, natural-scientific theme, philosophical bent—that, at least occasionally, have encouraged critics to locate Lucretius outside the main currents of classical and post-classical Latin poetry.The volume consists of eight chapters, six published in some form previously, [End Page 532] which collectively treat the broad subjects “Time, history, culture,” “Sublime visions,” and “Certainties and Uncertainties.” Argument generally proceeds by close reading, or through tracking close verbal reminiscence (often visually articulated by boldface highlighting). Yet this attention to detail does not prevent Hardie from making important larger connections: his first chapter, for example, “Cultural and historical narratives in Virgil’s Eclogues and Lucretius,” begins by tracking gen- words (genetrix, genitalia, gignant, etc.) in De rerum natura (13–15), but it quickly turns these detailed observations into a reading (based on Ovid Ars Amatoria 3.337) of Aeneas as the atomic, “original substance” of Rome. Similarly, his final chapter concludes with a pointed verbal reminiscence of Lucretius in Andrew Marvell’s “On Paradise Lost”: for Hardie, Marvell’s mention of “delight and horror” (l. 35), which conjures up Lucretius’ divina voluptas... atque horror DRN, 3.28–29), captures perfectly the similarity between Lucretius’ and Milton’s sense of the strong connection between verbal composition and the composition, or creation, of reality (278–79... (shrink)

In the present study, we tried to deal with the controversial concept of Alevism. Over the years, it has drawn our attention that controversial concepts have increased remarkably in various articles and studies. Especially heterodoxy, orthodoxy, syncretism, etc. It has been seen that the main concepts come to the fore as the main discussion axis in Alevism studies. However, without knowing what these concepts are, Alevism is being dragged into completely different channels with the tendency of slogans such as "Alevism (...) is heterodoxy, Alawism is syncretism". From this point of view, the need to deal with controversial concepts that create the hidden agenda has emerged. From this point of view, we tried to deal with the main platform concepts and discussions encountered in Alevism studies. In particular, we tried to deal with the controversial concepts formed around the speculations produced by the West and that create the hidden agenda. The Ottoman Safavid rivalry attracted the attention of Europe which sought to expand its research and experience in the field. To date, incomparable literature has been produced in this field. Over time, this literature has become a reference source for modern Alevism studies. Although these studies are partially objective, the ambassadors, clerics, travelers, and researchers who wrote them could not escape the influence of the educational, cultural, and religious political perspective from which they came. This accumulation, which was transferred to the present over time, was transmitted to other generations and formed a tradition of perception. Alevism, which was condemned to vicious circles such as sectarianism, left-wing radicalism, etc., was included in the script of studies that aimed at politicization, marginalization, and conceptual distortions by separating it from the religion of Islam. But at the same time, the changes in knowledge and methods produced by each period were reflected in this literature. In this context, the research products on Alevism have formed the information infrastructure in politicization and orientation activities. This long-standing interest of the Europeans eventually allowed the emergence of new concepts and some evaluations from their own perspectives. Due to the lack of systematic theology of Alevism and its structure as a mythological theological understanding based on oral literature and traditions, no consensus could be reached on the definition. As a natural result of this, Alevism operates with the belief that it is in a race to be defined by different people and groups, and each one of them is the right one. Thus, Alevism is an emotional state where everyone can speak and even feel themselves in absolute truth. As a method, we tried to examine the leading controversial concepts with their current counterparts in a concrete way, so that they can find concrete answers in the minds of researchers. In addition, we have tried to deal with the works that set the agenda in the past and today. Thus, it will reflect the general view of the controversial concepts of Alevism. This situation of Alevism has attracted the attention of orientalist researchers (George White, Irène Mélikoff, Marcus Dressler, Hans Lucas Kieser) in the historical process, and they have shown interest in this field with political, ideological, religious, and other motives. While doing this, they preferred to use the concepts found in the history of Christianity and Judaism in the field of Alevism. These researchers have used the historical understanding and patterns of their cultures, such as Christianity and Judaism, to which they originally belonged, in interpreting Alevism. All these approaches prevent the correct perception of Alevism and lead to an environment of mental confusion and chaos. It has caused Alevism to move away from the scientific understanding it deserves. (shrink)