Standard theories of liability say that X is liable to Y only if Y was harmed, only if X caused Y harm, and (usually) only if X was at fault. This article offers a series of criticisms of each of these claims, and use them to construct an alternative theory of liability in which the nature of X's having imposed a risk of harm on Y is central to the question of when X is liable to Y, and (...) for how much. The article ends with some conjectures on ignorance as an excusing condition. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the role of culpability in determining the degree of liability to defensive harm, and asks whether there are any restrictions on when culpability is relevant to liability. A natural first suggestion is that it is only relevant when combined with an actual threat of harm in the situation in which defensive harm becomes salient as a means of protection. The paper begins by considering the question of whether two people are equally liable to defensive (...) harm in a situation if both culpably intend to harm another, but due to circumstances outside the control of the two people only one has a chance of succeeding in causing harm. I argue that there is no difference in liability between the two. I then turn to a kind of slippery slope challenge that accepting this conclusion would lead to a vast over-inclusiveness in those liable to defensive harm, and consider a recent attempt at meeting it that requires that a person’s culpability can only affect liability if it concerns the very situation in which defensive harm is relevant. Finally, I put forward and assess a new way of meeting the challenge that appeals to a particular conception of culpability together with auxiliary theses concerning how culpability can decrease over time, among others. (shrink)

This article discusses the problematic aspects relating to the employee dismissal based on application of the disciplinary liability. It contains analysis of two grounds for termination of the employment contract without any previous notice: 1) imposing several disciplinary sanctions upon the employee in the course of twelve months, and 2) the employee has only one breach of labour discipline but a gross one. The article is based on legal acts and judgements of Judicial Assemblies of the Civil Division of (...) the Supreme Court of Lithuania and resolutions of the Senate of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in order to provide the legislative execution practice as well as reveal the problems in this field of labour law. (shrink)

This article is a response to commentaries on my book, Killing in War, by Cécile Fabre, Alex Leveringhaus and Victor Tadros. It discusses the implications of the approach I have defended for the morality of war for such issues as internecine killing in war, humanitarian intervention and the bases of individual liability to attack in war.

When states perpetrate injustices, do their individual citizens develop liabilities to repair such wrongdoings? Most existing accounts of citizens’ liabilities for state-perpetrated injustices, whilst applicable across certain democratic contexts, struggle to provide robust accounts of the grounds and nature of liabilities for citizens in non-democratic contexts. This problematically leaves a lacuna when it comes to the responsibilities and appropriate responses of citizens in these states. This article advances a distinctive two-pronged authorisation-based account applicable to non-democracies. Objective authorisers are individuals who (...) derive presumptive benefits, are comparably better-off under, and can reliably influence the decision-making processes over the injustice perpetrated by the state. Subjective authorisers are citizens who autonomously endorse their state as credible interpreters and upholders of their aims in relation to the injustices in question. Both objective and subjective authorisers of the state in relation to particular injustices perpetrated, are liable to compensate, actively oppose, and commemorate the victims of state-perpetrated injustices. This account will be shown to be empirically applicable to a large number of minimally decent non-democratic states, where the political elite enjoy moderate popular support over their incorporation and reflection of citizen interests and preferences in their governance, despite the absence of formal democratic electoral mechanisms. This authorisation-based view differs from existing accounts oriented around complicity and participatory intentions, in better accounting for non-participants who are nevertheless intuitively liable for the actions of their authorised state, as well as circumventing structural shortcomings affecting complicity-centric accounts. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan has argued against the moral equivalence of combatants (MEC) by developing a liability-based account of killing in warfare. On this account, a combatant is morally liable to be killed only if doing so is an effective means of reducing or eliminating an unjust threat to which that combatant is contributing. Since combatants fighting for a just cause generally do not contribute to unjust threats, they are not morally liable to be killed; thus MEC is mistaken. The problem, (...) however, is that many unjust combatants contribute very little to the war in which they participate—often no more than the typical civilian. Thus either the typical civilian is morally liable to be killed, or many unjust combatants are not morally liable to be killed. That is, the liability based account seems to force us to choose between a version of pacifism, and total war. Seth Lazar has called this “The Responsibility Dilemma”. But I will argue that we can salvage a liability-based account of war—one which rejects MEC—by grounding the moral liability of unjust combatants not only in their individual contributions but also in their complicit participation in that war. On this view, all enlistees, regardless of the degree to which they contribute to an unjust war, are complicitously liable to be killed if it is necessary to avert an unjust threat posed by their side. This collectivized liability based account I develop avoids the Responsibility Dilemma unlike individualized liability-based accounts of the sort developed by McMahan. (shrink)

According to the dominant position in the just war tradition from Augustine to Anscombe and beyond, there is no "moral equality of combatants." That is, on the traditional view the combatants participating in a justified war may kill their enemy combatants participating in an unjustified war - but not vice versa (barring certain qualifications). I shall argue here, however, that in the large number of wars (and in practically all modern wars) where the combatants on the justified side violate the (...) rights of innocent people ("collateral damage"), these combatants are in fact liable to attack by the combatants on the unjustified side. I will support this view with a rights-based account of liability to attack and then defend it against a number of objections raised in particular by Jeff McMahan. The result is that the thesis of the moral equality of combatants holds good for a large range of armed conflicts while the opposing thesis is of very limited practical relevance. (shrink)

The responsible corporate officer doctrine is, as a formal matter, an instance of strict criminal liability: the government need not prove the defendant’s mens rea in order to obtain a conviction, and the defendant may not escape conviction by proving lack of mens rea. Formal strict liability is sometimes consistent with retributive principles, especially when the strict liability pertains to the grading of an offense. But is strict liability consistent with retributive principles when it pertains, not (...) to grading, but to whether the defendant has crossed the threshold from noncriminal to criminal conduct? In this essay, I review the two most plausible arguments supporting an affirmative answer in the context of the RCO doctrine. First, perhaps this doctrine reflects a rule-like form of negligence, akin to a rule that prohibits selling alcohol to a minor. Second, perhaps this doctrine expresses a duty to use extraordinary care to prevent a harm. Neither argument is persuasive. The first argument, although valid in some circumstances, fails to explain and justify the RCO doctrine. The second argument, a duty to use extraordinary care, is also inadequate. If “extraordinary care” simply means a flexibly applied negligence standard that considers the burdens and benefits of taking a precaution, it is problematic in premising criminal liability on ordinary negligence. If instead it refers to a higher duty or standard of care, it has many possible forms, such as requiring only a very slight deviation from a permissible or justifiable standard of conduct, placing a “thumb” on the scale of the Learned Hand test, identifying an epistemic standard more demanding than a reasonable person test, or recognizing a standard that is insensitive to individual capacities. However, some of these variations present a gratuitous or incoherent understanding of “negligence,” and none of them sufficiently explain and justify the RCO doctrine. (shrink)

This paper examines some of the possible legal implications of the production, marketing and use of expert systems. The relevance of a legally useful definition of expert systems, comprising systems designed for use both by laymen and professionals, is related to the distinctions inherent in the legal doctrine underlying provision of goods and provision of services. The liability of the sellers and users of, and contributors to, expert systems are examined in terms of professional malpractice as well as product (...) liability. A recurring theme indicates that legislators may be inclined to restrict possibilities of liability suits in order to avoid disincentives to the creation of expert systems. (shrink)

Jonathan Quong argues for the “moral status” account of defensive liability. According to the moral status account, what makes it the case that assailants lack rights against the imposition of defensive violence on them is that they are treating defenders as if those defenders lack rights against the imposition of aggressive violence on them. This “as if” condition can be met in some situations in which one person, A, commands very good but factually inaccurate evidence that another person, B, (...) poses a lethal danger to her. In this “Mistaken Attacker” case, A will be entirely blameless. Nonetheless, A is defensively liable, because A assumes that B is defensively liable despite the fact that B is not defensively liable. In other cases, A may threaten B, who is innocent and hence defensively non-liable, without treating B as if B lacks rights. For example, in the “Conscientious Driver” case, A may have lost control of her car, having taken all due precautions, and be posing a lethal threat to an innocent pedestrian, B, but A is not treating B as if B lacks rights because B’s interests have already been taken fully into account in arriving at the verdict that careful driving is morally permissible. In this paper, I explore and criticize Quong’s account. I argue that the distinctions Quong draws between Conscientious Driver and Mistaken Attacker cannot be sustained in ways that uphold the moral status account, and I suggest that the moral status account’s focus on the “as if” condition is morally undermotivated. The drift of my argument is that we should take much more minimal accounts of defensive liability more seriously than we typically do. (shrink)

Collective Liability in Islam: The ʿĀqila and Blood-Money Payments. By Nurit Tsafrir. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. xviii + 167. $99.99.

Legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania establish several types of material liability of workers engaged in labour (professional) relations: material liability applied pursuant to the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the LC) and material liability applied pursuant to the Law on Public Service of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the LPC). In the present article, theoretical and practical aspects of material liability of Lithuanian public servants for (...) material damage caused are analysed. The authors of the article study the conditions for the application of the material liability and identify the main circumstances that must be determined in applying this type of legal compulsion. Furthermore, the authors investigate the relation between the material and disciplinary liabilities, study the limits of the application of labour law norms (that regulate material liability of employees) and civil law norms (regulating personal civil liability) in professional legal relations, identify the means and procedure for solving disputes arising in the application of the material liability. Practical mistakes in the application of the material liability of public servants and violations are analysed on the basis of a rather sparse case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania related to the material liability. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline a proposal for assigning liability for autonomous machines modeled on the doctrine of respondeat superior. I argue that the machines’ users’ or designers’ liability should be determined by the manner in which the machines are created, which, in turn, should be responsive to considerations of the machines’ welfare interests. This approach has the twin virtues of promoting socially beneficial design of machines, and of taking their potential moral patiency seriously. I then argue for (...) abandoning the retributive approach to machine crime in favor of prioritizing restitution. I argue that this shift better conforms to what justice demands when sophisticated artificial agents of uncertain moral status are concerned. (shrink)

Who is responsible when an AI machine causes something to go wrong? Or is there a gap in the ascription of responsibility? Answers range from claiming there is a unique responsibility gap, several different responsibility gaps, or no gap at all. In a nutshell, the problem is as follows: on the one hand, it seems fitting to hold someone responsible for a wrong caused by an AI machine; on the other hand, there seems to be no fitting bearer of responsibility (...) for this wrong. In this article, we focus on a particular (aspect of the) AI responsibility gap: it seems fitting that someone should bear the legal consequences in scenarios involving AI machines with design defects; however, there seems to be no such fitting bearer. We approach this problem from the legal perspective, and suggest vicarious liability of AI manufacturers as a solution to this problem. Our proposal comes in two variants: the first one has a narrower range of application, but can be easily integrated in current legal frameworks; the second one requires a revision of current legal frameworks, but has a wider range of application. The latter variant employs a broadened account of vicarious liability. We emphasise strengths of the two variants and finally highlight how vicarious liability offers important insights for addressing a moral AI responsibility gap. (shrink)

:Strict liability in tort law is thought by some to have a moral counterpart. In this essay I attempt to determine whether there is, in fact, strict liability in the moral domain. I argue that there is, and I critically evaluate several accounts of its normative foundations before suggesting one of my own.

The standard of proof applied in civil trials is the preponderance of evidence, often said to be met when a proposition is shown to be more than 50% likely to be true. A number of theorists have argued that this 50%+ standard is too weak – there are circumstances in which a court should find that the defendant is not liable, even though the evidence presented makes it more than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. In this paper, (...) I will recapitulate the familiar arguments for this thesis, before defending a more radical one: The 50%+ standard is also too strong – there are circumstances in which a court should find that a defendant is liable, even though the evidence presented makes it less than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. I will argue that the latter thesis follows naturally from the former once we accept that the parties in a civil trial are to be treated equally. I will conclude by sketching an alternative interpretation of the civil standard of proof. (shrink)

A minimally responsible threatener is someone who bears some responsibility for imposing an objectively wrongful threat, but whose responsibility does not rise to the level of culpability. Minimally responsible threateners include those who knowingly commit a wrongful harm under duress, those who are epistemically justified but mistaken in their belief that a morally risky activity will not cause a wrongful harm, and those who commit a harm while suffering from a cognitive impairment which makes it prohibitively difficult to recognize and (...) act on what is morally required of them. The chapter argues that minimally responsible threateners can indeed be morally liable for the harms they impose. Put differently, culpability is not a necessary basis for liability. (shrink)

Adam Hosein has recently proposed that a sufficient degree of intervening agency between a person’s contribution to an unjust lethal threat and the posing of that threat can exempt the contributor from liability to defensive killing. Hosein suggests that this will exempt most civilians from liability to lethal defence even if they contribute to unjust killings. I argue that intervening agency does not bear on a person’s responsibility for a threat, and does not exempt her from liability (...) to defensive killing. (shrink)

This paper offers an economic analysis of one aspect of the possible liability for incorrect information traded on information markets: expert liability for incorrect asset valuation. The article does not address the questions of whether and under what circumstances an expert should bear contractual liability for an incorrect valuation. Rather, it assumes such contractual liability towards the person who has solicited the opinion and focuses instead on analyzing the circumstances under which the expert’s liability should (...) be extended to third parties as well. (shrink)

The author investigates the necessity of fault as the prerequisite of contractual civil liability. The author makes the conclusion that Lithuanian law, following most of the countries belonging to the civil law tradition and contrary to the common law systems, as well as Vienna convention, UNIDROIT principles, PECL and DCFR, begins with the theory that fault is a requirement for contractual liability. Strict liability in Lithuanian law is the exception of this general rule. Nevertheless, the author argues (...) that the general rule is subject to important exceptions, and the practical importance of these exceptions is as great as the cases falling within the general rule. In case of no agreement of the parties or any provision of law regarding fault as the necessary prerequisite for contractual liability, in Lithuania, similar to France, the distinction between the obligations to produce a given result and the obligations to use reasonable care is essential: according to Article 6.200(4) of the Lithuanian Civil Code (hereinafter – the CC), a party in breach of an obligation to use best efforts is liable for fault. (shrink)

McMahan argues that justification defeats liability to defensive attack (which would undermine the thesis of the "moral equality of combatants"). In response, I argue, first, that McMahan’s attempt to burden the contrary claim with counter-intuitive implications fails; second, that McMahan’s own position implies that the innocent civilians do not have a right of self-defense against justified attackers, which neither coheres with his description of the case (the justified bombers infringe the rights of the civilians) nor with his views about (...) rights forfeiture, is unsupported by independent argument, and, in any case, extremely implausible and counter-intuitive; and third, that his interpretation of the insulin case confuses the normative relations between an agent’s justification and non-liability on the one hand and permissible or impermissible interference with the agent’s act on the other. Similar confusions, fourth, affect his discussion of liability to compensation. (shrink)

In most cases, liability in tort law is all-or-nothing—a defendant is either fully liable or not at all liable for a claimant's loss. By contrast, this paper defends a causal theory of partial liability. I argue that a defendant should be held liable for a claimant's loss only to the degree to which the defendant's wrongdoing contributed to the causing of the loss. I ground this principle in a conception of tort law as a system of corrective justice (...) and use it to critically evaluate different mechanisms for “limiting” liability for consequences of wrongdoing and for “apportioning” liability between multiple wrongdoers. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Jeff McMahan's "Just Cause for War". It defends a more permissive, and more traditional view of just war liability against McMahan's claims.

To a large extent liability for ICT perils is still a grey area, even though an increasing number of information security researchers adopt economic approaches to highlight market mechanisms and externalities. That is why this article focuses on the need for increased awareness of externalities and liability among ICT professionals and their customers. This is critical to achieve in order to promote appropriate ICT technologies and services with comprehensible privacy and security protection. What is needed is a better (...) understanding of the consequences of externalities from ICT perils. This would benefit customers and increase trust in ICT products and services which in turn may even increase suppliers' profit margin; customers would be prepared to buy more services and products if contracts and service level agreements would accept more liability. Moreover, suppliers could sell guaranties and insurances on top of their products and services. The result would be a win-win situation and would benefit society at large. (shrink)

This chapter discusses blameworthiness for problematic acts that an agent does inadvertently. Blameworthiness, as opposed to liability, is difficult to make sense of in this sort of case, as there is usually thought to be a tight connection between blameworthiness and something in the agent’s quality of will. This chapter argues that in personal relationships we should sometimes take responsibility for inadvertent actions. Taking on responsibility when we inadvertently fail in our duties to our loved ones assures them that (...) we respect them, take them seriously, and want to be respected and taken seriously in turn. The chapter ends with a defence of the claim that this is a genuine sort of blameworthiness. -/- . (shrink)

This article elaborates upon and defends the distinction between “primary duty” claims and “primary liability” claims in private law introduced in a previous article. In particular, I discuss the relevance of the distinction to the debates over fault and strict liability and “duty skepticism” and to the relationship between primary and remedial rights. I argue that the tendency to assume that all claims in private law arise from a breach of duty is a source of error and confusion. (...) As a prelude to the discussion, I set out an analysis of a claim or remedial right in private law as a Hohfeldian power correlated with a remedial liability. I also consider whether primary-liability claims can be formulated in terms of the legal relations found in Wesley Hohfeld's scheme, and I make some general comments about Hohfeldian analysis. (shrink)

This article presents the conception of negligent account management, analyses the rules of the criminal act that govern criminal liability for negligent account management, by focussing on the form of guilt and the problem of its content. The plenary session’s conclusion that the two offences – failure to administer bookkeeping and failure to protect the bookkeeping documents – can be committed both intentionally and negligently is disputed in this article. The adoption of the new Criminal Code in 2000, setting (...) the form of guilt and its content in criminal cases for negligent account management, posed no significant problems – the court practice and legal literature followed the attitude that this crime could be committed only negligently. According to Article 16(4) of the Criminal Code 2000, a person is punished for negligent commission of a crime or a misdemeanour only in individual cases stipulated in the Special Part of the Criminal Code. The problem was that no “individual case” was foreseen in Article 223 of the Criminal Code that imposed liability for negligent bookkeeping. This created preconditions for deviating from pre-existing case-law under which this crime could be qualified as negligent. Only in 2009 the Criminal Division of the Lithuanian Supreme Court concluded in its plenary session that Article 223 of the Criminal Code provided liability for criminal record-keeping and accounting only if committed negligently as a form of guilt, and other activities pursuant to this Article might be committed intentionally and recklessly. The plenary session identified a loophole of criminal law and created preconditions for the formation of uniform court practice. Only the legislator can remove the loophole of criminal law identified by the Supreme Court of Lithuania. The author states that all of the acts named in Article 223 of the Criminal Code can be committed negligently and suggests applying the rule contained in Article 16(4) of the Criminal Code to Article 223 of the Criminal Code. All of these findings are based on historical, grammatical and logical interpretation of the “neglect” concept and the analysis of Articles 222 and 223 of the Criminal Code. (shrink)

Many climate ethicists maintain that climate policy costs should be borne by those who historically emitted the most greenhouse gases. Some theorists have recently argued, however, that actors only became liable for emitting once the emissions breached legitimate legal regulation governing emissions. This paper challenges this view. Focusing on the climate responsibility of states, it argues that even if we assume that legitimate legal regulation is needed to remove excusable ignorance of entitlements to emit or is constitutive of such entitlements, (...) it does not follow that states should be exonerated from responsibility for all pre-legal emitting. This is because the pre-legal emissions may have violated moral duties not to behave recklessly and to promote the emergence of the relevant regulation. The paper closes by noting how grounding liability for emitting in such duties complicates the link between past emissions and liability. (shrink)

This essay explores the case against strict liability offenses as part of the more general debate about proportional punishment. This debate takes on a very different look in light of a formal result derived by the authors elsewhere, that is briefly summarized and whose implications are pursued here. Traditional objections that consequentialists have mounted against the deontologists’/retributivists’ defense of proportionality fall by the wayside, but a new threat to the proportionality requirement replaces it: the ease with which any such (...) requirement can be circumvented. (shrink)

Workplace exposure to SARS-CoV-2 has sickened workers and, subsequently, their family members. Family members might be able to recover from the employer in a negligence action using “take-home” liability theory.

A minimally responsible threatener is someone who bears some responsibility for imposing an objectively wrongful threat, but whose responsibility does not rise to the level of culpability. Minimally responsible threateners include those who knowingly commit a wrongful harm under duress, those who are epistemically justified but mistaken in their belief that a morally risky activity will not cause a wrongful harm, and those who commit a harm while suffering from a cognitive impairment which makes it prohibitively difficult to recognize and (...) act on what is morally required of them. The chapter argues that minimally responsible threateners can indeed be morally liable for the harms they impose. Put differently, culpability is not a necessary basis for liability. (shrink)

Developments in contract law over the past century have led to the proliferation of interpretive theories according to which contract law is no longer a sui generisi legal branch. It is widely accepted that if there is a sui generis contractual obligation, it must somehow be based on the wills of the parties. But a new orthodoxy in contract theory claims that the role of the will of the parties in contract law has been progressively shrinking due to judicial doctrines (...) within the law of contract and also to general statutory provisions. It is no longer apparent that there is any interesting sense in which contractual liability is based on the will of the parties. Hence, so it is claimed, contract law has lost its sui generis nature. The article challenges this new orthodoxy. But rather than reverting to the old orthodoxy—the will theory of contracts (or its contemporary rendition, contract as promise)—it argues that we should resist being forced to choose between them. The article argues that the purpose of contractual liability is to support the practice of voluntary obligations. This view preserves an important connection between contractual liability and voluntary undertakings and meets the objections that beset the will theory. (shrink)

This article focuses on the problem of criminal liability for unlawful engagement in economic activities, analyses the emergence and development of this norm in criminal law and the ways of its optimal explanation. Special attention is paid to the problem of identification of illegality of activities, based on specific tax and economic regulation. The study concludes that criminal liability must be limited to a violation of fundamental requirements for the legality of business, and does not include particular abuses (...) occurring in legal business. The author also deals with the criteria of delimitation of criminal and administrative liability for unlawful engagement in economic activities. Under Article 202(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, application of criminal liability is limited by two alternative conditions: either a person illegally undertakes activity in entrepreneurial way or on a large scale. According to the paper, the above-mentioned regulation lacks clarity and leads to the risk of unfounded prosecutions. The author gives practical examples, where on the basis of inexplicable criterion of an entrepreneurial way, criminal charges are filed in respect of petty economic activities. Such practice is incompatible with the purposes and principles of criminal law. The paper proposes to delete the criterion of an entrepreneurial way from the definition, leaving the possibility of criminal liability only in case of large scale illegal economic activity. The article also substantiates the conclusion that prohibited business activities provided for in Article 202(2) of the Criminal Code actually defies logical explanation and should be removed from the regulation. At the end of the article, the author offers a sample of optimal legal wording of unlawful engagement in economic activities in criminal law. (shrink)

The risk of tort liability for health maintenance organizations and other managed care plans has dramatically increased in recent years. This is due in part to the growing percentage of health care rendered through managed care plans. The cost-containment mechanisms commonly used by managed care plans, such as limiting access to services and/or choice of providers, creates a climate ripe for disputes that may end up in court. As dissatisfied patients and providers seek recourse in the courts, tort doctrines (...) are extended and new legal theories emerge as needed. For example, the concepts of direct and vicarious tort liability developed in the hospital context have been extended by courts to encompass HMOs. vicarious liability claims, based on ostensible agency or respondeat superior doctrines, have been brought against HMOs and managed care plans for negligent treatment by physicians selected to provide care to members. (shrink)

The Moral Responsibility Account of Liability to Defensive Harm (MRA) states that an agent becomes liable to defensive harm if, and only if, she engages in a foreseeably risk-imposing activity that subsequently threatens objectively unjustified harm. Advocates of the account contend that liability to defensive harm is best understood as an aspect of distributive justice. Individuals who are liable to some harm are not wronged if the harm is imposed on them, and liability to defensive harm thus (...) helps ensure that harm is borne by whoever has least of an objection of justice against being burdened with it—or so advocates of the MRA insist. In this paper, I argue that liability to defensive harm is not grounded in considerations of distributive justice. While it depends on the wider societal context what allocation of a burden is distributively most just, liability to defensive harm is a distinctly localised affair. I propose that liability to defensive harm is best understood as part of the enforcement dimension of our rights to non-interference. Framing liability in this way does not invalidate the MRA. It does, however, render subjective impermissibility accounts of liability particularly promising. (shrink)

The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (UN-SDGs) offer a comprehensive framework for global sustainable development, embraced by both UN member states and multinational enterprises (MNEs). The SDGs take a holistic approach and emphasize the need to align public- and private-sector actions. However, understanding the effectiveness of the SDG framework in coordinating stakeholder actions remains a challenge. This study explores how MNEs engage with the SDGs as a function of their home countries’ SDG profiles. Leveraging institutional theory, we test competing mechanisms (...) by analyzing sustainability reports from 150 MNEs across 23 countries. Our results suggest that MNEs’ engagement with the SDGs aligns most closely with a “liability of origin” explanation, with firms showing greater SDG engagement when their home countries have lower progress on the SDGs. However, at the individual SDG level, the engagement patterns are more nuanced. Our findings have important implications for both theory and practice, providing insights into the complex dynamics that shape MNEs’ engagement with the SDGs and offering guidance for policymakers and businesses seeking to enhance their contributions to sustainable development. (shrink)

Accomplice liability makes people guilty of crimes they knowingly helped or encouraged others to commit, even if they did not commit the crime themselves. But this method of criminalizing aiders and abettors is fraught with problems. In this chapter, I argue that accomplice liability in the criminal law should be replaced with a system in which agents are criminalized on the basis of their individual contributions to causings of harm—the larger the contribution, the more severe the crime—regardless of (...) whether those contributions were made “through” the actions of another person. Not only would this avoid the issues associated with making the guilt of accomplices parasitic on the guilt of the principal, it would also fill gaps in the law concerning other cases to which accomplice liability does not apply. (shrink)

In “Bioethics and the Moral Authority of Experience,” Ryan Nelson et al. (2022) argue that personal experience can simultaneously be an asset and a liability in the practice of bioethics and medici...

There is a well-established social practice whereby we hold one another responsible for the things that we say. Speakers are held liable for the truth of the contents they express and they can be sanctioned and/or held to be unreliable or devious if it turns out what they say is false. In this paper chapter we argue that a better understanding of this fundamental socio-linguistic practice – of ascribing what we will term (following Borg (2019)) ‘linguistic liability’ – helps (...) to shed light on a core debate in semantics and pragmatics, concerning how and where to draw the line between different kinds of content. We suggest that attributions of linguistic liability form a heterogenous (rather than a homogenous) class and seek to show that different kinds of liability judgements are useful because they track divergent kinds of content – specifically the kinds that have come to prominence in recent theorising theorizing about the semantics/pragmatics divide. (shrink)

The paper considers the proper method for theorizing about criminal jurisdiction. It challenges a received understanding of how to substantiate the right to punish, and articulates an alternative account of how that theoretical task is properly conducted. The received view says that a special relationship is the ground of a tribunal’s authority to prosecute and, hence, that a normative theory of that authority is faced with identifying a distinctive relation. The alternative account locates prosecutorial standing on an institution’s capacity to (...) address the basic reasons generating criminal liability. This reframes the normative issues at stake, and has the result that various, perhaps quite heterogeneous, considerations can substantiate penal authority. It also eliminates the existence of a special relation as a necessary condition for legitimate criminal accountability. The argument proceeds by offering an analysis and account of universal jurisdiction. Not only does the alternative elegantly perform where the received view struggles, it can accommodate much of what motivates the pursuit of relational ties in existing efforts to vindicate jurisdictional conclusions. (shrink)

Christian List argues that responsibility gaps created by viewing artificial intelligence as intentional agents are problematic enough that regulators should only permit the use of autonomous AI in high-stakes settings where AI is designed to be moral or a liability transfer agreement will fill any gaps. This work challenges List’s proposed condition. A requirement for “moral” AI is too onerous given technical challenges and other ways to check AI quality. Moreover, transfer agreements only plausibly fill responsibility gaps by applying (...) independently justified group responsibility attribution norms such that AI does not raise unique regulatory norms. (shrink)

In Lister v Hesley Hall [2002] 1 AC 215 the House of Lords reformed the law on vicarious liability, in the context of a claim arising over the intentional infliction of harm, by introducing the ‘close connection’ test. The immediate catalyst was the desire to facilitate recovery of damages on the part of victims of child abuse. The precise form the revision assumed was derived from two Canadian Supreme Court cases: Bazley v Curry [1999] 174 DLR (4th) 45 and (...) Jacobi v Griffiths [1999] 174 DLR (4th) 7. The Canadian jurisprudence contains a detailed review of the policy factors underpinning the law of vicarious liability and expresses the view that the most significant of these is ‘enterprise liability’. This article attempts to establish whether enterprise liability holds the same significance in the UK. And, on the assumption that it does, the article goes on to consider any difficulties that may ensue and any further common law reforms that may result. In particular it considers whether the law on vicarious liability for independent contractors is likely to change. (shrink)

Class action lawsuits and the justice that they are supposed to enforce have become of great concem to legislators in recent years. The traditional ruIes of tort liability cannot completely support the court decisions that have been reached. The rulings, however, are clearly in the interest of giving victims the justice that they are due. Legal scholars, such as Jules Coleman, claim that the conflicts between tort liability and class action justice cannot be reconciled in our legal system. (...) I propose an avenue of analysis whereby the principles of justice that support tort law are preserved as needed for modem issues, yet at the same time address the genuine public policy concems in these class actions. (shrink)