_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 71 - 105 Grotius’s theory of punishment provides a unique lens through which to view his evolving thought on sovereignty between _De Indis_ and _De iure belli ac pacis_ and the implications of that evolution for Grotius’s theory of the ius in bello. Throughout both works, Grotius attempted to leave open the possibility of private punishment and private warfare, a position not easily squared with prevailing views of sovereign authority. Initially, Grotius was (...) content with a theory marrying the private right of punishment with more traditional Scholastic views of sovereignty through a transfer of the private right from individuals into the hands of the sovereign. This theory also adopted traditional views of subject responsibility for sovereign acts—and, by extension, the exposure of subjects to punishment for the acts of their sovereign. By the time of his mature work, however, Grotius turned away from natural law justifications for collective responsibility and collective punishment, denying that subjects had to answer for the acts of their sovereign as a necessary incident of the compact creating civil society. This led Grotius to refer virtually all forms of collective responsibility, such as reprisal or punishment exacted through war, to the law of nations. This sharp reduction of the natural consequences of the creation of sovereign power also enabled Grotius’s argument that the private right of war, and in particular the private right of punishment, remained available after the creation of civil society. (shrink)

The idea of “just war” is not alien to Chinese thought. The term “yi zhan” (usually translated as “just war” or “righteous war” in English) is used in Mencius, was renewed by Mao Zedong, and is still being used in China today (zhengyi zhanzheng). The best place to start exploring this Chinese idea is in the enormous Art of War corpus in premodern China, of which the Seven Military Classics is the best representative. This set of treatises served as the (...) military bible in imperial China from 1078 CE. Ideas analogous to ius ad bellum and ius in bello can be found in these texts. These norms are present in these military texts, elaborated in subsequent commentaries, understood as a matter of fact in Chinese political history, and recently and briefly acknowledged by a few Chinese military scholars in the mainland and in Taiwan. This Chinese just war ethics has its distinctiveness vis-à-vis James Turner Johnson's articulation of the Western classic view. It differs from Johnson's claims that military lethal violence is intrinsically morally neutral and that last resort is not a primary consideration in deciding for war. Contemporary Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) military publications show that the PLA understands the general idea of just war, but they acknowledge only the ad bellum part, not the in bello components. (shrink)

This article examines the moral issues of guerrilla, and counter-guerrilla, warfare. Just war theorists who have studied the phenomenon tend to claim that the guerrilla tactic of wearing civilian clothes and hiding among the civilian population is rather difficult, if at all, to reconcile with the ius in bello principle of discrimination (the principle according to which combatants have to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and may only target the former “directly”). I argue that this ever-repeated assessment is profoundly (...) confused. I also argue, conversely, against the claim that this guerrilla tactic makes it somehow easier for the counter-insurgents to comply with the principle of discrimination, thereby easily allowing them to resort to tactics like area bombardment. Finally, I demonstrate that, contrary to common opinion, guerrilla war does not face greater difficulties in complying with ius ad bellum requirements than conventional or counter-insurgency war does. (shrink)

El Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH) nació en Latinoamérica. Ante la creencia imprecisa de que el DIH surgió tras la batalla de Solferino (24 de junio de 1864), como consecuencia de la experiencia de Henry Dunant, se refuta y demuestra que tal aseveración carece de sustentación empírica y científica porque desconoce la importancia histórica y jurídica del Tratado de Regularización de la Guerra y el Tratado de Armisticio suscrito entre la República de Colombia (presidida por El Libertador Simón Bolívar) y el (...) Reino de España (representada por el Mariscal Pablo Morillo) en Trujillo, Venezuela, el 27 de noviembre de 1820, que culminó con el encuentro de ambos líderes combatientes en la histórica población de Santa Ana de Trujillo, llamada, desde entonces, "Morada de Paz" o "Cuna de la Diplomacia Americana". Se destaca en el texto que tales Pactos Internacionales, denominados los "Tratados de Trujillo", fueron aplicados, a modo de precedente jurídico y humanitario, en las diversas Capitulaciones y Acuerdos de Paz que van desde 1820 a 1830 durante el curso de la Lucha de Emancipación frente al imperio español, dando nacimiento al "Derecho de la Guerra" moderno sometido a los sentimientos de piedad, justicia y humanidad. La obra destaca que, a contrario sensu de la opinión mayoritaria, el DIH se configuró en Latinoamérica durante la Guerra de Independencia que lideraron El Libertador Simón Bolívar, El Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho Antonio José de Sucre y los Padres Libertadores de la Gran Colombia (antes integrada por los ahora Estados de Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Panamá, Perú y Venezuela) frente al Reino de España, entre 1810 y 1830. La aseveración relacionada con que el DIH nación en dicho contexto local (y no en Europa), tiene como soporte legal, jurídico o dogmático un enorme cúmulo de instrumentos bilaterales y multilaterales (Acuerdos, Capitulaciones, Amnistías y Tratados) que sentaron las bases del "Derecho de la Guerra" o de la humanización del acto violento la guerra a través de su sometimiento a las reglas jurídicas como mecanismo para contener la venganza, la aniquilación y la destrucción de la vida y los bienes del enemigo en el conflicto bélico. Se sostiene que con dicha regulación, se generó y consolidó el Corpus Iuris Pro Humanitatis, para, en medio de la guerra sometida, a la legalidad y el sentido de justicia, resaltar y proteger la dignidad humana de los combatientes, heridos, enfermos, prisioneros de guerra, población civil (no beligerante), los bienes ajenos a las operaciones militares y lograr preservar la paz como valores y principios superiores de la humanidad. Para confirmarlo, vale la cita textual de lo afirmado por Simón Bolívar, El Libertador, cuando le escribió entonces a Pablo Morillo que ambos Estados estaban compelidos a suscribir "...un tratado verdaderamente santo, que regularice la guerra de horrores y crímenes que hasta ahora ha inundado de lágrimas y sangre a Colombia, y que sea un monumento entre las naciones más cultas, de civilización, liberalidad y filantropía..." (Simón Bolívar: Carta a Pablo Morillo, Cuartel General de Carache, 3 de noviembre de 1820). -/- Contenido del libro: Parte Primera. Elementos teóricos y normativos. Clásicos que forjaron el ius in bello hispano fuente jurídica primaria del ius in bello hispano-grancolombiano y del DIH contemporáneo: Capítulo I. Aportes de la edad antigua al ius in bello en general. Capítulo II. La Edad media y la Edad moderna: sus aportes en la definición de la «guerra justa» como teoría influyente en la fundamentación del ius in bello hispano. Parte Segunda. La Escuela de Salamanca y su influencia en el desarrollo del derecho internacional y el ius in bello hispano: Capítulo I. Sobre la Escuela de Salamanca y la ’guerra justa‘. Capítulo II. Otros referentes teóricos y regulatorios europeos y americanos relacionados con la conformación del ius in bello. Capítulo III. La edad contemporánea, el ius in bello y los DDHH. Parte Tercera. Acuerdos humanitarios entre la corona española y los beligerantes independentistas de Venezuela y la Nueva Granada antes de los tratados de Trujillo (1812/1819). Capítulo II. El trienio de los acuerdos humanitarios hispanograncolombianos durante el trienio liberal español: los tratados de Trujillo de 1820 y su aporte a la configuración del ius un bello hispano-grancolombiano. Parte Cuarta. El trienio de los acuerdos humanitarios hispanograncolombianos durante el trienio liberal español: otros acuerdos humanitarios convencionales para la regulación y humanización de la guerra posteriores a los tratados de Trujillo: Capítulo I. Las capitulaciones hispano-grancolombianas en Venezuela despues de los tratados de Trujillo. Capítulo II. Acuerdos humanitarios convencionales iberoamericanos en la campaña libertadora del sur del continente americano. Parte Quinta. Otros referentes normativos y conceptuales posteriores a los tratados de Trujillo y el impacto del ius in bello hispano-granclombiano en los principios basicos del DIH de las convenciones de Ginebra: Capítulo I. Referentes conceptuales y jurídicos posteriores a los tratados de Trujillo, que influyeron en la conformación del derecho humanitario de la guerra y del DIH contemporáneo. Capítulo II. La influencia notoria del ius in bello hispano-grancolombiano sobre la configuración de los principios básicos del DIH vigente. Capítulo III. Reflexiones sobre la odiosidad de la guerra y un proyecto de futuro para Iberoamérica y la familia humana. (shrink)

Avatar is laden with images and themes of religion and spirituality. Theology also forms the base of “just war theory.” The principles of just war theory were adapted by early Christian thinkers from the natural law theory developed by the Stoics – a group of ancient philosophers who believed that we could look to nature for guidance about what is right and good for human beings. The early Christians turned to just war theory to help resolve a quandary. Just war (...) theory includes two related philosophical doctrines. ius ad bellumis about when it's just to go to war, and ius in bello is about what it's just or unjust to do in the conduct of a war. Ius ad bellum shows us why Selfridge's authorization of force to displace the Omaticaya is wrong, while ius in bello exposes Quaritch's battlefield strategies and tactics as inhumane and indefensible. (shrink)

Ese artículo presenta una síntesis de las teorías normativas de la guerra justa, mostrando los consensos teóricos existentes en las tres categorías de la ius ad bellum (la justicia de la guerra), ius in bello (la justicia en la guerra) y ius postbelum (justicia de la postguerra). Posteriormente, se desarrollan estos conceptos para el caso de una guerra real.

The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification and justness (“justice”) are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution (through adequate definitions), the second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is the crucial part of “just war (...) theory.” However, “just war theory,” somewhat Manichean in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and destroys the collective character of warfare (reducing it to an incomprehensible individual level, as if a group of people entered a battle in hopes of finding another group of people willing to respond). Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over the future, predictability (obtained through laws), is a feature of peace. This might imply that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation of this inability (which could simply be incompetence, or because peace, as a specific articulation of distribution of social power, is not tenable anymore) forms the justification of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time (and expressed in customary and legal rules of warfare), with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive. (shrink)

The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification and justness are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution, the second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is the crucial part of “just war theory.” However, “just war (...) theory,” somewhat Manichean in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and destroys the collective character of warfare. Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over the future, predictability, is a feature of peace. This might imply that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation of this inability forms the justification of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time, with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan, one of the leading contemporary writers on ‘just war thinking’, argues in the book under review, Killing in War, that one of the central tenets of the ‘ius in bello’, namely the moral equality of combatants, is both conceptually and morally untenable. This results from a reflection upon and a departure from two basic assumptions in Walzer’s work, namely the idea that war itself isn’t a relation between persons, but between political entities and their human instruments and (...) the idea that the ‘ius ad bellum’ and ‘ius in bello’ are and should be kept distinct. This book merits serious reflection. However, the disadvantages of McMahan’s position are obvious. If the rights of combatants during war depend on the justice of their cause, the immunity of the civilians on the side of the supposed ‘unjust’ enemy is seriously endangered. (shrink)

Agresja putinowskiej Rosji na Ukrainę postawiła wobec dramatycznego wyzwania nobliwą doktrynę non‑violence. Zgodnie ze sformułowanym w latach 80. XX wieku wywodem antysowieckiego dysydenta rosyjskiego Władimira Bukowskiego to nie wojna jest przeciwieństwem pokoju, lecz przemoc, a do jej powstrzymania niekiedy konieczny jest zbrojny opór, czyli prowadzenie wojny. Według Clausewitza do wywołania stanu wojny nie wystarczy militarna agresja, lecz konieczne jest przeciwstawienie się jej, czyli aktywna obrona ze strony napadniętego, chcąc zatem uniknąć wojny, nie należy stawiać oporu agresorowi. Agresja na Ukrainę złamała (...) dwie zasady prowadzenia wojen: ius ad bellum i ius in bello. Według typologii Michaela Walzera jest to zatem niesprawiedliwa wojna prowadzona niesprawiedliwymi metodami, więc przeciwstawianie się jej, także militarne, jest prowadzeniem wojny sprawiedliwej. Zgodnie z analizą Slavoja Žižka tworzy to klarowną z etycznego punktu widzenia sytuację, zło jest łatwo identyfikowalne, a przeciwstawienie się mu stanowi etyczny obowiązek. Według filozofa Étienne’a Balibara w tej sytuacji pacyfizm nie jest żadną opcją. Helplessness as Acquiescence to Evil The aggression of Putin’s Russia towards Ukraine has posed a dramatic challenge to the noble doctrine of non-violence. In line with an argument made in the 1980s by anti-Soviet Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, war is not the opposite of peace; instead, violence is. Armed resistance, or warfare, is sometimes necessary to stop violence. According to Clausewitz, military aggression is insufficient to evoke a state of war; in its place, it is necessary to oppose aggression, i.e., actively mount a defense by the attacked party, thereby avoiding war requires not resisting the aggressor. However, the aggression against Ukraine broke two tenets of warfare: ius ad bellum and ius in bello. According to Michael Walzer’s typology, it is an unjust war waged by unjust methods, so resisting it, including militarily, amounts to waging a just war. According to Slavoj Žižek’s analysis, this establishes an ethically clear situation: evil is easily identifiable, and opposing it is an ethical duty. According to the philosopher Étienne Balibar, pacifism is not an option in such a situation. (shrink)

In spite of extensive criticisms, war metaphors are still widespread in medical discourse. In the domain of public health analogies between war and infectious diseases are rooted in the similar impacts they can have on political institutions and communities. This similarity has been emphasized by the recent trend of addressing infectious disease from the point of view of national security. Nevertheless, it is here argued that the analogy cannot be used to model normative principles for treating carriers of contagious diseases (...) after the principles of ius in bello . Yet, the analogy may provide some useful practical and theoretical insights in tackling the growing problem of limiting the spread of drug-resistant pathogens: an issue that generates increasing worries and raises difficult ethical and political questions of rights, responsibilities and obligations. It is suggested that if anti-microbials and antibiotics are seen as strategic information, their misuse can be usefully compared to careless talk in times of war. (shrink)

Although Plato writes less about war than we might expect--especially considering the fact that his dialogues are historically set during the Peloponnesian War--the right conduct of war constitutes a crucial concern for Plato. In both the Alcibiades and Laches dialogues, rightful conduct of war is linked to the practice of virtue. Neither a good statesman nor a good military man can ignore this link, which joins military pursuits not only to courage, but to the whole of virtue, including justice. In (...) the Republic , the passage from a luxurious city to a well-ordered and virtuous city is described by means of the proper education of the city's military guardians, and a teaching of ius in bello --to use a just-war term--for wars between Greeks is outlined. Finally, in the Laws , peace, not war, is presented as the true aim of good laws, and the importance of legitimate authority in war-making is duly emphasized. (shrink)

A comparison between the Prolegomena of Chapter II of De iure praedae and the Prolegomena of De iure belli ac pacis leads to the conclusion that the ideas of Grotius on legal systematization have changed considerably between 1604 and 1625. Whereas Grotius starts in IPC with general principles with a rather unclear distinction between leges and regulae, in IBP he gives first the philosophical and theological basis of international law, intertwined by a concise set of general legal rules, mostly derived (...) from Roman law after its reception in Western Europe. The general outlines of legal systematization in the early-modern period are expounded. In the attempts of legal systematization the concept of subjective rights is essential. These subjective rights are not, as is sometimes assumed, a medieval renewal of legal technique, but can be found essentially already in classical Roman law of the first centuries AD.The institutional system is not yet visible in De iure praedae, it might be different for De iure belli ac pacis. Significant here are possibly the expressions ius ad bellum and ius in bello. (shrink)

According to some, the combatant-noncombatant distinction has lost its relevance in today’s world. I examine two arguments to this effect. The first states that the distinction has become irrelevant when it categorizes children as combatants. I reply that the distinction has nothing to do with innocence or guilt, but with the degree to which a violent group poses a threat to others, even when it does so legitimately. The second argues that every civilian can be construed as a kind of (...) combatant, thus obliterating the distinction. My answer notes an error: states are representatives of citizens, not the other way around.My position in this paper is that individuals take on legitimate combatancy as a function of membership in an organization with legitimate combatancy. This paper attempts to construct a concept of the fighting organization that will allow us to determine the legitimate combatancy of such organizations. The three combatancy criteria I offer are military command structure, observance of the war convention, and representativeness. The first is a requirement for legitimate combatancy because it facilitates the prevention of ius in bello violations of the war convention and can enable the transition from war to diplomacy. My second criterion, the observance of the war convention, too, must be retained as a condition for legitimate combatancy: targeting noncombatants as a means of fighting the war certainly disqualifies organizations from potential POW status, and other ius in bello infractions might, as well. My third condition, representativeness, requires that fighters serve as moral proxies for a geographically contiguous, politically viable people in order to retain legitimate combatancy. If a fighting organization does not represent such a people, then it is a group of criminals rather than soldiers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Handbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms by James T. Bretzke, SJJohn J. FitzgeraldHandbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms James T. Bretzke, SJ washington, dc: georgetown university press, 2013. 260 pp. $24.95The Handbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms continues the recent sequence of concise dictionaries published by Georgetown University Press, including the Key Words volumes for various religions and A Handbook of Bioethics Terms. James Bretzke’s contribution is especially (...) welcome as it is the first such English-language reference work in Catholic moral theology since the Second Vatican Council. The author covers fundamental, social, medical, and sexual issues while providing frequent cross-references and further readings. Special attention is also given to scripture and ethics, the history of moral theology, the nature and authority of the Magisterium, canon law, Protestant thought, and moral philosophy. The longest entries are those on dissent (67–70), Humanae vitae (111–16), infallibility (122–24), and the Pontifical Commission on Births (180–82), which in advance of Humanae vitae produced the well-known Majority Report favorable to the use of contraception. The sections on these vexed issues delve into some of the relevant arguments from different sides.Given its space constraints as a portable paperback, the Handbook covers an impressive amount of historical and contemporary ground. The eight-hundred-plus entries are generally clear and irenic, and often illuminating. Consider the page-long entry on just war theory (131–32), which succinctly summarizes its development from Augustine to the present-day Catechism, calls attention to the importance of ius post bellum alongside the traditional categories of ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and outlines four possible critiques of the theory. Particularly helpful throughout are the various examples the author provides. For instance, in the course of explaining that moral norms and human laws may not bind at all times, he suggests that it is justifiable to forgo the duty to sustain life when this can only be done through extraordinary means (140), or to exceed the speed limit in case of a medical emergency (15, 81; see also 183 and 239–40 for other relevant examples).On the other hand, a few key topics are either overlooked or not fully dealt with. This book rightly highlights ecumenical ethics (77–78 and passim), but there is essentially no coverage of Eastern Orthodoxy and very little on pre-twentieth-century Protestant thought. In addition, considering the prevalence of a “morality-of-happiness” perspective in historical and modern-day Catholic thought, and given Bretzke’s own thorough attention to law, the book might have incorporated separate entries on happiness and grace, law’s complement. [End Page 221] (To his credit, he does mention grace several times—a fact that the preface points out—and includes the beatific vision, Gloria Dei vivens homo, and Summum Bonum among his definitions.) And speaking of law, the author’s treatment of the divine law is slightly confusing; he appears to alternately conflate it with and differentiate it from both the eternal law and the law of the Old and New Testaments (70–71, 136, 138).In the end, despite Bretzke’s best efforts to remain above the ideological frays of moral theology, one’s overall evaluation of his book may depend somewhat on one’s place within them. Some will chafe at his suggestions that contraception (116), certain forms of assisted reproduction (198–99), and artificial nutrition and hydration that sustain those in a persistent vegetative state (10, 224–25) remain open questions to an extent. Others will point out, as Bretzke does, that Church doctrine has previously undergone substantial development on other issues, such as religious freedom (65–66, 151, 193, 229) and the charging of interest (107, 241). What most should be able to agree upon is that in many respects the Handbook is a valuable resource, one that will help professionals and students alike come to a much better understanding of the key terms and debates within the field. [End Page 222]John J. FitzgeraldSt. John’s University (New York)Copyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The subject of this article is the Orthodox Christianity’s approach to war. Christians of other denomination have developed an elaborate theory of war, so-called “Just War Theory” (JWT), which has also been accepted by non-Christians and even secular thinkers regarding the nature and justification of war. A vast literature has been produced in a dire attempt to render perfect the world by insisting on the claim that war is the act of punishment for breaking the law. The result is an (...) epistemological ease from which everything seems evident in advance including who is right and who at fault, who is and who is not favored by God. By removing from war an essential feature – that it is a form of conflict – JWT takes away the concept of reciprocity and introduces an in advance declared inequality which enables removal of uncertainty about the war’s outcome. In Orthodox Christianity, the situation is different. With still live debate whether to persevere or abandon original Christian pacifism, for Orthodox Christianity, war is always a combination of cataclysm and temptation and far less Manichean than anything present in JWT. The aim of war is peace; but, however necessary, justice is an insufficient condition for justification. The difference between “justness” and “justification” is preserved through the uncertainty whom God, at war’s end, loves more, because both victors and vanquished remain and continue to be in His grace. Losing a war, as such, does not turn the vanquished into criminals, nor does victory give the vanquisher the right of revenge for defending oneself. The latter approach to war has significant potentialities: preserving the distinction of ius ad bellum and ius in bello, preserving reciprocity, mutual respect and trust, impossibility of incrimination of war per se, the possibility of honorable defeat, etc. (shrink)

This paper argues that the current stock of anti-personnel cluster bombs are temporally indiscriminate, and, therefore, unjust weapons. The paper introduces and explains the idea of temporal indiscriminateness. It argues that to honor non-combatant immunity—in addition to not targeting civilians—one must adequately target combatants. Due to their high dud rate, cluster submunitions fail to target combatants with sufficient temporal accuracy, and, thereby, result in avoidable serious harm to non-combatants. The paper concludes that non-combatant immunity and the principle of discrimination require (...) a moratorium on the use of current cluster munitions. (shrink)

A moral doctrine on war, which establishes the moral conditions of making war, is something quite different from a moral doctrine on the international use of force, which condemns war as an inmoral action in itself. If our options are for the latter, we should be provided with a more efficient and equitable way to solve international conflicts than war, because the moral condemnation of war undermines the grounds on which the moral and legal doctrine on war has been traditionally (...) based. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Definition of Terrorism in Terms of Innocents The Definition of Terrorism in Terms of Non‐Combatants Terrorism, Combatants and Authoritarian States The Definition of Terrorism: An Indirect Strategy Conclusion.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Ethics and the Use of Nuclear Weapons Ethics and the Possession of Nuclear Weapons Toward a Theory of Justified Deterrence Applying Justified Deterrence Theory References and Further Reading.

Palabras en memoria de Eduardo Bello pronunciadas en la sesión inaugural del V Congreso Internacional de la Sociedad Académica de Filosofía, celebrado del 2 al 4 de febrero de 2011 en La Laguna (Tenerife).

Many nongovernmental forms of business regulation aim at reducing ethical violations in commerce. We argue that such nongovernmental ethics standards, while often laudable, raise their own ethical challenges. In particular, when such standards place burdens upon vulnerable market participants (often, though not always, SMEs), they do so without the backing of traditional legitimate political authority. We argue that this constitutes a structural analogy to wars of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, we show that, while some harms imposed by such standards are desirable, (...) others are best thought of as a form of collateral damage. We thus look at the well-developed literature on just war theory for inspiration and find that the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello contain many insights that can be fruitfully adapted to the case of nongovernmental standard-setting. Consequently, we propose the Ius ad Normam—a set of principles that should guide would-be standard-setters in assessing whether imposing those burdens is ethically justifiable in particular cases. We also discuss how powerful multinational businesses often act simultaneously as standard-takers and standard-setters and explore the normative implications of this dual role. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to deal with E. Husserl’s and E. Stein’s analyses on the anthropological and metaphysical questions. To perform this task it is necessary to explain the meaning of the phenomenological method, first of all in Husserl and then in E. Stein, underscoring the novelty of their approach to the knowledge of human being, world and God. The essay is divided in four parts; two are dedicated to Husserl’s and Stein’s investigation on the human being and (...) two to their development of metaphysical themes. Regarding the first topic we discover a significant connection between the two thinkers, regarding the second one we notice that it is possible to find a metaphysical approach to reality even in Husserl and an original development of the theme in Stein’s analysis linked up with the medieval philosophy and theology. (shrink)

... Abu Hamid al-Ghazall enumerates twenty questions upon which he contends the philosophers have formulated heretical theories against which the Muslim ...

Suppose one hundred prisoners are in a yard under the supervision of a guard, and at some point, ninety-nine of them collectively kill the guard. If, after the fact, a prisoner is picked at random and tried, the probability of his guilt is 99%. But despite the high probability, the statistical chances, by themselves, seem insufficient to justify a conviction. The question is why. Two arguments are offered. The first, decision-theoretic argument shows that a conviction solely based on the statistics (...) in the prisoner scenario is unacceptable so long as the goal of expected utility maximization is combined with fairness constraints. The second, risk-based argument shows that a conviction solely based on the statistics in the prisoner scenario lets the risk of mistaken conviction surge potentially too high. The same, by contrast, cannot be said of convictions solely based on DNA evidence or eyewitness testimony. A noteworthy feature of the two arguments in the paper is that they are not confined to criminal trials and can in fact be extended to civil trials. (shrink)

In queste pagine è delineata la vicenda esistenziale e intellettuale di Edith Stein. Donna straordinaria, è stata capace di racchiudere nella sua persona molte "possibili" vite. Le ha realizzate come ebrea e cattolica, fenomenologa e filosofa cristiana, docente e monaca carmelitana, agnostica e santa. Si tratta di un processo vitale dagli apparenti salti qualitativi, i quali si volgono all'ascolto di un medesimo nucleo identitario. Questa viva "formazione di sé" ha condotto Edith Stein a una "donazione di sé", culminata nell'Olocausto. Il (...) Diario di Edith si sovrappone ai pensieri di Angela Ales Bello, in veste di narratrice d'eccezione. Con la sentita partecipazione della narratrice, e insieme mantenendo il distacco critico della studiosa, viene scoperta la storia di un'anima. Le emozioni e le conquiste intellettuali trovano una sintesi grazie al peculiare approccio ai "fenomeni" che Edith Stein aveva appreso alla scuola di Edmund Husserl, di Tommaso d'Aquino e di Teresa D'Avila. Sintesi mirabile di pensatori che "si danno la mano" al di là dello spazio e del tempo--Front flap. (shrink)

This essay offers a case study in jus in bello in the American Revolutionary War by focusing on responses to sexual violence committed against American women by soldiers in the occupying British army and their Loyalist auxiliaries. Two main bodies of sources are juxtaposed in order to explore the contexts and manner in which jus in bello was adjudicated: British courts-martial and American Congressional investigations documenting British and Loyalist breaches of the codes of war. By putting the fragmentary (...) evidence of instances of rape in the context of contemporary legal and sociocultural practices of sexual violence in peacetime, as well as of the British army's disciplinary regime, we can elucidate the horizon of experiences and expectations against which survivors, assailants and prosecutors acted. The British army disciplined some soldiers for sexual offenses that violated military law and the codes of war, and it executed a few of them at a time when even their home society featured very low prosecu.. (shrink)

This note discusses three issues that Allen and Pardo believe to be especially problematic for a probabilistic interpretation of standards of proof: (1) the subjectivity of probability assignments; (2) the conjunction paradox; and (3) the non-comparative nature of probabilistic standards. I offer a reading of probabilistic standards that avoids these criticisms.

The literature on algorithmic fairness has examined exogenous sources of biases such as shortcomings in the data and structural injustices in society. It has also examined internal sources of bias as evidenced by a number of impossibility theorems showing that no algorithm can concurrently satisfy multiple criteria of fairness. This paper contributes to the literature stemming from the impossibility theorems by examining how informational richness affects the accuracy and fairness of predictive algorithms. With the aid of a computer simulation, we (...) show that informational richness is the engine that drives improvements in the performance of a predictive algorithm, in terms of both accuracy and fairness. The centrality of informational richness suggests that classification parity, a popular criterion of algorithmic fairness, should be given relatively little weight. But we caution that the centrality of informational richness should be taken with a grain of salt in light of practical limitations, in particular, the so-called bias-variance trade off. (shrink)

Smith argues that, unlike other forms of evidence, naked statistical evidence fails to satisfy normic support. This is his solution to the puzzles of statistical evidence in legal proof. This paper focuses on Smith’s claim that DNA evidence in cold-hit cases does not satisfy normic support. I argue that if this claim is correct, virtually no other form of evidence used at trial can satisfy normic support. This is troublesome. I discuss a few ways in which Smith can respond.

In this article we focus on the jus in bello principle of necessity for guiding the use of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). We begin our analysis with an account of the principle of necessity as entailing the requirement of minimal force found in Just War Theory, before highlighting the absence of this principle in existing work on AWS. Overlooking this principle means discounting the obligations that combatants have towards one another in times of war. We argue that the requirement (...) of minimal force is an important requirement for considering ethical uses of force. In particular, we distinguish between lethal and non-lethal purposes of use of force and introduce the prospect of non-lethal AWS before reviewing a number of challenges which AWS pose with respect to their non-lethal use. The challenges arise where AWS generate unpredictable outcomes impinging upon the situational awareness required of combatants to ensure that their actions meet the requirement of minimal force. We conclude with a call for further research on the ethical implications of non-lethal uses of AWS as a necessary contribution for assessing the moral permissibility of AWS. (shrink)

I comment on two analyses of the Simonshaven case: one by Prakken (2019), based on arguments, and the other by van Koppen and Mackor (2019), based on scenarios (or stories, narratives). I argue that both analyses lack a clear account of proof beyond a reasonable doubt because they lack a clear account of the notion of plausibility. To illustrate this point, I focus on the defense argument during the appeal trial and show that both analyses face difficulties in modeling key (...) features of this argument. (shrink)

This book proposes a new interpretative key for reading and overcoming the binary of idealism and realism. It explores the way human consciousness unfolds through the relationship between the I and the world-a field of phenomenological investigation that cannot and must not remain closed within the limits of its own disciplinary boundaries. The book focuses on the question of realism in contemporary debates, ultimately dismantling prejudices and automatisms that one finds therein. It shows that at the root of the controversy (...) between realism and idealism there often lie equivocations of a semantic nature. By returning to the origins of modern phenomenology this study mines the Husserlian concept of transcendental idealism. Following this path, and neutralizing the extreme positions of an acritical idealism and a naïve realism, the book proposes a "transcendental realism": the horizon of a dynamic unity that embraces the process of cognition and that grounds the relation, and not the subordination, of subject and object. The close reading of this reciprocity offered here allows one to surpass the limits of the domain of knowing, leading one to fundamental questions about the ultimate sense of things and their origin. (shrink)

Many philosophers have pointed out that statistical evidence, or at least some forms of it, lack desirable epistemic or non-epistemic properties, and that this should make us wary of litigations in which the case against the defendant rests in whole or in part on statistical evidence. Others have responded that such broad reservations about statistical evidence are overly restrictive since appellate courts have expressed nuanced views about statistical evidence. In an effort to clarify and reconcile, I put forward an interpretive (...) analysis of why statistical evidence should raise concerns in some cases but not others. I argue that when there is a mismatch between the specificity of the evidence and the expected specificity of the accusation, statistical evidence—as any other kind of evidence—should be considered insufficient to sustain a conviction. I rely on different stylized court cases to illustrate the explanatory power of this analysis. (shrink)

Computational models will play an important role in our understanding of human higher‐order cognition. How can a model's contribution to this goal be evaluated? This article argues that three important aspects of a model of higher‐order cognition to evaluate are (a) its ability to reason, solve problems, converse, and learn as well as people do; (b) the breadth of situations in which it can do so; and (c) the parsimony of the mechanisms it posits. This article argues that fits of (...) models to quantitative experimental data, although valuable for other reasons, do not address these criteria. Further, using analogies with other sciences, the history of cognitive science, and examples from modern‐day research programs, this article identifies five activities that have been demonstrated to play an important role in our understanding of human higher‐order cognition. These include modeling within a cognitive architecture, conducting artificial intelligence research, measuring and expanding a model's ability, finding mappings between the structure of different domains, and attempting to explain multiple phenomena within a single model. (shrink)

A recent empirical study has argued that experts in the ethics or the law of war cannot reach reasonable convergence on dilemmas regarding the number of civilian casualties who may be killed as a side effect of attacks on legitimate military targets. This article explores the philosophical implications of that study. We argue that the wide disagreement between experts on what in bello proportionality means in practice casts serious doubt on their ability to provide practical real-life guidance. We then (...) suggest viewing in bello proportionality through the prism of virtue ethics. (shrink)