Uno de los temas fundamentales de la filosofía realista es la intentio. Este concepto surgió en la filosofía árabe a partir de la idea aristotélica que explica la posibilidad del alma de apropiarse de las formas de las cosas. La intentio es el vínculo referencial entre la realidad y el intelecto en el acto de conocer. En la primera parte del artículo se hace una revisión conceptual del término con especial énfasis en Avicena y Averroes; y en la (...) segunda parte se explica la idea de la intentio en dos filósofos tomistas contemporáneos. El objetivo principal de este estudio es volver a subrayar la conexión real que se establece entre el sujeto cognoscente y las cosas de la realidad. Se trata de una de las genuinas características del conocimiento realista en oposición al conocimiento inmanentista. (shrink)

El trabajo procura mostrar que la propuesta de Herveo sobre la naturaleza de las intentiones puede entenderse como una revisión y corrección de los planteos de Radulfo Brito. En el De secundis intentionibus de Herveo de Natal, el modista Radulfo Brito aparece aludido en la presentación de una de las opiniones que identifica la intentio con el acto intelectual (d. 1, q. 2). Conforme a esta doctrina, la cosa real que es objeto de conocimiento es denominada intentio precisamente (...) a partir del acto intelectual. La fortaleza de esta doctrina radica en que parece que efectivamente el acto intelectual es requerido para que una cosa sea intentio, esto es, el término de la tendencia con la cual el intelecto tiende hacia (in-tendit) su objeto. En efecto, parece que, si no hay acto intelectual, mal puede hablarse de dicha tendencia. Herveo considera inaceptable que la intentio, ya se trate de la primera o de la segunda, sea identificada con el acto intelectual, pues este es una entidad real con un esse subiectivum, que cae dentro de alguna de las diez categorías aristotélicas. Sin embargo, Herveo recoge la distinción de Radulfo entre intentio in concreto e intentio in abstracto y la reformula a su modo. La intentio in abstracto o intentionalitas es la relación de razón de la cosa conocida con el intelecto. La distinción entre intentiones primeras no se explica, como en Radulfo, como basada respectivamente en un conocimiento intrínseco y otro respectivo o relacional. Más bien se debe a una distinción entre dos "órdenes de inteligibles": lo que pertenece a las cosas en sí mismas, apartando la acción del intelecto, y lo que les pertenece como consecuencia de estar objetivamente en el intelecto. Sin embargo, Herveo retendrá a su modo la distinción de Radulfo, al considerar aquellas intenciones segundas que significan de modo relacional. (shrink)

El estudio acerca de la influencia de las pasiones en el voluntario libre ha sido recurrente en la tradición tomista. Sin embargo, las causas de los dos efectos psicológicos de la intentio volitiva mencionados por Tomás de Aquino, la redundantia y la distractio, pasaron desapercibidas, y podrían aclarar algunos comportamientos consecuencia de la dinámica de las pasiones del hombre. La acción de la intentio volitiva originada por los afectos, al alcanzar cierto grado de intensidad, puede llegar a sobrepasar (...) el control de la voluntad y la inteligencia. Además, otro punto original de esta temática es que, a la par que el influjo de “abajo hacia arriba” (pasiones hacia la voluntad) —algo ya mencionado por Aristóteles cuando habla de la intemperancia y por los medievales en el estudio de la voluntad—, también puede detectarse otro de “arriba hacia abajo” (influjos afectivos superiores que influyen en la inteligencia —conocimiento afectivo⎯ y ésta sobre la voluntad), de tal manera que cierto tipo de concentraciones psicológicas hacen que la persona deje de tener sensaciones somáticas hasta producirse en él evasiones temporales, trances inconscientes y efectos extremos similares. Finalmente, desde el punto de vista de la Historia de la Filosofía, este trabajo también muestra que ha habido un olvido en el estudio de esta faceta volitiva de la intentio, ya que se ha estudiado sobre todo su aspecto ético, pero sin relación con la intentio cognoscitiva (“intencionalidad”). En cualquier caso, las tesis sobre la intentio y sus efectos muestran cómo es preciso rebasar el estudio del ámbito natural-biológico para completarlo con el ámbito personal-cultural. (shrink)

In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas states that the “aspect of pastness” involved in memory is a certain kind of cognitive object — i.e., an intention — apprehended by the “estimative power.” All told, however, Aquinas mentions this idea precisely once. In this article, I construct an account of the idea that pastness is an estimative intention by drawing upon texts in which I argue that Aquinas develops this idea, albeit without invoking the terminology of the estimative intention. I conclude (...) that, by identifying the aspect of pastness as an estimative intention, Aquinas neatly synthesizes the Aristotelian and Arabic traditions on memory. (shrink)

The study of Agrippa's works confirms his constant interest in the theory and practice of alchemy. The apparent contradiction between De occulta philosophia, which uses alchemical doctrines, and De vanitate scientiarum, where alchemy is harshly criticized, is to be resolved in the light of a moral and cultural reform founded on a Hermetic-Christian perspective on the relationship between faith and reason. The analysis of the alchemic passages in De occulta philosophia proves that Agrippa's transmutatory operations have no secondary role in (...) his 'restored' magic. Furthermore, these operations are oriented towards a utopia, where original unity is to be regained. (shrink)

This study shows how Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Posterior Analytics adopts a peculiar criterion to structure arguments developed by Aristotle about the science of demonstration. Grosseteste places his commentary in the framework of the ratio disserendi by Cicero and Boethius; yet, the arguments he develops are summarised in conclusiones. After reviewing past and recent scholarship on the meaning of these ‘conclusions’ and their relationship to Aristotle’s arguments, the study proposes to consider them as an application of Euclid’s geometrical method.

Duns Scotus vigorously defends an idea foreign to Greek philosophers, namely that the individual has a higher ontological dignity than the species. He develops this view in two contexts: the problem of the principle of individuation and the discussion of divine ideas of individuals. This article focuses on the latter, in which Scotus critiques Aquinas, whom he mistakenly interprets as denying that there are divine ideas of individuals, as well as Henry of Ghent, who repeatedly rejects this hypothesis. In connection (...) with the claim that God has distinct ideas for each individual, Scotus argues that the intentio naturae concerns not merely the species, but also individu-als. Contrary to Greek thought, therefore, Scotus holds that the purpose of individuals is not merely to guarantee the eternity of the species; rather, they have an intrinsic value. (shrink)

“Austrian” (or “Austro-German”) philosophy of language is characterized, among other things, by the following two features: (1) Problems of language are considered within the broader framework of an intentionality-based philosophy of mind—or, to put it more precisely, questions of meaning are considered as involving a quite articulated theory of intentions; (2) several aspects of such an account are explicitly presented as inspired by or somehow already at work in the Medieval Scholastic tradition. In this study we follow the track indicated (...) by these two features and use some “Austrian” reflections on the articulation between meanings and intentions as a “heuristic filter”, as it were, to shed a new and different light on some Medieval debates in philosophy of language on the relationship between significare and intendere. It will be roughly divided into three parts. We begin by singling out some distinctive tenets of the “Austrian” strategy aimed at describing the relationship between meaning and intentions (section I), and then turn to various Medieval texts from the 13th and 14th century dealing with the two related notions of significatio and intentio (section II). The upshot of our investigation is to show how, for both “Austrian” and Medieval philosophers of language (and beyond their differences), a proper understanding of linguistic meaning—in the twofold sense of words or sentences having a lexical content and utterances having a determinate pragmatic function—presupposes an account of what one could call the “agentive intentionality”, i.e. the complex intentionality proper to practical goal-directed human behaviours. Some final remarks about outcomes, meaning, scope and perspectives opened by the method applied will conclude the study (section III). (shrink)

The more passages one examines in the translations from Arabic to Latin and from Arabic to English and other modern languages, the more mistakes one comes across in the translation of the Arabic expression ‘alā al-qaṣd al-awwal . The mistakes stem from the failure to distinguish between two senses of the expression, one an adverb, and the other a famous philosophic concept. Failing to distinguish between the two senses, the translators translated the phrase literally, often with unsatisfactory results. In this (...) paper, I shall indicate a Greek word which was rendered by the Arabic ‘alā al-qaṣd al-awwal. I shall refer to some English translations from the Arabic and show how wrong they are. I shall suggest that in Arabic philosophy itself al-Fārābī, rather than Avicenna, may have been the origin of the philosophic concepts of “first and second intentions.” I shall point out that although these concepts may have been introduced into Latin scholasticism by Raymond Lull, he could not have derived them from the Logic of al-Ghazālī, as has been alleged. (shrink)

A pesar de los reparos de algunos especialistas, Avicena es un punto de referencia insoslayable en la historia de la intencionalidad. Este trabajo se propone determinar la manera en que el intelecto toma posición con respecto a la realidad de los objetos con los que se relaciona. Abordamos la relación intencional centrando nuestra atención en el nexo entre lógica y ontología y enfatizando el papel que juegan la conceptualización y la estimación en la determinación de lo que es real y (...) existente efectivamente. La exploración de la estructura intencional nos lleva a identificar la relevancia de la doctrina de las esencias como presupuesto fundamental para la conceptualización y la verdad. La importancia de la teoría de la intencionalidad de Avicena radica en la descripción tanto de la referencia al objeto de conocimiento, como un proceso que avanza de lo conocido a lo desconocido, cuyas diversas fases conforman el itinerario de las esencias. Desde este punto de vista, la realidad y la existencia son accidentes que le acaecen a las esencias. Las capacidades del alma que hacen posible la referencia intencional son la estimativa, la conceptualización y el asentimiento. Asimismo, identificamos algunos puntos de convergencia entre las doctrinas de las esencias de Avicena y de Husserl. (shrink)

“Austrian” philosophy of language is characterized, among other things, by the following two features: Problems of language are considered within the broader framework of an intentionality-based philosophy of mind—or, to put it more precisely, questions of meaning are considered as involving a quite articulated theory of intentions; several aspects of such an account are explicitly presented as inspired by or somehow already at work in the Medieval Scholastic tradition. In this study we follow the track indicated by these two features (...) and use some “Austrian” reflections on the articulation between meanings and intentions as a “heuristic filter”, as it were, to shed a new and different light on some Medieval debates in philosophy of language on the relationship between significare and intendere. It will be roughly divided into three parts. We begin by singling out some distinctive tenets of the “Austrian” strategy aimed at describing the relationship between meaning and intentions , and then turn to various Medieval texts from the 13th and 14th century dealing with the two related notions of significatio and intentio . The upshot of our investigation is to show how, for both “Austrian” and Medieval philosophers of language , a proper understanding of linguistic meaning—in the twofold sense of words or sentences having a lexical content and utterances having a determinate pragmatic function—presupposes an account of what one could call the “agentive intentionality”, i.e. the complex intentionality proper to practical goal-directed human behaviours. Some final remarks about outcomes, meaning, scope and perspectives opened by the method applied will conclude the study. (shrink)

『창세기 문자적 해설(De Genesi ad litteram)』 제VII권에서 아우구스티누스는 성경의 확고한 권위에 바탕을 두고, 최초의 인간 영혼에 관한 다양한 가설들을 제시하고 그것들을 비판적으로 검토한 후에, 마침내 자기가 가장 선호하는 ‘합리적인’ 하나의 가설에 도달한다. 그것은 인간 영혼이, 천사적 자연과 마찬가지로, 기원으로부터 완성된 존재자로서 창조되었다는 것이다(“sicut primitus conditusest dies.” VII.24.35). 하지만 그는 제I권과 제IV권에서 “영적인 빛(lux spiritalis)”이 존재로 나오라는 창조주의 부르심(“Fiat lux” 창세 1,3)에 응답하는 “돌아섬(conversio)”을 통해 창조되었다고 설명하던 것과는 달리(I.1.2-3; 3.7; 5.10;IV.22.39), 인간 영혼의 창조 방식에 관해서는 아무런 구체적인 설명도 제시하지 않는다. 하지만 (...) 우리는 제III권에서 아우구스티누스가 제시하는 인간 영혼의 창조본문(창세 1,26-27)이 지닌 특징에 관한 설명(III.20.31)으로부터, 그것의 창조 방식에 관한 결정적 힌트를 얻을 수 있다. 인간 영혼은 천사적 자연과 동일한 지성적 본성을 지니고 “하느님의 모상을 향해(ad imaginem Dei)” 창조된 존재자인 한에서, 그것의 창조는 하느님께 대한 지식으로 이뤄지며, 그것의 창조 방식은 타락 이후에 그것의 존재론적 쇄신과 변형, 곧 하느님 모상의 완성을 위한 원리와 일치한다(III.20.32). 한편, 인간 영혼의 인식이 언제나 대상을 향한 ‘지향적 돌아섬(conversiout intentio)’을 통해 이뤄지며, 그것이 사랑의 동력으로부터 비롯된 ‘사랑의 인식’인한, 언제나 인식 대상(의 형상)에 따라서 자기-존재를 재규정(쇄신과 변형)하는 방식으로 진행된다면, 우리는 인간 영혼도, 천사적 자연과 마찬가지로, 존재를 향한 하느님의 부르심에 응답하는 사랑의 돌아섬을 통해 창조되었다고 해석할 수 있다. 이러한 전망으로부터 우리는 인간 영혼의 존재가 지닌 기원적인 지향적 구조, 곧 삼위일체적 존재 구조를 확증하게 되며, 바로 그 존재 구조에 따라, 성령을 통해 부어진 상승하는 사랑의 초월-지향(extensio)으로 성자-말씀을 향해 돌아섬으로써, 인간 영혼은 단지 자기 존재뿐만 아니라 모든 존재자의 존재를 그것의 기원이자 목적인 삼위일체 하느님께 되돌리는(referre) 관계(relatio) 안에서, 그분으로부터 유래하는 존재 의미를 모든 피조물에 증여하게 된다. 더 나아가, 지성적 피조물의 이러한 삼위일체적 돌아섬의 기원이 성부를 향한 성자의 돌아섬이라는 ‘내재적 삼위일체’의 차원을 지닌다면(beata v. 4.34), 우리는 삼위일 체적사랑의 관계를 구성하는 ‘돌아섬-지향’ 개념을 통해 ‘아우구스티누스의 삼위일체적 존재론’을 정초할 수 있다. (shrink)

Intentio is a widespread concept in the writings of Thomas Aquinas (1224/5–1274). This article focuses on its use in the description and explanation of human action because Aquinas is the first author to elaborate a coherent conception of practical intentionality in the history of Western philosophy. The analysis shows that his account is characterized by five distinctive features: Practical intentionality is (1) an active striving toward a causally relevant intentional object (i. e., a goal), which is not ‘in the (...) mind’, (2) a volitional state of mind rather than a distinct mental event, (3) action-guiding because it is a principle of concrete human actions which realize it, (4) essentially tied up with rationality, which is needed for bridging the operational distance to the final goal by deliberation on the means conducive to it, (5) potentially complex – allowing for a plurality of simultaneous intentions – but at the same time unified in the hierarchical ordering of means and ends. The article also relates these features to modern discussions of intentionality in phenomenology and in analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Brentano dans son introduction des objets in-existants affirme qu’il s’est inspiré de thèses médiévaleset on considère généralement qu’il se réfère aux thèses scotistes. En fait l’intentio a été l’objet d’intenses débats du milieu du XIIIe au milieu du XIVe siècle. On se propose ici d’en donner une idée à partir de la critique la plus radicale de la notion d’esse intentionale par Guillaume d’Ockham. Pour cela on commence par rappeler les principales thèses qui font intervenir des intentiones avec un (...) certain type d’existence, des species dans les processus de perception et d’aperception, et l’objet de l’intellection avant de présenter leur réfutation par Ockham. On montre que si cette réfutation est tout de suite radicale pour les species, elle retient pour l’intellection certains aspects de la solution scotiste. Ockham est alors conduit, dans un premier temps, à considérer l’objet de l’intellection comme une entité, un fictum ayant un mode d’être propre, un esse objectivum. Mais comme il se met par là en contradiction avec l’argument d’économie qu’il invoque systématiquement par ailleurs, celui-ci est retourné contre lui par certains de ses adversaires. Si bien que dans un second temps il considère l’acte de l’intellection comme signe de la chose intelligée et refuse toute existence à quelqu’objet de l’intellection qui serait autre que la chose. (shrink)

1. Machiavelli, Intentio auctoris e anatomia del Principe.

La teoría de la intentio hoy conocida como “intencionalidad” había pasado desapercibida en la filosofía moderna y fue recuperada por Brentano, pero sobre todo fue puesta de relieve por Husserl, quien se apoyó en ella como uno de los elementos básicos de su fenomenología. Sin embargo, en esta corriente la intencionalidad perdió su sentido clásico. Así lo pone de manifiesto Jacques Maritain en su gnoseología. ¿Por qué Husserl cambia el sentido del concepto?, ¿cuál es la crítica principal de Maritain (...) a este hecho? Parece pertinente esclarecer ambas visiones a fin de comprender el sentido que ha prevalecido en la Filosofía de la Mente contemporánea y las Neurociencias. Lo que se halla en juego es nuevamente la antigua confrontación entre inmanentismo y realismo gnoseológico: admitir en qué consiste la intencionalidad es el punto de inflexión entre estas posiciones. En este trabajo pongo de manifiesto que la forma de asumir un legítimo realismo es mediante una metafísica del ser que reclama una intencionalidad radicada no solamente en el sujeto cognoscente sino además en su relación con la cosa conocida y no sólo con los meros objetos mentales. -/- El propósito de esta publicación es mostrar el punto de quiebre que se lleva a cabo en la teoría del conocimiento y en la psicología racional con respecto al concepto “intencionalidad” del realismo metafísico. La teoría de la intentio en F. Brentano recoge la idea original de los medievales pero sin ser muy explícito en los términos gnoseológicos ya que su objetivo primario consistió sobre todo en superar el psicologismo de su época. En cambio, esa teoría heredada por Husserl se ve alterada completamente con respecto a su sentido primigenio cuando aplica su método trascendental. Esto se puede apreciar en varias partes de su obra "Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica" (1913). (shrink)

It is widely thought that Augustine thinks perception is, in some distinctive sense, an active process and that he takes conscious awareness to be constitutive of perception. I argue that conscious awareness is not straightforwardly constitutive of perception and that Augustine is best understood as an indirect realist. I then clarify Augustine’s views concerning the nature and role of diachronically unified conscious awareness and mental representation in perception, the nature of the soul’s intentio, and the precise sense in which (...) perception is an active process. (shrink)

Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. The puzzles of intentionality lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth century. ‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher's word. It derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives from the (...) verb intendere, which means being directed towards some goal or thing. The entry falls into eleven sections. (shrink)

창조의 제1단계(prima conditio)를 구성하는 근원적 6일 동안 이뤄진 창조와 제7일 안식일은 “유일한 날”인 천사적 자연, 곧 영적인 빛의 반복되는 동시적 돌아섬-지향과 그로 인한 관조-인식을 가리킨다. 이러한 해석의 맥락에서 아우구스티누스는, 첫째 날 창조된 그 지성적 피조물 이후에 만들어져야 할 다른 피조물들은, 천사들 편에서 이뤄진, 그것들의 존재를 앞선 그것들의 “영원한 이성들(rationes aeternae)”에 대한 관조와 인식 없이는 만들어지지 않는다고 확언한다. 이로써 히포의 주교는 삼위일체와 가장 큰 유사성 안에서 창조된 지성적 피조물이 수행하는 ‘삼위일체적 돌아섬-지향’이 지닌 가장 근본적인 존재론적 의미를 드러낸다. 그 돌아섬과 관조는 자기의 (...) 고유한 자연 안에 있는 존재자가 하느님의 영원한 말씀 안에 있는 ‘근원적 자기’를 지향하여 ‘아직 자기가 아닌’ 그 참다운 자기에게로 ‘이미’ 회귀함으로써만, 바꿔 말하면, 자기 안에 존재하면서 수행하는 순례의 여정에서 하느님 안에 존재하는 ‘자기의 원형’을 탐구하고 발견함으로써만, 그분 안에서 영원한 안식을 누리는 가운데 자기의 존재 의미를 궁극적으로 완성하는 것이다. (shrink)

This article examines Abu Nasr al-Farabı (c. 872–950/1) on the topic of intentionality, with particular focus on how intentionality is integral for the constitution of the intellect within his psychology. Unfortunately, targeted study of al-Farabı’s doctrine of intentionality has been largely neglected since Kwame Gyekye’s 1971 essay, The Terms ‘Prima Intentio’ and ‘Secunda Intentio’ in Arabic Logic. Gyekye showed that the Arabic (and thus the Latin) doctrine of first and second intention originated within the texts of al-Farabı,not the (...) texts of Avicenna, as had been previously thought. In response, this article aims to show three things. First, while the doctrine of first and second intention appears in al-Farabı’s texts, it is not as clearly developed or defined as is presented in Gyekye’s 1971 article. al-Farabı both lacks consistent technical terminology for the doctrine (as he discusses it across disparate sciences, in unrelated contexts) and develops it far too little to fully flesh out his doctrine. Second, even given the fact that al-Farabı’s discussion of intentionality is underdeveloped, Gyekye was right to credit the doctrine to him. And third, al-Farabı’s doctrine of first and second intention is not merely important to understand his positions regarding signification and universals; they play a pivotal role in the constitution of the human intellect. (shrink)

Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being—namely, “intentional inexistence” —and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale, which is a mode of being, and of intentio, which is a “tending towards” of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of (...) class='Hi'>intentio there is another distinction that plays an important role in medieval philosophy—namely, the distinction between first and second intentions, which are, roughly speaking, concepts of things and concepts of concepts respectively. What is less well-known is that Brentano explicitly borrowed this distinction as well, and used it in his account of intentionality. This paper explores this little-known chapter in the scholastic-Austrian history of intentionality by evaluating both the historical accuracy and the philosophical significance of Brentano’s borrowing of the scholastic distinction between first and second intentions. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 206 Seiten: 37-61.

This paper suggests several summa genera for the various meanings of intentio in Aquinas and briefly outlines the genera of cognitive intentiones. It presents the referential and existential nature of intentions of harm or usefulness as distinguished from external sensory or imaginary forms in light of Avicenna’s threefold sensory abstraction. The paper offers a terminological clarification regarding the quasi-immaterial existential status of intentions. Internal sensory intentions account for a way in which one perceives something, as is best seen in (...) light of the distinction between formal and material objects. Against the imagist account of intentions that denies the memorative power an immanent object, it shows that the memorative’s proper and immediate object is the intention of the past, while its extrinsic mediate object is the imaginary phantasm. (shrink)

Although Brentano generally regarded himself as at heart a metaphysician, his work then and subsequently has always been dominated by the Psychology. He is rightly celebrated as the person who reintroduced the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of intentio back into the study of the mind. Brentano's inspiration was Aristotle's theory of perception in De anima, though his terminology of intentional inexistence was medieval. For the history of the work and its position in his output may I refer to my Introduction to (...) the reprinted English translation. Alongside Aristotle the work shows influences of Descartes, Comte and the British empiricists. The theory of intentionality presented in the Psychology is much less modern and less plausible than almost all recent commentary would have it, and was in any case not where Brentano's main interest lay. Intentionality simply served to demarcate mental phenomena from physical, in Book One, but the main aim was a classification of the mental, outlined in Book Two. Books Three to Five were to have dealt in detail with the three main classes of presentations, judgements and feelings, with the final book considering the metaphysics: mind-body and the immortality of the soul. Brentano's shifting views, recently documented in English with Benito Muller's translation of Descriptive Psychology, a work from the transitional 1890s, made the original plan obsolete. The role of an a priori, philosophical or descriptive psychology, methodologically prior to empirical-experimental genetic psychology, foreshadowed and influenced Husserl's notion of phenomenology, and Brentano's Comtean methodological epoche of desisting from controversial metaphysical statements in favour of an examination of the phenomena likewise presaged Husserl's more ponderous phenomenological reductions. Brentano's other work covers most areas of philosophy, notably ethics, where he upheld a form of a priori intuitionism much admired by G. E. Moore, the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, philosophy of language, deductive and inductive logic, and the history of philosophy. I shall mention just two areas. In his logic lectures from 1866 onwards (a compilation published 1956) Brentano rejected the subject-predicate analysis of simple judgements and proposed instead (for which he apparently secured written assent from Mill) that all judgements are logical compounds of positive and negative existential judgements. For example the universal judgement All men are mortal becomes the negative existential There are no immortal men. On this basis Brentano radically simplified the inference rules of deductive logic. While unlike de Morgan, Frege and others he does not go beyond logic's traditional scope by recognising relations, within its bounds his reformed-term logic is simple, elegant and easily teachable. Some of his ideas in logic influenced the young Husserl. Unfortunately Brentano took against mathematical logic, which he wrongly associated exclusively with Hamilton's confused doctrine of the quantification of the predicate. His inductive logic, which takes up by far the greater part of his logic lectures, remains unresearched to this day. (shrink)

Negli studi sul pensiero medievale la questione delle filosofie francescane si presenta come controversa a proposito della definizione di una essenza del pensiero francescano – in relazione alla figura di Francesco d’Assisi –, di temi di riflessione specifici e del rapporto con le tradizioni filosofiche precedenti.Si tratta di un francescanesimo controverso pure all’interno di una stessa tradizione storiografica, come quella Neoscolastica, in cui studiosi come Gilson, Vignaux e Boehner ne hanno sottolineato il carattere prevalentemente agostiniano o aristotelico.Partendo dalla consapevolezza della (...) problematicità della questione, il saggio si sofferma sui possibili caratteri comuni delle teorie della conoscenza in alcuni pensatori francescani tra XIII e XIV secolo, come Pietro Giovanni Olivi e Pietro Aureolo, a partire dai concetti di conversio, intentio e reflexio e dal loro rapporto con la tradizione agostiniana.Si delineano così teorie della conoscenza che privilegiano l’attività e l’immediatezza del conoscere, sia per la conoscenza diretta sia per quella riflessa.Infine, tali caratteri si possono cogliere pure in un autore non francescano ma secolare come Nicola di Autrecourt, la cui teoria della conoscenza ha fatto parlare di un internalismo vicino a quello delle correnti francescane del XIV secolo. In conclusione, se da una parte non si può ipostatizzare l’idea di caratteri comuni del pensiero francescano, dall’altra si può forse parlare di un comune universo discorsivo in cui la figura di Francesco d’Assisi mostra la propria portata filosofica nella storia. In the History of Medieval Philosophy’s studies, the question of Franciscan philosophies has been the subject of controversy concerning the definition of an essence of Franciscan thought, about the relationship with Francesco d’Assisi, of specific topics of reflection and relationship with the previous philosophical traditions.It is a controversial Franciscanism even within the same historiographical tradition, such as the Neo-Scholastic one, in which scholars such as Gilson, Vignaux and Boehner have emphasised its predominantly Augustinian or Aristotelian character.Starting from the awareness of the problematic nature of the issue, the essay focuses on the possible common peculiarities of the theories of knowledge in some Franciscan thinkers between the 13th and 14th centuries, such as Pietro Giovanni Olivi and Pietro Aureolo, starting from the concepts of conversio, intentio, reflexio and their relationship with the Augustinian tradition.Thus the theories of knowledge are delineated which privilege the activity and the immediacy of knowing, both for direct and reflected knowledge.Finally, these features can also be grasped in a non-Franciscan but secular author like Nicola di Autrecourt, whose theory of knowledge has made mention of a type of internalism close to that of the 14th century Franciscan movement. Therefore, in conclusion, while on the one hand the idea of common particularities of Franciscan thought can not be hypostatised, on the other hand we can perhaps speak of a common discursive universe in which the figure of Francesco d’Assisi shows his philosophical significance in history. (shrink)

This essay examines Augustine’s notion that a person can transcend temporal “distention” by “extending” his soul to God by way of “intention”. Augustine conceived of intentio as an activity of the will that functions to connect the soul to beings and objects in the world. Augustine links his notion of “intention” to the activity of “extending oneself to God”. How do the soul’s “intention” and “extension” work together to combat temporal “distention”? Augustine suggests that Paul extended himself to God (...) but could not fully overcome distention. In his vision of God in Confessions 9, by contrast, Augustine transcends distention. Here, Augustine’s memory and self have been transcended as his soul “extends itself” to God “through intention.” Even in this state of self-transcendence, his intentio directs and connects his soul to God. (shrink)

die besagten Begriffe zunachst als synonyme Bezeichnungen fUr die Methode der Philosophie betrachtet werden konnen. Erst am Ende der Abhandlung zeichnet sich die Moglichkeit einer Bedeutungstren nung zwischen EpocM und Reduktion ab - allerdings nicht mehr ganz im Sinne HusserIs. Die Aufgabe, Philosophie als absolute Wissenschaft zu begriinden, ist fUr HusserI im Grunde das Problem der Gewinnung eines Ver fahrens, durch das der sich philosophisch Besinnende die absolute Ge wiBheit erIangt, daB er im Gang seiner Besinnungen keine ungepriif ten, unkritisch (...) hingenommenen Erkenntnisse voraussetzt, kein Vorur teil mitgelten laBt, das die wissenschaftliche Reinheit des gedanklichen Gebaudes zerstOren wiirde. DaB die Philosophie es bisher nicht fertig gebracht hat, sich als solche absolut gerechtfertigte Wissenschaft zu konstituieren, bezeugt fUr HusserI ihre Unfahigkeit, in voller Radika litat alle Voraussetzungen aus dem Wege zu raumen, die der Voraus setzungslosigkeit einer absoluten Wissenschaft im Wege stehen. Ihrem eingeborenen Telos der Letztverantwortung hat die Philosophie nie gerecht werden konnen, obschon in ihrer Geschichte zu alIer Zeit ein Streben, eine intentio auf dieses ihr Ziel der absoluten Reinheit hin wirksam war. Diese intentio war stets die "Motivation", der "Ent wicklungstrieb" des philosophischen Denkens: "In einigen Philoso phien zeitweilig relativ befriedigt, und doch nie letztbefriedigt, wird die Philosophie zu immer neuen methodischen Besinnungen fortgetrieben; sie nimmt immer neue methodische Gestalten an und kommt dabei doch nie zu Ende. (shrink)

For Abelard, the notion of “intention” (intentio, attentio) plays a central and important role in his cognitive and ethical theories. Is there any philosophical connection between its uses in these contexts? In recent publications, Constant Mews has argued that the cognitive and ethical senses of “intention” are related (namely, the cognitive sense evolves into the ethical sense), and that Abelard is repeatedly led to focus on intentions throughout his career due to the influence of Heloise. Here I evaluate Mews’s (...) arguments by examining and comparing the cognitive and ethical senses of the term. Although the basis for Mews’s claim seems to be false, I argue that there is nonetheless an important philosophical relationship between cognitive and ethical intentiones in Abelard’s thought, there cognition of which leads to a new and more precise understanding of his ethical theory of intention. (shrink)

Il De universalibus di Riccardo Brinkley è la seconda delle sette parti che costituiscono la Summa logicae. L'A., prima di fornire l'edizione del testo , conduce un'analisi dottrinale e comparativa. Perciò ne illustra struttura e contenuto, esplicitando il concetto di universale metafisico, la critica della concezione puramente semantica dell'universale, la natura dell'intentio universale, l'universale logico, la sua divisione. Brinkley esprime la sua contrarietà rispetto al concetto dell'universale logico come intentio in anima. La sezione successiva riguarda invece i cinque (...) predicabili di Porfirio, il genere, la specie, la differenza, il proprio e l'accidente. L'ultima parte del saggio è incentrata su alcune osservazioni comparative tra Brinkley e alcuni suoi contemporanei, come Guglielmo d'Ockham , Walter Burley , Giovanni Wyclif . L'A. conclude proponendo di considerare il De universalibus di Brinkley un testimone precoce dell'opposizione tardo medievale tra antiqui e moderni. In Brinkley l'universale metafisico ha il primato rispetto all'universale logico. Il Tractatus de universalibus è edito sulla base dei mss.: P = Praha, Narodní Knihovna, 396 8 , ff. 53rb-58va e L = Leipzig, UB, 1360, ff. 29vb-36va. Si fa riferimento, con la sigla GW all'edizione del primo capitolo del De universalibus. (shrink)

The content of a mental act- a pivotal element of a theory of intentionality- has a threefold meaning: as a logical concept, is the ideal signification, as a psychological concept, is the core of a noema (i.e., the instantiation of an ideal and as an ontological concept, is the object (real or unreal) intented by the nucleus. We can make a parallel between this Husserlian threefold distinction and the Fregean sense/”reference” distinction, reducing it to the sense/object distinction. This paralleism is (...) not to force the Husserl’s thought to Frege’s, but, on the contrary, to show the structure of the triple meaning of content: Husserl mtroduces the difference between ideal signification and instantiated signification, so the pure and Simple signification and the noematic sense are species of the genus sense. Husserl’s theory of intentionality and his philosophy of language does not go Frege, but beyond. The recognition of that allows us to see the error of Føesdal’s mterpretation, as while as those of Sartre and Gurwitsch. The Fregean sense/”reference” distinction is subsumed by the Husserlian conceptual trio ideal signification/noematic sense/object. This triad of concepts houses not only a semantic theory (as Frege’s pair), but also a theory of a theory of perception. Husserl integrates its semantics in a theory of of consciousness that overcomes the intentio doctrines ofBrentano, Twardowsk1 and the medievals. (shrink)

As one of the three sources of the moral act in Aquinas’s philosophy, intention is fundamental to the understanding of his ethics. And while intention’spsychological and linguistic dimensions have been appreciated recently, after the appearance of Anscombe’s Intention, the Aristotelian physical framework ofAquinas’s thought on the issue has been neglected. Taking only the end of the agent into account in intentional analysis has led to incorrect interpretations of moral action, particularly among new natural law theorists. In this paper, I propose (...) an understanding of intentio and praeter intentionem in Aquinas that elucidates his distinctions regarding justified killing, as well the bearing of intention in intentional action and moral acts. (shrink)

En varios pasajes de su Comentario a la Física S. Tomás polemiza con Averroes a propósito del tipo y valor de algunas argumentaciones de Aristóteles. Se aprecia uma divergencia acerca de las condiciones epistemológicas para considerar “apodíctica” uma demostración, y también sobre el valor de las argumentaciones probables. Se sugiere que la búsqueda de la intentio Aristotelis pudo estar condicionada en cada caso por la propia visión tanto de la hermenéutica histórica como de la metodologia.

Riassunto: La geomanzia, una disciplina divinatoria importata dal mondo arabo, prosperò nel medioevo latino. Di fronte a tale popolarità traduttori e autori di trattati geomantici, filosofi, teologi e letterati si interrogarono sulla sua validità, sulle sue implicazioni filosofiche e sulla visione del mondo che essa presupponeva. Il presente contributo esamina questo dibattito. In particolare, si ricostruisce lo statuto epistemologico della geomanzia nei suoi rapporti con l’astrologia. Il problema della scientificità della geomanzia viene discusso anche nel contesto dell’azione della causalità celeste (...) sul mondo sublunare. Sono esaminati i ruoli del geomante e dell’interrogante ed è analizzato il concetto di intentio, che rimanda ad un’analisi psicologica peculiare della geomanzia. Caratterizza la geomanzia anche una dimensione rituale fatta di prescrizioni preliminari e di invocazioni da rivolgere alla divinità. Quanto detto impedisce di ridurre la geomanzia ad una semplice tecnica divinatoria; essa appare piuttosto una forma di sapienza rivelata solo al geomante esperto e moralmente degno, che attinge così la conoscenza di eventi futuri e cose nascoste. Da questa breve ricostruzione emerge l’articolata natura della geomanzia, contraddistinta, nella sua originaria versione araba, da una marcata impronta religiosa e da uno stretto, benché ambiguo, nesso con la profezia Islamica.: Geomancy, a divinatory discipline imported from the Arab world, flourished in the Latin Middle Ages. In the attempt to explain the popularity of geomancy, translators and authors of geomantic writings, philosophers, theologians, and other scholars addressed such issues as its validity, its philosophical implications, and the worldview it presupposed. This paper explores this debate, delineating the epistemological status of geomancy in relation to astrology. The problem of the scientificity of geomacy will be discussed with regard to the celestial influences on the sublunary world. In addition, the different roles played by both the geomancer and the consultant are examined. Attention will be paid to the concept of intentio, which implies a psychological analysis peculiar to geomancy. Geomancy is also characterized by ritual elements such as both preliminary prescriptions and invocations of God, meaning that it is not an ordinary divinatory technique, but a form of wisdom revealed only to experienced and upright geomancers, who can thus obtain knowledge of future events and hidden things. From this analysis emerges the complex nature of geomancy, whose original Arabic version had a prominent religious character and a close, albeit ambiguous, link with Islamic prophecy. (shrink)

Avicenne, à la suite d’Aristote, définit la métaphysique comme science de l’étant en tant qu’étant : « le premier sujet de cette science est l’étant en tant qu’il est étant ; et ce qu’elle étudie, ce sont les propriétés qui accompagnent l’étant en tant qu’étant sans restriction ». Il enseigne que l’intellect saisit l’étant comme le premier objet qui s’imprime en lui, telle une « impression originaire », qu’il nomme en arabe ma’nâ, traduit en latin par intentio. Cette expression (...) apporte une précision importante, elle signifie que l’intellect est tourné vers la réalité extérieure, mais en retournant sur lui-même. L’étant est donc le premier connu – ou intelligé – en tant qu’étant, comme ma’nâ, non en tant que réalité extérieure, c’est-à-dire comme être au sens d’existentia. Immédiatement appréhendé, l’étant est en tant que tel ce qui permet de tout appréhender comme ce qui est et de tout intelliger comme étant. L’étant est saisi dans un retour sur soi de l’intellect pour lequel l’étant est de l’intelligé, du conçu. Renvoyant de la sorte à ce qui est, non à l’être de ce qui est, Avicenne est conduit à distinguer l’essence et l’être. Cette distinction constitue un apport crucial. Comment faut-il l’entendre? Comme une opposition ou comme une composition? (shrink)

“영혼의 분산(distentio animi)”으로서 시간 개념은, 시간이 그것을 측정하는 ‘영혼 안에만’ 존재한다는 진술로 인해, 많은 학자들이 아우구스티누스의 시간론을 ‘주관주의적’인 것으로 해석하도록 만들었다. 하지만 이러한 시간 규정을 제대로 이해하기 위해서는 다양한 요소들이 해명되어야 한다. 무엇보다 먼저 『고백록』 제XI권의 주된 목적은 시간에 대한 체계적인 가르침을 주기 위한 것이라기보다는 시간의 창조주가 지닌 영원성과 자비를 찬미하는 데 있음을 유념해야 한다. 또한이 ‘찬미로서의 고백’의 주체인 아우구스티누스의 영혼(“animus meus”)은 ‘자기 내면보다 더 내밀한’ 신에 의해 관통되고 신으로부터 선사된 신을 향한 사랑에 종속된 주체이면서 동시에 육체를 통해 물질세계 전체를 (...) 향해 개방된 관계적 존재이기도 하다. 한편 시간은 ‘아직 존재하지 않는 것’(미래)에서 ‘간격 없는것’(현재)을 통해 ‘이미 존재하지 않는 것’(과거)이 됨으로써만, 곧 ‘비존재(nonesse)를 지향하는’ 방식으로써만 존재하면서, 인간 영혼과 물질세계 전체를 관통하는 객관적인 보편적 창조질서로 제시된다. 하지만 물질이 시간을 소유할 수 있는 ‘내적 공간’을 결하고 있기 때문에 단지 시간에 의해 소유되는 것과는 달리, 인간 영혼은 단지 시간에 의해 소유될 뿐만 아니라 시간을 자기 안에 대상화하고 동시에 소유할 수 있는 능력도 지니고 있다. 이렇게 역설적인 방식으로써만 존재하는 시간에 대한 대상적 소유는 영혼이 지닌 ‘지향작용(intentio)’과 ‘기억(memoria)’이라는 내적 공간으로 인해 가능한데, 동일한 영혼은 지속적으로 생성하고 소멸하는 사물들의 형상적 변화 안에서 개현되는 시간을 지향하며 그것의 흔적들(affectiones)을 기억에 저장함으로써 시간을 지각하고 측정할 수 있게 되는 것이다. 따라서 시간 존재의 아포리아는 오직 기억 안에서 이뤄진 영혼의 ‘분산지향(distentio)’을 통해서만 그 해결의 실마리가 열리지만, 그 경우에도 시간 그 자체의 본성이 영혼에게 개현되는 것이 아니라 분산지향을 통해 자기를 확장하면서 그것을 측정하는 영혼의 존재 그 자체가 지닌 근본적인 시간성, 곧 무를 지향하는 산란된 존재 방식이 개현될 뿐이다. 인간 영혼이 지닌 이러한 시간적 실존은 물질세계를 통해 그리고 그것을 넘어서 신의 영원성을 지향하고 소유함으로써만 궁극적 안식을 발견하도록 창조된 그의 존재론적 소명을 의미한다. (shrink)

Este artículo propone interpretar la relación tiempo-eternidad, según la expone Agustín en conf. 11, como la búsqueda de superación de la dicotomía existente entre tiempo objetivo y tiempo subjetivo. La clave hermenéutica la da el análisis de los nombres distentio, attentio e intentio, a través de los cuales se establece la relación entre las dimensiones cronológica y kairológica del tiempo en cuanto símbolo de la eternidad.