The paper examines one of the considerations that determines the extent to which policymakers pursue the objec- tives demanded by constituents. The nature and extent of their ignorance serve to determine the incentives confronted by policymakers to pursue their constituents’ demands. The paper also considers several other consequences of policymaker ig- norance and its relationship to expert failure.

The use of biomarkers holds great promise for the development of new therapeutics and the acceleration of clinical research. However, biomarkers must be validated — a complex and costly endeavor. Importantly, biomarker validation is meaningfully shaped by economic and policy-driven incentives.

ABSTRACT Setting specific, challenging goals motivates employees to exert greater effort in their jobs. However, goal-setting may have unintended consequences of also motivating unethical behavior. The present study explores these consequences in the context of other features of goal-setting in organizations, how goals are framed and rewarded, to determine the tradeoff between performance and ethical behavior. Undergraduate students were incentivized to complete math problems using different outcome frames and incentive structures and were also provided an opportunity to cheat. (...) Findings demonstrate that when goals rewarded with piece-rate incentives are framed as a loss, performance increased, though cheating behavior increased as well. (shrink)

Current incentive structures are more favorably aligned with the world’s problems than with their solutions. We conceptualize this as the paradox of incentives to argue the need for new thinking and restructuring of incentives to break the paradox during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond, and create new opportunities for societal transformation.

End user participation in design is widely believed to benefit system development. In 1992, when the U.S. National Research Council advocated broadening research in computer science, it strongly recommended collaborative projects in which the user/ application discipline was an equal partner with computer science. This article exam ines the incentives and costs in user-designer relationships and argues that the costs to users are unexpected and often not assumable and that there are asymmetries inherent in the user-designer relationship that destabilize the (...) collaboration. The article draws on a case study of Sequoia 2000, a multimillion dollar collaboration between computerscien tists and global change researchers. (shrink)

Extraversion has two central characteristics: (1) interpersonalengagement, which consists of affiliation (enjoying and valuing close interpersonal bonds, being warm and affectionate) and agency (being socially dominant, enjoying leadership roles, being assertive, being exhibitionistic, and having a sense of potency in accomplishing goals) and (2) impulsivity, which emerges from the interaction of extraversion and a second, independent trait (constraint). Agency is a more general motivational disposition that includes dominance, ambition, mastery, efficacy, and achievement. Positive affect (a combination of positive feelings and (...) motivation) is closely associated with extraversion. Extraversion is accordingly based on positiveincentivemotivation. (shrink)

The communist norm requires that scientists widely share the results of their work. Where did this norm come from, and how does it persist? Michael Strevens provides a partial answer to these questions by showing that scientists should be willing to sign a social contract that mandates sharing. However, he also argues that it is not in an individual credit-maximizing scientist's interest to follow this norm. I argue against Strevens that individual scientists can rationally conform to the communist norm, even (...) in the absence of a social contract or other ways of socially enforcing the norm, by proving results to this effect in a game-theoretic model. This shows that the incentives provided to scientists through the priority rule are sufficient to explain both the origins and the persistence of the communist norm, adding to previous results emphasizing the benefits of the incentive structure created by the priority rule. (shrink)

This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning, or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. The author considers methods involving feedback iterative controls which require the prior selection of a 'criterion function', but no prior calculation of optimal quantities. The target is adjusted as the results for each step become data for the criterion function. Implementation is built in by (...) the incentive structure, and all controls rely on consistency with the self-interest of individuals. The applicability of all the methods is shown to be independent of the form of ownership of enterprises: examples are given for industries which are wholly privately owned, wholly nationalized, mixed and labour-managed. (shrink)

The HealthyFood program offers members up to 25% cash back monthly on healthy food purchases. In this randomized controlled trial, we tested the efficacy of financial incentives combined with text messages in increasing healthy food purchases among HF members. Members receiving the lowest cash back level were randomized to one of six arms: Arm 1 : 10% cash back, no weekly text, standard monthly text; Arm 2: 10% cash back, generic weekly text, standard monthly text; Arm 3: 10% cash back, (...) personalized weekly text, standard monthly text; Arm 4: 25% cash back, personalized weekly text, standard monthly text; Arm 5: 10 + 15%NET cash back, personalized weekly text, standard monthly text; and, Arm 6: 10 + 15%NET cash back, personalized weekly text, unbundled monthly text. In the 10 + 15%NET cash back, the cash back amount was the baseline 10% plus 15% of the net difference between healthy and unhealthy spending. The generic text included information on HF and healthy eating, while the personalized text had individualized feedback on purchases. The standard monthly text contained the cash back amount. The unbundled monthly text included the amount lost due to unhealthy purchases. The primary outcome was the average monthly percent healthy food spending. Secondary outcomes were the percent unhealthy food spending, and the percent healthy and unhealthy food items. Of the members contacted, 20 opted out, and 2841 met all inclusion criteria. There were no between-arm differences in the examined outcomes. The largest mean difference in percent healthy spending was between Arm 1 and Arm 2, and the largest mean difference in percent unhealthy spending was also between Arm 1 and Arm 2, but no differences were statistically significant after correction for multiple comparisons. None of the tested financial incentive structures or text strategies differentially affected food purchasing. Notably, more than doubling the cash back amount and introducing a financial disincentive for unhealthy purchases did not affect purchasing. These findings speak to the difficulty of changing shopping habits and to the need for innovative strategies to shift complex health behaviors. NCT02486588 Increasing Engagement with a Healthy Food Benefit. The trial was prospectively registered on July 1, 2015. (shrink)

This article presents an overview of traditional legal and regulatory incentives directed at achieving lawful corporate behavior, together with examples of more recent governmental incentives aimed at encouraging self regulation activities by corporations. These incentives have been differentiated into positive incentives that benefit corporations for actions that encourage or assist lawful behavior, and punitive incentives that only punish corporations for violations of legal or regulatory standards. This analysis indicates that traditional legal and regulatory incentives for lawful corporate behavior are overwhelmingly (...) punitive in their intended effects, while more recent governmental incentives to encourage voluntary corporate self regulation are much more positive in their intended effects.A prototype private compliance system containing typical features specified in governmental incentives for corporate self regulation was then analyzed applying the same positive/punitive analysis that was performed with the governmental incentives. This analysis suggests that corporate compliance programs that are structured to comply with Department of Defense regulations for defense contractors or the new Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines will reflect the same overwhelmingly punitive balance of incentives for lawful and ethical employee conduct as do the traditional legal and regulatory incentive systems for lawful corporate behavior. (shrink)

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception (...) of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice. (shrink)

We aim to establish the following claim: other factors held constant, the relative weights of the epistemic burdens of competing treatment options serve to determine the options that patient surrogates pursue. Simply put, surrogates confront an incentive, ceteris paribus, to pursue treatment options with respect to which their knowledge is most adequate to the requirements of the case. Regardless of what the patient would choose, options that require more knowledge than the surrogate possesses (or is likely to learn) will (...) either be neglected altogether or deeply discounted in the surrogate’s incentive structure. We establish this claim by arguing that the relation between epistemic burdens and incentives in decision-making is a general feature of surrogate decision-making. After establishing the claim, we draw out some of the implications for surrogate decision-making in medicine and offer philosophical and psychological explanations of the phenomenon. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe disadvantaged have incentives to commit crime, and to develop criminogenic dispositions, that limit the extent to which their co-citizens can blame them for breaking the law. This is true regardless of whether the causes of criminality are mainly “structural” or “cultural.” We need not assume that society as a whole is unjust in order to accept this conclusion. And doing so would neither stigmatize nor otherwise disrespect the disadvantaged.

This paper discusses two epistemic principles that are important to buyers and sellers: the appeal to popularity and the appeal to incentive structures. I point out the various ways these principles are defeasible, and then offer some examples of them at work in the contexts of hiring, politics and the arts. Finally, I consider why these principles are generally neglected, and conclude that our neglect is unwarranted on both epistemic and moral grounds.

This chapter discusses some legal implications of Hong Kong’s three types of organ donation incentive and presents further thoughts about their ethical and policy implications. It aims to transform the useful findings presented in previous chapters into legal solutions and policy innovations in practice. We argue that the Hong Kong law is able to incorporate mixed incentive measures and further suggest detailed legal rules regarding organ incentives for the government to consider. In terms of ethical and policy implications (...) in a wider context, we suggest a paradigm shift in incentive structure and the adoption of mixed incentive measures for the promotion of organ donation and procurement. However, we agree that the exact choice or combination of organ incentive measures ultimately depends on how each country or jurisdiction will assess their practical effectiveness, political legitimacy, and ethical justification. (shrink)

This paper documents for the first time tournament incentives of pension fund managers and their preferences for social and environmental security characteristics. Using a comprehensive data set on pension fund security holdings, differences in manager tournaments are distinguished by sorting pension funds into portfolios based on the number of concurrent managers each pension fund employs. Results indicate that the way pension schemes structure portfolio manager tournament incentives is important in explaining the social and environmental portfolio firm characteristics of pension fund (...) held stock. (shrink)

Rawlsians argue for principles of justice that apply exclusively to the basic structure of society, but it can seem strange that those who accept these principles should not also regulate their choices by them. Valid moral principles should seemingly identify ideals for both institutions and individuals. What justifies this nonintuitive distinction between institutional and individual principles is not a moral division of labor but Rawls’s dual commitments to conventionalism and constructivism. Conventionalism distinguishes the relevant ideals for evaluating institutions from those (...) for evaluating actions, while constructivism explains why this distinction is morally fundamental. (shrink)

While there is agreement on the need to improve sustainability in university hospitals, there are strong differences of opinion on how such goals interact with responsibilities of the medical profession, including research activities. To facilitate sustainability transitions in university hospitals, we need to gain a better understanding of the multiple incentive structures and ethical responsibilities related to sustainability that influence the physicians working there. Furthermore, there needs to be greater awareness and systematic consideration of the health co-benefits of (...) sustainability transitions. Both are necessary to prevent the sustainability agendas in hospital settings from becoming deadlocked due to disagreements over priorities and implementation, despite initial consensus in principle. (shrink)

In Rescuing Justice and Equality , G. A. Cohen reiterates his critique of John Rawls's difference principle as a justification for inequality-generating incentives, and also argues that Rawls's ambition to provide a constructivist defence of the first principles of justice is doomed. Cohen's arguments also suggest a natural response to my earlier attempt to defend the basic structure objection to Cohen's critique, which I term the alien factors reply. This paper criticises the reply, and Cohen's more general argument against Rawls's (...) constructivism. 1. (shrink)

This paper mounts a partial defense of the basic structure objection to the egalitarian criticism of productive incentives. The defense is based on the claim that some duties of justice are subject to a reciprocity condition. The paper develops this position via an examination of the debate between Andrew Williams and G. A. Cohen on publicity and incentives. Reciprocity is an intrinsic feature of a relational conception of social justice, not simply a requirement of stability. Not all duties are conditional (...) on reciprocity because some duties are owed to third parties, as well as to their primary targets. Some forms of exploitation may be unconditionally wrong, but not the specific kind of exploitation at stake when talented individuals accept market wages. (shrink)

Maternal health is considered a key global priority by the World Health Organization, and several strategies are used to promote it. Especially in lower- and lower-middle-income countries, one widely used strategy employs financial incentives to motivate pregnant women to access available healthcare. While such interventions have been extensively empirically evaluated, their normative aspects appear to have received less attention. To address this gap, we systematically searched and reviewed normative and qualitative literature to map and analyze the ethical considerations of using (...) financial incentives to promote maternal health. Twenty-three articles (four normative and 19 qualitative) were included in the review. We grouped ethical considerations under six categories, namely the program structure, promoting institutional births, of the ethical significance of cash, justifying conditionalities for maternal health, effects on individuals’ decision-making and the experiences of vulnerable groups. While incentives could be used for beneficent goals, we show how they may emphasize global rather than local solutions, impose unfamiliar sociocultural values, unfairly expect behavior change and disempower individuals and groups. We argue that future maternal health policy, especially those targeting vulnerable groups and minorities, would benefit from taking these normative considerations into account. (shrink)

: In its response to pressures to rationalize health care resource allocation, the American health care system has embraced managed care without concurrent comprehensive health care reform, either in the form of the centralized tax-based systems found in Europe and Canada or that of the Clinton reform plan. What survives is managed care without managed competition, employer mandates, or universal access. Two problems inherent in the incentive structure of managed care plans developed in the absence of comprehensive health care (...) reform work against the public interest. First, sacrifices in terms of medical innovation and quality of care may not be offset by greater equity in the distribution of health care. Second, such managed care plans fail to address the need for long-term accountability. (shrink)

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception (...) of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice. (shrink)

Phenomena like meat sharing in hunter-gatherers, self-sacrifice in intergroup conflicts, and voluntary contribution to public goods provision in laboratory experiments have led to the development of numerous theories on the evolution of altruistic in-group beneficial behavior in humans. Many of these theories abstract away from the effects of kinship on the incentives for public goods provision, though. Here, it is investigated analytically how genetic relatedness changes the incentive structure of that paradigmatic game which is conventionally used to model and (...) experimentally investigate collective action problems: the linear public goods game. Using recent anthropological data sets on relatedness in 61 contemporary hunter-gatherer and horticulturalist societies the relevant parameters of this model are then estimated. It turns out that the kinship patterns observed in these societies substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision. It is suggested, therefore, that renewed attention should be given to inclusive fitness theory in the context of public goods provision also in sizable groups, because its explanatory power with respect to this central problem in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism might have been substantially underrated. (shrink)

This article argues against privileging the expectations of settlers over those of dispossessed peoples. I assume in this article that historical rights to occupancy do not persist through all changes in circumstances, but a theory of justice should reduce perverse incentives to unjustly settle on land in hopes of legitimating occupancy. Margaret Moore, in her 2015 book, A Political Theory of Territory, tries to balance these intuitions through an argument based on legitimate expectations. I argue that Moore’s attempt to reduce (...) perverse incentives (through expectation-altering institutional design) fails. Moore unduly privileges settler expectations, especially over those of indigenous peoples. I criticize United States court decisions resurrecting the expectations of past settlers in the allotment era (which share structural features with Moore’s arguments). Lastly, distinguishing between ‘final’ supersession of historical injustice through changing circumstances, and ‘dormant’ supersession, shows how indigenous claims to land and jurisdiction may revive. (shrink)

To study hospital physicians’ awareness and perceptions of the legal and financial regulations, and their impact on professional discretion regarding equity in access to treatment and quality of care. A sample of 637 physicians in the Norwegian specialist healthcare services selected from a survey conducted by the Institute for Studies of the Medical Profession. The paper investigates how legal and financial policy instruments affect the application of professional discretion regarding the prioritisation of specialist health services. Descriptive statistics and regressions were (...) conducted for the analyses. Compared with financial incentives, legal regulations (laws, priority rules and guidelines) were assessed to be less negative external interventions in the exercise of medical and professional judgement. The empirical analyses revealed a positive tendency in physicians’ assessments of the impact of legal regulations on treatment equity and healthcare quality, but negative attitudes towards financial instruments. The variations revealed are attributable to various structural and epistemic features of the legal–bureaucratic and economic models of administration in this area of the welfare state. Legal and financial regulations are imposed to achieve certain social goals and values. The findings of this study can provide further insight for the health authorities in other countries concerning implementation of such regulations in the specialist healthcare services. (shrink)

Case studies about institutional pressures encouraging dishonesty in the US Navy.

In recent years, there has been a wide-ranging debate about the neo-republican principle of non-domination. Neo-republicans argue that domination is a capacity for one to intentionally use arbitrary power to interfere in someone’s life. Critics of neo-republicanism argue that this definition of freedom as non-domination precludes a structural analysis of domination, which would explain and critique the ways in which societies produce structural domination unintentionally. The article focuses on capitalism’s labor process and its labor markets. It argues that critics are (...) correct to think that the neo-republican principle of non-domination has an insufficient scope, but that an alternative account of structural domination should still support the neo-republican idea that agency must be involved. Otherwise, we might simply fail to explain the social processes that reproduce structural domination. What is needed is to explain how the labor process creates incentives for agents to intentionally produce structures that have unintended, yet dominating effects, and in turn, how the intentions of agents are conditioned by their social positions. Domination is thus agential and structural. (shrink)

Increasingly in the modern world, incentives are becoming the tool we reach for when we wish to bring about change. In government, in education, in health care, between and within institutions of all sorts, incentives are offered to steer people's choices in certain directions. But despite the increasing interest in ethics and economics, the ethics of the use of incentives has raised very little concern. From a certain point of view, this is not surprising. When incentives are viewed from the (...) perspective of market economics, they appear to be entirely unproblematic. An incentive is an offer of something of value, sometimes with a cash equivalent and sometimes not, meant to influence the payoff structure of a utility calculation so as to alter a person's course of action. In other words, the person offering the incentive means to make one choice more attractive to the person responding to the incentive than any other alternative. Both parties stand to gain from the resulting choice. In effect, it is a form of trade, and as such, it meets certain ethical requirements by definition. A trade involves voluntary action by all parties concerned to bring about a result that is beneficial to all parties concerned. If these conditions were not met, the trade would simply not occur. And as inducements in a voluntary transaction, incentives certainly have the moral high ground over coercion as an alternative. (shrink)

1.1.1 In a recent series of papers, G.A. Cohen has presented an egalitarian interpretation of the Difference Principle (hereafter, DP).1 According to this principle—first introduced by Rawls in A Theory of Justice2—inequalities in the distribution of primary goods3 are legitimate only to the extent that they maximize the prospects of the least advantaged members of society. Cohen argues that, once it is properly applied, DP does not legitimate any departure from equality. According to him, the distribution that maximizes the prospects (...) of the least advantaged is the equal distribution. Cohen has offered two kinds of argument in support of the egalitarian conclusion. According to the first argument, differential incentives are not necessary in order to maximize efficiency. According to the second argument, principles of distributive justice apply not only to the basic structure of society but also to the choices made by individuals within those rules. Therefore, talented people should not seek to maximize the gains they can get on the market, thereby making more social product available for the less well off. 4 In this paper, I focus only on Cohen’s first argument. The interesting feature of this argument is that it is presented as an internal criticism of Rawls’ theory of justice. My present concern is to understand to what extent the DP embodies an idea of equality and it is thus amenable to the egalitarian interpretation. I will argue that the first argument fails and that DP allows for the inequalities generated by the use of incentives. The assessment of the second argument merits a separate discussion that I intend to take up in a sequel to this paper. For the time being, I take not stance on the effect of the refutation of the first egalitarian argument on the success of the second one. In this work, I am rather concerned with articulating a novel.. (shrink)

I focus on a number of issues arising from Depue & Collins's target article that require further consideration: (1) data that fail to confirm extraversion effects in positive incentive experiments; (2) the role of personality factors, other than extraversion, in dopamine agonism on positive mood states; (3) the role of extraversion in nonspecific arousal, indicating that extraversion may not be an homogeneous trait; and (4) the problem of identifying neurobiologically important traits from existing structural models of personality. I applaud (...) the heuristic value of the model presented and suggest ways in which aspects of the model may be used to identify the personality traits associated with positive incentive motivation. (shrink)

Can the need for incentives justify inequality? Starting from this question, Frank Vandenbroucke examines a conception of justice in which both equality and responsibility are involved. In the first part of the inquiry, which explores the implementation of that conception of justice, the justification of incentives assumes that agents make personal choices based only upon their own interests. The second part of the book challenges the idea that a normative conception of distributive justice can be based on that traditional assumption, (...) i.e. that personal choices are not the subject matter of justice. Thus, Vandenbroucke questions the Rawlsian idea that the primary subject of a theory of justice is the basic structure of society, and not the individual conduct of its citizens. For a society to be really just, the ethos of individual conduct has to serve justice. Non-mathematical readers can skip the formal model proposed in Chapter 3 and understand the rest of the book. (shrink)

With the rapid development of society, all walks of life need the support of the Internet of Things, and the financial industry is no exception. This article integrates blockchain technology with supply chain finance and builds a supply chain financial alliance architecture based on blockchain technology and an underlying model of the Ethereum blockchain system suitable for supply chain finance. We innovated new supply chain finance models and operating mechanisms and proposed business scenarios for supply chain finance from the perspective (...) of blockchain. Taking into account the actual operation of the blockchain supply chain financial platform, the principal-agent model and the incentive theory are applied, and the supply chain financial accounts receivable model is taken as an example in the case of complete information and incomplete information. The incentive mechanism between the service provider of the chain supply chain financial platform and the core enterprise promotes the better implementation of blockchain technology and supply chain finance. Based on the existing theoretical research, this paper identifies the key influencing factors of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. These influencing factors system includes two dimensions: transaction factors and relationship factors. Transaction factors include resource dependence, uncertainty, and cooperation experience; relationship factors include corporate reputation, trust level, and relationship commitment. Based on the nature of the incentive mechanism, information sharing and revenue sharing are extracted as the measurement dimensions of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. On this basis, this article draws on the existing enterprise life cycle division method and constructs a hypothetical model of the influencing factors of the incentive mechanism in the incubation period, the growth period, and the maturity period. Relevant data was collected through questionnaires, and SPSS and AMOS software were used to perform statistical analysis, reliability analysis, exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and structural equation hypothesis testing on the data. The performance of each influencing factor in different stages of the enterprise’s life cycle and the importance of each influencing factor in the same life cycle stage are obtained. (shrink)

A disconnect remains between theories about responsible management and application in real-life organizations. Part of the reason is due to the complexity and holistic nature of the field, and the fact that many of the benefits of aligning business objectives with changing societal conditions are of an intangible nature. Human resource management is an increasingly important part of the field with benefits including talent retention, higher levels of motivation, and improvements in organizational cohesion. This paper sets out an experiment run (...) at a large Spanish university to try to analyze the impact on worker productivity of a responsible management stance by an employer. Based on the Corporate Social Performance model, the paper examines the issue from the point of view of responsibilities, responsiveness, and outcomes, and considers the cost/benefit effect of incorporating a social responsibility variable into the wage structure to measure the impact on productivity. (shrink)

This study introduces the concept of deviant behavior in a moderated-mediation framework of incentives and organizational justice perception. The proposed relationships in the theoretical framework were tested with a sample of 311 academics, using simple random sampling, via causal models and structural equation modeling. The findings suggest that incentives might boost the apparent performance, but not necessarily the intended performance. The results confirm that employees’ affection for incentives has direct, indirect, and conditional indirect effects on their deviant behavior likelihood. The (...) relationship between employee deviant behavior likelihood and affection for incentives was moderated by organizational justice perception and partially mediated by reward expectancy, thus having significant contributions toward the extant literature of deviant behavior and incentives. The findings have important implications for managers, academicians, and policy makers for mitigating adverse behavior in professional employees through proper use of incentives. (shrink)

Physics appears to be in a unique position to withstand antirealist attacks, especially ‘pessimistic induction’ arguments. Such resilience provides an incentive for embracing a ‘structural’ variant of scientific realism. Nevertheless, an examination of the physics-mathematics relationship suggests that whatever determines the success of modelling endeavours lends scant support to structural realism. A closer look at conceptual prerequisites of joint ab initio derivations of (i) Galilean and ‘special’ relativity theories and (ii) classical and ‘quantal’ probabilistic frameworks also fosters scepticism about (...) a major claim of structural realists: that mathematical features of theoretical frameworks – those, in particular, which determine their predictive efficiency – are ultimately rooted in ‘structural’ aspects of the natural world. Further concerns with the central tenets of structural realism are finally briefly addressed, and the question of possible non-instrumentalist alternatives is raised. (shrink)

With the expansion of multinational corporations (MNCs), the alarming upsurge in widely publicized and notable corporate scandals involving MNCs in emerging markets has begun to draw both academic and managerial attention to look beyond home market practices to the pressing concern of CSR in emerging markets. Previous studies on CSR have focused primarily on Western markets, reserving limited discussions in addressing the issue of MNC attitudes and CSR practices in their emerging host markets abroad. Despite this incongruity in academic response (...) to CSR in emerging markets, managers of multinational companies continue to face mounting and most often conflicting pressures to weigh among multiple strategic CSR responses in emerging markets. Such a task is often further complicated by the complexity of varying business norms and standards, regulatory environments, and stakeholder demands for CSR across national boundaries. With such a challenge in mind, I attempt to examine the explanatory factors in leading MNCs, otherwise recognized for accountability and integrity in their home markets, to employ inconsistent or negligent practices under CSR pressure in Chinese emerging economy. Preliminary findings reveal that discrepancies exist in how MNCs perform in CSR in home countries versus in host countries. While MNCs do have much to improve, the institutional environment in the emerging market, including the legal framework and the ethical culture, also needs to be improved by the host country governments, the industry associations, and local firms. Meanwhile, media interest and journalists, NGOs, third party monitors, industry stakeholders as well as consumer advocacy groups can raise the visibility of MNC's contradictory practices between their origin nations and countries with emerging economies and offer the pressures and incentives for MNCs to amend their ethical short-comings. This article also suggests implications for both theory and practice. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen’s discussion of the incentives argument for inequality has made an important contribution to our understanding of the normative theory of justice. The incentives argument is particularly difficult for egalitarians to rebut, yet Cohen seeks to show how egalitarians can mount a general defence against it. This paper argues that Cohen’s critique has so far been construed too narrowly, and that this has resulted in the mistaken impression that his critique stands or falls with the refutation of the (...) so-called basic structure objection. I explain Cohen’s argument and the objection, and I explain why I think his critique is invulnerable to this objection if it is construed in a different way. I also point out that this critique, if construed this way, has much wider implications than is usually thought, applying not only to the incentives argument, or even to arguments about justice, but to most arguments in ideal theory. (shrink)

This study explores the cultural evolution of finance through the analysis of monetary incentives and their impact on financial innovation. Through an interdisciplinary approach, it investigates how financial practices have changed due to economic and cultural pressures, and how these changes have driven new forms of innovation in global financial markets. The results reveal that monetary incentives play a crucial role in the evolution of financial structures, promoting the adoption of new technologies and financial products that have transformed the (...) global economy. This article highlights the importance of understanding the interplay between culture and finance in order to anticipate future trends in the industry. (shrink)

The online healthcare community has attained rapid development in recent years in which users are facilitated to exchange disease information and seek medical treatment. However, users’ motivation of participation in OHCs is still under investigation. Taking the perspective of user perceived value, this paper examined the impacts of different incentive levels including identity incentive, privilege incentive, and material incentive on user perceived value, user engagement, and user loyalty. To test the proposed hypotheses, the study adopted the (...) methods of the between-subjects experiment and questionnaire. Based on the data analysis by ANOVA and structural equation model, the results show there are significant differences in the impacts of different incentive levels on users’ perceived value. Most of the incentive measures exert significant effects on simple user hedonic value and community identity value. Accordingly, the research findings suggest that affective support value and self-health management value demonstrate more importance for user engagement and user loyalty. Therefore, OHCs should try to improve users’ affective support value and self-health management value which are the ultimate aims of the OHCs. Our study sheds some light on profoundly understanding the design of incentive mechanism of OHC and contributes to the research of OHC services. (shrink)

Background There has been growing interest in the use of incentives to increase the uptake of health-related behaviours and achieve desired health outcomes at the individual and population level. However, the use of incentives remains controversial for ethical reasons. An area in which incentives have been not only proposed but used is HIV prevention, testing, treatment and care—each one representing an interconnecting step in the "HIV Cascade." Methods The main objective of this qualitative case study was to document the experiences (...) of health care and service providers tasked with administrating incentivized HIV testing, treatment, and care in British Columbia, Canada. A second objective was to explore the ethical and professional tensions that arise from the use of incentives as well as strategies used by providers to mitigate them. We conducted interviews with 25 providers and 6 key informants, which were analyzed using applied thematic analysis. We also collected documents and took field notes. Results Our findings suggest that incentives target populations believed to pose the most risk to public health. As such, incentives are primarily used to close the gaps in the HIV Cascade by getting the "right populations" to test, start treatment, stay on treatment, and, most importantly, achieve viral suppression. Participants considered that incentives work because they "bring people through the door." However, they believed the effectiveness of incentives to be superficial, short-lived and one-dimensional—thus, failing to address underlying structural barriers to care and structural determinants of health. They also raised concerns about the unintended consequences of incentives and the strains they may put on the therapeutic relationship. They had developed strategies to mitigate the ensuing ethical and professional tensions and to make their work feel relational rather than transactional. Conclusions We identify an urgent need to problematize the use of incentives as a part of the "HIV Cascade" agenda and interrogate the ethics of engaging in this practice from the perspective of health care and service providers. More broadly, we question the introduction of market logic into the realm of health care—an area of life previously not subject to monetary exchanges. (shrink)

The real estate industry is characterized by a high degree of financial intensity and is more significant in certain areas. The relative enterprises require certain financial ability and large shareholders’ controlling power to support their survivals and competitiveness. However, due to the multiple adverse impacts of current state policies on banks and private capital, the problem of capital restraints of real estate has become increasingly serious. From a corporate governance perspective, this paper studies the interactions among financial constraints, ownership concentration (...) and corporate performance under different shareholding states: by analyzing the quantitative characteristics of equity structure and searching for the appropriate range of the largest shareholder holding ratio, which has considered both the financial sustainability and characteristics. It is found that raising the ownership concentration could enhance supervision effect rather than encroachment, effectively ease the financial constraints and improve the performance of enterprises, both of which are significant under high ownership concentration. Financial constraints play a significant intermediary effect in absolute holdings and have obvious regulatory effects in decentralized equity. Also, the mechanisms of ownership concentration are reflected in the strengthening of corporate supervision, reduced agency costs, improved operating efficiency, and increased investment attractiveness. The adjusted behavior adds to the responsibility awareness rather than free-ride psychology, forming a dynamic game on financial decisions. Their financial sustainability in areas would provide a nationwide reference for governance reform and managerial behavior. (shrink)

Socially Responsible Investment indices play a major role in the stock markets. A connection between doing good and doing well in business is implied. Leading indices, such as the Domini Social Index and others, exemplify the movement toward investing in socially responsible corporations. However, the question remains: Does the ratings-based methodology for assessing corporate social responsibility provide an incentive to firms excluded from SRI indices to invest in CSR? Not in its current format. The ratings-based methodology employed by SRI (...) indices in their selection processes excludes many corporations by creating limited-membership lists. This received ratings-based structure is yet to offer an incentive for most of the excluded corporations to invest in improving their levels of CSR. We, therefore, ask under what circumstances a ratings-based method for assessing CSR could provide an incentive to firms excluded from SRI indices to invest in CSR. In this article, we attempt to offer a theoretical reply to this question. We show that when all firms are publicly ranked according to SRI index parameters, such indices can indeed create a market incentive for increased investment by firms in improving their performance in the area of social responsibility. We further show that this incentive tapers off as the amount of investment required exceeds a certain point or if the amount of payback on that investment fails to reach a certain threshold. (shrink)

Rudolf Arnheim's great forte is his ability to illuminate the perceptual processes that go into the making and reception of artworks—painting, sculpture, architecture, and film. Over the years, his pioneering mode of "reading" art from a unique scientific/philosophic perspective has garnered him an established and devoted audience. That audience will take pleasure in Arnheim's most recent collection of essays, one that covers a range of topics and includes titles such as "Outer Space and Inner Space," "What Is an Aesthetic Fact?," (...) "As I Saw Children's Art," "Two Ways of Being Human," "Consciousness—an Island of Images," and "From Chaos to Wholeness." The notion of structure is Arnheim's guide in these explorations. Most of the essays examine the nature of structure affirmatively: how it comes about, its incentives and objectives, its celebration of perfection. He is interested in how artists grope for structure to shape powerful, enlightening images, and how a scientist's search for truth is a search for structure. Writing with enviable clarity, even when deploying complex arguments, Arnheim makes it easy and exciting to follow him as he thinks. America is not abundantly supplied with "public intellectuals" such as Rudolf Arnheim—to have his writings with us is cause for celebration. "The word 'structure' appears for good reason in the title of this collection.... Structure seems to be needed as an arbiter wherever this civilization of ours is split by selfish interests and fighting for either/or decisions. The essays want to speak with the voice of reason, because they want to show how the parts require the whole.". (shrink)

Classical probability models of incentive response are inadequate in where the dimensions of relative risk and the dimensions of similarity in outcome comparisons typically differ. Quantum probability models for choice in large worlds may be motivated pragmatically or metaphysically: statistical processing in the brain adapts to the true scale-relative structure of the universe.

In this paper I examine how the constituent elements of a firm's organizational structure affect the ethical behavior of workers. The formal features of organizations I examine are the compensation practices, performance and evaluation systems, and decision-making assignments. I argue that the formal organizational structure, which is distinguished from corporate culture, is necessary, though not sufficient, in solving ethical problems within firms. At best the formal structure should not undermine the ethical actions of workers. When combined with a strong culture, (...) however, the organizational structure may be sufficient in promoting ethical conduct. While helpful, ethics training and corporate codes are neither necessary nor sufficient in promoting ethical behavior within firms. (shrink)

John Rawls's focus on principles of justice for the basic structure of primary social institutions evolved from his early discussion of practices, social rules and Humean conventions, and his apparent commitment to a version of rule‐utilitarianism. Rawls says that there are two sources for the primacy assigned to the basic structure: the profound effects of basic social institutions on persons and their future prospects, and the need to maintain background justice. The chapter discusses three different kinds of reasons for the (...) primacy of principles for the basic structure: social nature of human relationships, ideals of persons and society, distributive justice and the importance of background justice. It concludes with a discussion of some prominent objections: monism vs dualism; capitalism, incentives and the institutional division of labor; the principles of justice are neither consequentialist nor prioritarian; social justice vs cosmopolitan justice. (shrink)

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that could not be traded. This restriction mitigated state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent management. Our findings support the view that economic incentives (...) are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud. (shrink)

There is considerable enthusiasm about the prospect that artificial intelligence (AI) will help to improve the safety and efficacy of health services and the efficiency of health systems. To realize this potential, however, AI systems will have to overcome structural problems in the culture and practice of medicine and the organization of health systems that impact the data from which AI models are built, the environments into which they will be deployed, and the practices and incentives that structure their development. (...) This perspective elaborates on some of these structural challenges and provides recommendations to address potential shortcomings. (shrink)