Previous studies showed that when reading a scenario depicting a harmless moral violation in the domain of purity, people nevertheless implicitly infer that harm was involved. In this study, we assessed whether this “implicit completion” process found in the perception of immoral actions is also present in people with autism spectrum disorder. In two experiments, we found an implicit activation of harm representations in response to all kinds of moral violations in neurotypical adults as well as in (...) adults with autism. These results suggested that the perception of moral violations is relatively preserved in people with autism. (shrink)

Legally blind participants were able to identify a visual stimulus attribute in the absence of consciously identifying its presence. Specifically, participants—with their corrective lenses removed—correctly guessed the hour-hand position above chance on a clockface shown on a computer screen. This occurred both when presented in a 1-clockface display , as well as when shown a display containing 4 clockfaces , in which only 1 face contained a hand. Even more striking, hand identification accuracy in the 4-clockface condition was comparable whether (...) the clockface containing the hand was or was not correctly identified. That legally blind individuals are capable of identifying stimulus attributes without conscious awareness provides an additional vehicle for exploring implicit perception. Consistent with previous research, the visualsystem can apparently cope with degraded visual input through information available through a secondary pathway via the superior colliculi. (shrink)

Previous studies conducted in the United States indicate that people associate numbers with gender, such that odd numbers are more likely to be considered male and even numbers considered female. It has been argued that this number gendering phenomenon is acquired through social learning and conditioning, and that male-odd/female-even associations reflect a general, cross-cultural human consensus on gender roles relating to agency and communion. However, the incidence and pattern of number gendering in cultures outside the United States remains to be (...) established. Against this background, the purpose of this study was to determine whether people from a culture and country very different from the United States also associate numbers with gender, and, if they do, whether the pattern of these associations is the male-odd/female-even associations previously observed. To investigate this issue, we adopted the Implicit Association Test used frequently in previous research, where associations between numbers and gender were examined using male and female Arabic participants native to, and resident in, the United Arab Emirates. The findings indicated that the association of numbers with gender does occur in Arabic culture. But while Arabic females associated odd numbers with male faces and even numbers with female faces, Arabic males showed the reversed pattern of gender associations, associating even numbers with male faces and odd numbers with female faces. These findings support the view that number gendering is indeed a cross-cultural phenomenon and show that the phenomenon occurs across very different countries and cultures. But the findings also suggest that the pattern with which numbers are associated with gender is not universal and, instead, reflects culture-specific views on gender roles which may change across cultures and gender. Further implications for understanding the association of numbers with gender across human societies are discussed. (shrink)

The present commentary addresses the main results obtained in the Butler and Klein [Butler, B. C., & Klein, R. . Inattentional blindness for ignored words: Comparison of explicit and implicit memory tasks. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 811–819.] study and discusses them in relation to the Perceptual Load Theory of Lavie [Lavie, N. . Perceptual load as a necessary condition for selective attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, 451–68.]. The authors claim that the use of (...) implicit indexes of conceptual distractor processing in high-load situations would be an important addition to the load literature, which would benefit the research field regardless of their positive or negative findings. (shrink)

Participants struck 500 golf balls to a concealed target. Outcome feedback was presented at the subjective or objective threshold of awareness of each participant or at a supraliminal threshold. Participants who received fully perceptible feedback learned to strike the ball onto the target, as did participants who received feedback that was only marginally perceptible . Participants who received feedback that was not perceptible showed no learning. Upon transfer to a condition in which the target was unconcealed, performance increased in both (...) the subjective and the objective threshold condition, but decreased in the supraliminal condition. In all three conditions, participants reported minimal declarative knowledge of their movements, suggesting that deliberate hypothesis testing about how best to move in order to perform the motor task successfully was disrupted by the impoverished disposition of the visual outcome feedback. It was concluded that sub-optimally perceptible visual feedback evokes implicit processes. (shrink)

Scholars have assumed that trust is fragile: difficult to build and easily broken. We demonstrate, however, that in some cases trust is surprisingly robust—even when harmful deception is revealed, some individuals maintain high levels of trust in the deceiver. In this paper, we describe how implicit theories moderate the harmful effects of revealed deception on a key component of trust: perceptions of integrity. In a negotiation context, we show that people who hold incremental theories reduce perceptions of their counterpart’s (...) integrity after they learn that they were deceived, whereas people who hold entity theories maintain their first impressions after learning that they were deceived. Implicit theories influenced how targets interpreted evidence of deception. Individuals with incremental theories encoded revealed deception as an ethical violation; individuals with entity theories did not. These findings highlight the importance of implicit beliefs in understanding how trust changes over time. (shrink)

Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi have recently argued against a simulationist interpretation of neural resonance. Recognizing intentions and emotions in the facial expressions and gestures of others may be subserved by e.g. mirror neuron activity, but this does not mean that we first experience an intention or emotion and then project it onto the other. Mirror neurons subserve social cognition, according to Gallagher and Zahavi, by being integral parts of processes of enactive social perception. I argue that the notion (...) of enactive social perception does not yet explain why social perception is subserved by mirroring. I also argue that this problem cannot be avoided by means of an appeal to multiple realization. Instead, I propose a holistic model of neural resonance-based social cognition that does give an explanatory role to mirroring by allowing for a partial experiential overlap between experiencing and recognizing emotions and intentions. This account avoids the simulationist step-wise conception of social cognition and recognizes the qualitative difference between first- and third-person emotion and intention attribution. It does capture too much of the simulationist intuitions, however, to warrant the label ‘social perception’. (shrink)

At the University of Sheffield during 2011 and 2012, a leading group of philosophers, psychologists, and others gathered to explore the nature and significance of implicit bias. The two volumes of Implicit Bias and Philosophy emerge from these workshops. Each volume philosophically examines core areas of psychological research on implicit bias as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology is comprised of two parts: “The Nature of (...) Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Stereotype Threat,” and “Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality.” The first part contains chapters examining the relationship between implicit attitudes and “dual process” models of the mind; the role of affect in the formation and change of implicit associations; the unity (or disunity) of implicit attitudes; whether implicit biases are mental states at all; and whether performances on stereotype-relevant tasks are automatic and unconscious or intentional and strategic. The second part contains chapters examining implicit bias and skepticism; the effects of implicit bias on scientific research; the accessibility of social stereotypes in epistemic environments; the effects of implicit bias on the self-perception of members of stigmatized social groups as rational agents; the role of gender stereotypes in philosophy; and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. (shrink)

Should we understand implicit attitudes on the model of belief? I argue that implicit attitudes are (probably) members of a different psychological kind altogether, because they seem to be insensitive to the logical form of an agent’s thoughts and perceptions. A state is sensitive to logical form only if it is sensitive to the logical constituents of the content of other states (e.g., operators like negation and conditional). I explain sensitivity to logical form and argue that it is (...) a necessary condition for belief. I appeal to two areas of research that seem to show that implicit attitudes fail spectacularly to satisfy this condition—although persistent gaps in the empirical literature leave matters inconclusive. I sketch an alternative account, according to which implicit attitudes are sensitive merely to spatiotemporal relations in thought and perception, i.e., the spatial and temporal orders in which people think, see, or hear things. (shrink)

Implicit learning is a core process for the acquisition of a complex, rule‐based environment from mere interaction, such as motor action, skill acquisition, or language. A body of evidence suggests that implicit knowledge governs music acquisition and perception in nonmusicians and musicians, and that both expert and nonexpert participants acquire complex melodic, harmonic, and other features from mere exposure. While current findings and computational modeling largely support the learning of chunks, some results indicate learning of more complex (...) structures. Despite the body of evidence, more research is required to support the cross‐cultural validity of implicit learning and to show that core and more complex music theoretical features are acquired implicitly. (shrink)

This landmark volume brings together the work of the world's leading researchers in sublimated perception. This compilation marks a fundamental shift in the current study of subliminal effects: No longer in question is the notion that perception without awareness occurs. Now, the emphasis is on elucidating the parameters of subliminal effects and understanding the conditions under which stimuli perceived without awareness significantly influence affect, cognition, and behavior. PERCEPTION WITHOUT AWARENESS firmly establishes subliminal perception within the mainstream (...) of psychological science. Well represented here are the two main research branches that have emerged: One directly investigates the nature of subliminal effects; the other uses subliminal techniques as tools for investigating psychological phenomena such as hypnosis, dreaming, repression, social judgment and inference, psychopathology, and symptom formation. Broadly grouped into three main sections, the contributed chapters explore * The cognitive perspective--including implicit memory and implicit perception, the measurement of unconscious perceptual processes, and methods for revealing unconscious processes * The clinical perspective--exploring the cognitive and dynamic aspects of subliminal perception, memory, and consciousness; direct recovery of subliminal stimuli; and validation of subliminal psychodynamic activation * The social perspective--discussing subliminal mere-exposure effects, affect and social perception, and the role of subliminality in social psychology Timely and thought-provoking, PERCEPTION WITHOUT AWARENESS is sure to be of enormous interest to all psychoanalytic clinicians and scholars, as well as cognitive, clinical, and social psychologists whose work touches upon issues relating to psychopathology, perception, cognition, and memory. (shrink)

Je lui ai associÉ un court extrait d'une revue de questions portant sur le même thème. Implicit memory is revealed when previous experiences facilitate perf on a task that does not require conscious or intentional recollection of those expces. Explicit memory is revealed when perf on a task requires conscious recolelction of previous expces. Il s'agit de defs descriptives qui n'impliquent pas l'existence de deux systs de mÉmo sÉparÉs. Historiquement Descartes est le premier ˆ faire mention de phÉnomènes de (...) mÉmo implicites, Leibniz, Maine de Biran, Bergson en ont Également parlÉ. Korsakoff (1889) avec ses travaux sur les amnÉsiques montre qu'ils sont capables d'utiliser de l'info qu'ils ont acquises dans des Épisodes rÉcents sans pour autant manifester le moindre souvenir de l'Épisode. L'interprÉtation de ces phÉnomènes Était alors que ça renvoyait ˆ des traces en mÉmoire trop tÉnues pour accèder jusqu'au champ de la conscience. Cette interprÉtation va pouvoir être ÉcartÉe par les travaux rÉcents. Thorndike a Également conduit un nbre important de travaux sur MI. Les trauvaux un peu plus rÉcents ont montrÉ qu'un apprentissage antÉrieur pouvait faciliter une perfce sans qu'il y ait ref explicite à l'Épisode d'apprentissage. On a montrÉ aussi l'effet de stimuli subliminaux, qui en tant que tels ne peuvent pas être rappelÉs consciemment, mais qui influencent la conduite ou les jugts ultÉrieurs. Par ex, la prÉsentation de formes sur des temps très courts qui excluent la possibilitÉ d'une perception consciente influence significativement lechoix de formes dans une pÉreuve ultÉrieure de choix forcÉs où les sjts doivent indiquer la forme qu'il prÉfère entre deux. Ils choisissent prÉfÉrentiellement celles qui leur ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉes de manière subliminale. De même Bargh et al. ont montrÉ que des sjts soumis de manière subliminale ˆ des mots hostiles portent ultÉrieurement des jugts plus nÉgatifs sur une personne target. Il ya Également eu des travaux sur l'apprsge ou le condt without awareness en particulier apprsge implicite de règles de grammaire (ie le sjt peut construire de nouvelles phrases conformes ˆ la syntaxe de celles qui lui ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉes sans pour autant petre capables d'noncer les règles de grammaire qu'il utilise) Rem: N'est ce pas un pbe de typemÉtacognition??? Enfin, tous les travaux sur le priming sont des elts en faveur de MI: Facilitation in the processing of a stimulus as a function of a recent encounter with the same stimulus. Type de perfce sur lesquels les effets de priming ont ÉtÉ dÉmontrÉs: -T‰ches de dÉcision lexicale: Le sjt doit dire si la cha"ne de caractères qu'on lui prÉsente est un mot ou pas: Le temps de latence est beaucoup plus court si la cha"ne a dÉjˆ ÉtÉ prÉsentÉe une première fois. -Mesures de temps d'identification de mots en rpÉsentation tachitoscopiques -ComplÉmentation de mots: les sjts ont tendance ˆ complÉter pour crÉer les mots qui leur ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉs antÉrieurement. L'intÉrêt pour le paradigme de priming se retouve chez les gens qui s'intÉressent ˆ: -reconnaissance de mots et organisation lexicale. les effets de priming permettent de faire des hyps sur l'accès lexical et la reprÉsentation. -M. Épisodique: travux sur les amnÉsiques qui ne se souviennent pas qu'on vient de leur prÉsenter des mots mais qui manifestent une mÉmoire implicite lorsqu'on leur fait faire de la complÉmentation de mots. DISSOCIATION ENTRE M.I. ET M EXPLICITE 1-Si de nombreux travaux montrent que la M explicite est influencÉe par le travail d'Élaboration (profondeur de traitement) en jeu pendant la première phase d'Étude des stimuli, il semble que la MI ne le soit pas. 2-Le changt de modalitÉ (par ex auditif -> visuel) entre la phase d'Étude et la phase de test provoque une attÉnuation importante de l'effet de priming si le test est un test de MI mais pas si c'est un test de ME. 3-Les effets de primings persistent assez largement sur plusieurs jours ce qui n'est pas le cas des perfces ˆ une Épreuve de reconnaissance. 4-Les perfces sur des tests de MI ne semblent pas influencÉes par des manipulations d'interfÉrences proactives ou rÉtroactives dont on sait qu'elles influencent les perfces en ME. 5-Absce de corrÉlation entre perfces ˆ des tests de reconnaissance et perfces ˆ une Épreuve de complÉmentation de mots. SIMILARITES ENTRE PRIMING ET REMEMBERING 1- A certaines conditions les durÉes de rÉtention on des effets parallèles sur les effets de priming et les mesures de ME (REm: en partie contradictoire avec 3 ci dessus) 2-La manipulation du contexte de la liste lors de la phase d'Étude affecte ˆ la fois les perfces en reconnaissance et en identification de mots. 3- ME et MI sont influencÉes par des associations nouvellement acquises entre des paires de mots non reliÉes (Rem: contradictoires avec 4 ci dessus ??) 4- Rem: Le contraire de 1 du pt "dissociation" !!!! dans une manip particulière 5-Johnston et al. ont montrÉ que des mots identifÉs plus rapidement Étaient plus svt jugÉs comme 'old' dans une t‰che de reconnaissance que les mots identifiÉs plus lentement. Il n'est pas exclu que les phÉnomènes que l'on interprètent comme relevant de MI soient parfois de la ME involontaire cad des cas o les cues fournis dans le test conduisent ˆ un souvenir involontaire mais totalement conscient. LES INTERPRETATIONS THEORIQUES DE MI 1-Les effets de priming sur des test de MI sont attribuables ˆ l'activation temporaires de reprÉsentations ou structures de K prÉ-existantes . Cette activation est supposÉe avoir lieu de manière automatique, indÉpendamment des processus d'Élaboration nÉcessaires pour Établir de nouvelles traces Épisodiques. 2- les difÉrences entre ME et MI sont dues ˆ la nature et aux relations entre les processus d'encodage et de rÉcupÉration. Une version de cette approche est celle qui s'appuie sur la distinction entre processus dirigÉs par les donnÉes et processus dirigÉs par les concepts. Ces derniers reflètent des activitÉs initiÉes par le sjt comme l'Élaboration, l'organisation et la reconstruction, c'est sur ce type de processus que reposerait la ME alors que la MI reposerait sur des processus data-driven. 3-ME et MI renvoient ˆ des systs sous jacents diffÉrents. Pour Cohen & Squire (1984), la ME est supportÉe par une M DECLARATIVE , syst qui est en jeu dans la formation de nouvelles reprÉsentations. La MI repose sur un syst PROCEDURAL dans lequel la M se manifeste par des modifications on line de procÉdures ou opÉrations de traitement. Le syst de M Épisodique est vu comme la base pour le souvenir explicite d'evts rÉcents tandis que la M sÉmantique est responsable des perfces sur des tests de MI. Chacune de ces approches est conforme ˆ certaines des donnÉes recueillies mais pas ˆ d'autres. (shrink)

The implicit-explicit distinction is applied to knowledge representations. Knowledge is taken to be an attitude towards a proposition which is true. The proposition itself predicates a property to some entity. A number of ways in which knowledge can be implicit or explicit emerge. If a higher aspect is known explicitly then each lower one must also be known explicitly. This partial hierarchy reduces the number of ways in which knowledge can be explicit. In the most important type of (...) implicit knowledge, representations merely reflect the property of objects or events without predicating them of any particular entity The dearest cases of explicit knowledge of a fact are representations of one's own attitude of knowing that fact. These distinctions are discussed in their relationship to similar distinctions such as procedural-declarative, conscious unconscious, verbalizable-nonverbalizable, direct-indirect tests, and automatic voluntary control. This is followed by an outline of how these distinctions can be used to integrate and relate the often divergent uses of the implicit-explicit distinction in different research areas. We illustrate this for visual perception, memory, cognitive development, and artificial grammar learning. (shrink)

For almost half a century dual-stream advocates have vigorously defended the view that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in the primary visual cortex: a ventral, perception-related ‘conscious’ stream and a dorsal, action-related ‘unconscious’ stream. They furthermore maintain that the perceptual and memory systems in the ventral stream are relatively shielded from the action system in the dorsal stream. In recent years, this view has come under scrutiny. Evidence points to two overlapping action pathways: (...) a dorso-dorsal pathway that calculates features of the object to be acted on, and a ventro-dorsal pathway that transmits stored information about skilled object use from the ventral stream to the dorso-dorsal pathway. This evidence suggests that stored information may exert significantly more influence on visually guided action than hitherto assumed. I argue that this, in turn, supports the notion of skilled automatic action that is nonetheless agential. My focus here will be on actions influenced by implicit biases (stereotypes/prejudices). Action that is biased in this way, I argue, is in an important sense intentional and agential. (shrink)

The implicit motivational needs for power, achievement, and affiliation are highly relevant in the context of sports. Sport enables people to experience achievement incentives like mastering challenges as well as social incentives such as recognition by teammates. Further, McClelland’s (1986) hypothesized that implicit motives are particularly associated right-hemisphere functions. Therefore, this preregistered study, conducted online, examines motivational needs using a standard picture-story exercise (PSE) and their associations with indicators of laterality, sports participation, and competition in gymnasts (N = (...) 67). Further it explores how implicit motives interact with suitable motivational incentives in the prediction of sports performance. Results partly confirm a link between indictors of cerebral rightward laterality and implicit motives, showing that the implicit affiliation and achievement motives are positively associated with an indicator of emotional-perceptional laterality (chimeric-faces task), but not with an indicator of motor laterality (turning bias). Moreover, the implicit achievement motive was positively correlated with training hours. The implicit affiliation motive was negatively associated with competition level. The presence of achievement incentives (perceived control, failure) and affiliation incentives (training together or alone) did not interact with corresponding motives to predict sports performance. (shrink)

A modified version of the mere exposure effect paradigm was utilized in an implicit artificial grammar learning task in an attempt to develop a procedure that would be more sensitive in assesing nonconscious learning processes than the methods currently utilized within the field of implicit learning. Subjects were presented with stimuli generated from a finite-state artificial grammar and then had to either decide if novel items conformed to the rule structure of the grammar or rate the degree to (...) which they liked novel items. Because the latter of the task was more indirect of the two procedures, subjects′ availability to discriminate between well-formed and ill-formed items on this liking task was taken as a more sensitive piece of evidence of implicit learning, compared to performance on the rule conformity task. A subsequent test of subjects′ explicit knowledge of the rules of the grammar showed that subjects do have some conscious knowledge of the artificial grammar, but subjects making liking decisions exhibited significantly less conscious rule knowledge than subjects initially making rule-conformity judgements. The findings are discussed in relation to synergistic relationships among implicit perception, implicit memory, and implicit learning proceses. (shrink)

The central contention of The Implicit Mind is that understanding the two faces of spontaneity-its virtues and vices-requires understanding the "implicit mind." In turn, Michael Brownstein maintains that understanding the implicit mind requires the consideration of three sets of questions. First, what are implicit mental states? What kind of cognitive structure do they have? Second, how should we relate to our implicit attitudes? Are we responsible for them? Third, how can we improve the ethics of (...) our implicit minds? (shrink)

The possibilities of unconscious perception and unconscious bias prompt parallel debates about unconscious mental content. This chapter argues that claims within these debates alleging the existence of unconscious content are made fraught by ambiguity and confusion with respect to the two central concepts they involve: consciousness and content. Borrowing conceptual resources from the debate about unconscious perception, the chapter distills the two conceptual puzzles concerning each of these notions and establishes philosophical strategies for their resolution. It then argues (...) that empirical evidence for unconscious bias falls victim to these same puzzles, but that progress can be made by adopting similar philosophical strategies. Throughout, the chapter highlights paths forward in both debates, illustrates how they serve as fruitful domains in which to study the relationship between philosophy and empirical science, and uses their combined study to further understanding of a general theory of unconscious content. (shrink)

The second section contains chapters examining implicit bias and skepticism; the effects of implicit bias on scientific research; the accessibility of social stereotypes in epistemic environments; the effects of implicit bias on the self-perception of members of stigmatized social groups as rational agents; the role of gender stereotypes in philosophy; and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics is comprised of three sections. 'Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias' (...) contains chapters examining the relationship of implicit biases to concepts that are central to moral responsibility, including control, awareness, reasons-responsiveness, and alienation. The chapters in the second section--'Structural Injustice'--explore the connections between the implicit biases held by individuals and the structural injustices of the societies in which they are situated. (shrink)

This article reviews experimental evidence for a specific sensorimotor function which can be dissociated from higher level representations of space. It attempts to delineate this function on the basis of results obtained by psychophysical experiments performed with brain damaged and healthy subjects. Eye and hand movement control exhibit automatic features, such that they are incompatible with conscious control. In addition, they rely on a reference frame different from the one used by conscious perception. Neuropsychological cases provide a strong support (...) for this specific motor representation of space, which can be spared in patients with lesions of primary sensory systems who have lost conscious perception of visual, tactile or proprioceptive stimuli. Observation of these patients also showed that their motor behavior can be ''attracted'' by a goal only under specific conditions, that is, when the response is immediate and when no cognitive representation of this goal is elaborated at the same time. Beyond the issue of the dissociation between an implicit motor representation and more cognitive processing of spatial information, the issue of the interaction between these two systems is thus a matter of interest. It is suggested that the conscious, cognitive representation of a stimulus can contaminate or override the short-lived motor representation, but no reciprocal influence seem to occur. The interaction observed in patients can also be investigated in normals. The literature provides examples of interaction between sensorimotor and cognitive framing of space, which confirm that immediate action is not mediated by the same system as delayed action, and that elaborating a categorial representation of the action goal prevents the expression of the short-lived sensorimotor representation. It is concluded that action can be controlled by a sensory system which is specialized for on-line processing of relevant goal characteristics. The temporal constraints of this system are such that it can affect the action before a full sensory analysis of this goal has been completed. The performance obtained on the basis of this spatial sensory processing suggests that short-lived motor representations may rather be considered as real ''presentation'' of the action world, which share its metric properties. (shrink)

Previous studies have shown that Chinese speakers and non-Chinese speakers exhibit different patterns of cross-modal congruence for the lexical tones of Mandarin Chinese, depending on which features of the pitch they attend to. But is this pattern of language-specific listening a conscious cultural strategy or an automatic processing effect? If automatic, does it also apply when the same pitch contours no longer sound like speech? Implicit Association Tests (IATs) provide an indirect measure of cross-modal association. In a series of (...) IAT studies, conducted with participants with three kinds of language backgrounds (Chinese-dominant bilinguals, Chinese balanced bilinguals, and English speakers with no Chinese experience) we find language-specific congruence effects for Mandarin lexical tones but not for matched sine-wave stimuli. That is, for linguistic stimuli, non-Chinese speakers show advantages for pitch-height congruence (high-pointy, low-curvy); no congruence effects were found for Chinese speakers. For non-linguistic stimuli, all participant groups showed advantages for pitch-height congruence. The present findings suggest that non-lexical tone congruence (high-pointy, low-curvy) is a basic congruence pattern, and the acquisition of a language with lexical tone can alter this perception. (shrink)

Three key ways of updating one’s knowledge are (i) perception of states of affairs, (ii) reception of messages, (iii) drawing new conclusions from known facts. If one represents knowledge by means of Kripke models, the implicit assumption is that drawing conclusions is immediate. This assumption of logical omniscience is a useful abstraction. It leaves the distinction between (i) and (ii) to be accounted for. In current versions of Update Logic (Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Logic of Communication and Change) (...) class='Hi'>perception and message reception are not distinguished. We will look at what is needed to distinguish them. (shrink)

How do we understand other people’s minds? This is a descriptive problem of other minds, a question concerning the descriptive nature of social cognition or interpersonal understanding. There are currently three prominent approaches to this problem, namely, the theory theory approach, the simulation theory approach and the direct perception approach. Instead of trying to resolve the conflict between them, I will conduct a preliminary exploration concerning the nature of social perception or the experience of seeing other people. TT, (...) ST and DP are all implicitly or explicitly committed to a particular conception of social perception. Thus, it is necessary to look into the nature of social perception in developing a theory of social cognition. I claim that social perception involves the following three characteristics: In social perception, other people are given to us; other people are given as transcendent; other people are given as transcendent but potentially accessible. They respectively constitute the Immediacy constraint, the Transcendence constraint, and the Accessibility constraint on theories of social cognition. I suggest that TT and ST fail to do justice to the Immediacy constraint and the Accessibility constraint, while DP does not pay due attention to the Accessibility constraint. (shrink)

People are unable to report how they decide whether to move backwards or forwards to catch a ball. When asked to imagine how their angle of elevation of gaze would change when they caught a ball, most people are unable to describe what happens although their interception strategy is based on controlling changes in this angle. Just after catching a ball, many people are unable to recognise a description of how their angle of gaze changed during the catch. Some people (...) confidently choose incorrect descriptions that would guarantee failure of interception demonstrating unconscious knowledge co-existing with systematically different conscious beliefs. Where simple solutions to important evolutionary problems exist, unconscious perception needs to be impervious to conscious beliefs. (shrink)

'Sense perception in current process thought' was the topic of a workshop organized by the 'Whitehead Psychology Nexus' (for more information see below) at Fontareches in spring 2003. This and earlier Fontareches meetings can be characterized by just a few elements: non-dogmatism, interdisciplinarity and overlapping approaches. Although the convergence point is Whitehead's philosophy, this is intended in the sense of an 'eschaton' rather than a 'telos'. The vivid discussions, occurring in a very thoughtful, yet relaxed, atmosphere in the small (...) village of Fontareches in Southern France, have amply testified for the promising paths and synergies that can emerge in such an environment. This year, the core intention was to examine relations between Whitehead's theory of perception and contemporary psychology. The individual contributions can be sorted into the three areas of philosophy, cognitive science, and mental health/psychoanalysis. Unsurprisingly, the question of temporality was addressed -- explicitly or implicitly -- in most of the papers. (shrink)

Pain, suffering and positive emotions in patients in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/uws) and minimally conscious states (MCS) pose clinical and ethical challenges. Clinically, we evaluate behavioural responses after painful stimulation and also emotionally-contingent behaviours (e.g., smiling). Using stimuli with emotional valence, neuroimaging and electrophysiology technologies can detect subclinical remnants of preserved capacities for pain which might influence decisions about treatment limitation. To date, no data exist as to how healthcare providers think about end-of-life options (e.g., withdrawal of artificial nutrition (...) and hydration) in the presence or absence of pain in non-communicative patients. Here, we aimed to better clarify this issue by re-analyzing previously published data on pain perception (Prog Brain Res 2009 177, 329–38) and end-of-life decisions (J Neurol 2010 258, 1058–65) in patients with disorders of consciousness. In a sample of 2259 European healthcare professionals we found that, for VS/uws more respondents agreed with treatment withdrawal when they considered that VS/uws patients did not feel pain (77%) as compared to those who thought VS/uws did feel pain (59%). This interaction was influenced by religiosity and professional background. For MCS, end-of-life attitudes were not influenced by opinions on pain perception. Within a contemporary ethical context we discuss (1) the evolving scientific understandings of pain perception and their relationship to existing clinical and ethical guidelines; (2) the discrepancies of attitudes within (and between) healthcare providers and their consequences for treatment approaches, and (3) the implicit but complex relationship between pain perception and attitudes toward life-sustaining treatments. (shrink)

In clinical practice, decision-making is not performed by individual knowers but by an assemblage of people and instruments in which no one member has full access to every piece of evidence. This is due to decision making teams consisting of members with different kinds of expertise, as well as to organisational and time constraints. This raises important questions for the epistemology of medicine, which is inherently social in this kind of setting, and implies epistemic dependence on others. Trust in these (...) contexts is a highly complex social practice, involving different forms of relationships between trust and reasons for trust: based on reasons, and not based on reasons; based on reasons that are easily accessible to reflection and others that are not. In this paper, we focus on what it means to have reasons to trust colleagues in an established clinical team, collectively supporting or carrying out every day clinical decision-making. We show two important points about these reasons, firstly, they are not sought or given in advance of a situation of epistemic dependence, but are established within these situations; secondly they are implicit in the sense of being contained or nested within other actions that are not directly about trusting another person. The processes of establishing these reasons are directly about accomplishing a task, and indirectly about trusting someone else’s expertise or competence. These processes establish a space of reasons within which what it means to have reasons for trust, or not, gains a meaning and traction in these team-work settings. Based on a qualitative study of decision-making in image assisted diagnosis and treatment of a complex disease called pulmonary hypertension, we show how an intersubjective framework, or ‘space of reasons’ is established through team members forging together a common way of identifying and dealing with evidence. In dealing with images as a central diagnostic tool, this also involves a common way of looking at the images, a common mode or style of perception. These frameworks are developed through many iterations of adjusting and calibrating interpretations in relation to those of others, establishing what counts as evidence, and ranking different kinds of evidence. Implicit trust is at work throughout this process. Trusting the expertise of others in clinical decision-making teams occurs while the members of the team are busy on other tasks, most importantly, building up a framework of common modes of seeing, and common ways of identifying and assessing evidence emerge. It is only in this way that trusting or mistrusting becomes meaningful in these contexts, and that a framework for epistemic dependence is established. (shrink)

This paper offers a pragmatist reading of the political thought of Amartya Sen. In his recent book, The Idea of Justice, Sen argues against the transcendental institutionalism of John Rawls in favour of a comparative approach that differentiates what is more from what is less just. Sen’s fallibilistic approach to justice bears a strong affinity to classical and contemporary pragmatism. Reading Sen in a pragmatist light enables us to appreciate the nature, strengths, and weaknesses of his project. Relying on the (...) thought of Robert Brandom, this paper argues that the ongoing and indeterminate process of working out the details of an imperfect and evolving idea of justice through public reason is an example of what Brandom calls “making explicit in principle what is implicit in practice.” Brandom’s inferentialism offers a useful corrective to Sen’s intuitionism about the idea and perception of “manifest injustice.”. (shrink)

I argue that in addressing worries about the validity and reliability of implicit measures of social cognition, theorists should draw on research concerning “entitativity perception.” In brief, an aggregate of people is perceived as highly “entitative” when its members exhibit a certain sort of unity. For example, think of the difference between the aggregate of people waiting in line at a bank versus a tight-knit group of friends: The latter seems more “groupy” than the former. I start by (...) arguing that entitativity perception modulates the activation of implicit biases and stereotypes. I then argue that recognizing this modulatory role will help researchers to address concerns surrounding the validity and reliability of implicit measures. (shrink)

Le but du présent essai est de montrer la différence entre la phénoménologie descriptive et la phénoménologie transcendantale en ce qui concerne la per­ception et la constitution du sens objectif de l’expérience. La conception générale qui anime notre travail peut être caractérisée comme « néo-brenta­nienne ». -/- Nous ne visons pas à une exposition complète de la théorie de la synthèse passive telle qu’elle est développée principalement dans le volume XI des Husserliana1. Notre but n’est pas de faire un résumé (...) de cette doc­trine2, mais d’en comprendre certains points critiques. -/- Ce que Husserl appelle « la sphère de la passivité » (der Sphäre der Passivität)3 est en fait un titre générique pour une série de problèmes particulièrement riches. Elle fait écho aux thèmes centraux de la phénoméno­logie husserlienne : la structure du remplissement, le rapport entre représen­tations vides et représentations intuitives, le rapport entre sens et intuition, la constitution de l’objet, la genèse de nos concepts et finalement le continu perceptif et son unité. Comme la passivité au sens qui nous intéresse re­couvre un champ plus large que les concepts de synthèse passive et d’inten­tion passive, nous nous bornerons à interroger seulement certains passages de l’œuvre husserlienne, notamment les recherches sur la constitution dans les Ideen II (Hua IV) et le cours sur les synthèses passives (Hua XI). Il faudra rappeler que, s’étendant de la VIe Recherche logique — le sensible et l’intel­ligible, le rapport entre la réceptivité et la spontanéité — et la découverte du concept de monde de la vie (Lebenswelt), la question de la passivité est, au fond, quelque chose qui traverse comme un fil conducteur toute l’œuvre de Husserl. Toutefois, malgré l’attention accordée par Husserl à la passivité de la conscience, nous voudrions suggérer dans ce travail que (1) son idée de la pensée humaine n’est rien d’autre que l’idée d’une expérience qui, en tant que remplissement du sens, est nécessairement liée à l’activité de l’esprit ; (2) et que cette idée n’est pas seulement une abstraction de ce que nous appelons « expérience », mais qu’elle empêche une véritable description des actes de conscience par rapport au réel, le réel n’étant jamais quelque chose que le sens peut saisir dans sa totalité4. Dans l’optique husserlienne, la raison présente une aspiration à l’unité5 que notre perception semble incapable de satisfaire. La transformation transcendantale de l’intentionnalité brentanienne implique une relation au réel telle qu’elle porte en elle, dans sa structure, un sens implicite. La possibilité de saisir ce sens « caché » dans les profondeurs des actes mentaux est précisément ce que nous allons mettre en question dans le présent essai. (shrink)