Potential ethical issues can arise during the process of epidemiological classification. For example, unnatural infant deaths are classified as accidental deaths or homicides. Societal sensitivity to the physical abuse and neglect of children has increased over recent decades. This enhanced sensitivity could impact reported infant homicide rates. Infant homicide and accident mortality rates in boys and girls in the USA from 1940 to 2005 were analysed. In 1940, infant accident mortality rates were over 20 times greater than infant (...) homicide rates in both boys and girls. After about 1980, when the ratio of infant accident mortality rates to infant homicide rates decreased to less than five, and the sum of infant accident and homicide rates became relatively constant, further decreases in infant accident mortality rates were associated with increases in reported infant homicide rates. These findings suggest that the dramatic decline of accidental infant mortality and recent increased societal sensitivity to child abuse may be related to the increased infant homicide rates observed in the USA since 1980 rather than an actual increase in societal violence directed against infants. Ethical consequences of epidemiological classification, involving the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, are suggested by observed patterns in infant accidental deaths and homicides in the USA from 1940 to 2005. (shrink)

This case note considers the availability in the United Kingdom of the provocation defence in cases of intimate homicide in the context of the recent House of Lords decision in Rv. Smith [2000] 3 W.L.R. 654. The note argues that the expansion of the objective component of the defence to encompass the mental infirmities of individual defendants is dangerous for women. Although it has the potential to help some abused women who kill to use the defence, it has, at (...) the same time, exposed women who are abused by sexually possessive, violent men to even greater danger. It is thus argued that the defence should be restricted in the way envisaged by the minority judgement of Lord Millett so that abused women will still be able to use the defence, but by anon-medical route. Alternatively, the defence should be abolished and defences which pose no risk of encompassing violent men should be developed to accommodate abused women. (shrink)

Cannibalism in the animal kingdom is widespread and well characterized, whereas the occurrence of human cannibalism has been controversial. Evidence points to cannibalism in aboriginal societies, prehistory, and the closely related chimpanzees. We assembled a non-comprehensive list (121 offenders, ~631 victims) of cannibalistic homicides in modern societies (since 1900) through internet-searches, publications, and expert questioning. Cannibalistic homicides were exceedingly rare, and often sex-related. Cannibalistic offenders were mainly men and older than offenders of non-cannibalistic homicides, whereas victims were comparatively young. Cannibalistic (...) offenders typically killed manually (stabbing, strangulating, and beating) rather than using a gun. Furthermore, they killed more strangers and fewer intimates than conventional offenders. Human cannibals, similar to cannibalism in other species, killed and ate conspecifics, occasionally vomited and only rarely (2.5% of victims) ate kin. Interestingly, cannibalistic offenders who killed their blood relatives had more severe mental problems than non-kin-cannibals. We conclude that cannibalistic homicides have a unique pattern of murder methods, offenders, and victims. (shrink)

Consensual homicide remains a crime in jurisdictions where active voluntary euthanasia has been legalized. At the same time, both jurisdictions, in which euthanasia is legal and those in which it is not, recognize that all patients (whether severely ill or not) have the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment (including life-saving treatment). In this paper, I focus on the tensions between these three norms (the permission of active euthanasia, the permission to reject life-saving treatment, and the prohibition of (...) consensual homicide), assuming a justification of euthanasia based on the right to (personal) autonomy. I argue that the best way to provide a coherent account of these norms is to claim that patients have two distinct rights: the right to autonomy and the right to bodily integrity. This solution has some relevant implications for the discussion of the legalization of active euthanasia. (shrink)

Sentencing practices in cases of domestic homicide have been the object of critical scrutiny on previous occasions across a number of jurisdictions. It has been suggested by some that these practices reveal judges to be taking a more lenient approach to women who kill their violent male partners than to men who kill allegedly unfaithful female partners. This note evaluates claims of gender bias in sentencing practices in UK cases of domestic homicide following the Court of Appeal sentencing (...) decision in R. v. Suratan, R. v.Humes and R.v. Wilkinson [2002]E.W.C.A. 2982 concerning three men who killed their female partners. It will argue that in the wake of this decision current proposals to review both the substantive law of provocation and sentencing practices are to be welcomed. (shrink)

For perspicuous comparison and evaluation of moral positions on life-and-death issues, it is necessary to take into account the different meanings that killing and getting killed can bear in the two dimensions of dealing with persons (intention meeting intention) and handling them. A homicidal scenario in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight shows the possibility of courteous dealing coinciding with lethal handling. The extreme possibility of lovingly affirming persons while killing them, suggested by the Augustinian “kindly severity” ideal for state-sponsored (...) punitive killing, requires the killers’ affirmation of a fleshliness and fallibility shared with their victims; but love can accept killing only provisionally, since it postulates freedom from the constraints that are felt to require killing. (shrink)

Kant formulated a secular argument against suicide’s permissibility based on what he regarded as the intrinsic value of humanity. In this paper, I first show that Kant’s moral framework entails that some types of suicide are morally permissible. Just as some homicides are morally permissible, according to Kant, so are suicides that are performed according to equivalent maxims. Intention, foreseeability, voluntariness, diminished responsibility, and mental capacity determine the moral characterization of the killing. I argue that a suicide taxonomy that differentiates (...) types of suicide according to morally relevant criteria is compatible with Kantian ethics; it establishes that even where we hold a robust deontological sanctity of life position, we are not obligated to preserve the lives of people whose future life only offers profound suffering, and helping them to die may be justifiable if doing so honors their dignity and autonomy. Nevertheless, homicide and suicide are only weakly morally symmetrical in that even if a given suicide is morally impermissible, we do not normally have the right to prevent it forcibly, though this may be altered by juridical laws under some circumstances. (shrink)

In this article, I examine politics and protest during the post-authoritarian Indonesian regime by analysing the song ‘Puritan ’ by Homicide., drawing from my fieldwork...

When an abortion is performed, someone dies. Are we killing a human person? Widespread disagreement exists. However, it is not necessary to establish personhood in order to establish the wrongness of abortion: a substantial chance of personhood is enough. We defend The Do Not Risk Homicide Argument: abortions are wrong after 10 weeks gestation because they substantially and unjustifiably risk homicide, the unjust killing of a human person. Why 10 weeks? Because the cumulative evidence establishes a substantial chance (...) (a more than one in five chance) that preborn human beings are persons after 10 weeks (if not before then). We submit evidence from our bad track record, widespread disagreement about personhood (after 10 weeks gestation), problems with theories of personhood, the similarity between preborn human beings and premature newborns, miscalculations of gestational age, and the common intuitive responses of women to their pregnancies and miscarriages. Our argument is cogent because it bypasses the stalemate over preborn personhood and rests on common ground rather than contentious metaphysics. It also strongly suggests that society must do more to protect preborn human beings. We briefly discuss its practical implications for fetal pain relief, social policy, and abortion law. (shrink)

When a severely suffering dying patient is deeply sedated, and this sedated condition is meant to continue until his death, the doctor involved often decides to abstain from artificially administering fluids. For this dual procedure almost all guidelines require that the patient should not have a life expectancy beyond a stipulated maximum of days (4–14). The reason obviously is that in case of a longer life-expectancy the patient may die from dehydration rather than from his lethal illness. But no guideline (...) tells us how we should describe the dual procedure in case of a longer life-expectancy. Many arguments have been advanced why we should not consider it to be a form of homicide, that is, ending the life of the patient (with or without his request). I argue that none of these arguments, taken separately or jointly, is persuasive. When a commission, even one that is not itself life-shortening, foreseeably renders a person unable to undo the life-shortening effects of another, simultaneous omission, the commission and the omission together should be acknowledged to kill her. I discuss the legal and ethical implications of this conclusion. (shrink)

In a well-known paper entitled, ‘Survival Lottery’, published in a philosophical journal, John Harris proposed for discussion an interesting idea for saving the lives of certain kinds of patients who are at the point of death. Let us assume that there are two such patients, one that could be saved by a heart transplant and the other by the transplantation of a pair of lungs. However, no suitable organs are available for this purpose. Might it perhaps not be immoral to (...) select, by national lottery, a healthy person, who would be sacrificed, his organs used as transplants, and thus two lives be saved through the sacrifice of only one? This proposal is subjected first to a critical philosophical and ethical analysis, and then to a critical analysis from the point of view of Jewish Ethics as embodied in Halakhah. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This review article examines Jeremy Horder’s proposals for reform of the law of homicide in his book Homicide and the Politics of Law Reform. It focuses on Horder’s defence of the Law Commission’s proposals for a three-tier structure of homicide offences, and the ‘moderate constructivist’ theory that he relies upon in mounting this defence. Horder’s theory, it is argued, fails to provide sound normative foundations for his preferred structure. However, a qualified defence is offered of another of (...) Horder’s proposals: to give public opinion research a role in homicide reform. This would help to give substance to the principle of fair labelling in an area of the law where this principle is frequently invoked, but is also uncertain in its implications and force. (shrink)

Catholic doctrine’s strict prohibition on abortion can lead clinicians or institutions to conscientiously refuse to provide abortion, although a legal duty to provide abortion would apply to anyone who refused. Conscientious refusals by clinicians to end a pregnancy can constitute murder or reckless homicide under American law if a woman dies as a result of such a refusal. Such refusals are not immunized from criminal liability by the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion or by statutes that (...) confer immunity from criminal homicide prosecution. Core principles of the rule of law require the state to protect the lives of all persons equally and to place the life and health of persons above any the interests of providers have in moral integrity or in respecting the moral status of prenatal humans. In some states criminal liability related to conscientious objection also applies to corporate hospital officials. (shrink)

This paper draws from critical data studies and related fields to investigate police officer-involved homicide data for Los Angeles County. We frame police officer-involved homicide data as a rhetorical tool that can reify certain assumptions about the world and extend regimes of power. We highlight the possibility that this type of sensitive civic data can be investigated and employed within local communities through creative practice. Community involvement with data can create a countervailing force to powerful dominant narratives and (...) supplement activist projects that hold local officials accountable for their actions. Our analysis examines four Los Angeles County police officer-involved homicide data sets. First, we provide accounts of the semantics, granularity, scale and transparency of this local data. Then, we describe a “counter data action,” an event that invited members of the community to identify the limits and challenges present in police officer-involved homicide data and to propose new methods for deriving meaning from these indicators and statistics. (shrink)

This is the first book in recent years to reconsider the shape and details of the English law of homicide, a topic avoided by governments in their plans for law reform. It discusses how the law should define murder, how it should respond to provoked killings, how it should deal with mentally abnormal killers, etc.

Do individuals have a positive right of self-defence? And if so, what are the limits of this right? Under what conditions does this use of force extend to the defence of others? These are some of the issues explored by Dr Uniacke in this comprehensive 1994 philosophical discussion of the principles relevant to self-defence as a moral and legal justification of homicide. She establishes a unitary right of self-defence and the defence of others, one which grounds the permissibility of (...) the use of necessary and proportionate defensive force against culpable and non-culpable, active and passive, unjust threats. Particular topics discussed include: the nature of moral and legal justification and excuse; natural law justifications of homicide in self-defence; the Principle of Double Effect and the claim that homicide in self-defence is justified as unintended killing; and the question of self-preferential killing. This is a lucid and sophisticated account of the complex notion of justification, revolving around a critical discussion of trends in the law of self-defence. (shrink)

Both in criminal law science and in the judicial practice there are a lot of discussions as to what should be considered as the beginning and end of human life. Birth and death are not instantaneous acts, but rather processes made up of time-spans that can be construed as evidence of the beginning or end of a human life. From a biological point of view the human life is a constant, continuous metabolic process after cessation of which the human life (...) also ceases. These circumstances very much aggravate the definition of criteria of the moments of beginning and end of human life. There are disagreements in the criminal law science with respect to from which moment the human life is to be protected by the criminal law. Herewith this presupposes also the other problematic question—what is to be considered a “living human” as a homicide subject (a victim). Complication of the said question is also determined by the fact that it is related not only to legal but also to medical, religious, and moral aspects. This article exactly analyses certain aspects of the beginning and end of human life in the context of the homicide composition attributes. (shrink)

Criminal attempts, it is often said, are crimes of intention. While many complete crimes can be committed recklessly, criminal attempts require “purposive conduct”; in attempts “the intent is the essence of the crime.” But what kind of intention is required; what must be intended, or purposed, by someone who is to be guilty of a criminal attempt?

This book explores the puzzling phenomenon of new veiling practices among lower middle class women in Cairo, Egypt.

This paper uses the debate about whether capital punishment deters homicide as a case study for examining the claim, made by many feminists and others, that the traditional ideal of objectivity in seeking knowledge is misguided. According to this ideal, knowledge seekers should strive to gather and assess evidence independently of any influences exerted by either their individual and societal circumstances or their moral values. This paper argues that, although the traditional ideal rests on some valid precepts, it is (...) neverthelesss untenable. the author goes on to propose an alternative epistemological ideal – one that retains these valid precepts but also recognizes an important and legitimate role for people's circumstances and moral values in their efforts to find knowledge. (shrink)

The study of child abuse and child homicide has been based on the often implicit assumption that there is a continuum of violence ranging from mild physical punishment to severe abuse and homicide. Empirical data supporting this assumption are sparse. Existing data can be shown, however, to support an assumption that there are distinct forms of violence, not a continuum. This paper reviews these data and discusses their implications for the study of violence, abuse, and homicide in (...) terms of substantive and methodological explanations. In addition, the implications of the assumption that violence consists of distinct behaviors as opposed to a continuum are discussed in light of sociobiological and evolutionary explanations of child abuse and child homicide. (shrink)

This article describes issues related to the consideration of the victim’s behavior when sentencing a person who intentionally killed someone in a state of strong emotional excitement. Also, the author analyzed in the article that the main reason for the strong emotional excitement of the culprit is the illegal act of the victim, therefore, the sudden emotional excitement is defined in the law as a mitigating circumstance. In addition, the article analyzes the objective aspect of the crime of intentional (...) class='Hi'>homicide committed in a state of strong emotional excitement, in which (a) intentional homicide is caused by the victim's response to violence; (b) severe insults by the victim (insulting human dignity, accusing him of committing a crime or immorality, insulting his religion and nationality); (c) it is emphasized that attention should be paid to the victim's other illegal actions (such as dereliction of duty). (shrink)

Examining racial profiling in American policing, Naomi Zack argues against white privilege discourse while introducing a new theory of applicative justice. Deepening understanding without abandoning hope, Zack shows why it is more important to consider black rights than white privilege as we move forward through today's culture of inequality.

According to its author, Engineered Death is not a book about the morality of homicide but about intellectual self-consistency—in particular about the self-consistency of the “liberal” view of homicide. The “liberal” view is defined by Woods as the view that murder is morally wrong because, and only because, it is a violation of rights. He tells us that he is concerned to defend neither liberalism in general nor its notion of individual rights in particular, but only to work (...) out the implications of these assumptions for the problems of abortion, suicide, euthanasia, and senecide. It is only in this sense that Woods' disclaimer about the non-ethical nature of his book can be taken seriously. In every other respect it is a treatise on ethics. It puts forward and defends moral theses that are independent of, and in some cases even contrary to, traditional ethical liberalism. (shrink)

The study is aimed to test the governing-law anchor in the comparative analysis of legal terminology to harmonize the clash of legal cultures in legal translation. It is considered as an adjustment to a juritraductological approach to legal translation which invites legal translators to merge the tools of jurilinguistics, comparative law and traductology in the comparative analysis of legal concepts before selecting a suitable translation solution (Monjean-Decaudin, in: Research methods in legal translation and interpreting, Routledge, 2019). Rather than transposing a (...) text from a source law system to a target law system, legal translators are believed to operate in the bi-semiotic environment of two legal cultures as navigators of their recipients toward understanding the legal concepts under the governing law of the document. To this end a comparative conceptual analysis, that correlates with the parametrization method (Matulewska in Stud Logic Gramm Rhetor 45:161–174, 2016), should be anchored in the analysis of the source law concepts (Šarčević in New Approach to Legal Translation, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000). First, the componential and taxonomic analyses were used to identify conceptual markers/parameters of source concepts to serve as tertia comparationis for the subsequent search of their functional equivalents in the target legal culture. Source concepts and their functional equivalents were subsequently subject to a comparative componential analysis aimed to reveal a degree of their match based on which coinage operations were activated in selecting suitable translation strategies. We hypothesized that the change in the governing-law perspective would trigger changes in translation solutions. The governing-law-anchored process of comparative analysis was detailed and exemplified by the analysis of the conceptual field of Homicide in the Slovak law, English law, and the US Model Penal Code. (shrink)

Murdering Animals confronts the speciesism underlying the disparate social censures of homicide and “theriocide”, and as such, is a plea to take animal rights seriously. Its substantive topics include the criminal prosecution and execution of justiciable animals in early modern Europe; images of hunters put on trial by their prey in the upside-down world of the Dutch Golden Age; the artist William Hogarth’s patriotic depictions of animals in 18th Century London; and the playwright J.M. Synge’s representation of parricide in (...) fin de siècle Ireland. Combining insights from intellectual history, the history of the fine and performing arts, and what is known about today’s invisibilised sites of animal killing, Murdering Animals inevitably asks: should theriocide be considered murder? With its strong multi- and interdisciplinary approach, this work of collaboration will appeal to scholars of social and species justice in animal studies, criminology, sociology and law. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dike Phonou: The Right of Prosecution and Attic Homicide ProcedureDavid C. MirhadyAlexander Tulin. Dike Phonou: The Right of Prosecution and Attic Homicide Procedure. Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1996. x 1 135 pp. Cloth, DM 56. (Beiträge zum Altertumskunde, 76)The normal means of seeking redress in Athenian law was through a dike, which the victim brought to the appropriate magistrate, who then conducted the case (...) through the various stages of the Athenian legal process, an initial inquiry, possibly a public arbitration, and finally a trial before a democratic court. What distinguishes homicide from almost every other offense, however, is precisely that its victim cannot seek legal redress because he is dead. So who does? [End Page 639]This short book is devoted to the single aim of supporting the “traditional view” that it was only the members of the victim’s family who had the right to seek this redress through a suit for murder (dike phonou). In a wider-ranging book (almost as short as this one, Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators), Douglas MacDowell argued in 1963 against that restrictive interpretation: though Athenian law enjoined the relatives (or in the case of a slave, the owner) of the victim to prosecute, it did not order others not to. Others have since followed MacDowell’s lead. Tulin relies on three disparate pieces of evidence, to each of which he devotes one chapter: Drakon’s Code (IG I3 104), [Dem.] 47.68–73, and Plato’s Euthyphro 3e7–5d7.He gives the entire text of Drakon’s Code in Greek, translates most of it in a footnote, but then discusses specifically only the four lines (20–23) that relate most directly to his argument, although he points out many peripheral issues along the way, such as the authenticity of the code and the possibility of interpolation. Without reviewing the evidence in detail, he takes as established that in archaic conceptions of homicide, murder was viewed initially as a violation of a kinship unit, not “any larger corporate entity” (11). Yet the Code itself is an indication of interest, and indeed control, being taken by the larger corporate entity, and the roles it ascribes to the ephetai in the place of the family of the victim need discussion, since they touch directly on Tulin’s central thesis; they do not get it. Ultimately the issue of restrictiveness will be decided on the basis of whether the jussive infinitives that form the injunctions of the Code are to be understood inclusively or exclusively. To Tulin they seem exclusive and restrictive; to me they could be inclusive, calling upon an ever wider circle to take responsibility for sharing in the prosecution. Viewed in isolation, this piece of evidence is inconclusive.In [Dem.] 47.68–73 the speaker, the Trierarch, is concerned to show his own scruples with regard to legal procedure, which prevented him from laying charges for murder against his opponents even after they had killed his old wetnurse. Tulin analyzes the passage in great detail, giving the Greek text twice and reproducing the Loeb translation. Although the presentation is unnecessarily awkward, Tulin is successful in showing that it is in fact the lack of the requisite family or owner’s relationship to the victim that has compelled the Trierarch not to pursue a prosecution for murder. It would have required him and his family to commit perjury with regard to their relationship to the deceased. One lapse in Tulin’s account sticks out, however: his interpretation of the clause (47.69). He translates it as a protasis to the infinitives set out in the funeral nomima: “if there be anyone related to the woman, let him...” (23). But the position of the clause after the second of the three infinitive clauses strongly suggests that it be made to follow that clause as an indirect question: “and (you, Trierarch, must) make a proclamation at the tomb whether there be some relative of the woman.” It becomes clear several lines later that the Trierarch will make this proclamation, since no relative [End Page 640] is required for it. The proclamation involves not... (shrink)

More than half of all intimate partner homicides involve a firearm and firearms are frequently used by perpetrators of intimate partner violence (IPV) to injure and threaten victims and survivors. Recent court decisions undermine important legal restrictions on firearm possession by IPV perpetrators, thus jeopardizing the safety of victims and survivors. This article reviews the history and recent developments in the law at the intersection of IPV and firearm violence and proposes a way forward through a health justice framework.

In a series of papers in the early 1970s and in his important book _Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life_ (1975), Baruch Brody offered what remains to this day one of the most philosophically rigorous contributions to the debate concerning the morality of abortion and the ethics of homicide more generally. In this paper I would like to critically examine Brody’s argument that abortion is sometimes justifiable in some cases even when (1) one cannot claim self-defense, or (2) (...) diminished responsibility, and (3) the abortion is a ‘killing’ rather than a ‘not saving.’ This justification, I argue, is limited to certain cases in which the life of the mother is at stake. The cautious principle which he finally formulates merits serious attention and consideration. While I find a great deal of value in Brody’s discussion, I will argue that there are several difficulties with the principle of justifiable homicide he constructs. Accordingly, I will further amend and supplement his final version by offering my own alternative principle. (shrink)

La contraception était généralement condamnée dans le judaïsme comme dans le christianisme des premiers siècles, avec plus ou moins de sévérité ou de tolérance, en tant qu’atteinte à la Loi divine, qui fait un devoir à l’homme de procréer. Mais il existe aussi une autre forme de condamnation des pratiques contraceptives, liée à l’interdiction de verser le sang. Peu présente dans le judaïsme rabbinique, on la trouve exprimée différemment chez les premiers Pères, selon qu’il s’agisse de condamner le retrait, l’usage (...) de potions stérilisantes ou le recours à des abortifs précoces - étant entendu que les Anciens distinguaient mal entre un abortif précoce et un contraceptif. Le terme d’homicide est employé – très inégalement - pour chacune de ces pratiques, sans qu’il soit véritablement tenu compte des différentes doctrines de l’animation de l’être humain : dès l’expulsion de la semence (dans le cas de l’onanisme), dès la conception, au fur et à mesure de la croissance de l’embryon ou même seulement à la naissance. (shrink)

In theological discourse of sexuality, queer theory has often been regarded as an extension of the project of gay and lesbian liberation, when it actually challenges an organizing value of the entire discourse, because it challenges any ascription of ultimate value to "sex," an imaginative formation of power relations. Rather than appeal to God to authorize the privileged status of sex, queer commentary suggests that theological writers should refuse assertions of the absolute importance of any particular formation of human imagination (...) as a basis of relation between self and God. The goal is to recognize the violence—symbolized and real—that enforces the worth of certain imaginations of intelligibly sexed personal identity and stunts the formation of alternative imaginations of intelligible personal identity. Critical account of this violence as sentimental-homicidal-suicidal opens space to confess a theological discourse of personal identities that is entirely beyond sex. (shrink)