This article focuses on the analysis of the geo-politics and body-politics of being, and perception as the key concepts in the decolonial option grounded in the spatiality and corporeality of our cognitive and perceptive mechanisms. Revived spatiality refers in this case not only to a physical space that we inhabit but also to our bodies as specific spatial entities – the privileged white male bodies or the damned, non-white, dehumanized and often gendered and sexualized bodies from the underside of (...) modernity. The article presents a decolonial interpretation of the human/non-human binary aimed at rethinking the fundamental modern/colonial division into anthropos and humanitas and the subsequent animalization of large human groups. The main questions are then what does it mean to be animalized by and in modernity and what ways out are possible, desired and attainable for the dehumanized others? The main goal of the article is to further question liberal Western humanism from a decolonial perspective, without yet dropping this concept altogether, and considering instead another humanism model suggested by Sylvia Wynter. Contemporary critical anti-humanist and “other humanism” theories often find a much more accurate and immediate realization through artistic metaphors and activist art projects than traditional theory, problematizing the border between the human and the animal, the man-made and the natural, the individual and the communal. Therefore, the article dwells at some length on one such project balancing between art and critical anthropology – the works of the Northern Caucasus decolonial artist Taus Makhacheva. (shrink)

The Anthropocene, as we encounter it now, is the age in which we can no longer avoid postnaturalism, that is, a view of the ‘environment’ as largely ‘built.’ This means that we exist in a highly technologically mediated relationship to the rest of the earth system. But because the Anthropocene has barely emerged this time is best thought of as a transition phase between two epochs, i.e., it is ‘the end-Holocene.’ The end-Holocene is essentially a period of ecological crisis, the (...) most salient manifestation of which is anthropogenic climate change. Given our political inertia, some have suggested that we should we respond to the climate crisis through technological manipulation of the global climate: geoengineering. The proposal raises many questions. The one I am interested in here is whether or not geoengineering represents an objectionable species-level narcissism. Will deployment of these technologies effectively cut us off from contact with anything non-human? This is what I’m calling ‘the question concerning geoengineering.’ I show how Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, especially his concept of ‘enframing,’ can help us think about the issue with the seriousness it demands. (shrink)

Many feel a sense of aversion and tragedy about proposals for engineering the climate. Precautionary concerns only partly explain these feelings. For a fuller understanding, we need a thicker conception of the values and ends of political society than “neutralitarian” political theories offer. To this end, I examine how Buddhist and Greek notions of temperance, justice, and freedom bear on the question of geo-engineering. My intention is not to pronounce on whether geo-engineering is morally “right” or “wrong,” but (...) to highlight reasons for thinking it unattractive in a broader sense, thereby strengthening the case for exhausting conventional emissions-reductions options. (shrink)

This article analyses the complex and contested geo-politics associated with the concept of a universal human society during the era of the French Revolution. It focuses on the figure of Constantin-François Volney (1757?1820), a neglected philosopher who played a significant role in the history of both French anti-imperialist thought and French imperial practice in North Africa and the Levant. It uses that focus to explore the relationship between visions of human emancipation and the exercise of global power during the 1790s (...) and beyond. (shrink)

The Buddhist World joins a series of books on the world's great religions and cultures, offering a lively and up-to-date survey of Buddhist studies for students and scholars alike. It explores regional varieties of Buddhism and core topics including buddha-nature, ritual, and pilgrimage. In addition to historical and geo-political views of Buddhism, the volume features thematic chapters on philosophical concepts such as ethics, as well as social constructs and categories such as community and family. The book also addresses (...) lived Buddhism in its many forms, examining the ways in which modernity is reshaping traditional structures, ancient doctrines, and cosmological beliefs. (shrink)

The Public Sphere from Outside the West brings together established and emerging new voices from philosophy, literature, anthropology, history, migration studies and information technology to address the present reality of the public sphere. In the age where everyone is in the public and everything is visible, this volume creates a delay in which the internet of things, mass surveillance and social media are asked "What is/not the Public?†? The essays bring to attention the formation of geo-politically and historically distinct public (...) spheres from South Africa, India, America and Europe. Such formations are found not only in the postcolonial histories of print, photography, cinema and caricature but also those underway in the digital era, such as the Arab Spring, Occupy movements and Anonymous. Through critical engagement with philosophers such as Kant, Heidegger, Benjamin, Habermas and Arendt, the determining concepts of the Public Sphere-privacy, secrecy, reason, the people-are shown to be undergoing epistemological and practical ruptures. Demonstrating the necessity of these considerations to understand the world public that is rapidly transforming this concept in radical ways through technologies today, this is the first collection on the subject to feature an impressive range of international thinkers. Global and timely in outlook, it breaks new ground and changes our way of looking at politics in the 21st century. (shrink)

Written in the early stages of the Cold War by one of the most controversial political and legal thinkers of the twentieth century, Carl Schmitts two short dialogues on power and space bring together several dimensions of his work in new ways. The dialogues renew Schmitts engagement with the questions of political power and geo-politics that had been a persistent concern throughout his intellectual life. As a basis on which to think through the historical role of human agency (...) in relation to power and its new geographies, the dialogues condense and rework key concepts in Schmitts political theory during a transitional period between his Weimar and fascist years to the post-war writings. In this book, Schmitt develops a new dialectics of modern power and an original understanding of the global spatial transformations of the Cold War period. Equally important, the dialogues anticipate the debates on the new geo-political possibilities and threats related to cosmic spaces, overpowering technological advances, and the existential predicament of the human in an increasingly multipolar world. (shrink)

This paper seeks to reconstruct the role of schooling in a moment of accelerated social, political, economic, geo-political, climatic, indeed planetary crisis. It identifies the school as a potentially prefigurative institution, an evolutionary social frontier, capable of nurturing the democratic social character, a form of sensibility apart from which authentic political democracy is not possible. As theorized by Herbert Marcuse and Richard Hart and Antonio Negri, the “new sensibility” or “multitude” is characterized by greater psychological freedom, individuality, (...) social creativity and self-rule, comprising a “whole of singularities” that “acts in common”. It suggests a human subject with a vital, biological drive for liberation, with a consciousness capable of breaking through the material as well as ideological veil of a society based on hierarchy and domination, and is associated politically with democracy and social-anarchism, or what Murray Bookchin called “communalism”. This paper identifies three main characteristics of an institution informed by this form of modal subjectivity, all of them based on student-teacher dialogue: an emergent, project-based curriculum, whole-school direct democratic governance on all levels of the community, and the regular practice of communal philosophical inquiry, through which we problematize the concepts we live by, in the interest of their ongoing reconstruction. (shrink)

Drawing from his previous writings on the search for a new image of thought and the vitalist role of 'conceptual personae' in the history of philosophy, Gregg Lambert proposes a new geo-political image of thought that is uniquely commensurate with the globalisation of contemporary continental philosophy. Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari's concept of geo-philosophy and Jean-Francois Lyotard's archipelago of contemporary political reason, Lambert radically reorients the future direction of continental philosophy, no longer defined traditionally according to national and (...) linguistic traditions and by the opposition with Anglo-American academic philosophy. (shrink)

continent. 2.3 (2012): 218–223 Vijay Prashad. Arab Spring, Libyan Winter . Oakland: AK Press. 2012. 271pp, pbk. $14.95 ISBN-13: 978-1849351126. Nearly a decade ago, I sat in a class entitled, quite simply, “Corporations,” taught by Vijay Prashad at Trinity College. Over the course of the semester, I was amazed at the extent of Prashad’s knowledge, and the complexity and erudition of his style. He has since authored a number of classic books that have gained recognition throughout the world. The Darker (...) Nations , a peoples’ history of the Third World, sent defibrillating shockwaves through an academic world that had almost forgotten the epic scope and historic dignity of the non-aligned movement and post-colonial struggles. In his recent, award-winning work, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter , Prashad delves into his capacious knowledge of the Third World to excavate the discourses and narratives surrounding the upheavals of 2011. “Revolutions have no specific timetable,” states Prashad in the opening line of this exciting and provocative look at contemporary events. Instantly, an atmosphere of suspense emerges. The reader is alerted to the problem of history. Does the making of history then involve a suspension of historical time, or is it a continuous narrative structure into which events must eventually be integrated? Arab Spring, Libyan Winter shows that the answer to the question, “How is history made?” lies just as easily in the asking. The first half of the book works through the events that transpired to bring about the explosive popular uprisings of Arab Spring: Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain. But the events are not put together in a cohesive, chronological fashion. Using an uncommonly gripping style more akin to the folk-story motif of the djeli than to traditionally Orientalist academia, Prashad suspends a given situation, points out its components, and traces back the characters and genealogies that define each link before resuming a narrative. Every moment is an end to itself, and an origin of something different. Thus, the making of history becomes the suspension of its own progress, it’s catastrophic 'stability,' in a process of differentiation through inclusion. Empirically, one might suggest that history is a condition of time, and by extension, of the subject, but history is also an eminent producer of the Subject and her concept of time through memory and narrative. Hence, history is often overdetermined by a dominant narrative of the sovereign. The apparently chaotic composition of Prashad’s historicity is, then, an interstitial morphology of resistance. It illustrates that the time to act for the revolutionary lies in the gaps within the dominant historical realities. It points out the sorties of signifiers constituting nothing in the obliterated ruins of history. Through such illuminations, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter breaks through “the surface of history” to elaborate revolution’s snapping synapses, exploding interruptions and breaches, connecting flows. Messianic Politics It is tempting to think, 'History is either singular, or it is diffuse. It is either one coherent factual narrative, or it is comprised of the aletheia of the multitude.' Yet the reader finds Prashad examining the structure of history on multiple levels. For Prashad, world history is shaped by geographically defined political movements, such as communism or national liberation, with historical agents like the working class for the former and the nationalist militant for the latter. Religion, however, is another matter: “Religion has an unshakable eschatology which a post-utopian secular politics lacks.” Within the telos of religion, there appears on the horizon the image of Benjamin’s thoughts on messianic time—time as “a small fissure in the continuous catastrophe,” a break with history, may contain an ultimate redemption of the human beyond the political power struggle. Succoring the split between geo-political and utopian-religious (messianic) time in the context of Arab Spring, Prashad indicates that the base of “the deep desire and commitment to some form of democracy” is forged by the affinity between eschatological Islamist politics with the People. To think about the Subject of messianic time in the context of the lack of a “coherent timetable” for emancipatory politics, it is perhaps best to return to the modern tradition of Martin Luther King, Jr., whose prefigurative blending of liberation theology and emancipatory politics became most important during his works of 1963, the climactic year of “The Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” the March on Washington, and the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church. In “The Letter,” King states the point bluntly: Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct-action campaign that was “well timed” in view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word “wait!” It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This “Wait” has almost always meant ‘Never.” We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that “justice too long delayed is justice denied.” The timing of rebellious action must not be a part of history. It must change history. The kairos appears spontaneous and untimely in its convulsive, shocking presence, yet it is, deeper still, a path, a longue durée , forged through diligent and rigorous praxis. King put a finer point on the path of historic liberation in his declaration in his 1963 speech at Western Michigan University: “[T]ime is neutral.... Somewhere along the way we must see that time will never solve the problem alone but that we must help time. Somewhere we must see that human progress never rolls in on the wheels on inevitability. It comes through the tireless efforts and the persistent work of dedicated individuals who are willing to be co-workers with God. Without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the insurgent and primitive forces of irrational emotionalism and social stagnation. We must always help time and realize that the time is always right to do right.” Time, then, exists in “the neutral,” while action must turn to the kairos , not only of taking time, but taking the right time. By turning our relation to time into kairos , we move time from its context within history to a duration between histories—the longue dure?e of Messianic time. The implementation of neutrality in this context suggests a broad space of time to extend through the valley of positive and negative. In Roland Barthes’s lectures from 1978, the neutral takes place in this minimal distance of non-conflict that exists outside of two extremes. It is, in the words of Maurice Blanchot, “the non-general, the non-generic, as well as the non-specific.” For Blanchot, the neutrality of time permeates life as death, impassive and beyond control; such is the neutrality of messianic time, which permeates the charge of history, changing the "I" into the "one." The neutrality of time therefore implicates history in a case against extremism, showing that the work of the radical is not to tend to any particular side, but to have the time to navigate through the terrible terrain of history by altering its course, its patterns and rhythms of movement, connection, sociality. Hence, one does not simply “make history,” one alters the course of history in accordance to “the right time.” The historical path toward emerging power is transmitted as a gesture to the outside of history, against history; a gesture as simple as reaching out. Thus a counterhistory, to use Foucault’s term, is brought forward as the guide of time past a point of no return, a Rubicon, the point where the normal path of history falls to the past. The subject, who must be the only true agent of history, facilitates time through helpfulness, and both the Subject and her history become decentered in relation to one another. Yet history negates the neutrality of time. As Barthes discloses, although the neutral is the “thought and practice of the nonconflictual, it is nevertheless bound to assertion, to conflict, in order to make itself heard.” Engaged with history, time is charged with a destiny, and becomes an opposition. As Prashad insists, “For Arab lands, the events of early 2011 were not the inauguration of a new history, but the continuation of an unfinished struggle that is a hundred years old.” The emergence of the Subject during Arab Spring did not conceive of a new history, but changed the path of history toward a different destiny. “Historical grievances combined with inflationary pressures now met with the subjective sense that victory might be at hand—this was not simply a protest to scream into the wind, but a protest to actually remove autocrats from their positions of authority. The facts of resistance had given way to the expectation of revolutionary change.” The negativity of this charge toward “revolutionary destiny” rendered control, as a positive force, seriously lacking. The lack of control lies in the problem that the Subject is not totally detemporalized or timeless, but untimely in her presence. The Subject is untimely, because her work is visionary, and it is only through such visionary work that the Rubicon can be crossed. Still, the crossing of this border is haunted by anxiety over an impending disaster that lays in wait. It is only through the form of what Benjamin calls divine violence, captivated not with the justice of the means, but the ends—the transformation of history—that a revelation of history’s traumatic foundations can be liberated, and patterns and rhythms of time developed throughout obscured traditions awakened. In this situation, the Subject appears to be outside of right, but setting the state to rights. Because her position is correct, in-so-far as the rebelling subject rebels due to a lack of recognition, her representation appears outside of the norm, which is mistaken as right. Therefore, such visionary work must be carried out through obscured traditions, underground, away from the surveillance of empire. Explaining his method from the start along the lines of Marx’s metaphor of the mole, Prashad insists, “It is the burrowing that is essential, not simply the emergence onto the surface of history.” Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is a book on uncharted networks of time, spread out over the 252 pages like an elaborate spider’s web of passages intertwining with and overwhelming the machinery of the state. Although untimely, Arab Spring was not a flash in the pan, or a Facebook or Twitter revolution. Prashad notes that the government’s suspension of these tools led to further radicalism by furthering communications through face-to-face encounters. In existential terms, Arab Spring might be thought of as a revolution of Being over techne , an uprising of the unchartable, infinite potential of the Other. The name of this Other is found in Chance. The faith of the revolution lies in the proper decentering of the subject, its giving to the Other of time, for only with respect to time does history actually appear on the horizon of the subject, rather than as an imposition. This time of historical agency appears as a moment when anything can happen—a revolutionary truth event where everything comes into question while being realized in its Otherness as a community of the people begins anew in the streets amidst discourse, friendship, reconfigurations of hegemony, and a becoming of a constituent power. Throwing a wrench into the gears of the “cobwebbed tradition” of Orientalism, the decentering of history in Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is a defining quality of its impassioned revolutionary cry. But perhaps the most paradigmatic points of the book emerge from the unexpected voices. To make the connection between the particular manifestations of revolutionary demands to the general historic terms of revolution, Prashad quotes an anonymous young Egyptian in Tahrir Square, who reminds us, “[T]he French Revolution took a very long time so the people could eventually get their rights.” Far from timelessness, the historicization of Arab Spring must exist precisely within the most uncanny appearance of time, as something that does not appear to come from the natural state of time as we know it, but in arriving has completely transformed the way that we understand time. Strange Monsters Revolution is never as simple as a revolt from below against a rusting structure of elites trying to remain in power. As with the French Revolution, Arab Spring consisted of complex familial ties, outside interests, and religious factions fighting alongside, often in awkward juxtaposition to, liberals, working class parties, farmers, and students. It is perhaps because of this historically difficult and incongruous composition that the Arabic word for revolution is thawra , referring to the image of the bull, or thawr , which has religious significance as a pagan deity for the Ancient Semitic tribes and Cartheginians. If Daniel Guérin was correct in saying, “Anarchism and Marxism drink from the same spring,” then it is quite a different oasis that drove the thirsty beast of revolution through what Prashad calls, “the Libyan labyrinth.” Recalling Bataille’s Acéphale, the intestinal labyrinth gains significance as the mode of metabolism and rumination in which, “(the Acephale) has lost himself, loses me with him, and in which I discover myself as him, in other words, as a monster.” Unraveling the discourse of the revolution, the flows of power and hegemony—from Qaddafi’s nationalist coup in 1969 to the wars with Chad from 1978 to 1987, the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s to, finally, the War on Terror—we find that the metabolic process of Libyan Winter ends in the production of oil. In a process of what Prashad calls “involution,” Qaddafi’s bellicose policies, along with his attempts to nationalize Islam together with oil, mutated the source of his power, turning his house against itself. Already a divided nation, with its two major cities on opposite geographic sides of the country, Libya became split between two opposed political powers—liberal reformists and staunch nationalists—as Qaddafi’s political disengagement manifested through what can only be described in psychoanalytic terms as a recursive passage a l’act (mysteriously calling Wikipedia “Kleenex,” declaring that opponents drank hallucinogens with their instant coffee, and so on). Prashad declares, “The mercurial style that Qaddafi adopted was not about his personality alone, but also a leader’s natural response to a system that relied upon power brokers whose own loyalty… did not have any ideological commitment to the system.” As in the case of other nations during Arab Spring, the true expression of revolt was an outward exposition of what had inwardly been happening in microcosmic societies throughout the realm—from indigenous tribes to political parties, for a century, the people, partly motivated by (and in resistance to) economic impositions of development, had been changing the traditional social compositions and participating in what Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls, “the relative autonomy of the movement from the leaders.” It was this empowerment of political reconfigurations taking place under the context of new democratic assemblages that shocked the elites and evoked such a powerful response. Unlike Qaddafi’s awkward policy choices and rants, real acts of power from the West were clear and decisive. Prashad sets the stages of war and diplomacy, far removed from the deserts, mountains, and cities that forged the backdrop of popular politics. Taking place under the now-classic architecture of the “four pillars” of US interests—oil, the War on Terror, Israel, and the circumvention of Iranian hegemony—we find elites rubbing elbows in “Heliopolist cocktail parties and hushed conferences in Kasr al-Ittihadiya” as well as the Concorde-Lafayette hotel in Paris, which provides the setting for a meeting of anti-Qaddafi figures consolidating their power. These scenes are buttressed with the careful portraiture of key historical actors. As Prashad brings the stage of history to life, we find the diplomats and liberals like Frank Wisner, whose career has brought him from Enron in the late 1990s to the Obama Administration, under the aegis of which he was meeting with Mubarak about military support during Arab Spring. We spy the provocateurs, for instance, gauche cavalier , Bernard Henri-Levy, who telephones Sarkozy from Benghazi about the need for more NATO air strikes. We follow the rebel military establishment as it suffers mysterious deaths and even more mysterious assents (like that of apparent CIA cohort, Khalifa Hifter). In each of these intriguing characters, we find different representations of the security state biopolitique: an oil-injected reification that drives Arab Spring from the resentment of rising food prices to the brink of implosion in Libyan Winter. Reminiscent of the scenes of Cold War soirées represented in old Bond films, the aristocratic fight for oil against democracy that was Libyan Winter presents a harsh truth that the new global crisis is simply the continuation of the old history: the global exploitation of capitalism waged against the imagination of the people. As Benjamin laments, “The labyrinth is the right path for the person who always arrives early enough at his destination. This destination is the marketplace.” Yet, “(t)he labyrinth is the habitat of… a humanity (a class) which does not want to know where its destiny is taking it.” Thus, the labyrinth leads, like the desert, only further into itself. As Blanchot explains, “The desert is even less certain than the world; it is never anything but the approach to the desert.” Only the visionary can take time out of the involution toward oblivion. It is here, in this approach to and escape from history, that we find ourselves within Benjamin’s Golgotha, Blanchot’s desert: A space of indeterminate uncertainty where we become familiar only with our own exile. Blanchot writes, “For the moderated and moderate man, the room, the desert, and the world are strictly determined places. For the man of the desert and the labyrinth, devoted to the error of a journey necessarily a little longer than his life, the same space will be truly infinite, even if he knows that it is not, all the more so since he knows it.” The desert, as allegory, provides an eschatology, a mortality in the destiny of Arab Spring. But any allegory of nature might lead to a labyrinthine eschatology (for example, in Bachelard, the forest presents "a limitless world"); the prescience of the untimely is always an uncanny acceptance of the infinite within the finite—the outside of what is understood. Transgenerational and occupied with the image of the future, the untimely makes otherness its home as it proceeds toward liberation. In the work of helping time navigate this dangerous passage of history, Prashad illustrates that the more violent break with history may have occurred in the peaceable struggles of Tahrir Square, and not in the military clashes of Qaddafi with his former Generals who defected to the CIA and NATO countries. It might be possible to suggest, then, that in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the historical subject of the people was drawn together in a Dionysian dance of different rhythms in the marvelous realm of the ancients, while we fear that the case of Libya suggests an Apollonian future where time, itself, may lay dying under the machinic hand of history. The properly Nietzschean inversion would follow: time is dead, for history has killed it. Yet, if time is dead, struck down in Golgotha, exposed in the desert, mauled by the thawra , it is only in the present sense that it is rendered impossible outside of the context into which the untimely has thrown us. Thus, if history becomes an art of revolution, life as being-towards-death (death as the provocation of the neutrality of time) becomes what Benjamin calls “the allegory of resurrection” through the glorious ruins of history. Prashad ends his work with a rousing finale: “The time of the impossible has presented itself. In Egypt, where the appetite for the possibilities of the future are greatest, the people continue to assert themselves into Tahrir Square and other places, pushing to reinvigorate a Revolution that must not die… For them the slogan is simple: Down with the Present. Long live the Future. May it be so.&rdquo. (shrink)

Anticolonial theorists and revolutionaries have long turned to dialectical thought as a central weapon in their fight against oppressive structures and conditions. This relationship was never easy, however, as anticolonial thinkers have resisted the historical determinism, teleology, Eurocentrism, and singular emphasis that some Marxisms place on class identity at the expense of race, nation, and popular identity. In recent decades, the conflict between dialectics and postcolonial theory has only deepened. In _Decolonizing Dialectics _Geo Maher breaks this impasse by bringing the (...) work of Georges Sorel, Frantz Fanon, and Enrique Dussel together with contemporary Venezuelan politics to formulate a dialectics suited to the struggle against the legacies of colonialism and slavery. This is a decolonized dialectics premised on constant struggle in which progress must be fought for and where the struggles of the wretched of the earth themselves provide the only guarantee of historical motion. (shrink)

This article sets out to develop a critical and theoretical interpretation of what scale means in and for photography, an investigation provoked by the expansive character of photography in the context of networked digital culture that also involves questions relating to historical practices and theorisations of photography. Scale has many different meanings in these contexts and these are normally addressed separately in specialised discursive frameworks. This article explores an alternative, namely, that it is its very diversity which gives the clue (...) to what scale means for photography. The article projects a concept of ‘photographic scale’ to delineate the relational form of scale in photography and argues that photographic scale has ontological significance for photography. This concept denotes a ubiquitous, variegated and compound play between differing but necessarily associated scales that inform the spatiotemporality of photography, that allow for its sense as a form of visual representation, that structure its modes of materialisation and that figure significantly in determinations of its global geo-political processes. (shrink)

This paper aims to establish the meaning of Dharma as the principle of self-denial and emptiness. Dharma, a key concept in the religious thought of India, has the literal meaning of "supporter.” Something that supports something else does not exist for itself. Just as the truth supporting the universe is Dharma, so the four pillars supporting the roof of the house to prevent it from collapsing are also Dharma. The four pillars supporting the house do not exist for themselves, but (...) create an empty space in the house. In this respect, the essence of Dharma is self-denial, self-sacrifice. The traditional ascetic practices and religions in India is referred to as sanatana dharma, and the core is the complete extinction of I-ness. When individual consciousness is completely lost, mokṣa is achieved. The moment the eternal truth is achieved, the individual consciousness becomes zero, and this position can be likened to the center where the x- and y-axes meet in the coordinates of mathematics. Just as the center in the coordinates of mathematics is a place where the value of the x-axis is zero and the value of the y-axis is zero, the center of the universe, that is, nirvāṇa is achieved when individual consciousness is completely lost. Dharma is the path of becoming nothing to reach the zero point, and the process of self-denial is bound to entail pain. The pain involving voluntary self-denial can be rather a positive nourishment for the realization of Dharma. In fact, we can say that the core of the Hindu ethics of Aśrama-dharma and Varṇa-dharma is voluntary renunciation for the complete extinction of individual consciousness and renunciation concerning that which is possible. (shrink)

Term and concept of bioethics originally were developed by Fritz Jahr, a Protestant Pastor in Halle an der Saale in 1927, long before the period, when bioethics in the modern sense was recreated in the US in 1970s and since that time has spread globally. Jahr’s bioethical imperative, influenced by Christian and humanist traditions from Assisi to Schopenhauer and by Buddhist philosophy holds its own position against Kant’s anthropological imperative and against dogmatic Buddhist reasoning: ‘Respect each living being as an (...) end in itself and treat it, if possible, as such’. Jahr interprets the 5th Commandment ‘Thou shall not kill’ offensively and liberally as ‘common morality’ which includes the obligation of caring for one’s own health, public health and health education within the wider framework of a universal bioethical Sittengesetz. In the article-translation the actual contemporary thoughts about the bioethical imperative, which serves not only the object of interdisciplinary study, but also the practical approach to acquiring responsibility and environmental image of thinking, are found. Didactic considerations of Yahr go beyond the paternalistic upbringing, they point to the content and methodological purpose of teaching ethics to ethical discourse. According to Yahr, ethics does not regulate philosophical, theological or political knowledge, does not act as a dictatorship of a way of behavior. Ethics is the conduct of discussions, the culture of discussion and communication. Following the philosophy of Yahr, Professor Hans-Martin Zass formulated the geo-ethical imperative: "Respect the Mother Earth and all natural life as it is, for which the responsible person is an end in itself, and get around as much as possible in this way!". In respect for all living things, there is a relationship between man and animals, plants, nature, including the health systems, educational-informational and research organizations. Pastor Fritz Jahr, who had no immediate influence during his times, built a strong first Protestant foundation for contemporary theological and ethical concepts in medical ethics, bioethics, and environmental ethics. (shrink)

Coherence and Correspondence. Questions on a Programme of Reconciliation. Nicholas Rescher has recently proposed an original synthesis of the correspondence and the coherence idea. My purpose is a critical examination of this proposal. Against the background of a sketch of Rescher's general truth-conception and the synthesis mentioned above, I ask two questions. First: Given that coherence can only be the criterion of truth, if it forms a constitutive part of the concept of truth too; why not accept the inverse idea, (...) which postulates the criterion-presence of correspondence? Secondly: Given the plausibility of the theoretical framework which allows the synthesis; why not accept a framework which allows a global synthesis between all truth-theories? (shrink)

The concept of boundary represents one of the fundamental philosophical issues triggered and required by the reflection upon geography – and ontology of geography specifically. But what kind of entity are geographical boundaries? What sorts of boundary have been identified by contemporary ontologists of geography? How can boundaries be classified from a geo-ontological point of view? What are the main contemporary classifications of geographical boundaries? How can culture and human beliefs influence such classifications? These questions represent the starting point of (...) this paper, aimed at analyzing how the notion of boundary has been conceived by contemporary ontologists of geography, what kinds of geographical boundaries have been identified and categorized, and the influence eventually exerted by cultural diversities and human beliefs on such geo-ontological classifications. Primarily, we will take into account Smith’s and Galton’s taxonomies, which represent two of the most cited examples of comprehensive classifications of geographical boundaries encompassing physical, biological, psychological, social, and political phenomena. Secondly, starting from Smith’s and Mark’s considerations, the importance of cultural diversities and human beliefs for geo-ontological classifications will be discussed. As third, we will analyze the possibility of the existence of cultural boundaries and the prospect of categorizations that can influence, in their turn, beliefs, culture and individual or collective behavior. The idea is to show three different modalities through which culture and beliefs may have an influence on (and the power to modify) the definition and the individuation of geographical boundaries. (shrink)

The monk Gaunilo opens the vigorous disputation with Anselm by describing the infamous proof in the second chapter of the Proslogion. The following paper offers a detailed logical reconstruction of Gaunilo’s account of Anselm’s argument, thus making explicit the reasoning of Anselm in the view of Gaunilo. It will serve two purposes. Firstly it provides an easily understood example for the use of logic to interpret a nontrivial philosophical text. Secondly it reveals the reasons and the concepts involved in (...) the argument, thereby indicating further argumentative and semantic tasks. (shrink)

Good interlocutors are a blessing, and needless to say, I’m feeling very blessed today. This is especially true for a project in which _vision_ figures so centrally, since we often see most clearly through the parallax of another’s eyes. Contributors to this conversation have cast distinct lines of sight onto _Anticolonial Eruptions _that have allowed me to see both otherwise and better, to recognize which elements of my original argument remain incomplete or unclear, to glimpse what was overlooked or taken (...) for granted, and to realize other moments where I might have been wrong entirely. They have revealed how my book, despite diagnosing colonial hubris, might reproduce blindspots that are more or less hubristic in their own right. This apparent irony is anything but. Any book, especially one this short, slices into and across history and theory ways that are inescapably partial, leaving a generative remainder to be dealt with. But more than this, I find nothing but encouragement in how my comrade-readers have taken up the lenses provided—the colonial blindspot, the second sight of the colonized, and the decolonial ambush—to excavate and cultivate a radical second sight from the depths of the colonial blindspot. Whether diagnosing the paradoxical unseeing of ocular-centrism, my own blindness toward the revolutionary nature of care as community resistance, or the ways that tropes of inevitability might refract my political judgment, each of the critiques printed above offers, in Kevin Bruyneel’s words, “more ammo for the canon/cannon” (88). (shrink)

Does a political conception of human rights dictate a particular view of corporate human rights obligations? The U.N. “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework and Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights hold that corporations have only a responsibility to respect human rights. Some critics have argued that corporations should be responsible for a wider range of human rights obligations, beyond merely an obligation to respect such rights. Furthermore, it has been argued that the Framework relied on a political (...) conception of human rights, and this is what led to limiting corporate obligations to mere respect for human rights. In this paper, I explore and critically assess this general claim about political conceptions of human rights. This involves distinguishing different types of political conceptions of human rights, as well as specifying what makes a theory of human rights a “political conception.” In light of this clarificatory discussion, I argue that the general thesis is false; the mere fact that a theory offers a political conception of human rights does not necessarily entail any certain range of corporate human rights obligations. Finally, I identify some of the other aspects of a theory of human rights that do affect the range of corporate obligations it will prescribe. (shrink)

This encyclopedia article provides a procedural account of explication outlining each step that is part of the overall explicative effort (2). It is prefaced by a summary of the historical development of the method (1). The latter part of the article includes a rough structural theory of explication (3) and a detailed presentation of an examplary explication taken from the history of philosophy and the foundations of mathematics (4).

A by-product of the Watergate investigations into illegal political contributions and money-laundering was the revelation that American corporations had been making questionable payments to foreign officials to gain business advantages. That discovery was the driving force behind passage of the FCPA in 1977. Many since have complained that the law put American firms at a disadvantage in international trade. This paper assesses the credibility of that claim, as well as exploring the socioeconomic implications of corruption in a world of (...) intensifying international competition. Based on the literature review, examination of international trade data and intensive interviews with foreign firms doing business in Nigeria, the paper reaches the following conclusions:1. Enforcement of FCPA has waxed and waned, but there is no evidence that its enforcement has impeded the growth of U.S. trade. In fact, trade with countries previously considered "bribe prone" has out-paced the growth of trade with non-bribe-prone countries, despite FCPA. (shrink)

Whereas the relationship between truth and propositional content has already been intensively investigated, there are only very few studies devoted to the task of illuminating the relationship between truth and illocutionary acts. This book fills that gap. This innovative collection addresses such themes as: the relation between the concept of truth and the success conditions of assertions and kindred speech acts the linguistic devices of expressing the truth of a proposition the relation between predication and truth.

This paper makes a case for love as a powerful force for ‘transforming power’ in our educational institutions and everyday lives, and proposes that ‘revolutionary love’ serves as a moral and strategic compass for concrete individual and collective actions in critical education. The paper begins by reviewing current conceptualizations of love in critical education and identifies the potential for further theorization of the concept of love. It continues by theorizing love as a transformational political concept, focusing on six different (...) perspectives about love; love as an emotion, love as choice, and love as response, love as relational, love as political, and love as praxis. The paper concludes by discussing what “transforming power” with a “loving revolution” could mean for educators who engage with critical education. (shrink)

The concepts that organize our thinking wield, by virtue of this fact, a great deal of political power. This book looks at five concepts whose dominion has increased, steadily, during the bourgeois period of modernity: Labor, Time, Property, Value, and Crisis. These ruling ideas are central not only to many academic disciplines— from philosophy and law to the political, social, and economic sciences— but also to everyday life.

This collection brings together a strong ethnographic and theoretical field. The volume includes chapters that address issues of identity formation and change in relation to ‘educational’ political projects and politically coloured notions of citizenship. Drawing on their different ethnographies and on comparative analysis, the contributors address the problematic of the relationship between rulers and the ruled and between élite and non-élite groups, critically raising issues of legitimacy and responsibility in the management of power and political decision-making. The empirically (...) based analyses offered here graphically demonstrate that urban issues are at the forefront of political and social debates. More specifically, the contributors address, from different perspectives, the more or less successful attempts of the state to legitimise its approach and authority through urban policies. A collective reading of the chapters provides a powerful analytical framework for the study of the processes that underlie ideologically biased definitions of citizenship and of their effects on urban dynamics. (shrink)

One of the big problems Muslims have to face in Ukraine today is the escalation of a negative atmosphere around them related to the issue of terrorism. Very often, the media provide information about Islam to a frightening population, incorrectly setting out the issues of Islamic dogma associated with such a concept as jihad.

It has been argued recently that tyranny is a persisting phenomenon very much alive today, a greater danger than newer forms of misrule such as totalitarianism. One argument is based on human nature being such that the temptation to abuse political power in the form of tyranny remains a possibility in all societies. Another defines tyranny as a spiritual disorder of the soul and polity. Both date the 19th century as the time when tyranny dropped out of the western (...) political vocabulary. In this view, modern political thought, like political science generally, has been impoverished by ignorance of, or indifference to, the nature of tyranny. By contrast, I treat tyranny not as possessing an essential, unchanging nature, but as a contested political concept used for a variety of purposes by different regimes and groups. Nor do I agree that, because ‘tyranny’ was used infrequently during the 19th century, systematic abuses of political power went unnoticed and unclassified. I treat a number of cases by postulating a family of controversial and contested regime types: tyranny, despotism, absolute monarchy, Bonapartism, Caesarism, and dictatorship. From them I conclude that, after tyranny was conflated with despotism at the end of the 18th century, both concepts were redescribed in terms of newer classifications belonging to the same conceptual family. Because ‘tyranny’ was then extended to many non-political arenas, it became so trivialized as to leave no prospect of our retrieving its once potent political meanings. If ‘tyranny’ is equally applicable to teachers, husbands, fashions, or public opinion, the concept has lost its political cutting edge. It now lacks any distinctive meaning that might frame a situation and define it as calling for urgent and decisive action, especially in foreign policy. (shrink)

The political conception makes sense of human rights strictly in light of their role in international human rights practice, more specifically by describing how they justify interventions against states that engage in or fail to prevent human rights violations. This conception is, therefore, normative and fact-dependent. Beyond this, it does not seem to have much to say about the actual nature of international human rights practice. The argument sustained here reinterprets the political conception by resorting to a heuristic (...) device that explains how normativity can be fact-dependent: the Hartian model. The characteristics of H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition are useful to determine the characteristics of human rights practice from the viewpoint of the political conception. Also, they help to overcome some of the problems typically faced by the political conception, such as whether there is only one practice or many, whether the notion of human rights becomes too contingent on the way the world is currently organised, how agents can violate content-changing practices, or how reliance on current states of affairs leaves room for criticism of those states of affairs. (shrink)

The article deals with the differences of pre-global and post-global conceptualizations in political sciences. It investigates the functions of political concepts under the changes globalization caused to political systems, culture and ideology. The paper does not engage with the methodological debates on political concepts, or question the undeniable importance of certain political concepts, but rather it addresses some of the principal concepts for which globalization may be a useful concept with regard (...) to their similarities and differences with the Cold War era. Despite the variety of political concepts as a result of various development phases of society, models of governance and ideological impact to the political processes along centuries, the concepts of power and authority seem to be among those that have survived in terms of the consistency of their relevance. However, the conception of politics through power, authority and leadership has been re-dimensioned significantly under the post-global era. By contrast, although the concept of sovereignty has been one of the initial concepts in the landscape of contemporary politics for many centuries back, following the effects of globalization, it has reduced its relevance significantly. In this view, as a consequence, the article discusses as well as the reconfiguration of the concept of state in a post-global era marked by a period of advancing causes—both trans-border and transnational causes—promoted by post-sovereignty states. Under these circumstances the traditional debate regarding conflict versus cooperation in politics is one of the areas remaining within a status quo dimension in the dioptric view of both pre-global and post-global conceptualizations. With a contrastive methodological approach, the article as well analyzes the development and meaning of the concepts of political equality, justice and liberty as indispensable concepts in modern post-global political processes. (shrink)

_Natural and Political Conceptions of Community_ demonstrates how the early modern Jesuits recruited the household community when reflecting on the political community, integrating an account of human nature with a notion of politics as the sphere of law, rights, and virtues.

Legal and Political Concepts as Contextures Socio-political concepts are not singularities. They are, instead, complex and evolving contextures. An awareness of the latter and of what we need to do when we handle concepts opens up space for the resolution of political disagreements and multiplies opportunities for constructive dialogue and understanding. In this article, I argue that the concepts-as-contextures perspective can unravel conceptual connectivity and interweaving, and I substantiate this by examining the ‘contexture’ (...) of liberty. I show that the different, and seemingly contested, definitions of liberty are the product of mixed articulations and the development of associative discursive links within a contexture. (shrink)

Mind and Political Concepts offers a descriptive account of the conceptual mind as applied to political philosophy. In an attempt to find the common feature characterizing the conceptual method in political philosophy, this book examines three classical works: Plato's Republic, Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Social Contract. It argues that political philosophy can also contribute something to philosophical psychology. This book is comprised of six chapters and begins by tracing the origins of the conceptual (...) method to Plato's general philosophical method. In particular, Plato's views on concepts such as justice, human behavior, and political order in Republic are discussed. The reader is then introduced to Hobbes' Leviathan and his role in the advent of the scientific conceptual method; Rousseau's Social Contract and his analysis of human nature and the state; the structure of a political theory; and the link between the philosophy of mind and psychology. The last chapter considers some modern political theories and shows that, however different their methods and their programs, their notion of the philosopher's participation in political life was dependent on their concept of reason. This monograph will appeal to students and practitioners of philosophy, politics, and psychology. (shrink)

Human rights have become a wider and more visible feature of our political discourse, yet many have also noted the great discrepancy between the human rights invoked in this discourse and traditional philosophical accounts that conceive of human rights as natural rights. This article explores an alternative approach in which human rights are conceived primarily as international norms aimed at securing the basic conditions of membership or inclusion in a political society. Central to this `political conception' of (...) human rights is the idea of human rights as special (in contrast to general) rights that individuals possess in virtue of specific associative relations they stand in to one another. This view is explored and defended through a critical review of four recent political conceptions — Michael Ignatieff, John Rawls, Thomas Pogge and Joshua Cohen. (shrink)

In a recent comment on H.L.A. Hart’s ‘Postscript’ to The Concept of Law, Ronald Dworkin claims that the meaning of legal and political concepts may be understood by analogy to the meaning of natural kind concepts like ‘tiger’, ‘gold’ and ‘water’. This article questions the efficacy of Dworkin’s claims by challenging the use of natural kinds as the basis for a semantic theory of legal and political concepts. Additionally, in matters of value there is no (...) methodological equivalent to the scientific method. Thus, there is little hope of finding hidden essences to explain the meaning of legal and political concepts. Finally, even if there are natural kinds, Dworkin’s arguments for their efficacy in jurisprudence are problematic and unpersuasive. The problem for Dworkin is that his embrace of natural kinds undermines the ‘fit’ side of the fit/justification model of adjudication that lies at the heart of his theory of law. (shrink)