Dialectic of Enlightenment is undoubtedly the most influential publication of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. Written during the Second World War and circulated privately, it appeared in a printed edition in Amsterdam in 1947. "What we had set out to do," the authors write in the Preface, "was nothing less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism." Yet the work goes far beyond a mere (...) critique of contemporary events. Historically remote developments, indeed, the birth of Western history and of subjectivity itself out of the struggle against natural forces, as represented in myths, are connected in a wide arch to the most threatening experiences of the present. The book consists in five chapters, at first glance unconnected, together with a number of shorter notes. The various analyses concern such phenomena as the detachment of science from practical life, formalized morality, the manipulative nature of entertainment culture, and a paranoid behavioral structure, expressed in aggressive anti-Semitism, that marks the limits of enlightenment. The authors perceive a common element in these phenomena, the tendency toward self-destruction of the guiding criteria inherent in enlightenment thought from the beginning. Using historical analyses to elucidate the present, they show, against the background of a prehistory of subjectivity, why the National Socialist terror was not an aberration of modern history but was rooted deeply in the fundamental characteristics of Western civilization. Adorno and Horkheimer see the self-destruction of Western reason as grounded in a historical and fateful dialectic between the domination of external nature and society. They trace enlightenment, which split these spheres apart, back to its mythical roots. Enlightenment and myth, therefore, are not irreconcilable opposites, but dialectically mediated qualities of both real and intellectual life. "Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology." This paradox is the fundamental thesis of the book. This new translation, based on the text in the complete edition of the works of Max Horkheimer, contains textual variants, commentary upon them, and an editorial discussion of the position of this work in the development of Critical Theory. (shrink)

_Dialectic of Enlightenment_ is undoubtedly the most influential publication of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. Written during the Second World War and circulated privately, it appeared in a printed edition in Amsterdam in 1947. "What we had set out to do," the authors write in the Preface, "was nothing less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism." Yet the work goes far beyond a mere critique of (...) contemporary events. Historically remote developments, indeed, the birth of Western history and of subjectivity itself out of the struggle against natural forces, as represented in myths, are connected in a wide arch to the most threatening experiences of the present. The book consists in five chapters, at first glance unconnected, together with a number of shorter notes. The various analyses concern such phenomena as the detachment of science from practical life, formalized morality, the manipulative nature of entertainment culture, and a paranoid behavioral structure, expressed in aggressive anti-Semitism, that marks the limits of enlightenment. The authors perceive a common element in these phenomena, the tendency toward self-destruction of the guiding criteria inherent in enlightenment thought from the beginning. Using historical analyses to elucidate the present, they show, against the background of a prehistory of subjectivity, why the National Socialist terror was not an aberration of modern history but was rooted deeply in the fundamental characteristics of Western civilization. Adorno and Horkheimer see the self-destruction of Western reason as grounded in a historical and fateful dialectic between the domination of external nature and society. They trace enlightenment, which split these spheres apart, back to its mythical roots. Enlightenment and myth, therefore, are not irreconcilable opposites, but dialectically mediated qualities of both real and intellectual life. "Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology." This paradox is the fundamental thesis of the book. This new translation, based on the text in the complete edition of the works of Max Horkheimer, contains textual variants, commentary upon them, and an editorial discussion of the position of this work in the development of Critical Theory. (shrink)

In 1807 Hegel published thePhenomenology of Spiritwhich calmly asserted that philosophy had, at long last, ceased to be merely the love of knowing and had finally consummated its lust for truth, giving birth to ‘strenge Wissenschaft’ in logic and the system (Hegel, 1807: 3). In 1944, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno circulated mimeographed copies ofDialectic of Enlightenment, ominously asserting that the same process of reason's self-clarification which Hegel described brings us, not, as he claimed, to truth and freedom, but (...) to barbarism. Somehow critical reflection's efforts to liberate humanity from superstition, darkness, and oppression has lead instead to Auschwitz.A crucial aspect of Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of enlightenment is the notion that enlightenment and its seeming antithesis, myth, are inextricably linked. In thePhenomenologyHegel had already investigated the underlying link between the rationality of the Enlightenment period and faith, its ostensible arational other, in Chapter VI. In various places Horkheimer and Adorno acknowledge the influence of Hegel, and they make suggestive passing references to thePhenomenology. Obviously, their connecting of enlightenment and myth bears more than a family resemblance to Hegel's pairing of enlightenment and faith. Just as Hegel disclosed that enlightenment and faith have more in common than usually thought, Horkheimer and Adorno aim to show that there is an important aspect of enlightenment already in myth and further, that enlightenment has itself fallen back into the essential features of myth it purports to be have overcome. (shrink)

Horkheimerian’s critique of the Enlightenment, shows the process whereby the demystification of the world is triggered by way of an “an act of sovereignty” of reason. There the man lost for reason his possibility of self-criticism, causing it to be in instrumental reason. Since its inception, the Enlightenment, as myth, mutilated reason, over the pursuit of truth –theoretical truth and moral truth–, there was a renounce to sense. The dream of Enlightenment rationality was reduced to the 'instrumentalization'. (...) This dialectic not only reveals the irreversible crisis of reason, but leaves in place, in the discussion of critical theory, the idea of the 'social pathology of reason', from which a “normative horizon” can be proposed, hinting at the scene of the ethical discussion the lack of rationality of societies. (shrink)

흔히 『계몽의 변증법』은 내재적 비판의 관점에서 이해되어 왔다. 그러나 본 논문은 이 저작이 계보학적 비판으로 해석될 때 더 잘 이해될 수 있음을 입증하고자 한다. 이를 위해 본 논문은 우선 내재적 비판과 계보학적 비판의 관계를 규명할 것이다. 두 비판 형식은 완전히 이질적인 것이 아니며, 내재적 비판에 계보학적 단초가 이미 들어 있다는 점이 밝혀질 것이다. 더 나아가 본 논문은 계보학적 비판을 보다 엄밀히 규정하기 위하여 니체의 방법론을 도입할 것이다. 이에 따라 『계몽의 변증법』은 세 가지 물음 하에서 분석될 것이다. 계몽은 어디에서 유래했는가 하는 (...) 물음, 계몽은 어떤 척도에 의해 비판되는가 하는 물음, 그리고 유래와 정당성 물음이 어떻게 결합되고 있는가 하는 물음이 그것이다. 이러한 탐구를 통하여 계몽 비판의 복잡한 담론 구조가 재구성될 것이며, 이로써 이 비판의 규범성이 해명될 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

The importance of the concept of subjectivity has been underestimated in the work of Theodor Adorno. In order to address this lacuna we make an interpretation of Adorno’s text Dialectic of Enlightenment, in the form of an ‘idealized’ narrative of enlightenment’s historical decline into its ‘self-conceived’ opposite, namely myth. Within this narrative we unravel the Freudian assumptions underlying Adorno’s work. We depict the form of subjectivity that Adorno regards as inextricably connected to enlightenment reason. We then (...) analyse his argument for the inevitable regression of this kind of subjectivity, and the resultant collapse of reason and enlightenment themselves. In so doing we demonstrate that, in Adorno’s view, the enlightenment concept of subjectivity is seriously flawed and entails an inevitable regression which, in the end, encompasses the very ‘death of the Subject’. (shrink)

This celebrated work is the keystone of the thought of the Frankfurt School. It is a wide-ranging philosophical and psychological critique of the Western categories of reason and nature, from Homer to Nietzsche.

Volume 20, Issue 1, February 2019, Page 71-87.

Russell Berman has written a fascinating book about space and alterity in colonial discourse. The book has a Eurocentric focus: the time and world Berman discusses were Eurocentric. So, too, was the Enlightenment, and Berman explicates the encounter between European voyagers and non-European peoples in terms of the “dialectic of enlightenment.” As a device, this works well. It allows a unity of focus in an otherwise varied assortment of topics. As he writes, his book is “neither a (...) history of German colonialism nor an intellectual history of images of non-Europeans in German literature,” but a look at “some specific cases…. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Horkheimer and Adorno's original take on the idea of a critical anthropology, as they work it out in Dialectic of Enlightenment. In particular, I address a set of concerns that commentators have formulated against their view. I do so through a close examination of the first excursus of the book. In particular, I argue, first, that this excursus can be read as an investigation into the prototype of the self (Odysseus), understood as a (...) mimetic model of the self; second, that Horkheimer and Adorno see in Odysseus' cunning the model of reflectivity. (shrink)

This article explores the recent reception of the German Idealist tradition within the English-speaking philosophical world. Texts by four authors—Fredrick Beiser, Richard Velkley, Dennis Schmidt, and Gregg Horowitz—are examined as to their respective participation in what I call a materialist appropriation of German Idealism. In this article, I explore (1) what the term ‘materialism’ means in this context and (2) the reasons for such a new interpretation. I hold that this interpretation is utilized as a response to the Enlightenment (...) priority of universalizing abstraction. Further, I hold that such an interpretation amounts to a reclaiming of German Idealism from previous interpretations which viewed it as supporting this priority. (shrink)

:This essay provides a reading of Steve McQueen's critically acclaimed movie Hunger, which tells the story of the hunger strike of Bobby Sands in light of contemporary hunger strikes around the world and especially in Guantánamo. The central concern of the essay is to read Hunger together with Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment, showing how both works problematize the sacrificial subjectivity of enlightenment, its instrumental rationality, and sovereign temporality, while advancing a devastating critique of Western civilization. (...) I argue that Hunger situates the high-security prison within the self-destructive tendency of enlightenment and depicts how self-sacrificial resistance emerges as a response to sovereign domination. Interpreting the figure of Bobby Sands as the reversal of Odysseus in the encounter with the Sirens, I explore how insurgent sacrifice interrupts the dialectic of enlightenment and points to a new configuration of subjectivity and time. (shrink)

Critical theorists have argued that the concept of Enlightenment is paradoxical. While it designates the liberation from superstition through the use of reason, Enlightenment also sets up new forms of superstition. This article focuses on Gan Yang’s and Wang Hui’s rereading of the dynamic processes of Enlightenment in China and in Europe. It argues for a transcultural perspective on Enlightenment’s tendency to give rise to a deformation of reason. Only if the culturally varying forms of reason (...) and unreason in Europe as well as China are being reflected might it be possible to continue pursuing the self-critical project of Enlightenment at a global level. (shrink)

A review of a 2010 translation of the inaugural address of Dr Jaap Klapwijk as professor of Philosophy at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam in 1976.

본 논문은 홉스를 통해서 보는 근대 사회에서의 계몽의 변증법을 다룬다. 그 출발점은 자기보존을 위한 자발적 복종이 근대적 주체의 특징이 되었다는 사실이다. 오늘날 신자유주의로 인한 사회의 해체와 무한경쟁의 도입 이후 오히려 민족적 동일성을 요구하는, 새로운 권위주의를 뒷받침하는 목소리가 커지고 있다는 사실은 이를 뒷받침한다. 이러한 역설은 아도르노와 호르크하이머가 『계몽의 변증법』에서 분석한 자기보존과 자기부정 사이의 역설적 관계에 상응한다. 이를 밝혀 내기 위해 이 글은 홉스의 『리바이어던』이 보여주는 자기보존의 역설적 특징을 분석하며, 이로부터 아도르노와 호르크하이머의 『계몽의 변증법』이 진단하는 자기보존의 역설을 읽어내고자 한다. 이로부터 ‘자발적 복종’과 (...) ‘자기규율’의 원칙을 넘어서는 새로운 자기보존과 주체화를 모색하는 것이 이 글의 목적이다. 즉 이 글은 홉스적 자연상태의 현실태인 현재의 경쟁적 사회의 논리에서 벗어나, 보편적 연대가 실현될 수 있는 새로운 사회관계를 모색하고자 한다. (shrink)

To make Adorno’s difficult notion of “identity thinking” more amendable to sociological research, this project brings his Negative Dialectics into conversation with Schutz’s theory of typification. When revised with Adorno’s attention to political economy and the pathologies of reification, Schutz’s framework allows for an analysis of identity thinking in everyday life. Both theorists argue that categories of thought: automatically subsume objects for pragmatic yet socially conditioned reasons, are socially formed, transferred, and selected, and suppress particularizing characteristics of objects. Their overlapping (...) arguments are cross-fertilized to propose a critical approach to cognitive sociology that can engage in a form of ideology critique that illuminates forms of thinking that conceal social contradictions. This approach is useful for explaining the “mundane dialectic of enlightenment”: the daily reproduction of unreflective rationalization that breeds irrationality in the form of social domination and environmental harm, a contradiction which finds its ultimate expression in climate change inaction. (shrink)

According to the author Rorty´s romanticism is limited by postanalytical presuppositions. Consequently, Rorty should be considered a "modern enlightened man". Due to his disbelief in the concept od "experience", in searching for something beyond "vocabularies", Rorty ignores an important fact: Humans are interconnected with their world also by other relationships, not only by those, which can be formulated in banal, everyday "rational" language. In order to show more clearly the blind spot of the postanalyticians he tries to compare Rorty´s approach (...) with that of Michel Foucault, who attempted at reintroducing the forgotten conception of truth as a personal "proof" or "battle". Thus he wanted to confirm the superiority of ac_ting over thinking, of experiment over clearly defined and intelligible "vocabulary". According to the author this approach is much closer to romanticism than that of Rorty. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The article rereads Horkheimer and Adorno's classic Dialectic of Enlightenment from the standpoint of animal philosophy while also offering a comparison and contrast between Odysseus and Socrates as personifications of the “animal question” that haunts all Western philosophy. The key thesis is that this question is a metaphilosophical question and that we thus have to develop a critical philosophy that is at its core also an animal philosophy.

At its heart, The Dialectic of Counter-Enlightenment is a plea not to take doubt at its word—a plea for the return of a vanished philosophical intelligence..

The idea of creaturely life has, in recent years, emerged as an important and illuminating category of literary and philosophical critique. In this paper I seek to contribute to this contemporary discourse by examining the references to the creaturely found in the writings of T.W. Adorno. Whilst much attention has been paid to Walter Benjamin’s reflections on creatureliness, Adorno, a thinker with whom Benjamin is often associated, has received comparatively little in this regard. I begin to redress this lacuna by (...) developing a reading of key passages of Dialectic of Enlightenment which orients itself towards Adorno’s remarks concerning the ‘inverse theology’ which he sees as grounding both his own, and Benjamin’s, thought. In placing theological core of Adorno’s philosophy in the foreground of my analysis, I argue that the notion of the creature, which I claim signifies a redemptive perspective on human existence, can be read as an important, if somewhat overlooked, concept in the normative framework of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. (shrink)

That something is profoundly wrong with the way in which enlightenment has unfolded has widely been taken to be the main thrust of Dialectic of Enlightenment. In this paper, I propose to defend that to understand the book and shed light on some of its most puzzling features, one should rather take Horkheimer and Adorno's critical claim at face value: through their criticism they contend to have prepared a positive concept of enlightenment. How this can be (...) so is the question I want to answer. I defend that what we need is an account that works out the conceptual grounds on which their critique can operate. The focus of my attempt will consist in understanding what they mean when they assert that rationality is intrinsically social and how they conceive of rationality as being reflective at its core. (shrink)

This paper considers the aporia in Dialectic of Enlightenment in two aspects of the self-destruction and self-critique of enlightenment and then emphasizes the dual vision which Horkheimer and Adorno hold on rationality. Firstly, it traces the explanation of the self-destruction of enlightenment so as to make explicit that it results in another form of the aporia, the self-critique of enlightenment. This is followed by formulating the criticism into two aspects, that Horkheimer and Adorno’s aporia leads (...) them to be confronted by a self-contradiction. I argue that the criticism neglects their narrative strategy of history as critique and the methodology of immanent critique of Horkheimer and Adorno. In conclusion, it is elucidated that Horkheimer and Adorno rightly posit their aporia and suggest a proper solution, by which we could take the dual vision on rationality and their own model of immanent critique as its significances. (shrink)

하버마스는 계몽과 세속화된 종교를 역사적으로 대립적이거나 배제적인 것으로 파악한다. 동시에 하버마스는 계몽과 종교, 지식과 믿음이 사실상 공통적인 윤리적인 내용을 가진다고 주장한다. 그렇다면 이 둘이 공통적인 내용을 가지는데, 어떻게 둘 간의 갈등이 생긴 것일까? 또한 역사적으로 상호 배제적인 것으로 파악되던 믿음과 지식이 현대 사회에서 “반성적 도약”을 통해 화해에 이를 수 있을까? 헤겔에 따르면 믿음과 지식은 “현실 세계로부터의 도피”라는 점에서 동일한 생성론적 원천을 가지며, 의식의 순수 사유를 현실의 반대로서 현실의 진리라고 파악한다는 점에서 내용적 동일성도 가진다. 하지만 이 진리를 믿음은 표상의 형식 속에, (...) 지식은 개념의 형식 속에 표현한다는 점에서 둘은 다르다. 이 형식적 차이는 둘 간의 상호 비판을 가능케 하여, 계몽의 변증법과 종교의 세속화를 촉발한다. 지식과 믿음, 계몽과 종교는 하나이자 동일한 정신의 자기 이해라는 과정이라는 동전의 양면을 불과하다. 우리는 계몽과 세속화의 관계에 대한 헤겔의 이론으로부터 하버마스가 주장하는 “반성적 도약”의 가능 토대를 얻을 수 있다. (shrink)

Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno famously argued that ‘myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology.’ Although much scholarship has analyzed and built upon Horkheimer and Adorno’s insight, it has often conflated myth with another concept: epic. By closely reading Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, this article disentangles the two concepts and elucidates key features of myth. Sacrifice, it argues, stood at the centre of myth, connecting and organizing its other dimensions. Next, the (...) article reconstructs the lineage of Horkheimer and Adorno’s account of myth and sacrifice in the fields of anthropology, ethnology, and sociology. Specifically, Horkheimer and Adorno drew on analyses of sacrificial rites in these disciplines to argue that sacrifices constituted a transaction between worshipers and gods and, therefore, established control, disempowerment, and fraud. Finally, the article takes up Horkheimer and Adorno’s task of tracing the conduits between myth and enlightenment by identifying parallel features of sacrifice and modern wage labor. To conclude, the article indicates the significance of mythical sacrifice by connecting its analysis of wage labour to contemporary theorizing about the ‘theological dimensions of capitalism.’ Together, these arguments show the centrality of Dialectic to theories of myth as conceptual tools and critical resources. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out to consider the extent to which Horkheimer and Adorno's account of the transition from Kant's philosophy to key features of the novels of the Marquis de Sade in the Second Excursus of their Dialectic of Enlightenment can be viewed as a fragment of the ‘history of philosophy’ and to explain this account in a way that allows us to ask whether it succeeds in establishing a necessary connection between Kant's philosophy and Sade's (...) novels. In connection with, a particular problem emerges. This problem concerns the role played by a non-instrumental form of reason in Horkheimer and Adorno's attempt to establish an essential connection between Kant's theoretical philosophy and Sade's novels, in which the practical implications of the theoretical employment of reason allegedly become explicit. It will be shown that, despite appearances to the contrary, an employment of reason of the relevant type is not identified by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

Would Habermas’s “The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment” pass muster as coursework in a class on Dialectic of Enlightenment? Using this polemical thought experiment setup as an estrangement device, I critically discuss Habermas’s essay that was pivotal in his repositioning of Critical Theory in the 1980s. I argue that it is philosophically and biographically unreflective; and that he is engaging in underhanded politicking. I sketch an alternative reading of Dialectic of Enlightenment: instead of viewing it (...) as the dead end that Habermas presents it to be, we can see as a self-therapeutical exercise in destabilizing a complacent self-conception whereby modernity is the pinnacle of moral progress—an exercise which might have a certain exemplarity for others in the ongoing quest of making use of our own understanding. The contribution is rounded off with a postscript by a second assessor of Habermas’s essay, discussing both the proposed assessment and the polemical thought experiment. (shrink)

Until the publication of the Dialectic of Enlightenment it was possible to place the controversy regarding myth in the framework of the general rivalry between enlightenment and rationalism on the one hand and Romanticism on the other. However, Horkheimer and Adorno's joint work rendered this controversy irrelevant and anachronistic. This essay presents this theoretical shift by analyzing the conceptual problems it raises. The basic question addressed is whether in our poststrucuralist and postmodernist age the distinction between critical (...) and mythical thought is still possible and appropriate. I believe that our answer to this question has fundamental significance for our personal and public life, and as such also determines the role and meaning of our current philosophical discourse. (shrink)

Ovaj tekst se bavi Adornovom dijalektickom kritikom kulture, unutar koje pokusava uciniti jasnijim odnos izmedju nekadasnje visoke gradjanske kulture, s jedne, i savremenih oblika masovne kulture, s druge strane. Adornovo razumevanje kulture omogucuje nam da mnoge specificne drustvene forme sagledamo u njihovom dijalektickom odnosu i medjusobnoj uslovljenosti. Sam tekst, pre svega, razmatra promene koje je savremeno industrijsko drustvo donelo s obzirom na kriticki potencijal kulture, naime nacin na koji ono uspeva da pretvori, nekada beskorisno- provokativnu kulturu u korisnu-impotentnu kulturu. Ovde (...) se analizira uticaj koji industrijska proizvodnja visoke i masovne kulture ima na svest individua - odnosno na svest masa - kao i nacin na koji individue bivaju obmanjivane za ono sto se govori da im kultura pruza. Tvrdi se da trijumf proizvodnje unutar kulturne industrije vara ljude za ponudu koju toboze pruza, te da je stoga danas unutar kulture postalo gotovo nemoguce sprovoditi individuaciju, a samim tim i zauzeti odredjenu kriticku distancu spram vladajucih oblika materijalne i duhovne proizvodnje. (shrink)