A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

We analyze the concept of correlated equilibrium in the framework of two-player two-strategy games. This simple framework makes it possible to clearly demonstrate the characteristic features of this concept. We develop an intuitive and easily memorizable test for equilibrium conditions and provide a complete classification of symmetric correlated equilibria in symmetric games.

In a pair of controversy provoking papers1, Kadane and Larkey argued that the normative or prescriptive understanding of expected utility theory recommended that participants in a game maximize expected utility given their assessments of the probabilities of the moves that other players would make. They observed that no prescription, norm or standard of Bayesian rationality recommends how they should come to make probability judgments about the choices of other players. For any given player, it is an empirical question as to (...) whether other players are Bayes rational, judge him to be Bayes rational, etc., just as it is an empirical question as to what the other players’ goals and beliefs are. Participants in the game should, of course, use all empirical information available to them about how other players have behaved and how they are likely to behave in the given context of choice. Kadane and Larkey pointed out that rational players could participate in a game meeting these requirements without the game’s terminating with a Nash equilibrium or a result satisfying any other particular solution concept. (shrink)

Aconvention is a state in which agents coordinate their activity, not as the result of an explicit agreement, but because their expectations are aligned so that each individual believes that all will act so as to achieve coordination for mutual benefit. Since agents are said to follow a convention if they coordinate without explicit agreement, the notion raises fundamental questions: (1) Why do certain conventions remain stable over time?, and (2) How does a convention emerge in the first place? In (...) a pioneering study, Lewis (1969) addresses these questions by applyingnoncooperative game theory. Lewis defines a convention as aNash coordination equilibrium of a noncooperative game that issalient, that is, it is somehow conspicuous to the agents so that all expect one another to conform with the equilibrium. This paper presents a new game theoretic definition of conventions, which formalizes the notion of salience and which also generalizes the class of conventions Lewis discusses in his work. I define a convention as acorrelated equilibrium (Aumann 1974, 1987) satisfying apublic intentions criterion: Every agent wants his intended action to becommon knowledge. I argue that many conventions correspond to correlated equilibria that are not Nash equilibria, and that this is consistent with Lewis' general viewpoint. Finally, I argue that game theoretic characterizations of convention, such as Lewis' and my own, help to explain a convention's stability, but that a fully satisfactory account of the emergence of convention requires a theory of equilibrium selection beyond the scope of Lewis' work. (shrink)

We introduce a new solution concept, called correlated-belief equilibrium. The difference to Nash equilibrium is that, while each player has correct marginal conjectures about each opponent, it is not necessarily the case that these marginal conjectures are independent. Then, we provide an epistemic foundation and we relate correlated-belief equilibrium with standard solution concepts, such as rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and conjectural equilibrium.

Catastrophe insurance differs from regular insurance in that individual claims are correlated and insurers have to pay more clients at once, which creates a liquidity strain. In this paper, I show two related findings: first, that when customers know their claims are correlated, this correlation can cause positive-sloping demand at low prices, and second, that because of this, a catastrophe insurance market can fail. Market failure is a stable equilibrium, which provides a better understanding of the frequent (...) failures in catastrophe insurance markets. (shrink)

In this comment on Francesco Guala’s Understanding Institutions, I express my admiration for the book but I also raise some critical criticisms: His general account of institutions as rules-in-equilibrium seems to get their ontology wrong by disregarding their material side - their concrete realizations. It also diregards social institutions whose rules are not (and are not meant to be) in equilibrium. Finally, his suggestion that institutional equilibria necessarily involve correlation devices appers to lack justification.

There are two general classes of social conventions: conventions of coordination, and conventions of partial conflict. In coordination problems, the interests of the agents coincide, while in partial conflict problems, some agents stand to gain only if other agents unilaterally make certain sacrifices. Lewis' (1969) pathbreaking analysis of convention in terms of game theory focuses on coordination problems, and cannot accommodate partial conflict problems. In this paper, I propose a new game-theoretic definition of convention which generalizes previous game-theoretic definitions (Lewis (...) 1969, Vanderschraaf 1995), and which can be used to characterize norms of justice in partial conflict situations. I argue that the key structural property necessary for a social arrangement to be a convention is that it be conditionally self-enforcing, in the sense that: (i) each agent has a decisive reason to follow her end of the arrangement given that she expects all to do likewise, (ii) given a different set of expectations, some agents would have had a decisive reason to deviate, and (iii) these facts are common knowledge. This leads to a definition of convention as a strict correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) together with appropriate common knowledge conditions. Examples are given in which it is shown how this more general account of convention can be used to analyze norms of justice as well as coordination problems. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behavior. And this may properly be call'd a convention or agreement betwixt us,.. (shrink)

Two institutions that are often implicit or overlooked in noncooperative games are the assumption of Nash behavior to solve a game, and the ability to correlate strategies. We consider two behavioral paradoxes; one in which maximin behavior rules out all Nash equilibria (‘Chicken’), and another in which minimax supergame behavior leads to an ‘inefficient’ outcome in comparison to the unique stage game equilibrium (asymmetric ‘Deadlock’). Nash outcomes are achieved in both paradoxes by allowing for correlated strategies, even when (...) individual behavior remains minimax or maximin. However, the interpretation of correlation as a public institution differs for each case. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a game-theoretic solution to the rule-following paradox in terms of what I will call basic constitutive practices. The structure of such a practice P constitutes what it is to take part in P by defining the correctness conditions of our most basic concepts as those actions that lie on the correlated equilibrium of P itself. Accordingly, an agent S meant addition by his use of the term ‘+’ because S is taking part in (...) a basic constitutive practice of adding where quus-like answers are ruled out by not lying on the equilibrium. The resulting picture of language will preserve the objectivity and correctness conditions of meaning, all the while providing room for the community as a whole to make a mistake. I also argue that by accepting the account presented, we have a strong reason to reject the idea that language is rule-governed. (shrink)

Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.

No-arbitrage is the fundamental principle of economic rationality which unifies normative decision theory, game theory, and market theory. In economic environments where money is available as a medium of measurement and exchange, no-arbitrage is synonymous with subjective expected utility maximization in personal decisions, competitive equilibria in capital markets and exchange economies, and correlated equilibria in noncooperative games. The arbitrage principle directly characterizes rationality at the market level; the appearance of deliberate optimization by individual agents is a consequence of their (...) adaptation to the market. Concepts of equilibrium behavior in games and markets can thus be reconciled with the ideas that individual rationality is bounded, that agents use evolutionarily-shaped decision rules rather than numerical optimization algorithms, and that personal probabilities and utilities are inseparable and to some extent indeterminate. Risk-neutral probability distributions, interpretable as products of probabilities and marginal utilities, play a central role as observable quantities in economic systems. (shrink)

This article shows that social norms are better explained as correlating devices for a correlated equilibrium of the underlying stage game, rather than Nash equilibria. Whereas the epistemological requirements for rational agents playing Nash equilibria are very stringent and usually implausible, the requirements for a correlated equilibrium amount to the existence of common priors, which we interpret as induced by the cultural system of the society in question. When the correlating device has perfect information, we need (...) in addition only to posit that individuals obey the social norm when it is costless to do so. When the correlating device has incomplete information, the operation of the social norm requires that individuals have a predisposition to follow the norm even when this is costly. The latter case explains why social norms are associated with other-regarding preferences and provides a basis for analyzing honesty and corruption. (shrink)

In Being Realistic About Reasons,T.M. Scanlon develops a non-naturalistic realist account of normative reasons. A crucial part of that account is Scanlon’s contention that there is no deep epistemological problem for non-naturalistic realists, and that the method of reflective equilibrium suffices to explain the possibility of normative knowledge. In this critical notice we argue that this is not so: on a realist picture, normative knowledge presupposes a significant correlation between distinct entities, namely between normative beliefs and normative facts. This (...) correlation calls for an explanation. We show that Scanlon does not have the resources to offer such an explanation. (shrink)

Standard models in epistemic game theory make strong assumptions about agents’ knowledge of their own beliefs. Agents are typically assumed to be introspectively omniscient: if an agent believes an event with probability p, she is certain that she believes it with probability p. This paper investigates the extent to which this assumption can be relaxed while preserving some standard epistemic results. Geanakoplos (1989) claims to provide an Agreement Theorem using the “truth” axiom, together with the property of balancedness, a significant (...) relaxation of introspective omniscience. I provide an example which shows that Geanakoplos’s statement is incorrect. I then introduce a new property, local balancedness, which allows us both to correct Geanakoplos’s result, and to extend it to cases where the truth axiom may fail. I exploit this general Agreement Theorem to provide novel epistemic conditions for correlated and Nash equilibrium, both of which relax the assumption of introspective omniscience. In all three cases, the results are also extended to infinite state spaces. (This is Chapter 5 of my 2014 Oxford DPhil (PhD) thesis.). (shrink)

In this article, I analyze the circumstances of justice, that is, the background conditions that are necessary and sufficient for justice to exist between individual parties in society. Contemporary political philosophers almost unanimously accept an account of these circumstances attributed to David Hume. I argue that the conditions of this standard account are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for justice. In particular, I contend that both a Hobbesian state of nature and a prisoner’s dilemma are cases in which the conditions (...) of the standard account obtain and yet no justice exists between parties. I propose an alternative set of generic circumstances of justice motivated by examples from game theory. Parties are in these generic circumstances with respect to each other when: (1) they are engaged in a conflictual coordination game with multiple strict Nash equilibrium points where, at any of these equilibria, some parties do not receive their greatest payoffs, and (2) they have common knowledge that each party is rational and follows her end of a strict equilibrium where no party receives her greatest payoff. These two conditions reflect the idea that justice requires all parties to make some sacrifices so that others can have more of the goods they need and want. I argue that these generic circumstances are necessary and sufficient conditions for parties to follow generic norms of justice, that is, mutually beneficial practices that require some sacrifices. Key Words: common knowledge • conflictual coordination • correlated equilibrium • moderate selfishness • moderate variable scarcity • rough equality. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a game-theoretic solution to the rule-following paradox in terms of what I will call basic constitutive practices. The structure of such a practice P constitutes what it is to take part in P by defining the correctness conditions of our most basic concepts as those actions that lie on the correlated equilibrium of P itself. Accordingly, an agent S meant addition by his use of the term ‘+’ because S is taking part in (...) a basic constitutive practice of adding where quus-like answers are ruled out by not lying on the equilibrium. The resulting picture of language will preserve the objectivity and correctness conditions of meaning, all the while providing room for the community as a whole to make a mistake. I also argue that by accepting the account presented, we have a strong reason to reject the idea that language is rule-governed. (shrink)

The distribution function associated with a classical gas at equilibrium is considered. We prove that apart from a factorisable multiplier, the distribution function is fully determined by the correlations among local momenta fluctuations. Using this result we discuss the conditions which enable idealised local observers, who are immersed in the gas and form a part of it, to determine the distribution 'from within'. This analysis sheds light on two views on thermodynamic equilibrium, the 'ergodic' and the 'thermodynamic limit' (...) schools, and the relations between them. It also provides an outline for a new definition of equilibrium that is weaker than full ergodicity. Finally, we briefly discuss the possibility that the distribution can be determined by external observers. (shrink)

We construct a local \-epistemic hidden-variable model of Bell correlations by a retrocausal adaptation of the originally superdeterministic model given by Brans. In our model, for a pair of particles the joint quantum state \\rangle \) as determined by preparation is epistemic. The model also assigns to the pair of particles a factorisable joint quantum state \\rangle \) which is different from the prepared quantum state \\rangle \) and has an ontic status. The ontic state of a single particle consists (...) of two parts. First, a single particle ontic quantum state \|i\rangle \), where \\) is a 3-space wavepacket and \ is a spin eigenstate of the future measurement setting. Second, a particle position in 3-space \\), which evolves via a de Broglie–Bohm type guidance equation with the 3-space wavepacket \\) acting as a local pilot wave. The joint ontic quantum state \\rangle \) fixes the measurement outcomes deterministically whereas the prepared quantum state \\rangle \) determines the distribution of the \\rangle \)’s over an ensemble. Both \\rangle \) and \\rangle \) evolve via the Schrodinger equation. Our model exactly reproduces the Bell correlations for any pair of measurement settings. We also consider ‘non-equilibrium’ extensions of the model with an arbitrary distribution of hidden variables. We show that, in non-equilibrium, the model generally violates no-signalling constraints while remaining local with respect to both ontology and interaction between particles. We argue that our model shares some structural similarities with the modal class of interpretations of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Modern microscopic theory is employed to construct a powerful analytical algorithm that permits a clear description of characteristic features of strongly correlated quantum fluids in thermodynamic equilibrium. Using recently developed formal results we uncover an intricate relationship between strongly correlated systems and free quantum gases of appropriately defined constituents. The latter entities are precisely defined renormalized bosons or fermions. They carry all the information contained in the statistical correlations of the strongly interacting many-particle system by virtue of (...) their effective masses. The mass of such a renormalized boson or fermion depends in a specific form on temperature, bulk particle number density of the many-body system, and eventually on momentum. Due to these properties the renormalized bosons and fermions determine in particular the location and nature of the transition to non-normal phases. (shrink)

This article investigates the emergence of the concept of stress in the 1930s and outlines its changing disciplinary and conceptual frames up until 1960. Originally stress was a physiological concept applied to the hormonal regulation of the body under stressful conditions. Correlated closely with chemical research into corticosteroids for more than a decade, the stress concept finally became a topic in cognitive psychology. One reason for this shift of the concept to another discipline was the fact that the hormones (...) previously linked to the stress concept were successfully transferred from laboratory to medical practice and adopted by disciplines such as rheumatology and dermatology. Thus the stress concept was dissociated from its hormonal context and became a handy formula that allowed postindustrial society to conceive of stress as a matter of individual concern. From a physiological phenomenon stress turned into an object of psychological discourse and individual coping strategies. (shrink)

Much work in game theory concerns mechanisms by which players can infer information about the utilities and beliefs of other players based on actions within games and pre-play signals. When game theory is applied to interactions among people, such analysis interprets them as ‘mindreading’. Recent work in cognitive science, however, suggests that human coordination rests more centrally on ‘mindshaping’, where interactants determine preferences jointly. As mindshaping is strategic, there is motivation to extend game theory to accommodate it. Conditional Game Theory (...) (CGT) is a strategic theory of mindshaping. We show how it can be used to help players of standard games identify correlated equilibrium, and thus solve games. We then extend CGT to address a challenge to the relevance of correlated equilibrium to empirical choice data, by showing how pre-play analysis using CGT can reconcile the Harsanyi Doctrine – assumed common priors among Bayesian players – with rank-dependent choice as observed in economic experiments. (shrink)

Economic theories of team reasoning build on the assumption that agents can sometimes behave according to beliefs or preferences attributed to a group or a team. In this paper, I propose a different framework to introduce collective intentionality into game theory. I build on John Searle’s account, which makes collective intentionality constitutive of institutional facts. I show that as soon as one accepts that institutions are required to solve indetermination problems in a game, it is necessary to assume a form (...) of collective intentionality that comes from what I call a common understanding of the situation among the players. This common understanding embodies the epistemic requirements for an institution to be a correlated equilibrium in a game. As a consequence, I question recent claims made by some economists according to which game-theoretic accounts of institutions do not need to assume collective intentionality. (shrink)

Several studies have lately revealed that social media conceal at least three dangerous pitfalls. Firstly, social media can negatively impact sociopolitical processes in advanced liberal democracies by becoming vehicles for the spread of false information that augments political polarization (Lee et al. 2017; Ostillio 2018). Secondly, as a result of the first point, social mediacan rapidly become a source of incorrect beliefs for those subjects with low digital literacy (Guess et al. 2019). Thirdly, because of the first and second points, (...) intentionally deceitful manipulations of social media content are potent generators of information cascades that increase group polarizations across groups of vulnerable social media users (Jang and Kim2018, Wang et al. 2018, Colliander 2019). These findings support the claim that the circulation of biased content on social media potentially threatens sociopolitical stability in liberal Western democracies (Duffy 2018; Sunstein 2018). Although this claim is far from being speculative, as shown by the FacebookFile investigations (Wall Street Journal 2019) and the center for humane technology’s recen tresearch, it introduces a thorny dilemma regarding the founding principles of liberal Western democracies. Namely, should Western legislators limit free speech by introducing severe penalties for those who spread fake news and the likes on social media? Or should they let the free market autonomously produce efficient technology allowing people to identify biased social media content?In other words, is a libertarian solution to the plight of online fake news and the like preferable to adequate legislation that punishes those who spread such content? Though appealing, it is unrealistic to believe that the free market can resolve this problem. On the other hand, it is realistic to suppose that Western governments should engage in a merciless battle against biased social media content. For instance, following the publication of the Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation in 2018, the European Union introduced new directives to limit the spread of fake news online in 2021, when the Covid19 pandemic started fading. Although initiatives as such might look like limitations of free speech, there is solid philosophical ground to defend such initiatives. To prove this contention, we resort to Hobbes’s (1651, Part II, §18 and §29) argument that humans can avoid falling back into the Hobbesian state of war only if they stipulate a covenant. Specifically, we appeal to Hobbes’s (1651) argument in favor of bestowing the sovereign the right to ban those seditious doctrines that might undermine peace and sociopolitical stability in the Hobbesian Commonwealth. In this regard, we show that the Hobbesian covenant resolves conflict among humans in the same way a correlated equilibrium limits noncooperation in game theory. Namely, like game theory players, citizens enjoy greater welfare whenever they observe rules that mitigate conflict (Slomp 2010). Accordingly, we argue that citizens would be better off only if Western governments introduced severe penalties for those who intentionally spread fake news. Notably, we argue that effective regulation would create disincentives for spreading biased content and incentives for spreading truthful content. Furthermore, we argue that effective regulation against online fake news would assuage the polarizing effects of online availability cascades on social networks. Importantly, we provide empirical evidence supporting these claims by showing that the lack of effective regulation led the American government to miserably fail to contain the devasting effects of the online infodemic (i.e., the epidemic of false online information)that took place during the first two waves of the Covid19 pandemic (Evanega et al. 2020, Milosh et al. 2020). (shrink)

Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria.

This article presents a community-based account of salience as an alternative and a complement to the ‘natural salience’ approach which is endorsed by almost all game theorists who use this concept. While in the naturalistic approach, salience is understood as an objective and natural property of some entities, the community-based account claims that salience is a function of community membership. Building on David Lewis’s theory of common knowledge and on some of its recent refined accounts, I suggest that salience acts (...) as a correlating device in a correlated equilibrium. What is constitutive of salience is common understanding, the fact that agents have common knowledge that they share the same modes of reasoning with respect to a well-identified set of events. I argue that the basis for common understanding is community membership. The relevance of this account stems from the fact that it answers the objection that salience is either unnecessary or unable to account for coordination between rational agents. (shrink)

Current debates in social ontology are dominated by approaches that view institutions either as rules or as equilibria of strategic games. We argue that these two approaches can be unified within an encompassing theory based on the notion of correlated equilibrium. We show that in a correlated equilibrium each player follows a regulative rule of the form ‘if X then do Y’. We then criticize Searle's claim that constitutive rules of the form ‘X counts as Y (...) in C’ are fundamental building blocks for institutions, showing that such rules can be derived from regulative rules by introducing new institutional terms. Institutional terms are introduced for economy of thought, but are not necessary for the creation of social reality. (shrink)

The article discusses the problem of the naturalistic methodology of social ontology. Following Katherine Hawley's (2018) analysis, the author considers three approaches: conceptual analysis, the ameliorative (or normative) approach, and inference to the best explanation (from best social science to social ontology). Hawley concludes that only the first two can provide a viable naturalistic social metaphysics, and the latter cannot. The author, drawing on the notion of naturalistic limitations of social ontology, shows that only a conclusion to the best explanation (...) can lead to a consistent realistic social ontology; this methodology avoids the problem of being rooted in concepts that do not have an empirical basis, which contradicts realism, and also does not imply normative prescription, which also contradicts the realistic description of the world. The problem critics attribute to inference to the best explanation - the lack of a predictively strong theoretical core of social theory from which to infer social ontology - can be resolved by satisfying three criteria (Turner, 2007): physical realizability, computability, and cognitive realism. The author proposes to implement them through the introduction of naturalistic restrictions into game theory. Formal models of coordination described by a correlated equilibrium - coupled with evolutionary explanations of the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the causal processes that make formally described coordination possible - may provide the desired theoretical core from which ontology can be derived. (shrink)

This note documents Aumann's reason for omitting the “empty shells” argument for the common prior assumption from the final version of “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.” It then continues to discuss the argument and concludes that rational entities cannot learn their own identity; if they do not know it a priori, they never will.

In this dissertation, I develop a theory of rational inductive deliberation in the context of strategic interaction that generalizes previous theories of inductive deliberation. In this account of inductive deliberation, I model rational deliberators as players engaged in noncooperative games, such that: They are Bayesian rational, in the sense that every deliberator chooses actions that maximize expected utility given the beliefs this deliberator has regarding the other deliberators, and They update their beliefs about one another recursively, using rules of inductive (...) logic. Inductive deliberators update their beliefs until they reach an equilibrium of the game, at which every deliberator maximizes expected utility given the deliberator's beliefs over the actions of the other deliberators. ;The theory of inductive deliberation generalizes previous theories by allowing for the possibility of correlation in the beliefs of the deliberators. Most of the results of noncooperative game theory presuppose that the players strategies are probabilistically independent. I argue that such probabilistic independence assumptions are unfounded, and that agents should take into account the possibility that their opponents' actions are correlated. Relaxing the probabilistic independence assumption in noncooperative game theory leads to various correlated equilibrium concepts, which I argue are the appropriate solution concepts for noncooperative games. Relaxing the independence assumption in the inductive dynamics enables correlation in the deliberators' beliefs to emerge spontaneously, resulting in the deliberators converging to correlated equilibrium. ;I devote the majority of the dissertation to the formal theory of inductive deliberation and correlated equilibrium. In particular, I show the following: Under suitable conditions, correlated equilibria correspond to fixed points of the dynamics, and The dynamics can create correlation in beliefs from an initial uncorrelated state. In the final chapter of the dissertation, I give an account of the origins of social conventions such as the use of particular words in human languages as the result of inductive deliberation. (shrink)

It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately, or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and indeed the literature takes different approaches in different cases. In this article, I consider the specific example of Stackelberg mixed strategies. I argue that, even (...) though a Stackelberg mixed strategy can also be seen as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a corresponding extensive-form game, there remains significant value in studying it separately. The analysis of this special case may have implications for other solution concepts. (shrink)

Universal social institutions, such as marriage, commons management and property, have emerged independently in radically different cultures. This requires explanation. As Boyer and Petersen point out ‘in a purely localist framework would have to constitute massively improbable coincidences’ . According to Boyer and Petersen, those institutions emerged naturally out of genetically wired behavioural dispositions, such as marriage out of mating strategies and borders out of territorial behaviour. While I agree with Boyer and Petersen that ‘unnatural’ institutions cannot thrive, this one-sided (...) explanation of universal social institutions in terms of genetic human nature is unsatisfactory. Drawing on the literature on multi-level selection and gene-culture coevolution, I argue that universal social institutions are first and foremost the products of cultural selection. They occupy fitness peaks in the landscape of cultural possibilities, much in the same way that biological adaptations occupy fitness peaks in the landscape of biological possibilities. To show this, I use game-theory. By modelling the domains of social interaction in which marriage, commons management, and property emerged as Prisoner’s dilemma situations, it becomes clear how an institutional framework allows the group to move to an interactive equilibrium with a larger payoff. Institutions do so by incentivising all parties to adopt a cooperative strategy. They are culturally selected ways of optimising genetically constrained domains of human social interaction. (shrink)

The thesis of this essay is that social conventions of the kind Lewis modeled are generated and maintained by a form of practical reasoning which is essentially common. This thesis is defended indirectly by arguing for an interpretation of the role of salience in Lewis’s account of conventions. The remarkable ability of people to identify salient options and appreciate their practical significance in contexts of social interaction, it is argued, is best explained in terms of their exercise of what I (...) call “salience reasoning,” a form of common practical reasoning. The more widely accepted understanding of salience competence, the “natural salience” understanding, fails as an interpretation of the notion at work in Lewis and Schelling (on whom Lewis relied) and is inadequate as an explanation of salience competence. (shrink)

This study investigates Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī's sufi philosophy of illumination and explores its potential contribution to contemporary environmental consciousness. The increasingly urgent global ecological crisis has sparked interdisciplinary debate about root causes and comprehensive solutions. Several contemporary thinkers argue that the ecological crisis is a manifestation of a more fundamental ontological crisis, namely the loss of humans' harmonious relationship with nature. In this context, Islamic philosophy, especially the school of illumination (ishrāq) developed by Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, offers a unique perspective (...) that can enrich environmental discourse. The research aims to integrate Suhrawardī’s ontological and epistemological concepts with contemporary ecological principles to offer a novel perspective on human-nature relationships. A descriptive-analytical approach is employed to analyze Suhrawardī’s philosophical texts and correlate them with modern ecological theories. The study reveals that Suhrawardī’s concept of asala al-mahiya (essential reality) and his illuminationist epistemology, which views all beings as emanations of divine light, challenge the anthropocentric worldview. This perspective promotes two fundamental ecological principles: biospherical illuminative egalitarianism and illuminative equilibrium. These principles emphasize social justice and environmental balance, recognizing humans as integral parts of nature with responsibility for its preservation. By shifting the human-nature relationship from a subject-object dichotomy to an inter-subject interaction, Suhrawardī’s philosophy can enhance awareness of environmental issues and inspire more sustainable practices. Integrating spiritual wisdom and ecological consciousness offers a holistic approach to addressing contemporary environmental challenges. (shrink)

1. EXPLICATING THE CONCEPT OF REFLECTION (under review) -/- To understand how ‘reflection’ is used, I consider ordinary, philosophical, and scientific discourse. I find that ‘reflection’ seems to refer to reasoning that is deliberate and conscious, but not necessarily self-conscious. Then I offer an empirical explication of reflection’s conscious and deliberate features. These explications not only help explain how reflection can be detected; they also distinguish reflection from nearby concepts such as ruminative and reformative reasoning. After this, I find that (...) reflection is not obviously limited to only practical or only theoretical reasoning. The chapter ends with reasons to prefer ‘unreflective’ and ‘reflective’ to dual process theorists’ labels about systems or types. -/- 2. BOUNDED REFLECTIVISM & EPISTEMIC IDENTITY (in Metaphilosophy) -/- Reflection features centrally in philosophy (e.g., Korsgaard, 1996; Rawls, 1971; Sosa, 1991) and psychology (e.g., Pennycook, 2018). Bounded reflectivism is an empirically adequate model of reflection that explains reflection’s capacity to either help or hinder reasoning—e.g., reflective equilibrium vs. reflective polarization (e.g., Kahan et al., 2017). One innovation of the model is epistemic identity: an identity that involves particular beliefs—e.g., religious and political identities. When we feel that our epistemic identity is threatened, we can reflectively defend its beliefs rather than update our beliefs according to the best arguments and evidence. The solution, I argue, is not to suppress epistemic identity but embrace it by appealing to shared, superordinate epistemic identities. -/- 3. ALL MEASURES ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL (under review) -/- A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? “10 cents” comes to most people’s minds immediately. However, upon reflection, we can realize that “5 cents” is the correct answer. There are many reflection tests. Each has its limitations. Some reflection tests are mathematical—like the bat-and-ball problem (e.g., Frederick, 2005) and others are logical (e.g., Janis & Frick, 1943). So there are concerns that reflection tests track logical and mathematical competence rather than reflection per se. Also, some psychologists assume a priori that correct answers are reflective and lured answers are unreflective. New evidence raises additional concerns about the plausibility of these assumptions. I argue that think aloud protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1998) and process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991) can assuage some of these concerns. -/- 4. GREAT MINDS DO NOT THINK ALIKE (in Review of Philosophy and Psychology) -/- Two large studies (N = 1299), one pre-registered, found that many correlations between reflection and philosophical beliefs among non-philosophers replicated among philosophers. For example, less reflective philosophers preferred theism to atheism and utilitarian rather than deontological responses to the trolley problem (Hannikainen & Cova, in prep.; Pennycook et al., 2016; Reynolds, Byrd, & Conway, forthcoming). However, philosophical judgments were sometimes better predicted by factors like education, gender, and personality than by reflection test performance. So although some relationships between reflection and philosophy were robust, there is more to the link between reflection and philosophy. Normative implications are also discussed—e.g., how we can infer the quality of philosophical views from their correlations with reflective or unreflective reasoning. -/- 5. WHAT WE CAN (AND CAN’T) INFER ABOUT IMPLICIT BIAS (in Synthese) -/- Contrary to some philosophers and psychologists, I argue that implicit bias is probably associative. However, I also argue that debiasing is not thereby entirely unconscious and involuntary. Indeed, strong evidence suggests that reflection can change implicitly biased behavior—e.g., conscious and deliberate counterconditioning. This has implications for the science and morality of implicit bias—e.g., evidence suggests that we can reform biases; so. intuitively, we can be responsible for biases. (shrink)

The fluctuation-dissipation theorem is a central theorem in nonequilibrium statistical mechanics by which the evolution of velocity fluctuations of the Brownian particle under a fluctuating environment is intimately related to its dissipative behavior. This can be illuminated in particular by an example of Brownian motion in an ohmic environment where the dissipative effect can be accounted for by the first-order time derivative of the position. Here we explore the dynamics of the Brownian particle coupled to a supraohmic environment by considering (...) the motion of a charged particle interacting with the electromagnetic fluctuations at finite temperature. We also derive particle’s equation of motion, the Langevin equation, by minimizing the corresponding stochastic effective action, which is obtained with the method of Feynman-Vernon influence functional. The fluctuation-dissipation theorem is established from first principles. The backreaction on the charge is known in terms of electromagnetic self-force given by a third-order time derivative of the position, leading to the supraohmic dynamics. This self-force can be argued to be insignificant throughout the evolution when the charge barely moves. The stochastic force arising from the supraohmic environment is found to have both positive and negative correlations, and it drives the charge into a fluctuating motion. Although positive force correlations give rise to the growth of the velocity dispersion initially, its growth slows down when correlation turns negative, and finally halts, thus leading to the saturation of the velocity dispersion. The saturation mechanism in a supraohmic environment is found to be distinctly different from that in an ohmic environment. The comparison is discussed. (shrink)

Darwin's theory of evolution brought to an end the static view of nature. It was no longer possible to think of species as immortal, with secure places in nature. Fluctuation of population could no longer be thought of as occurring within definite limits which had been set at the time of creation. Nor was it any longer possible to generalize from the differential reproductive potentials, or from a few cases of mutualism between species, that everything in nature was “fitted to (...) produce general ends, and reciprocal uses.” 134 The appeal to “design” could no longer be substituted for answers to questions concerning animal demography. Instead, the dynamics of a population had to be viewed as the outcome of species' struggle against animate and inanimate factors in the environment. Both the members of a species and the environmental factors tend to vary randomly, and therefore neither evolution nor population dynamics could be fully understood alone. For this reason Darwin's linking of the two subjects was inevitable and not merely an historical accident. Since Darwin had shown that no automatic equilibrium existed, he demonstrated the importance of closer study of the causes of population dynamics and extinction. He also indicated that an understanding of population depends upon the development of a broad knowledge in ecology.Viewed from another direction, Darwin's work ended the early modern era of population studies by clarifying three interrelated problems which were important for understanding population: extinction, distribution, and the nature of species. The components of his answer had been discussed in the eighteenth century, but there had not existed enough evidence for the completion of the revolution in thought which had then begun. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Playfair found the evidence for extinction conclusive, and, in spite of Lamarck, Curvier convinced the scientific world that there could no longer be any doubt about it. This was a step the importance of which, with his limited knowledge of biogeography and population, Cuvier could not have fully realized. Lamarck attempted, with his evolutionary theory, to circumvent the necessity for admitting extinction, but he overestimated the adaptability of organisms and in doing so he underestimated the importance of competition and the whole field of ecology. On the other hand, he was not willing to let questions such as the origin of species remain taboo to science. The origin of species was a biogeographical as well as a paleontological question. Humboldt correlated environment with the distribution of species and conveyed the impression that plant communities are subject to change. De Candolle, following the lead of Linnaeus and Humboldt, emphasized the ecological aspects of biogeography, not only the importance of habitat and range, clearly showing the ecological effects of competition. The entomologists Kirby and Spence took a faltering step toward understanding the relationship between population and ecological role, but they fell short of any significant new conclusions. Neither they nor Swainson could fully comprehend the new perspective of De Candolle.Lyell was able to bring together the evidence from these three lines of investigation and weave them into an important synthesis that almost accomplished that Darwin later did. Although opposing Lamarck's theory of evolution, Lyell had a dynamic view of ecology. He realized that population dynamics offered an important key to the understanding of biogeography. Since he knew that species become extinct, he investigated closely the factors which could either preserve or extinguish species. While explaining these factors, he described the interrelationships of species in greater detail than had ever been done before. Forbes continued to develop Lyell's ecological concepts, and his first-hand field experience enabled him to describe biotic communities more concretely than Lyell had.Having the advantages of Lyell's understanding and his own experience from a global voyage, Darwin could take the final step from the static to the dynamic concept of life. He had seen populations fluctuating and also fossil species in South America, and on the Galapagos Islands he had encountered a biogeographical problem that could not be credibly solved without the idea of evolution. However, the bare idea of evolution did not fully answer his questions. He sought physiological causes of extinction before he read Malthus and realized that De Candolle and Lyell had correctly emphasized the importance of competition. Darwin found that, in order to understand evolution, he needed to improve his understanding of ecology. He wanted to know when populations were most easily decimated, how extensive were competition and cooperation, what effects parasites have upon populations, and what changes occur in biotic communities when a species is either added or subtracted. He contributed to some extent to answering these questions. Though there remained much for others to do, there was now a new and more secure theoretical framework within which later studies could be interpreted. As Ernst Mayr has observed, Darwin's “consistent thinking in terms of population has had an impact on biological theory and practice which is second only to his sponsorship of natural selection as the mechanism of evolution.” 135. (shrink)

The present article explores the rationales of scientists and engineers for distributing moral responsibilities related technology development. On the basis of a qualitative case study, it was investigated how the actors within a research network distribute responsibilities for these issues. Rawls’ Wide Reflective Equilibrium model was used as a descriptive framework. This study indicates that there is a correlation between the actors’ ethics position and their responsibility rationale. When discussing how to address ethical issues or how to distribute the (...) responsibility for addressing them, actors with similar normative background theories referred to the same type of normative arguments. It was found that these deliberative processes could best be interpreted in terms of an interplay between different layers of morality. The case suggests that people seek coherence between these layers rather than work through them one-directionally. By distinguishing between rationales for distributing responsibilities and the actual distributions, possible sources of misunderstanding can be identified. The benefit from acknowledging these different rationales is that it enables actors to recognize the legitimacy of other people’s opinions, ultimately contributing to a responsibility distribution that is both complete and accepted by all as justified. (shrink)

A classical gas at equilibrium satisfies the locality conditionif the correlations between local fluctuations at a pair of remote small regions diminish in the thermodynamic limit. The gas satisfies a strong locality conditionif the local fluctuations at any number of remote locations have no (pair, triple, quadruple....) correlations among them in the thermodynamic limit. We prove that locality is equivalent to a certain factorizability condition on the distribution function. The analogous quantum condition fails in the case of a freeBose (...) gas. Next we prove that strong locality is equivalent to the total factorizability of the distribution function, and thus (given Liourille’s theorem) to the Maxwell Boltzmann distribution for an ideal gas. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the formulation and analysis of an epidemic model of COVID-19 governed by an eight-dimensional system of ordinary differential equations, by taking into account the first dose and the second dose of vaccinated individuals in the population. The developed model is analyzed and the threshold quantity known as the control reproduction number R0\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal {R}_{0}$$\end{document} is obtained. We investigate the equilibrium stability of the system, and the COVID-free (...) equilibrium is said to be locally asymptotically stable when the control reproduction number is less than unity, and unstable otherwise. Using the least-squares method, the model is calibrated based on the cumulative number of COVID-19 reported cases and available information about the mass vaccine administration in Malaysia between the 24th of February 2021 and February 2022. Following the model fitting and estimation of the parameter values, a global sensitivity analysis was performed by using the Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient (PRCC) to determine the most influential parameters on the threshold quantities. The result shows that the effective transmission rate (α)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$(\alpha )$$\end{document}, the rate of first vaccine dose (ϕ)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$(\phi )$$\end{document}, the second dose vaccination rate (σ)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$(\sigma )$$\end{document} and the recovery rate due to the second dose of vaccination (η)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$(\eta )$$\end{document} are the most influential of all the model parameters. We further investigate the impact of these parameters by performing a numerical simulation on the developed COVID-19 model. The result of the study shows that adhering to the preventive measures has a huge impact on reducing the spread of the disease in the population. Particularly, an increase in both the first and second dose vaccination rates reduces the number of infected individuals, thus reducing the disease burden in the population. (shrink)

Of the many proposals for inferring genetic regulatory structure from microarray measurements of mRNA transcript hybridization, several aim to estimate regulatory structure from the associations of gene expression levels measured in repeated samples. The repeated samples may be from a single experimental condition, or from several distinct experimental conditions; they may be “equilibrium” measurements or time series; the associations may be estimated by correlation coefficients or by conditional frequencies (for discretized measurements) or by some other statistic. This paper describes (...) two elementary statistical difficulties for all such procedures, no matter whether based on Bayesian updating, conditional independence testing, or other machine learning procedures such as simulated annealing or neural net pruning. One difficulty obtains if large numbers of cells are aggregated in a measurement of expression levels from a common population of cells; the other obtains if small numbers of cells are aggregated or if samples are separately aggregated over different populations of cells. (shrink)

A number of theorists have proposed mechanisms suggesting that corporate social responsibility produces better financial results. Others subscribe to the theory that, realistically, less ethical means are necessary. This article contains an analysis of these perspectives drawing on observations from evolutionary game theory and nature. Based on these analyzes, it is concluded that the financial returns of corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility (CSR and CSI) are equal on average. The explanation is that CSR and CSI are driven to a state (...) of equilibrium, because if one or the other were to offer higher profits, it would attract more players who would compete for the best opportunities until there was no difference in average profit. Existing empirical research generally shows a positive correlation between CSR as measured and financial outcomes. It is argued that what is actually causing that finding is probably not CSR but management skill. More skillful managers, whether actually responsible or irresponsible, are able to obtain both higher profits and greater credit in imperfect measures of CSR. Next it is shown that this theory of equal returns implies greater moral freedom and therefore responsibility for business leaders. It is concluded that this insight can intensify the interest of decent business leaders in vigorously championing CSR. (shrink)

To mitigate the spread of schistosomiasis, a deterministic human-bovine mathematical model of its transmission dynamics accounting for contaminated water reservoirs, including treatment of bovines and humans and mollusciciding is formulated and theoretically analyzed. The disease-free equilibrium is locally and globally asymptotically stable whenever the basic reproduction number R0<1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$R_0<1$$\end{document}, while global stability of the endemic equilibrium is investigated by constructing a suitable Lyapunov function. To support the analytical results, parameter values (...) from published literature are used for numerical simulations and where applicable, uncertainty analysis on the non-dimensional system parameters is performed using the Latin Hypercube Sampling and Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient techniques. Sensitivity analysis to determine the relative importance of model parameters to disease transmission shows that the environment-related parameters namely, εs\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\varepsilon _s$$\end{document} (snails shedding rate of cercariae), ps\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$p_s$$\end{document} (probability that cercariae shed by snails survive), c (fraction of the contaminated environment sprayed by molluscicides) and μc\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mu _c$$\end{document} (mortality rate of cercariae) are the most significant to mitigate the spread of schistosomiasis. Mollusciciding, which directly impacts the contaminated environment as a single control strategy is more effective compared to treatment. However, concurrently applying mollusciciding and treatment will yield a better outcome. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to exhibit some important features of the two versions of the deduction. In the first edition, Kant emphasizes the role of imagination as an autonomous faculty; in the second, On the contrary, Imagination, Though keeping its synthetic function, Is subordinated to the understanding. This reversal in the role of imagination is bound up to a paradoxical conception of the object which pervades the two editions of the "critique". The deduction should be conceived as a (...) way out of the paradox, Each edition favoring one alternative against the other. The role of the subject is correlative of the way the object is conceived: this article shows how german idealism radicalized kant's position in the first edition, And positivism, The second version, Though both were led to depart from kant's general requirement that knowledge was a result of the equilibrium of concepts and intuitions. (shrink)

Alternative pre‐mRNA splicing leads to distinct products of gene expression in development and disease. Antagonistic splice variants of genes involved in differentiation, apoptosis, invasion and metastasis often exist in a delicate equilibrium that is found to be perturbed in tumours. In several recent examples, splice variants that are overexpressed in cancer are expressed as hyper‐oncogenic proteins, which often correlate with poor prognosis, thus suggesting improved diagnosis and follow up treatment. Global gene expression technologies are just beginning to decipher the (...) interplay between alternatively spliced isoforms and protein‐splicing factors that will lead to identification of the mutations in these trans‐acting factors responsible for pathogenic alternative splicing in cancer. BioEssays 28: 378–386, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This NATO Advanced Study Institute centered on large-scale molecular systems: Quantum mechanics, although providing a general framework for the description of matter, is not easily applicable to many concrete systems of interest; classical statistical methods, on the other hand, allow only a partial picture of the behaviour of large systems. The aim of the ASI was to present both aspects of the subject matter and to foster interaction between the scientists working in these important areas of theoretical physics and theoretical (...) chemistry. The quantum-mechanical part was mostly based on the operator-algebraic formulation of quantum mechanics and comprised quantum statistics of infinite systems with special em phasis on macroscopic observables, equilibrium conditions, irreversibility on the one hand, symmetry breaking for molecules in the radiation field and macroscopic quantum phenomena in the theory of superconductivity (BCS-theory) on the other hand. In addition, phase-space methods for many-body systems were also presented. Statistical physics was the main topic in the other lectures of the School; much emphasis was put on the statistical features of macros copic ("large") systems, the lectures dealt with mass and energy transport im polymers, in gels and in microemulsions, with aggregation and growth phenomena, with relaxation in complex, correlated systems, with conduction and optical properties of polymers, and with the means of describing disordered systems, above all fractals and related hierarchical models. (shrink)

In the paper, I propose a project of social coordination as naturalistic social ontology (CNSO) based on the rules-in-equilibria theory of social institutions (Guala and Hindriks 2015; Hindriks and Guala 2015). It takes coordination as the main ontological unit of the social, a mechanism homological across animals and humans, for both can handle coordination problems: in the forms of “animal conventions” and social institutions, respectively. On this account, institutions are correlated equilibria with normative force. However, if both humans and (...) animals solve coordination problems in a similar way, and only humans have social institutions, how do the latter evolve? I suggest identifying possible causes of this evolution among cognitive capacities like mindreading and imitation by building dynamic models. Social ontology becomes constrained by the evolution of the forms of coordination and by the cognitive mechanisms involved in the emergence and persistence of social institutions. It means that it becomes bound to what might be derived from social institutions, i.e., social roles, structures and their derivatives. It shows how conceptual relations might emerge from causal. I conclude the paper with the discussion of the relationship between involved types of explanation, mechanistic and equilibrium ones. (shrink)