Abstract

In this dissertation, I develop a theory of rational inductive deliberation in the context of strategic interaction that generalizes previous theories of inductive deliberation. In this account of inductive deliberation, I model rational deliberators as players engaged in noncooperative games, such that: They are Bayesian rational, in the sense that every deliberator chooses actions that maximize expected utility given the beliefs this deliberator has regarding the other deliberators, and They update their beliefs about one another recursively, using rules of inductive logic. Inductive deliberators update their beliefs until they reach an equilibrium of the game, at which every deliberator maximizes expected utility given the deliberator's beliefs over the actions of the other deliberators. ;The theory of inductive deliberation generalizes previous theories by allowing for the possibility of correlation in the beliefs of the deliberators. Most of the results of noncooperative game theory presuppose that the players strategies are probabilistically independent. I argue that such probabilistic independence assumptions are unfounded, and that agents should take into account the possibility that their opponents' actions are correlated. Relaxing the probabilistic independence assumption in noncooperative game theory leads to various correlated equilibrium concepts, which I argue are the appropriate solution concepts for noncooperative games. Relaxing the independence assumption in the inductive dynamics enables correlation in the deliberators' beliefs to emerge spontaneously, resulting in the deliberators converging to correlated equilibrium. ;I devote the majority of the dissertation to the formal theory of inductive deliberation and correlated equilibrium. In particular, I show the following: Under suitable conditions, correlated equilibria correspond to fixed points of the dynamics, and The dynamics can create correlation in beliefs from an initial uncorrelated state. In the final chapter of the dissertation, I give an account of the origins of social conventions such as the use of particular words in human languages as the result of inductive deliberation