Many democratic theorists hold that when a decision is collectively made in the right kind of way, in accordance with the right procedure, it is permissible to enforce it. They deny that there are further requirements on the type of reasons that can permissibly be used to justify laws and policies. In this paper, I argue that democratic theorists are mistaken about this. So-called public reason requirements follow from commitments that most of them already hold. Drawing on the democratic ideal (...) of civic equality, I show that it can successfully explain why political decision-making must have the right sort of procedure-independent justification. However, contra standard accounts of public reason, I argue that laws and policies need to be justified with convergence accessible, not shared, reasons. Public reasons are those that are accessible in light of evaluative standards shared by all, or in light of every citizen’s private evaluative standards. Since this will make the set of public reasons wider, it makes the theory more palatable to sceptics while retaining the framework’s justificatory potential. (shrink)

'A brilliant, utterly persuasive argument for genuine democracy in our own country...The proposals...are bound to be inspiring to anyone who takes politics, in the largest sense of the word, seriously.'-Barbara Ehrenreich.

Whether religious and other voluntary associations should reflect public values is a subject of controversy. Corey Brettschneider argues that the state should assert its own values of free and equal citizenship, deliberately attempting to transform the beliefs of illiberal groups through court decisions and through selective withdrawal of tax exemptions. I argue, however, that as long as individuals and groups comply with the law, it is not the business of the state to change their beliefs. Moreover, public authority itself does (...) not always exemplify his preferred values. Second, although I oppose direct funding for organizations that oppose public values, determining which organizations espouse the “right” values accords too much power to public authority. Moreover, many associations evolve over time. Finally, the true threat lies in practices that voluntary associations may seek to impose on the larger community. (shrink)

This article contributes to ongoing discussions in the social sciences about how to interpret the incorporation of gender equality into integration policies – is it a form of state feminism or femonationalism? Drawing upon intersectionality, we analyse how gender equality is presented, discussed and negotiated in relation to ethnicity and nationality in Sweden. Methodologically, we employ a bifocal lens that combines (1) a quantitative investigation of representations of civic orientation programmes in Swedish policy documents and mainstream media, (...) and (2) a qualitative analysis of ethnographic data collected in six civic orientation courses – three in English and three in Arabic – in three large municipalities. Such a two-pronged approach, which connects policy and media discourses with interactions in civic orientation classes, offers a granular picture of the complex and often ambivalent intersections of ethnicity and gender in relation to migration in Sweden. Ultimately, the co-optation of feminist values brings with it the risk of warping feminism into a trait of national/ethnic distinctiveness. Crucially, femonationalism is not the prerogative of far-right parties but is already becoming institutionalised, informing both mainstream media and educational practices in a feminist state like Sweden. (shrink)

The central feature of modern liberal political morality is the principle of equal respect for persons. According to Ronald Dworkin, governments have an obligation to treat each person as an equal, with equal concern and respect. In distributive contexts, this principle stipulates that each individual is entitled to an “equal” share of social resources, where equal is a function of what is required by the abstract principle of equal concern and respect. For Dworkin, this requirement means that liberal justice is (...) fundamentally concerned with treating peopleas equalsand notequally. By treating someone as an equal he supposes that government must treat each of its citizens with equal dignity, regarding her as an individual with a standing interest in leading a truly good life. By contrast, to treat someone equally, according to Dworkin, “...requires that government treat all those in its chargeequallyin the distribution of some resource or opportunity....” To treat persons as equals, that is, with equal concern and respect, is to arrange for all individuals to receive those material goods and opportunities that make living a good life possible. For my purposes, I will assume that treating people as equals is the constitutive feature of liberal equality. (shrink)

In this paper, Caitlin Murphy Brust and Hannah Widmaier begin with the assumption that highly selective institutions of higher education in the United States have a duty to promote civic equality. They employ Wendy Salkin's theory of informal political representation to examine how highly selective institutions should go about promoting civic equality. According to Salkin's theory, someone serves as an informal political representative (IPR) when they speak or act on behalf of others, without having been selected (...) to do so via a systematized selection procedure. Brust and Widmaier argue that as part of their civic educational missions, highly selective institutions should educate their students for informal political representation, and this includes equipping students to (1) serve as effective IPRs, (2) be responsible audience members to others' informal political representation, and (3) deliberate carefully and with open-mindedness about when they should or should not take on the role of IPR. Brust and Widmaier examine two types of injustice that students from marginalized communities face at highly selective institutions, and they explore how education for informal political representation might ameliorate those injustices. The authors conclude by offering some practical suggestions to institutional policymakers and educators. (shrink)

The recent construction of “gender equality” as a defining value of European societies has shaped the policy goals of immigrant integration programs. This focus on “gender equality” may function, paradoxically, to exclude immigrants, if immigrant integration policies rely on stereotypical representations of immigrants and fail to acknowledge the multiple, intersecting forms of inequality that immigrant women face. This article contributes to the critical scholarship on the role of “gender equality” in the field of immigrant integration policy by (...) examining the framing of this concept in the policy documents and implementation of the French civic integration program. Using ethnographic observations and field interviews, I illustrate how frontline workers, many of whom were women of immigrant origin, interacted with participants to frame “gender equality” in exclusionary and inclusionary ways, and how “gender equality” functioned as a racial boundary within the program. The tensions in the discourses of frontline workers mirrored those of the political context in which the policy developed; they were constrained by a difference-blind ideology of French republicanism as they insisted on “gender equality” as the pathway to belonging in France. (shrink)

The promise of a free, high-quality public education is supposed to guarantee every child a shot at the American dream. But our widely segregated schools mean that many children of color do not have access to educational opportunities equal to those of their white peers. In Integrations, historian Zoë Burkholder and philosopher Lawrence Blum investigate what this country’s long history of school segregation means for achieving just and equitable educational opportunities in the United States. Integrations focuses on multiple marginalized groups (...) in American schooling: African Americans, Native Americans, Latinxs, and Asian Americans. The authors show that in order to grapple with integration in a meaningful way, we must think of integration in the plural, both in its multiple histories and in the many possible definitions of and courses of action for integration. Ultimately, the authors show, integration cannot guarantee educational equality and justice, but it is an essential component of civic education that prepares students for life in our multiracial democracy. (shrink)

It is clear that a revival of republicanism is under way, but it is not clear that the republican tradition truly speaks to contemporary concerns. In particular, it is not clear that republicanism has anything of value to say about economic matters in the early 21st century. I respond to this worry by delineating the main features of a neo-republican civic economy that is, I argue, reasonably coherent and attractive. Such an economy will preserve the market, while constraining it (...) to serve public purposes, and promote what John Rawls calls a ‘property-owning democracy’. To accomplish these ends, a civic economy is likely to concern itself with the character of work and the workplace, to take steps to preserve and protect the sense of community or publicity, to levy an inheritance tax and a progressive consumption tax, and to provide some kind of ‘social’ or ‘civic’ minimum of support to all citizens. Key Words: republicanism • equality • self-government • deliberative politics • civic virtue • publicity • markets • property-owning democracy • basic income • inheritance tax • consumption tax. (shrink)

We formulate a distinctly 'political liberal' conception of mutual respect, which we call 'civic respect', appropriate for governing the public political relations of citizens in pluralist democratic societies. A political liberal account of education should aim at ensuring that students, as future citizens, learn to interact with other citizens on the basis of civic respect. While children should be required to attend educational institutions that will inculcate in them the skills and concepts necessary for them to be free (...) and equal citizens, parents should be granted as much freedom as is compatible with the requirements of civic respect to raise their children in accordance with their respective 'comprehensive doctrines' (systems of beliefs and values, including religious doctrines). We consider an objection to our position drawn from the account of upbringing recently advanced by Matthew Clayton, namely, that the conception of civic respect that we advance rests on an implausible view about the limited scope of the requirements of political justice. We develop an account of the 'basic structure of society' as the appropriate subject of political justice that can overcome this objection. (shrink)

One prominent criticism of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples is that it treats certain non-liberal societies, what Rawls calls ‘decent hierarchical societies’, as equal participants in a just international system. Rawls claims that these non-liberal societies should be respected as equals by liberal democratic societies, even though they do not grant their citizens the basic rights of democratic citizenship. This is presented by Rawls as a consequence of liberalism’s commitment to the principle of toleration. A number of critics have (...) claimed that Rawls’s treatment of these non-liberal societies is symptomatic of a more general problem with political liberalism, namely, its reliance on toleration as its ‘fundamental principle’. Against this view, I argue that the principle of toleration should not be understood as political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle’. This is revealed through a consideration of the normative basis of what Rawls calls the ‘Liberal Principle of Legitimacy’. A correct understanding of political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle’, which I claim is a principle of equal ‘civic respect’ for citizens, shows that Rawls’s toleration of non-liberal societies is in fact a misapplication of political liberalism to the global domain. Moreover, I explain that political liberalism must assert that the principle of equal civic respect for citizens is the correct principle to govern the public political relations of citizens in all pluralist societies, and that most ‘decent hierarchical societies’ are pluralist in nature. Identifying political liberalism’s fundamental principle as that of equal civic respect for citizens helps to render political liberalism, in both the domestic and international domains, a more coherent and compelling approach to thinking about fundamental political issues. Key Words: civic respect • international relations • justice • political liberalism • Rawls • toleration. (shrink)

In this dissertation I seek to answer the question, “What are the virtues of the excellent citizen in a liberal democracy?" This question is important on three levels. First, if civic virtue is as important to the perpetuation of liberal democratic community as neo-liberal and communitarian thinkers have argued, then curiosity alone should motivate us. Second, if projects to foster the virtues are critical, then we must understand the virtues in order to foster them effectively and appropriately. Third, those (...) who wish to attain greater excellence in citizenship need to know what the virtues are so that they may pursue them. In Chapters One and Two, I argue that current accounts of civic virtue are deficient because they fail to explore its basis, nature, and constituents. To better understand civic virtue, we must explore specific citizen virtues. To fulfill this aim, we require a citizen virtue catalog structured by an explanatory framework that is anchored in the role-based nature of citizen virtue. Such a framework provides the rationale for determining which virtues should be included in the catalog and which should not as well as a basis for comparing competing catalogs. As the role of citizen is to assist his state, the citizen virtues are those qualities that enable the citizen to assist the state in achieving its aims” in protecting, promoting, and realizing the liberal democratic ideals (namely, freedom, equality, self-government, collective cooperation, and stability). In the remaining chapters, I survey neo-liberal accounts of citizen virtue proposed by Richard Dagger, William Galston, David Jones, Mark Kingwell, Stephen Macedo, and Thomas Spragens, Jr. I apply the Chapter Two framework to assess the virtue candidates they propose. These chapters share a common format but differ in focus. Chapter Three takes up the citizen virtues that treat political community: cooperation, participation, vigilance, deliberative excellence, and obedience to law. Chapter Four, the liberal citizen virtues: allegiance to liberal democratic community, tolerance, and respect for rights. And Chapter Five, the citizen virtues relating to self-governance: autonomy, responsibility, and restraint. Chapter Six concludes. (shrink)

This final reply responds to Honohan’s invitation to articulate the Arendtian tone of the key-note paper. It spells out the philosophical intuition that the political life of citizens, at least potentially, is capable of making visible what makes human life worthwhile and fully meaningful, and the philosophical curiosity to see whether traces of this deep political awareness can be retrieved in dialogues with volunteers. In response to Dekker’s critical doubts, this final reply clarifies the central stakes of Claes’s paper. The (...) core argument was not to show that the biographical model of meaningfulness is the prevailing approach of meaning in/of volunteering, but to assess the potentials and limits of the model’s interpretive power. Moreover, the paper argues for an alternative, existential model of meaningfulness. This approach refers to deep experiences of meaning that emerge from the practice of volunteering and that shift into powerful political experiences of hope, and a lived sense of equality. (shrink)

The years since the world-wide demonstrations in the wake of George Floyd’s murder in 2020 have seen a significant embrace of antiracist education as part of moral education, followed by conservative rollback of such efforts. The article discusses both, and is applicable to the further retrenchment in the second Trump administration (in 2025). Antiracist moral and civic education should educate about both interpersonal racism (racism of individuals toward other individuals) and institutional racism (systemic racial injustices). Each of those areas (...) involves both “negative” values—avoiding racial wrongs—and “positive” values—promoting race-related goods. Negative interpersonal values include stereotyping, antipathy, and demeaning the other. Positive interpersonal values include respecting racial others as equals, recognizing positive racial differences, respecting cultures associated with racial groups. Negative institutional values are the most familiar—ending, mitigating, repairing systemic racial injustices. Positive institutional values include promoting racial justice, understanding, harmony, and a culture of respect throughout society represented in its institutions. Institutional racism requires civic education, in order to recognize patterns of injustice, to analyze their causes, and to be able to measure them against both morally sound and nationally salient ideals (such as equality, liberty, and justice). Antiracist education must be sensitive to students’ particular racial identities, and to asymmetries between the way white and non-white identities function morally and civicly. -/- Although sometimes it is important to ignore someone’s racial identity in interacting with them, “color-blindness,” promoted as an overarching principle by the Trump administration and the retrenchment legislation, cannot play that role. Antiracist education requires that we often take account of people’s race, and the issue is how to do that properly, not to ignore it entirely. (shrink)

According to the commonsense view of civic virtue, the places to exercise civic virtue are largely restricted to politics. In this article, I argue for a more expansive view of civic virtue, and argue that one can exercise civic virtue equally well through working for or running a for-profit business. I argue that this conclusion follows from four relatively uncontroversial premises: (1) the consensus definition of “civic virtue”, (2) the standard, most popular theory of virtuous (...) activity, (3) a conception of the common good widely shared by liberal political philosophers, and (4) the mainstream economic theory of for-profit business. (shrink)

이 글의 목적은 자유주의의 대안으로 제시된 신공화주의의 정치경제학을 비판적으로 검토하는 것이다. 현대 공화주의는 ‘신-아테네 공화주의’와 ‘신-로마 공화주의’로 구분된다. 이 논문은 이렇게 구분되는 현대 공화주의의 특징을 간단하게 요약하고, 이러한 신공화주의가 갖는 경제적 함의를 탐구함으로써 자유주의 경제와 다른, 공화주의의 정치경제학을 탐구하려고 한다. 공화주의의 핵심인 정치적 평등, 자치, 시민적 덕을 중시하는 신공화주의의 정치경제학은 효율과 생산성에 초점을 맞춘 자유주의 정치경제학과 구별된다. 신공화주의는 사유재산과 시장의 교환을 신뢰하지만, 시장의 원리가 사회의 모든 부분에 적용되는 것에는 반대한다. 그러나 신공화주의자들 사이에서도 공화주의의 가장 중요한 원리를 무엇으로 파악하느냐에 따라 공화주의의 (...) 경제적 함의에 차이가 있다. 이 글에서는 샌델, 선스타인, 대거, 페팃, 김상봉의 공화주의적 정치경제학을 논의하면서, 신공화주의의 정치경제학이 지닌 한계를 지적할 것이다. (shrink)

As part of recent epistemic challenges to democracy, some have endorsed the implementation of epistemic constraints on voting, institutional mechanisms that bar incompetent voters from participating in public decision-making procedures. This proposal is often considered incompatible with a commitment to political equality. In this paper, I aim to dispute the strength of this latter claim by offering a theoretical justification for epistemic constraints on voting that does not rest on antiegalitarian commitments. Call this the civic accountability justification for (...) epistemic constraints on voting. On this view, voters stand to one another in a normative relation of reciprocal accountability that requires them to uphold an epistemically responsible conduct. Modest epistemic constraints on voting are justifiable because they secure that participation in voting is conforming to this normative requirement. Thanks to its distinctive features, the civic accountability justification can overcome two problems that egalitarians commonly associate with the idea of epistemic constraints on voting: the disrespect problem and the hierarchy problem. (shrink)

In The New Religious Intolerance, Martha Nussbaum addresses rising intolerance and fear of difference in contemporary societies. She suggests overcoming these issues through ethical consistency, equality, and the cultivation of sympathetic imagination. Nussbaum views this imaginative engagement as a form of civic friendship essential for societal transformation. However, we argue that her concept of civic friendship is problematic. First, Nussbaum's criteria do not suffice to define friendship. Second, this thin concept of civic friendship is unlikely to (...) achieve the societal transformation Nussbaum envisions. We propose developing a more substantive account of civic friendship. This paper aims to create an Aristotelian account of civic friendship within a capabilitarian framework compatible with contemporary, plural societies. (shrink)

This article revisits the question of the modernity of the Renaissance by examining the political language of Florentine civic humanism and by critically analyzing the debate over Hans Baron’s interpretation of the movement. It engages two debates that are usually conducted separately: one concerning the originality of civic humanism in comparison to medieval thought, and the other concerning the political and social function of the civic humanists’ political republicanism in fifteenth-century Florence. The article’s main contention is that (...) humanist political discourse rejected the perception of social and political reality as being part of, or reflecting, a metaphysical and divine order or things, and thus undermined the traditional justifications for political hierarchies and power relations. This created the conditions of possibility for the distinctively modern aspiration for a social and political order based on liberty and equality. It also resulted in the birth of a distinctively modern form of ideology, one that legitimizes the social order by disguising its inequalities and structures of domination. Humanism, like modern political thought generally, thus simultaneously constructs and reflects the dialectic of emancipation and domination so central to modernity itself. (shrink)

Elizabeth Anderson argues for civic as against distributive egalitarianism. I agree with civic egalitarianism understood as a public ideal, and welcome her interest in the sociological conditions under which it may best flourish. But I argue that she is mistaken in opposing what she calls 'hierarchies of esteem' and proposing that where the egalitarian ideal has insufficient hold on civil society it should be implemented by an efficient bureaucracy. We should learn a different lesson from Max Weber. What (...) the ideal of equality needs is not more bureaucracy but more influential advocacy—and that requires healthy 'hierarchies of esteem'. (shrink)

There is no question Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is an engaging and powerful book which will inform legal philosophy, particularly Kantian theories, for years to come. The text explores with care Kant’s legal and political philosophy, distinguishing it from his better known moral theory. Nor is Ripstein’s book simply a recounting of Kant’s legal and political theory. Ripstein develops Kant’s views in his own unique vision illustrating fresh ways of viewing the entire Kantian project. But the same strength and (...) coherence which ties the book to Kant’s important values of independence blinds the work to our shared moral ties grounded in other political values. Ripstein’s thoughts on punishment are novel in that he embeds criminal law, both in its retributivist and consequentialist facets, into Kant’s overarching political philosophy to show how criminal law can be seen as one aspect of the supremacy of public law. But a criminal law solely focused on the preservation of freedom takes little notice of the ways criminal law need expand its view to account for how a polity can restore the victim of a crime back to civic equality, reincorporate offenders after they have been punished and cannot leave past offenders isolated and likely to reoffend, resulting in the rotating door prison system and communities of innocents who remain preyed upon by career criminals. Lastly, a political theory that does not prize our civic bonds will ignore the startling balkanization of our criminal punishment practices, where policing, arresting and imprisonment become tools of racial and social oppression. In illustrating the benefits in viewing criminal law as a coherent part of Kant’s political theory of freedom, Ripstein also highlights what is absent. It then becomes clear that though Kant presents one important facet of punishment, only a republican political theory can meet the most pressing moral demands of punishment by reminding us that criminal law must be used to preserve and strengthen civic society. (shrink)

In recent years, a distinction between two concepts of equality has been much discussed: 'distributive’ equality involves people having equal amounts of a good such as welfare or resources, and ‘social’ or ‘relational’ equality involves the absence of social hierarchy and the presence of equal social relations. This contrast is commonly thought to have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between equality and justice. But the nature and significance of the distinction is far from (...) clear. I examine several accounts of this issue and argue none are entirely satisfactory. In turn, I offer an alternative proposal. Relational equality, on my account, involves a concern with each person having an equal 'civic status'. I characterize this concern and show it has distinctive and normatively significant positional and temporal aspects. (shrink)

Traditional accounts of the emergence of professional biology have privileged not only metropolis over province, but research over teaching and laboratory over museum. This paper seeks to supplement earlier studies of the ‘transformation of biology’ in the late nineteenth century by exploring in detail the developments within three biology departments in Northern English civic colleges. By outlining changes in the teaching practices, research topics and the accommodation of the departments, the authors demonstrate both locally contingent factors in their development (...) and continuities with existing traditions in natural history. The appointment of Arthur Milnes Marshall in preference to Louis Miall to the new zoology chair in Manchester in 1879 casts light on contemporary views of the laboratory and museum as ‘equal though different’. The transformation in biology, in Northern England at least, was shaped more by such local institutional changes than by a phoenix-like rise of the laboratory from the ashes of the museum—more by the rhetorical construction of a professional academic community than any dramatic shift in sites. In this period the biology laboratory supplemented, rather than eclipsed, the museum, and the dichotomy between the ‘naturalist’ and the ‘experimentalist’ was far from clear-cut. (shrink)

From a tradition of discourse ethics, human dignity can be defined as “being an equal member in the realm of subjects and authorities of justification.” Additionally, “to act with dignity means being able to justify oneself to others; to be treated in accordance with this dignity means being respected as such an equal member.” Conversely, “to treat others in ways that violate their dignity means regarding them as lacking any justification authority”. The guidelines found in Habermas’s “ideal speech situation” are (...) essential to guarantee this notion of human dignity. Based on aspects of Habermas’s, as well as Rainer Forst’s theory of justice, this study analyzes efforts made by the late speaker of Deutsche Bank, Dr. Alfred Herrhausen, and the former CEO of Alcoa and United States Secretary of the Treasury, Paul H. O’Neill, to challenge the way debt crises in the developing world were handled. Both leaders understood indebted countries, the livelihoods and dignity of its citizens, not as an external entity but as an integral part of their agendas. The two agents included underrepresented groups in their considerations and discussions through a proxy or surrogate participation, giving them a greater voice and acknowledging their dignity. (shrink)

Most democratic states tolerate, to various extents, conscientious objection. The same states tend not to tolerate acts of civil disobedience and what they perceive as selective conscientious objection. In this paper it is claimed that the dichotomy between civil disobedience and conscientious objection is often misguided; that the existence of a “civic conscience” makes it impossible to differentiate between conscientious objection and civil disobedience; and that there is no such thing as “selective” conscientious objection—or that classifying an objection as (...) “selective” has no significant moral or practical implications. These claims are supported by a preliminary, more general argument according to which conscientious objection is and should be tolerated because the objector lacks the ability to choose his conscience and to decide whether to act upon it. The lack-of-choice argument, it is claimed, applies equally to all types of conscientious objection, including those that are mistakenly called “selective” objection. It also applies to one type of civil disobedience. As a result, if a state is willing to tolerate non-selective conscientious objection, it may and at times must also tolerate selective conscientious objection and civil disobedience and to a similar degree. (shrink)

If there is one generally acknowledged “take away” from the election of Trump, it may well be that the old divisions between right and left no longer hold. Trump supporters were seemingly moved less by traditional conservative appeals to free markets and small government than by anger against perceived condescension and indifference on the part of the cultural elite to their own deeply held moral beliefs and sense of personal dignity. Kant offers both insight into and potential remedies for the (...) dilemmas growing out of our present situation. This is particularly true in matters of economic policy and civic engagement, where “top down” solutions have often left their would-be beneficiaries feeling ever more powerless and disrespected. By addressing these concerns in the name of common citizenship, Kant’s thought helps restore the meaning of the core constitutional principles of freedom, equality, and civic dignity that Trump’s presidency increasingly puts in question. (shrink)

Traditional accounts of the emergence of professional biology have privileged not only metropolis over province, but research over teaching and laboratory over museum. This paper seeks to supplement earlier studies of the 'transformation of biology' in the late nineteenth century by exploring in detail the developments within three biology departments in Northern English civic colleges. By outlining changes in the teaching practices, research topics and the accommodation of the departments, the authors demonstrate both locally contingent factors in their development (...) and continuities with existing traditions in natural history. The appointment of Arthur Milnes Marshall in preference to Louis Miall to the new zoology chair in Manchester in 1879 casts light on contemporary views of the laboratory and museum as 'equal though different'. The transformation in biology, in Northern England at least, was shaped more by such local institutional changes than by a phoenix-like rise of the laboratory from the ashes of the museum-more by the rhetorical construction of a professional academic community than any dramatic shift in sites. In this period the biology laboratory supplemented, rather than eclipsed, the museum, and the dichotomy between the 'naturalist' and the 'experimentalist' was far from clear-cut. (shrink)

Alisdair ManIntyre's well-known criticism of modern moral philosophy contrasts what he sees as the moral vacuity of modern culture with a ‘classical tradition' in ethical thought depicted as restoring cohesion and coherence to social striving and ethical life. MacIntyre's stress on the culturally specific circumstances within which ethical imperatives derive their force provides a corrective to unworldly tendancies within post-Kantian moral philosophy, yet his ‘classical’ ethical landscape possesses an equally striking kind of unworldliness. His image of a life lived as (...) an unbroken moral narrative is dependent on a picture of classical social existence viewed as an integrated whole, as opposed to the ethical ‘segmentation’ of modern social life. Here I question this image of a moral life without boundaries by reference to perhaps the most influential of all classical ethical texts, Cicero's De Officiis. I argue that Cicero's discussion of the virtues is marked by a strong sense of the demarcation of ethical spheres and statuses, and that what MacIntyre takes as the appropriate end-product of ethical ascesis is instead a highly exceptional heroic limit-case. (shrink)

The article elaborates an original intertwined reading of republican theory, deliberative democracy and political equality. It argues that republicans, deliberative democrats and egalitarian scholars have not paid sufficient attention to a number of features present in these bodies of scholarships that relate them in mutually beneficial ways. It shows that republicanism and deliberative democracy are related in mutually beneficial ways, it makes those relations explicit, and it deals with potential objections against them. Additionally, it elaborates an egalitarian principle underpinning (...) the resulting model that I label Equality of Access and Deliberation. The upshot of these considerations is a novel and mutually reinforcing interrelated three-tiered theoretical and institutional proposal. (shrink)

Although the intrinsic physicality of human beings has not changed in millennia, the species has managed to profoundly reconstitute the physical and social world it inhabits. Although the word “profound” is insufficient to describe the vast changes our world has undergone, it is sufficiently neutral to encompass both the opportunities—and the challenges—that our age provides. It is a premise of my work that technology, particularly information and communication technology (ICT), offers spectacular opportunities for humankind to address its collective problems. The (...) problems themselves are equally spectacular that is war and militarism, poverty, environmental depletion and destruction, disease, etc., and lack of successful alleviation may prove catastrophic. Humankind’s problems will not be solved by elite fiat, by chance, or as a side-effect of the “free market.” To address these challenges effectively and appropriately, “civic intelligence” will be required. This paper is designed to explore the relation between community networks and the nascent concept of civic intelligence. Civic intelligence describes the capacity of society to consciously adapt to its environment and shape a future environment that is healthy, equitable, and sustainable. Although individuals contribute to civic intelligence, the concept describes a phenomenon that is collective and distributed. This paper argues that community networks were an important manifestation of civic intelligence in the early days of the Internet revolution. It further argues that a theory of civic intelligence can be used to account for the declining influence of traditional community networks and to provide useful prescriptions for renewed vitality and influence of community networks in the future. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses Chapters 6 and 7 of On Taking Offence. Chapter 6 defends the idea that an inclination to take offence can be a ‘corrective civic virtue’ against threats to social equality. Chapter 7 argues that the practice of taking offence does not change much when we turn to analysing our lives online. With respect to Chapter 6, I argue that the instrumental vindication of offence-taking as a virtue is in tension with arguments earlier in the (...) book, and needs more empirical support. Earlier chapters of the book defend offence-taking as intrinsically apt and justified, regardless of its effects. What is more, if the case for offence-taking is grounded on its effects, then we need solid empirical backing; and an initial obstacle to that might be that the marginalised are probably less likely to be able to produce positive effects through their offence-taking. With regard to Chapter 7, I suggest that McTernan overlooks some potentially relevant differences between real-world and online interactions, which might make the adjustment of our norms to social media interaction more complex than she suggests. (shrink)

This book advances a novel justification for the idea of "public reason": citizens within diverse societies can realize the ideal of shared political autonomy, despite their adherence to different religious and philosophical views, by deciding fundamental political questions with "public reasons." Public reasons draw upon or are derived from ecumenical political ideas, such as toleration and equal citizenship, and mutually acceptable forms of reasoning, like those of the sciences. This book explains that if citizens share equal political autonomy—and thereby constitute (...) "a civic people"—they will not suffer from alienation or domination and can enjoy relations of civic friendship. Moreover, it contends that the ideal of shared political autonomy cannot be realized by alternative accounts of public justification that eschew any necessary role for public reasons. In addition to explaining how the ideal of political autonomy justifies the idea of public reason, this book presents a new analysis of the relation between public reason and "ideal theory": by engaging in "public reasoning," citizens help create a just society that can secure the free compliance of all. It also explores the distinctive policy implications of the ideal of political autonomy for gender equality, families, children, and education. (shrink)

In Solidarity, Hauke Brunkhorst brings a powerful combination of theoretical perspectives to bear on the concept of "democratic solidarity," the bond among free and equal citizens. Drawing on the disciplines of history, political philosophy, and political sociology, Brunkhorst traces the historical development of the idea of universal, egalitarian citizenship and analyzes the prospects for democratic solidarity at the international level, within a global community under law. His historical account of the concept outlines its development out of, and its departure from, (...) the less egalitarian notions of civic friendship in the Greco-Roman world and brotherliness in the Judeo-Christian tradition. He then analyzes the modernization of Western societies and the destruction of the older, hierarchical solidarities. The problems of exclusion that subsequently arose -- which stemmed from growing individualization in society as well as from the exclusion of certain groups from the benefits of society -- could be solved only with democratic solidarity in the form of its "institutional embodiment," the democratic constitution. Finally, Brunkhorst examines the return of these exclusion problems as a result of economic globalization. Analyzing the possibilities for democratic self-governance at a global level, Brunkhorst finds in recent global protest movements the beginnings of a transnational civic solidarity. Brunkhorst's normative and sociological account, mediating between these two perspectives, demonstrates the necessity of keeping normative requirements systematically attuned with conditions of social reality. (shrink)

In Book 3 of Plato’s Laws, we read that a legislator must aim to endow the polis with a trio of properties: freedom, wisdom, and internal friendship. This paper explores what such freedom consists in, with a focus on the so-called doctrine of the mixed constitution. It argues that such freedom is a constitutional matter; that it is not to be identified with ‘voluntary servitude to the laws’ cultivated by persuasive preludes to the laws; nor is it the rational self-control (...) essential to virtuous character, or citizens’ ability to decide and act for themselves; nor is it a restriction on the size of individual political authority. Rather, it is a freedom based on equality: a polis is free to the extent that its constitution mitigates the inherent inequality between rulers and ruled, between those who wield political authority and those who are subject to that authority. (shrink)

Contemporary Americans often view politics as a necessary evil. This cogent and original work uses the ancient philosophical/political tradition of the West to rehabilitate the high vocation of the politician and the citizen in the modern world. Kane seeks to locate human beings and such philosophical notions as the public good, public virtue, public speech, and public action in the complicated middle between the bestial and the divine. To live as best we can on that middle path is, he believes, (...) our vocation as citizens. The classical tradition comes alive in fresh ways as Kane applies it to key contemporary events and figures, from Elizabeth Bouvia (who wanted medical practitioners to help her die) to Rosa Parks (who wanted equal treatment on a city bus). By paying close attention to our public transactions, Kane shows how the reality of the common good operates in our lives. Kane contends that we are more likely to rediscover our political selves not in broad national or international forums but in our local communities where character can be displayed and authentic speech and action become possible. Aimed at a broad interdisciplinary and inter-professional audience, Kane's book is accessible to the interested citizen. Weaving through the tangled web of contemporary politics, including issues of character and virtue, Kane sails against the prevailing currents of strident individualism and political cynicism. (shrink)

The idea that healthcare should become more person-centred is extremely influential. By using recent English policy developments as a case study, this article aims to critically analyse an important element of person-centred care, namely, the belief that to treat patients as persons is to think that care should be ‘co-produced’ by formal healthcare providers and patients together with unpaid carers and voluntary organizations. I draw on insights from political philosophy to highlight overlooked tensions between co-production and values like equality (...) and liberty. Regarding equality, I argue that co-production compounds both problems of gender inequality in the distribution of care labour and the challenges associated with securing equal access to care. Turning to liberty, I identify important commonalities between co-production and republicanism in political philosophy, given their shared insistence on common citizens’ civic virtue. Then, I use against co-production some liberal arguments against republicanism, to highlight a problem of over-demandingness. In bringing my argument to a close, however, I wish to caution against hastily rejecting co-production as a policy programme. (shrink)

Vietnam is implementing global socio-economic integration, so the law must also be renovated to meet the requirements of international integration. Because the law is attached to the country's institutions, it shows the consistency in Vietnam's politics, economy, and diplomacy. In the world, the rule of law is a typical value that humanity aims for because it upholds the law, expressing our nation's aspiration for a democratic and equal society. Therefore, Vietnam has built a socialist rule of law. To achieve this, (...) Vietnam must ensure the free power of its citizens, promote the democracy of the state, and ensure that power belongs to the people. The paper uses a materialist dialectical method to examine the building of civic consciousness that promotes the perfection of Vietnam's current socialist rule of law. At the same time, the article also uses analytical methods and synthetic methods to clarify the sense of citizenship in the Vietnamese state, Vietnam's political institutions, and the development of the socialist rule of law is correct. (shrink)

Civic agriculture is an approach to agriculture and food production that—in contrast with the industrial food system—is embedded in local environmental, social, and economic contexts. Alongside proliferation of the alternative food projects that characterize civic agriculture, growing literature critiques how their implementation runs counter to the ideal of civic agriculture. This study assesses the relevance of three such critiques to urban farming, aiming to understand how different farming models balance civic and economic exchange, prioritize food justice, (...) and create socially inclusive spaces. Using a case study approach that incorporated interviews, participant observation, and document review, I compare two urban farms in Baltimore, Maryland—a “community farm” that emphasizes community engagement, and a “commercial farm” that focuses on job creation. Findings reveal the community farm prioritizes civic participation and food access for low-income residents, and strives to create socially inclusive space. However, the farmers’ “outsider” status challenges community engagement efforts. The commercial farm focuses on financial sustainability rather than participatory processes or food equity, reflecting the use of food production as a means toward community development rather than propagation of a food citizenry. Both farms meet authentic needs that contribute to neighborhood improvement, though findings suggest a lack of interest by residents in obtaining urban farm food, raising concerns about its appeal and accessibility to diverse consumers. Though not equally participatory, equitable, or social inclusive, both farms exemplify projects physically and philosophically rooted in the local social context, necessary characteristics for promoting civic engagement with the food system. (shrink)

This paper explores the question whether perfectionism amounts to a political doctrine that is more attractive than liberalism. I try to show that an egalitarian liberalism that is open to questions of value and that holds a conception of limited neutrality can meet the perfectionist challenge. My thesis is that liberalism can be reconciled easily with perfectionism read as a moral doctrine. Perfectionism as a political doctrine equally stays within the value framework of liberalism. Finally, I try to show that (...) liberalism can give an account of civic virtue that is a sufficient basis for developing the normative guidelines of a rich and meaningful social life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal CommunityPaul HendricksonThe University of South Carolina. Hauke Brunkhorst. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. Pp. xxv + 262. $42.50, hardcover.Public appeals to solidarity have been pervasive throughout the storied history of political dissent and democratic politics. From the French Revolution and the European revolutions of 1848 to decolonization, Polish Solidarność, and the antiglobalization movement, solidarity has been invoked as a means (...) of reinventing citizenship, rights, and community. Yet political theorists have not generally accorded the concept of solidarity a degree of attention comparable to that afforded other core political concepts, such as freedom, equality, and deliberation. In Solidarity, Hauke Brunkhorst seeks to remedy this neglect, arguing that the concept of solidarity should be deemed fundamental to democratic theory and practice: "In modern societies, solidarity coincides with the concept of democracy" (xxiii). Brunkhorst presents this thesis as a corrective to current theory, but he also develops it—in the spirit of much Frankfurt School theorizing—as a Zeitdiagnose, as a timely diagnosis, regarding the threats globalization poses to democratic self-governance: "Power, law, and money are globalized [today] at the expense of democratic solidarity" (7).Solidarity, as Brunkhorst understands it, is a thoroughly modern concept. The "ideas of 1789"—in particular, the fraternité of the French Revolution—provided the historical foundation for an egalitarian and democratic model of solidarity. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the concept of solidarity [End Page 343] gradually replaced that of fraternity in the wake of industrialization. Drawing on Marx, Brunkhorst argues that what promoted working-class solidarity was "not the local sympathy of communal relations or the friendly affection... of a tightly structured polis," but rather the railway, the steamship, and the telegraph (60). Brunkhorst's historiography is woven into a broad social-theoretic framework. Following Durkheim, he reasons that the modern division of labor is not founded on the mechanical solidarity of Gemeinschaft, on a shared sense of affinity, ritual, and communal belonging, but on the organic solidarity of Gesellschaft, on the integration of an individualized, pluralist, and functionally differentiated society.To readers acquainted with contemporary German appropriations of the sociological tradition, many of Brunkhorst's conceptual moves will seem familiar. But his unique fusion of social-theoretic and historical argumentation yields a fascinating and novel characterization of solidarity. For Brunkhorst, solidarity is not a form of sentiment or emotional bond; it is not premised on compassion for "tormentable bodies" (Brecht) or on a "flexible feeling of sympathy" (Rorty); rather, "it is nothing but the democratic realization of individual freedom" (3). This normative model of solidarity is guided by the regulative ideal of a political association without domination; it envisages a polity in which the individual is neither servant nor master to her compatriots. As modes of governance become increasingly globalized, democratic forms of solidarity must reach beyond the rights traditions of particular nation-states to include a "human-rights patriotism."Brunkhorst traces this ideal back to Greco-Roman antiquity and the Judeo-Christian tradition. Drawing principally on the writings of Greek and Roman philosophers, he argues that civic friendship (philia) provided a space for mutual freedom, emancipated individuals from the bonds of kinship, generalized friendship into a form of patriotism (philia politike), and realized the universal essence of man as a political being. But this civic-republican model remained profoundly elitist, excluding the many on the basis of gender, class, and citizenship status. More suggestive and original is Brunkhorst's treatment of Jewish and Christian thought. The intersection between rhetoric and philosophy is central to his interpretation of the Exodus story and covenant theology as a form of collective countermemory and as a prophetic practice of critique. Through his reading of the Jotham fable and other biblical narratives, he argues that the Jewish prophets and the Christian New Testament avowed "the equal proximity of all humans to God" and contributed to a "prophetic project of egalitarian solidarity" (33, 36). [End Page 344]Brunkhorst's historical reconstructions culminate in the French Revolution. On his view, the otherworldly universalism of the Judeo-Christian tradition was secularized and institutionalized in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) and the first French... (shrink)

The radical Democratic-Republican Societies that emerged during the 1790s not only challenged conventional interpretations of the civic republican tradition, they also adopted Enlightenment principles in their advocacy for universal public education. Brian W. Dotts’ The Political Education of Democratus: Negotiating Civic Virtue during the Early Republic shows that, unlike mainstream educational philosophy of the period, radical democrats supported universal political education as essential in protecting liberty and political equality.

The ideal model of a just society defended by John Rawls entails the existence of certain institutions—those that form the basic structure of society—that guarantee citizens' basic rights and liberties, equality of opportunity, and access to material resources. Such a model also presupposes a certain account of reasonable citizenship. In particular, reasonable citizens will have a set of moral capacities and dispositions and will voluntarily support just institutions. According to Rawls, the need for such citizens is related to the (...) following important consideration in favor of a normative theory of justice: that it be stable. That is, such a theory must be capable of generating its own support over time. This means that it has to be possible for citizens to come to endorse the theory's principles of justice, integrating them into their personal conceptions of the good life. Rawls explicitly draws attention to the stability requirement on ideal theories of justice. Somewhat surprisingly, when Rawls explains how a widespread and deep moral consensus on the principles of justice might be generated in actual societies—a problem that is closely related to the issue of how such consensus could be maintained over time—he pays very little attention to the potential contribution of schools to the production of reasonable citizens. This neglect can be explained, in part, by his confidence that the functioning of just institutions will spontaneously generate, in citizens who live under them, the necessary support for principles of justice and will encourage the development and exercise of the virtues characteristic of reasonable citizens. But this confidence seems misplaced. (shrink)

The picture he paints is not a pretty one. “Societies,” he writes in the first section of the volume, “do not decay and fall into ruin because of what happens to them from the outside but rather as a result of an internal process.” One of the most important indicators of social decadence, Tonsor thinks, is the breakdown of traditional political forms, which is itself the result of the decay of aristocratic norms and republican virtue. The contemporary secular, anti-Christian culture (...) promoted by our academic and media elites, in Tensor’s judgment, has replaced its traditional calling of providing uplifting intellectual and artistic standards. In providing evidence of decadence, Tonsor hardly needs to call attention to the breakdown of the family, the dissolution of conventional morality, the increase in crime and use of addictive drugs, and a declining birth rate. Troubling, he thinks, is the transformation of the army from a citizen body to a professional army of paid mercenaries and the propensity of the government to radiate its power outward to world conquest and domination. Above all, Tonsor is concerned about the nation’s loss of the moral tradition represented in the country’s founding documents. Can a civilization survive, he asks, without the unity provided by a common core of values? The crisis of Western civilization, detected early in the last century and addressed by philosophers as different as Husserl, Heidegger, and Santayana, remains. The denial of the Christian and classical sources of Western civilization and the cultural hostility to religion as found among our governing elites has created a moral vacuum. When a consensus with respect to the desired goals of society disappears there is no basis for an ordered civic life. Tonsor fears that absent virtue in the people, it is inevitable that a dictator or authoritarian regime will arise to impose order from without. Tonsor tries to avoid the outright pessimism of Spengler and Toynbee by pointing out that man is not fated but chooses his own life. There is, he believes, a parallel between the personal and the social. Of the twenty-six essays collected for the volume, only three in the first part are devoted to the topic of “decadence.” Others are organized under such headings as “Equality,” “Historiography,” “Intellectual History,” and “Politics.” Throughout the volume we find a highly informed, philosophical mind at work, one fully equipped to address the pressing issues of the day. (shrink)

This article discusses the integrative function frequently assigned to festive events by scholars. This function can be summed up in a proposition: experiencing similar emotions during collective gatherings is a powerful element of socialization. The article rejects this oft-developed idea according to which popular fervor could be an efficient tool to measure civic engagement. It raises the following question: what makes enthusiasm “civic”, “patriotic”, “republican” or simply “political”? Based on a study of French presidential tours in France from (...) 1888 to 2007, this article casts a different light on the topic. The enthusiasm of the crowds interacting with the successive French presidents is not civic because an inquiry may find “patriotism” into participants’ minds. It can be called civic simply because the forms and meaning of the festive jubilation, which may be summarized into the formula: “if spectators applaud, it means they support,” necessarily preexist its multiple manifestations. (shrink)

This article aims to contribute to the existing literature on the virtues and challenges of political liberalism. It argues that the principle of reciprocity can only sustain political agreement under pluralism, if citizens share a relationship of civic friends, based on mutual recognition as equals (Lister in Anal Kritik 2011, pp. 91–112), a non-prudential concern for the interest of others (Leland and van Wietmarschen in J Moral Philos 14, 2017, pp. 142–167) and shared experiences that can foster interpersonal trust. (...) Inasmuch as this thicker definition of civic friendship is sound, and breeds a successful ground for civic reciprocity, it is argued that this renders the concept of civic reciprocity culturally sensitive in at least four ways: how citizens commit to reciprocity, what political values and institutional arrangements they deem reasonable and how they choose to cooperate are all influenced by culture. While this makes the project of multiculturalism more challenging, it does not make it impossible. Rather, it reminds us that while the formal requirement of reciprocity is important, it is a relational value anchored in how citizens relate to one another. Therefore, for multiculturalism to be successful, policies that strengthen ties of civic friendship need to be implemented. (shrink)

This paper reports on recent developments in the rise of bioethics in Japan. Much of the recent interest in bioethics in Japan is seen as a response to various civic movements. The women's liberation movement, access to equal opportunity, and the recognition of patients' rights and the importance of informed consent are among some of the movements influencing the development of bioethics in Japan. The author argues that this movement is to be encouraged and fostered by health care professionals, (...) public policy makers, as well as lay persons in Japan. Keywords: bioethics, Japan, patients' rights, informed consent CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Democracy—as a form of governance, a moral community, and a way of life—is under great stress. The prospects for democracy and bioethics are linked because bioethics relies on an open society and a democratic cultural environment in order to flourish. For its part, democracy can be restored and strengthened by widespread cultural and psychological support for the values of mutual recognition, equal dignity and respect for persons, and solidarity, interdependence, and the common good. Promoting values such as these is in (...) keeping with the founding vision of bioethics, which was a civic vision. At the present time, bioethics can and should continue to be a bioethics for democracy by engaging directly in civic learning and civic place-making. These have a significant impact on health as well as on democracy. (shrink)