AUTHOR'S PREFACE THE first chapter of this book is its proper preface. It was written to elicit the views of men of science as to the extent to which modern ...

In my translation of the Historia Animalium, now thirty-five years old, I pointed out a couple of passages where νθρωπος stood in the text though νος seemed to be the appropriate word. It had not occurred to me for the moment, though it soon after wards did, that ανος was at hand to account for so curious a misreading. The same contraction has other misreadings to account for, as we may read in Cobet; but I do not know that (...) this one has been drawn attention to. (shrink)

This research examines the problem of censorship in the Libyan context from a historical and ideological standpoint. Libyan cinema has not gotten as much academic attention as Middle Eastern nations like Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. In addition to providing a historical overview of Libyan cinema, this study carefully investigates the settings that influenced Libyan national cinema from the perspectives of people who work in this industry there. To learn more about the problems with censorship in Libyan cinema (...) before and after 2011, 25 individuals were interviewed informally between July 2018 and February 2019. Twenty-five people were the maximum because many were reluctant to give interviews due to safety concerns, which participants also mentioned. Data analysis was done using Nvivo 14. The data gathered identified two problems—safety and censorship—that have long plagued Libyan cinema. All panelists agreed that the Libyan film industry needs to advance in governing authorities, censorship, inventiveness, and how films engage with society's members. (shrink)

The tribute of two maidens to the temple of Athena in Ilium was discontinued after the end of the ‘Phocian’ war. We have for this the evidence of the Epitome of Apollodorus 6. 22 χéων δ τν παρελӨντων μετ τν Φωκiκν πλεπoν κτiδας πασαντo πμoντεσ. In Tzetzes' commentary to Lycophron 1. 1141 the same piece of information is given on the authority of Timaeus, but Wilamowitz, among others, showed that Tzetzes arbitrarily transferred the name of Timaeus from the scholium (...) on 1. 1155.3 The information remains valuable without the adornment of an illustrious name. We know from a story of Aelian, which ‘Suidas’ partially preserved in many fragments, that the Locrians were compelled by the Delphic oracle to resume the interrupted practice and submitted the regulation of it to a King Antigonus, δ βασiλες ντγoνoς øεӨν o πρσταξεκλρ δiακρiӨναi This King Antigonus can hardly be identified with Antigonus Doson for two reasons which must, however, be admitted to be not absolutely cogent. First, the interval between interruption and resumption would be one of more than a century, whereas Aelian presupposes a shorter interval. Secondly, the ‘Lokrische Madcheninschrift’ made famous by A. Wilhelm, which is an evident terminus ante quern for the intervention of King Antigonus, can hardly be later than 230–220 B.C. Wilhelm, indeed, had suggested a date c. 270–240 B.C. His date has been affected by recent changes in Delphic chronology; but the balance of probability still favours a date nearer to 250 than to 200 B.C. Thus, the more natural alternative remains between Antigonus Monophthalmus and Antigonus Gonatas. Either agrees well with the interruption after the third Sacred War. (shrink)

Plutarch in his Life of Agis describes the plots by which Lysandrus the ephor contrived to depose King Leonidas II. He meant to use against him one of the Spartan laws which forbade a member of the royal houses from begetting children by a foreign woman, and another by which he who went out of Sparta with a view to settling abroad was liable to the death penalty. But though apparently a case could be made out against Leonidas under these (...) charges, Lysandrus did not simply proceed with the prosecution. After instructing confederates who would bring the case, he with his fellow ephors ‘waited for the sign’. What this meant Plutarch explains in these words: στι δ τοινδε· δι' τν1 ννα1 λαβντες ο οροι νκτα καθαρν κα σληνον, σιωπ καθζονται πρς τν ορανν ποβλποντες. ν ον κ μρους τινς ες τερον μρος στρ διξ, κρνουσι τος βασιλες, ς περ τ θεον ξαμαρτνοντας, κα καταπαουσι τς ρχς, μχρις ν κ Δελν ἢ λυμπας χρησμς λθτος λωκσι τν βασιλων βοηθν. (shrink)

Fifty years ago when Jacques Hadamard set out to explore how mathematicians invent new ideas, he considered the creative experiences of some of the greatest thinkers of his generation, such as George Polya, Claude Le;vi-Strauss, and Albert Einstein. It appeared that inspiration could strike anytime, particularly after an individual had worked hard on a problem for days and then turned attention to another activity. In exploring this phenomenon, Hadamard produced one of the most famous and cogent cases for the (...) existence of unconscious mental processes in mathematical invention and other forms of creativity. Written before the explosion of research in computers and cognitive science, his book, originally titled The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field , remains an important tool for exploring the increasingly complex problem of mental life. The roots of creativity for Hadamard lie not in consciousness, but in the long unconscious work of incubation, and in the unconscious aesthetic selection of ideas that thereby pass into consciousness. His discussion of this process comprises a wide range of topics, including the use of mental images or symbols, visualized or auditory words, "meaningless" words, logic, and intuition. Among the important documents collected is a letter from Albert Einstein analyzing his own mechanism of thought. (shrink)

“All experience is an arch wherethro’ gleams” an untravell'd world and through which come the joyous adventures of life and also grief and pain. Since all that we know and hope to know and think we know must come through this arch and since the primary task of science is the validation and enlargement of knowledge, science is vitally interested in this experience and its interpretation. This interest stems not from the philosopher's epistemology but it is strictly operational. We want (...) to know what kind of experience yields reliable knowledge when checked against other experience and applied in practical adjustment to things as they are and to prediction of the probable future course of events. In short, the field of natural science embraces everything that comes within the range of human experience. Its specific functions are to codify this mixed experience, to search out those uniformities which yield classification, verification and prediction, and from these observed uniformities to construct by sound reasoning verifiable laws, hypotheses and theories, that is, to find the meaning of the experiences had. First we want to know the facts, but what we are after in the upshot is the interpretation of the facts. (shrink)

Scientific data are often subjected to two contradictory over-simplifications. People who have no personal experience in science often say that a certain idea has been scientifically established and feel that the question is therewith settled. They do not distinguish among methods, or generalizations in different fields. This implies that all science is infallible. The other oversimplification comes from the specialist; he may dismiss the work of men who study the problems approaching his own but who use methods different from his. (...) This view implies that only one type of scientific investigation is really sound. Both groups are wrong, for science is neither infallible nor wholly untrustworthy. In fact, science as an abstract whole is nothing; it is the name given collectively to all methods which men have used to explore natural processes and the results obtained by the use of such methods. Some problems are sufficiently simple and accessible to be explored in detail while others can be treated only after a set of postulates have been set as a starting point. A mechanism must be established within which it is possible to deal with the problems at hand. In other words, there are levels of scientific research which may be arranged in a series based on increasing assumptions. The more complex levels are formed by assuming the data and methods of those simpler and adding to them a new set of assumptions with the aid of which it is possible to treat the phenomena to be studied. Material cannot be carried directly from one level to another unless attention is given to the premises on which the conclusions have been drawn. Since such attention is not always given, entire fields of research have sometimes been brought into suspicion on the part of those working in what they themselves style “a more fundamental field.” Yet there may be data available at a different level which, when properly used, would be of value in their own work. (shrink)

During the Communist regime, after Poland was officially proclaimed the People’s Republic of Poland, the aim of the Polish Communist government was to control all aspects of society. Communist ideals were enforced in books and other publications; censorship was introduced on all published materials. This paper aims to present the situation of media in People’s Poland, as well as to provide a background and description of Polish censorship. Additionally, this paper will exposit and examine the socio-political role (...) of Tygodnik Powszechny in Polish society. As TP is a Catholic weekly, an outline of the unique socio-political role of the Polish Roman Catholic Church in communist Poland will accompany the above analysis. This paper is based on the research conducted by the author in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree written and defended at the Central European University in Budapest in 2012. (shrink)

In the United States, property rights are afforded protection, but moral rights are not. Up until 1989, the United States adamantly refused to join the Berne Copyright Convention, the first multilateral copyright treaty, now ratified by seventy-eight countries. The American government refused to comply because the Berne Convention grants moral rights to authors. This international policy was—and is—incompatible with United States copyright law, which recognizes only economic rights. Although ten states have enacted some form of moral rights legislation, federal copyright (...) laws tend to prevail, and those are still wholly economic in their motivation. Indeed, the recent pressure for the United States to agree, at least in part, to the terms of the Berne Convention came only as a result of a dramatic increase in the international piracy of American records and films.In September 1986, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts first introduced a bill called the Visual Artists Rights Act. This bill attempts to amend federal copyright laws to incorporate some aspects of international moral rights protection. The Kennedy bill would prohibit the intentional distortion, mutilation, or destruction of works of art after they have been sold. Moreover, the act would empower artists to claim authorship, to receive royalties on subsequent sales, and to disclaim their authorship if the work were distorted.4 This legislation would have prevented Clement Greenburg and the other executors of David Smith’s estate from authorizing the stripping of paint from Several of Smith’s later sculptures so that they would resemble his earlier—and more marketable—unpainted sculptures. Such moral rights legislations would have prevented a Japanese bank in New York from removing and destroying a sculpture by Isamu Noguchi simply because the bank president did not like it. And such legislation would have prevented the United States government from destroying Tilted Arc. 4. Although this section appeared in the original version of Kennedy’s bill, the current version provides for a study of resale royalties. Richard Serra is known for his large-scale site-specific works in landscapes, urban environments, and museums. (shrink)

After describing the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) of 1996, I argue that the Act ought to be significantly amended. The central objections to CPPA are (1) that it is so broad in its main proscriptions as to violate the First Amendment rights of adults; (2) that it altogether fails to provide minors and their legal guardians with the privacy rights needed to combat the harms associated with certain classes of prurient material on the Internet; and, (3) that the (...) actual rate of technological advance in home computing, and Congress' failure to appreciate how prurient material may be accessed, combined with CPPA to wrongfully expose an increasing number of individuals to possible prosecution and personal ruination. Several other objections are registered along the way, including one aimed at the draconian punishments the law metes out to violators. I close by offering the outlines of an amended version of the law that promises not to violate the rights of adults, that affords children and adults equal and effective protection against the very harmful practices the current law cannot eradicate, and that prescribes punishments that are consistent with the tolerance necessary to support a more democratic vision of the Internet. (shrink)

The article offers a philosophical rereading of George Orwell’s novel 1984 in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, in particular after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022. In recent decades, the dystopia of the English writer has become not only a model of literary criticism of totalitarianism but also the subject of constant falsifications and censorship for Russian propagandists. This study aims to clarify the primary philosophical content of Orwell’s novel and its heuristic potency to (...) expose the sociopolitical situation in contemporary Russia. The author of the article turns to biographical descriptions and philosophical interpretations of the novel in the works of leading Western scholars to finally draw reasonable analogies between the dystopian world of 1984 and the contemporary Russian Federation. (shrink)

In 1731, Filippo Argelati printed for the first time the complete works of the Modenese historian Carlo Sigonio. Intended originally as an edition in five volumes, the collection was augmented by a sixth volume after the discovery in Rome of previously unknown manuscripts of Sigonio. Among the new papers were four sets of ecclesiastical censures which had been secretly directed in the 1580s against four of Sigonio’s works, and, with them, Sigonio’s responses to the papal authorities. According to Argelati, (...) the censures and Sigonio’s responses were found in two manuscripts, one from the vatican Library and the other from the city of Bologna. Until now, the veracity of Argelati’s account has never been questioned. Yet, while there is no doubt about the authenticity of the censures, which are attested also by eight other sixteenth-century manuscripts, Sigonio’s replies do raise doubts, as three-quarters of them are known only from Argelati’s edition of his works. The present article investigates the sources used by the author of the replies. This new evidence clearly proves that, in fact, the replies were written centuries after Sigonio’s death, probably in the same period as Argelati’s edition. In turn, this supports the hypothesis that Sigonio’s works were employed as an instrument to oppose the Roman Church’s political claims, in the jurisdictional debate between the papacy and the empire in the early eighteenth century. (shrink)

After outlining some of the reasons for the delayed and uninspiring Hispanophone translations of Milton's works, this essay examines the ways in which El Paraíso Perdido, Juan de Escoiquiz's translation of 1812?the first and still most readily-available Spanish verse translation of Paradise Lost (1667)?Catholicizes Milton's Protestant epic. A comparative close reading of key anti-Catholic passages in Milton's original and Escoiquiz's translation demonstrates the translator's avowed practice of excising anything ?ridiculous or indecent to the rites and practices of the Catholic (...) Church.? Silent additions, though, are the primary means by which Milton's Anglo-Protestant epic is converted into a Hispano-Catholic translation. A brief discussion of Areopagitica, in terms of its content and its popularity in Spanish translation, ties together the issues of translation, censorship, and reading reception circulating with El Paraíso Perdido. (shrink)

Because he was a Jesuit, Irish-born Edward Boyd Barrett (1883–1966) had to submit his writing to Jesuit censors, who were charged with making sure that nothing in the documents was contrary to Roman Catholic faith and morals. Drawing upon archival records, this article shows the complexities of the censorship process in the early 20th century. Boyd Barrett’s Motive Force and Motivation-Tracks (1911), an experimental study in will-psychology completed under Michotte, was threatened with withdrawal from circulation after an anonymous (...) review (which was not published) accused the book of modernism. In the 1920s, articles on psychoanalysis directed at a wide Catholic readership, received severe criticism by Jesuit censors, and some were not published. The article presents the censors’ objections and Boyd Barrett’s defense. One effect of censorship was to make psychoanalysis, at least in some formulations, acceptable to a Catholic readership. (shrink)

In July 2015, shortly after the murder of an elderly priest in the city of Rouen, the leading French daily Le Monde announced it would no longer publish the names or images of individuals involved in acts of terrorism. The decision, wrote the editors, was intended to limit the "posthumous glorification" of terrorist acts. It was not the first time the notion of conscientious self-censorship in the fight against terrorism had bubbled to the fore. The strategy had been (...) flowing through media circles and policy centers for over a decade. By the time the Islamic State emerged in the summer of 2014, it had become nearly impossible for the average Western consumer to hear or see any actual trace of the... (shrink)

Sixty years after the famous ‘Conférence des écrivains et artistes noirs at the Sorbonne’, and sixty years after Black-Label, the third collection of poetry by French Guianese Leon-Gontran Damas, the word “nègre” and “nigger” remain offensive words all too much used in postcolonial Europe today. Even after the short lived Obamamania, Damas’s poetry remains actual as it expresses the censorship all too many times endured by the lyrical voice who cannot speak out loud against those violent (...) verbal, physical, and thus psychological assaults. Consequently, his “mors dans la bouche”, or “bit in the mouth” is incoporated in his less wellknown work which testifies to the “mort dans l’âme”, it is the constant feeling of depression and blues lurking on the Black or coloured citizen of France and the West Indies. Standing in the shadow of the cofounders, and quite neglected by the leading Martinicans of the post-Négritude era, Damas nevertheless understood the urgency of transcontinental and transcultural solidarities in this battle and wrote against the dichotomies of race, class, and gender. Damas and James knew each other for over forty years. Damas read James’s novel, Minty Alley before they met in Paris when James was doing the research for The Black Jacobins, his landmark history of Tousssaint L’Ouverture and the revolution in the French colony of Saint-Domingue. Damas helped James with translations and discovering documents at the Bibliothèque Nationale. On one occasion, Damas brought James to the home of Robert Desnos. Both lived in Washington, DC, in the 1970s when Damas was at Howard University and James taught at Federal City College/University of the District of Columbia. (shrink)

Descartes and the last Scholastics: objections and replies -- Descartes and the Scotists -- Ideas, before and after Descartes -- The Cartesian destiny of form and matter -- Descartes, Basso, and Toletus: three kinds of Corpuscularians -- Scholastics and the new astronomy on the substance of the heavens -- Descartes and the Jesuits of La Fleche: the Eucharist -- Condemnations of Cartesianism: the extension and unity of the universe -- Cartesians, Gassendists, and censorship -- The cogito in the (...) seventeenth century. (shrink)

In the months after Donald Trump's election, Hannah Arendt's seminal work, The Origins of Totalitarianism crashed onto the Amazon bestseller lists. "Never has our future been more unpredictable," she had written in the preface to the first edition in 1951, "never have we depended so much on political forces that cannot be trusted to follow the rules of common sense and self-interest - forces that look like sheer insanity, if judged by the standards of other centuries." With an uncannily (...) accurate prescience, Arendt's dark history of her times seemed to be describing the insanity of our own. Arendt would've recognized the extremes of the twenty-first century from her own: the disenchantment with politics; the rise of conspiracy theories; self-censorship; powerlessness; tyranny and occupation, the climate catastrophe, the banality of evil. She had lived through it already. Born in the first decade of the last century, just before it lurched into war, she escaped Fascist Europe to make a new life for herself in America, where she became one its most influential-and controversial-public intellectuals. She wrote about power and terror, exile and love, and above all about freedom. Hannah Arendt wrote, and thought, in order to engage directly with the political chaos of her time. Questioning - thinking - was her first defence against tyranny. Her approach was to change the world by examining it unflinchingly, and not simply to criticise and protest. It is this defiance that attracts so many to her work today. (shrink)

This paper takes an initial but significant step toward penetrating the intricate historiography of the renowned siyin half seal, which appears on 199 surviving or now-lost canonical Chinese paintings and calligraphies. Through a forensic tracking of the siyin art pieces, Ming dynasty court diaries, legal statutes, and other official seals ending in the words si and yin, I refute the dominant twentieth-century theory by arguing that this seal could not have originated from the eunuch-run Dianli jicha si in 1373–84, nor (...) could it have been used by the Ming general Xu Da on the Yuan palace collection as previously hypothesized. The alleged Dianli jicha si characters do not match the siyin seal strokes. New evidence suggests that the siyin seal came into existence after 1385, by which time the Directorate of Ceremonial had superseded the shuttered Dianli jicha si office. Instead of simply dividing the various siyin seal impressions into binary genuine/forged categories as past studies have done, I demonstrate that three types of siyin seals can be considered authentic, all of which were used by different branches of the jingli si. The fact that a half seal was employed suggests that the jingli si registry office followed the kanhe inventory system, which imposed an official seal on the seam of both an inventorying object and its complementary ledger. By deconstructing the siyin historiography, this paper raises new socio-political questions about ownership, censorship, and imperial competition over the siyin-marked art pieces. It also builds a foundation for the further investigation of the role inventory systems played in mapping, defining, and legitimizing the royal power of the Ming dynasty. (shrink)

The science fiction films of Andrei Tarkovsky, Solaris (1973) and Stalker (1979), are complex responses to the repressive atmosphere of Brezhnev’s rule, after the 7-year delay in seeing Andrei Rublev (1971) released publicly. By using science fiction—a genre that Tarkovsky openly maligned—he was able to fly beneath the radar of State censorship, and develop a nuanced response to the application of Marxist theory of religion in the Soviet experience. Arguing in these films (and in others in his oeuvre) (...) that humans still need the affective dimension of religion (though not the hierarchical, institutional elements of it that Marx had identified with sedation), Tarkovsky hid within his science fiction films a thoroughgoing critique of the Soviet application of Marx. This article uses the concept of “war machine” from the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to analyze how Tarkovsky did this, and demonstrates that Tarkovsky’s engagement with Marx’s philosophy in these two films shares much in common with Deleuze and Guattari’s way of understanding human meaning making. (shrink)

This essay considers calls to boycott working with the Russian academy after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Against the view that such a boycott would prevent Western academics from working with their Russian colleagues to counter Kremlin propaganda and to co-produced Western-Russian research that may benefit everyone, I argue that the Russian censorship and policing of the academy combined with Russian ideology means that there are currently no conversation partners for Western academics within the Russian academy.

This guide accompanies the following article: Matthew Kieran, ‘Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)moral Character of Art Works and Inter‐Relations to Artistic Value’. Philosophy Compass 1/2 (2006): pp. 129–143, doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2006.00019.x Author’s Introduction Up until fairly recently it was philosophical orthodoxy – at least within analytic aesthetics broadly construed – to hold that the appreciation and evaluation of works as art and moral considerations pertaining to them are conceptually distinct. However, following on from the idea that artistic value is (...) broader than aesthetic value, the last 15 years has seen an explosion of interest in exploring possible inter‐relations between the appreciative and ethical character of works as art. Consideration of these issues has a distinguished philosophical history but as the Compass survey article suggests (‘Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)Moral Character of Art Works and Inter‐Relations to Artistic Value.’Philosophy Compass 1.2 (2006): 129–43), it is only very recently that figures in the field have returned to it to develop more precisely what they take the relationships to be and why. Consensus is, unsurprisingly, lacking. The reinvigoration of the issues has led sophisticated formalists or autonomists to mount a more considered defence of the idea that aesthetic and literary values are indeed conceptually distinct from the justification or otherwise of the moral perspective or views endorsed in a work (Topic I). The challenges presented by such a defence are many but amongst them are appeals to critical practice (Lamarque and Olsen), scepticism about whether or not art really can give us bona fide knowledge (Stolnitz) and the recognition that truth often seems to be far removed from what it is we value in our appreciation of works (Lamarque). One way to motivate consideration of the relevance of a work’s moral character to its artistic value concerns the phenomena of imaginative resistance. At least sometimes it would seem that, as Hume originally suggested, we either cannot or will not enter imaginatively into the perspective solicited by a work due to its morally problematic character (Topic II). In some cases, it would seem that as a matter of psychological fact, we cannot do so since it is impossible for us to imagine how it could be that a certain attitude or action is morally permissible or good (Walton). The question then is whether or not this is a function of morality in particular or constraints on imaginative possibility more generally and what else is involved. At other times, the phenomena seem to be driven by a moral reluctance to allow ourselves to enter into the dramatic perspective involved (Moran) or evaluation of the attitude expressed (Stokes). Nonetheless, it is far from obvious that this is so of all the attitudes or responses we judge to be morally problematic. After all, it looks like we can and indeed often do suspend or background particular cognitive and moral commitments in engaging with all sorts of works (Nichols and Weinberg). If the moral character of a work interacts with how we appreciate and evaluate them, then the pressing question is this: is there any systematic account of the relationship available to us? One way is to consider the relationship between our emotional responses to works and their moral character (Topic III). After all, art works often solicit various emotional responses from us to follow the work and make use of moral concepts in so doing (Carroll). Indeed, whether or not a work merits the sought for emotional responses often seems to be internally related to ethical considerations (Gaut). Yet, it is not obvious that we should apply our moral concepts or respond emotionally in our imaginative engagement with works as art as we should in real life (Kieran, Jacobson). A different route is via the thought that art can convey knowledge (Topic IV). There might be particular kinds of moral knowledge art distinctively suited to conveying (Nussbaum) or it may just be that art does so particularly effectively (Carroll, Gaut, Kieran). Either way where this can be tied to the artistic means and appreciation of a work it would seem that to cultivate moral understanding contributes to the value of a work and to betray misunderstanding is a defect. Without denying the relevance of the moral character of a work some authors have wanted to claim that sometimes the immoral aspect of a work can contribute to rather than lessen its artistic value (Topic V). One route is to claim that there is no systematic theoretical account of the relationship available and what the right thing to say is depends on the particular case involved (Jacobson). Another involves the claim that this is so when the defect connects up in an appropriate way to one of the values of art. Thus, it has been claimed, only where a work reveals something which adds to intelligibility, knowledge or understanding in virtue of its morally problematic aspect can this be so (Kieran). The latter position looks like it could in principle be held whilst nonetheless maintaining that the typical or standard relationship is as the moralists would have it. Yet perhaps allowing valence change for such reasons is less a mark of principled explanation and more a function of downright inconsistency or incoherence (Harold). The topics themselves and suggested readings given below follow the structure articulated above as further amplified in the Compass survey article. The design and structure given below can be easily compressed or expanded further. Author Recommends 1 Carroll, Noël. ‘Art, Narrative and Moral Understanding.’Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection. Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 126–60. 2 This article develops the idea that engaging with narrative art calls on moral concepts and emotions and can thereby clarify our moral understanding. 2 Carroll, Noël. Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. 4 Part IV consists of six distinct essays on questions concerning the inter‐relations between art and morality including the essay cited above and the author’s articulation and defence of moderate moralism. 3 Gaut, Berys. ‘The Ethical Criticism of Art.’Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection. Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 182–203. 4 Gaut, Berys. Art, Emotion and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. 7 This monograph provides the most exhaustive treatment of the issues and defends the claim that, where relevant, whenever a work is morally flawed it is of lesser value as art and wherever it is morally virtuous the work’s value as art is enhanced. Chapters 7 and 8 defend concern ethical knowledge and chapter 10 is a development of the article cited above concerning emotional responses. Chapter 3 also gives a useful conceptual map of the issues and options in the debate. 5 Jacobson, Daniel. ‘In Praise of Immoral Art.’Philosophical Topics 25 (1997): 155–99. 9 A wide ranging and extended treatment of relevant issues which objects to generalising moral treatments of our responses to art works and defends the idea that particular works can be better because of rather than despite their moral defects. 6 Kieran, Matthew. ‘Forbidden Knowledge: The Challenge of Cognitive Immoralism.’Art and Morality. Ed. Sebastian Gardner and José Luis Bermúdez. London: Routledge, 2003. 56–73. 11 A general argument for immoralism is elaborated by outlining when, where and why a work’s morally problematic character can contribute to its artistic value for principled reasons (through enhancing moral understanding). 7 Kieran, Matthew. Revealing Art. London: Routledge, 2005. Chapter 4. 13 This chapter argues against both aestheticism and straightforward moralism about art, elaborating a defence of immoralism in relation to visual art whilst ranging over issues from pornographic art to the nature and demands of different genres in art. 8 Lamarque, Peter. ‘Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries.’ Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 127–39. 15 This article concisely outlines and defends a sophisticated aestheticism that denies the importance of truth to artistic value. 9 Stolnitz, Jerome. ‘On the Cognitive Triviality of Art.’British Journal of Aesthetics 32.3 (1992): 191–200. 17 This article articulates and defends the claim that no knowledge of any interesting or significant kind can be afforded by works appreciated and evaluated as art. 10 Walton, Kendall. ‘Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality, I.’Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 68 (1994): 27–51. 19 This article builds on some comments from Hume to develop the idea that when engaging with fictions it seems impossible imaginatively to enter into radically deviant moral attitudes. Online Materials ‘Aesthetics and Ethics: The State of the Art.’American Society of Aesthetics online (Jeffrey Dean):. ‘Art, Censorship and Morality’ downloadable podcast of Nigel Warburton interviewing Matthew Kieran at Tate Britain (BBC/ou Open2.net as part of the Ethics Bites series):. ‘Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)Moral Character of Art Works and Inter‐Relations to Artistic Value.’Philosophy Compass 1.2 (2006): 129–43 (Matthew Kieran):. ‘Ethical Criticism of Art.’Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ella Peek):. ‘Fascinating Fascism.’New York Review of Books Piece Discussing Leni Riefenstahl (Susan Sontag):. ‘The Beheading of St. John the Baptist (1450s), Giovanni de Paolo’ (Tom Lubbock):. Vladimir Nabokov and Lionel Trilling discuss Lolita (CBS):. Sample Syllabus Topic I Autonomism/aestheticism • Anderson, James C. and Jeffrey T. Dean. ‘Moderate Autonomism.’British Journal of Aesthetics 38.2 (1998): 150–66. • Beardsley, Monroe. Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958. Chapter 12. • Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgement.Trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1952 [1790]. • Lamarque, Peter. ‘Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries.’Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 127–39. • ——. ‘Tragedy and Moral Value.’Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73.2 (1995): 239–49. • Lamarque, Peter and Stein Olsen. Truth, Fiction and Literature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. Chapter 10. • Stolnitz, Jerome. ‘On the Cognitive Triviality of Art.’British Journal of Aesthetics 32.3 (1992): 191–200. Topic II Imaginative Capacities, Intelligibility and Resistance • Moran, Richard. ‘The Expression of Feeling in Imagination.’Philosophical Review 103.1 (1994): 75–106. • Nichols, Shaun. ‘Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn’t Behave Like Believing’. Mind & Language 21.4 (2006): 459–74. • Stokes, Dustin. ‘The Evaluative Character of Imaginative Resistance’. British Journal of Aesthetics 46.4 (2006): 387–405. • Tanner, Michael. ‘Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality, II’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 68 (1994): 51–66. • Walton, Kendall (1994). ‘Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality, I’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 68 (1994): 27–51. • Weinberg, Jonathan. ‘Configuring the Cognitive Imagination.’New Waves in Aesthetics. Eds. K. Stock and K. Thomson‐Jones. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 203–23. Topic III Moralism and Emotions • Carroll, Noël. ‘Moderate Moralism.’British Journal of Aesthetics 36.3 (1996): 223–37. • Carroll, Noël. ‘Art, Narrative and Moral Understanding.’Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection. Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.126–60. • Gaut, Berys. Art, Emotion and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. Chapter 10. • ——. ‘The Ethical Criticism of Art.’Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection. Ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 182–203. • Hume, David. ‘Of the Standard of Taste.’Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993 [1757]. 133–53. • Kieran, Matthew. ‘Emotions, Art and Immorality.’Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Emotions. Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. 681–703. • Tolstoy, Leo. What is Art?. London: Penguin, 2004. Chapters 5 and 15. Topic IV Moralism and Knowledge • Aristotle. Poetics. Trans. M. Heath. London: Penguin, 1996 [367–322 BC]. • Carroll, Noël. ‘The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature and Moral Knowledge.’Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60.1 (2002): 3–26. • Gaut, Berys. Art, Emotion and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. Chapters 7 and 8. • Gaut, Berys. ‘Art and Cognition.’Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 115–26. • Kieran, Matthew. ‘Art, Imagination and the Cultivation of Morals.’Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54.4 (1996): 337–51. • Nussbaum, Martha. ‘Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Literature and the Moral Imagination.’Love’s Knowledge. New York: Oxford UP, 1990. 148–68. • Plato. The Republic. Trans. D. Lee. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974. Book 10. Topic V Immoralist Contextualism • Harold, James. ‘Immoralism and the Valence Constraint.’British Journal of Aesthetics 48.1 (2008): 45–64. • Jacobson, Daniel. ‘In Praise of Immoral Art.’Philosophical Topics 25 (1997): 155–99. • ——. ‘Ethical Criticism and the Vices of Moderation.’Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 342–55. • John, Eileen. ‘Artistic Value and Moral Opportunism.’Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Ed. Matthew Kieran. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 331–41. • Kieran, Matthew. ‘Forbidden Knowledge:The Challenge of Cognitive Immoralism.’Art and Morality. Ed. Sebastian Gardner and José Luis Bermúdez. London: Routledge, 2003. 56–73. • Kieran, Matthew. Revealing Art. London: Routledge, 2005. Chapter 4. • Patridge, Stephanie. ‘Moral Vices as Artistic Virtues: Eugene Onegin and Alice.’Philosophia 36.2 (2008): 181–93. Focus Questions 1 What is the strongest argument for the claim that the moral character of a work is not relevant to its artistic value? Does artistic or literary criticism tend to concern itself with the truth or morality of works? If so, in what ways? If not, why do you think this is? 2 What different explanations might there be for difficulty with or resistance to imaginatively entering into attitudes you take to be immoral? How might this relate to the way our imaginings work as contrasted with belief? How might different literary or artistic treatments of the same subject matter make a difference? 3 How do narrative works draw on our moral concepts and responses? Can we suspend our normal moral commitments or application of moral concepts in responding emotionally to art works? Should we respond emotionally to art works as we ought to respond to real world events we witness? Why? Why not? 4 How, if at all, do art works convey moral understanding? How, if at all, is this related to the kinds of moral knowledge art works can teach or reveal to us? When, where and why might this be tied to the artistic value of a work? How can we tell where a work enhances our moral understanding as opposed to misleading or distorting it? 5 What art works do you value overall as art which commend or endorse moral values and attitudes that you do not? Is appreciation of them always marred or lessened by the morally dubious aspect? If not, what explains the differences in evaluation? What, if anything, might you learn by engaging with works which endorse moral attitudes or apply moral concepts different from those you take to be justified? How, if at all, might this connect up with what makes them valuable as art? (shrink)

Brahe creía que su teoría sobre los cometas refutaba el copernicanismo. Analizamos el argumento y mostramos que ningún sistema existente podía acomodarlos. Tras el decreto anticopernicano de 1616, muchos jesuitas que rechazaban a Ptolomeo e incluso coqueteaban con Copérnico se vieron obligados a abrazar el sistema de Brahe. La discusión de los cometas de 1618 permitía a los jesuitas reforzar a Brahe en un momento en que Galileo no podía defender el copernicanismo. La disputa de los cometas se examina bajo (...) esta luz y se conjetura la orientación pro-Brahe de las censuras del Diálogo de Galileo.It was Brahe’s belief that the motion of comets refuted Copernicus’ system and complied with his own. His argument is analyzed to show that neither could explain their motion. After the anti-copernican decree of1616 quite a few Jesuits that rejected Ptolemy and even courted Copernicus were bound to accept Brahe’s system. The appearance of comets in 1618 allowed the Jesuits to describe them and support Brahe, while Galileo could not treat them in copernican terms. So he crossed them off. The comets war is seen under this light and the pro-Brahe bias in the censorship of the Dialogo is strongly conjectured. (shrink)

This paper investigates a problem about freedom of information. Although freedom of information is generally considered desirable, there are a number of areas where there is substantial agreement that freedom of information should be limited. After a certain ordering of the landscape, I argue that we need to add the category of "dangerous" information and that this category has gained a new quality in the context of current information technology, specifically the Internet. This category includes information the use of (...) which would be morally wrong as well as some of what may be called "corrupting" information. Some such information should not be spread at all and some should be very limited in its spread. (shrink)

Over the last eight years, there has been a sharp increase in government censorship and officially sponsored persecution of the Moroccan free press. The Moroccan press still enjoys greater freedoms now than under the late King Hassan II, thanks to the liberalization efforts he facilitated toward the end of his life, which were also continued in the early years of his son’s reign. However, the freedoms media activists worked so hard to obtain at the end of the last century (...) have rapidly begun to erode, particularly after the 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca. Morocco remains an important Arab ally to both the United States and Europe, but the monarchy risks that relationship by tightening the reigns on speech and violating international human rights laws. Moreover, the monarchy puts itself at risk domestically every time it imprisons a journalist or imposes a bankrupting fine on a popular periodical, as Moroccan human rights groups grow less enchanted by their king. Over the last two years, criminal charges against the media have increased significantly, causing some publications to close and leaving a number of journalists in jail for their writings. In addition, since 2008, the Moroccan government has begun to censor the Internet, arresting bloggers and satirists and temporarily suspending access to popular websites, such as YouTube. This article explores Morocco's obligations under international and domestic law relating to freedom of expression and examines some recent court cases involving the Moroccan media. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTheodor Haecker’s translation and reception of Kierkegaard exerted a strong influence on interwar German readings of Kierkegaard. Recent scholarship has drawn renewed attention to Haecker’s World War I Kierkegaardian polemics and the dampening of his enthusiasm for Kierkegaard after his conversion to Catholicism in 1921. This article offers a twofold refinement of current accounts of Haecker’s Kierkegaard reception. First, it shows that Haecker’s attempt to describe a Catholic theological anthropology after 1931 was less a turn away from Kierkegaard (...) and more a turning of Kierkegaard toward the Catholic intellectual tradition. Second, the article shows how this anthropological project collided with the ideology and censorship of the Third Reich, where Haecker became a key voice in the Catholic ‘inner emigration.’ Revisionist methodologies in German studies have modelled how to retrieve the resonance of inner-emigration texts – literary, philosophical, theological, etc. – that were written against the grain of dictatorship. As inner emigrant, Haecker draws instinctively on Kierkegaard’s authorship, life, and thought as a paradigm for his own regime-critical writing and existence. With the claim that Haecker’s inner-emigration writings depend on his ongoing encounter with Kierkegaard, this article offers new access to Haecker’s late thought for philosophers, theologians, and literary scholars alike. (shrink)

I feel the urge to express my solidarity with Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, the authors of the much‐discussed article “After‐Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?” that appeared in the Journal of Medical Ethics in February. Both their argument and, more sadly, they themselves suffered a violent attack by people who obviously do not consider freedom of expression an important value. Censorship does not fit well with the mission of scholarship—particularly when the scholarship depends on a method (...) of speculation and hypothetical argument, as in the case of philosophy and bioethics—and the level of hatred and extremism expressed about the article seem out of proportion. Having said this, though, I want to consider why publishing the article was nonetheless inappropriate. (shrink)

Par sa couverture particulièrement intense au début, la presse américaine a donné beaucoup d'importance aux attentats de Madrid. Le cadrage dominant est un parallèle avec le 11 septembre, justifiant une approche faite d'empathie et un sentiment fort de solidarité dans l'épreuve. Mais, après les résultats des élections législatives espagnoles, quand il est devenu évident que la population espagnole a élu un chef ouvertement hostile à la participation de son pays à la guerre en Irak, la couverture change. La presse américaine (...) passe de la solidarité à la censure. Surtout dans le New York Post, la victoire de Zapatero est présentée comme la preuve que les terroristes ont réussi. Cette orientation anti-Zapatero est justifiée par un cadrage patriotique articulant de façon indissociable la lutte globale contre le terrorisme et la guerre menée par les États-Unis en Irak, conformément à la doctrine de l'administration Bush. Néanmoins, les autres journaux laissent s'exprimer des critiques contre la rhétorique simpliste de Bush.By its cover especially intense at the beginning, the American press has given much importance to the Madrid bombings. The dominant framing is parallel with the September 11, justifying an approach made empathy and a strong sense of solidarity in the event. But after the results of the Spanish elections, when it became clear that the Spanish population has elected a leader openly hostile to the country's participation in the war in Iraq, the coverage changes. The American press passes solidarity censorship. Especially in the New York Post, the victory of Zapatero is presented as evidence that the terrorists have succeeded. This orientation anti-Zapatero is justified by framing patriotic inextricably linking the global fight against terrorism and the war waged by the U.S. in Iraq, according to the doctrine of the Bush administration. However, other newspapers leave to express criticism against the simplistic rhetoric of Bush. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction to the 30th Anniversary Issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & PsychologyJohn Z. Sadler (bio)This issue marks the 30th anniversary of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology (PPP). All of us at the journal are grateful to our authors, readers, editors, and publishers for enabling this landmark. To commemorate this event, I invited our Founding Editor and Chair of the Advisory Board, K.W.M. "Bill" Fulford to write a brief essay, along with (...) our panel of smart and industrious senior editors. Their instructions were simple: 500 words on PPP past, present, and/or future. These essays appear in the pages to follow. As Editor-in-Chief, I write about PPP's early commitments as a scholarly journal, situate these in the history of academic publishing, and muse over our current moment.Bill Fulford briefly discusses the early years of the journal in his essay. My perspective emerges from an editor's perspective. As co-editors in the early years, Bill and I were committed to an international authorship with comparable editorial oversight. We wanted to build a journal that would equally recognize clinical science and practice and philosophy, maintaining the rigor of each field. We saw philosophers and mental health practitioners as equal partners, collaborators, innovators, and educators. More important, PPP was intended to offer up the best criticism of the mental health and related fields.The scattershot history of scholarly editing has identified several functions of the editor over the centuries following Gutenberg's invention of the printing press in the mid-1440s. The earliest editors took liberties with the language of the Bible, trying to make it more accessible to the public; the printing press permitted fast and inexpensive reproduction. Not surprisingly, this popularizing of the Bible led to praise as well as outrage. The printing of other scholarly works followed quickly. In 1470, only about 25 years after the invention of the printing press, Niccolo Perroni called for Pope Paul II to censor Andrea Bussi's edition of Pliny the Elder's Natural History, an anthology of then-ancient writings about the natural world. This marked the first recorded instance of censorship of a more-or-less secular scholarly work (Monfasani, 1988). In the ensuing centuries, "editors" initially were the popularizers, and later the gatekeepers of texts worth (and not worth) reading. In the [End Page 1] ensuing centuries into the present, editors have been venerated both as defenders of good reading and reviled as censors or intellectual selfaggrandizers.The current moment, in my view, represents a crisis in the history of editing and editorship. Digital communications have liberated communications worldwide. However, this liberty has come at the cost of colossal amounts of material not worth reading and an explosion of divisive, destructive discourse. Even worse, internet "trolls" on social media have moved bullying out of the schoolyard and into international cyberspace. Determining what is worth reading has moved away from a cluster of (hopefully) responsible editors to anyone who wants to go to the small effort of silencing others through online harassment and even violent threats. Such cyberbullying does not eliminate elitism, but instead substitutes a toxic online "elite" without principle other than self-promotion and the alienation of others. Our contemporary online culture has yet to figure out how to shape what is, and is not, worth reading.My wish and intent for the future of PPP is to maintain and grow our place of rational, deliberative, and open discourse, even in the face of such disruptive cultural change.John Z. Sadler John Z. Sadler, MD, is the Editor-in-Chief of PPP. He is the Daniel W. Foster, MD, Professor of Medical Ethics at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, as well as a Professor of Psychiatry there. He has been a PPP editor since its inception.ReferenceMonfasani, J. (1988). The first call for press censorship: Niccolo Perotti, Giovanni Andrea Bussi, Antonio Moreto, and the editing of Pliny's Natural History. Renaissance Quarterly, 41, 1–31. Google ScholarCopyright © 2023 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Since the mid-twentieth century, we have passed from a time where sexual frankness was actively obstructed by censorship and industry self-regulation to an age when pornography is circulated freely and is fairly ubiquitous on the Internet. Attitudes to sexually explicit material have accordingly changed a great deal in this time, but more at the level of the grounds on which it is objected to rather than through a general acceptance of it in the public sphere. Critical objections now tend (...) to be political or aesthetic in nature rather than moralistic. Commercial cinema still seems wary of a frank exploration of sexuality, preferring to address it tangentially in genres such as the erotic thriller. In Europe, an art house canon of sexually explicit movies has formed, starting with Bertolucci’s Last Tango in Paris and the French-produced In the Realm of the Senses. This article looks at the steps taken since the 1970s to challenge out-of-date taboos and yet at the same time differentiate the serious film about sex from both pornography and the exploitation film. After reviewing the art film’s relationship with both hard and soft core, two recent films, Intimacy and 9 Songs, are analyzed for their explicit content and for the way they articulate their ideas about sex through graphic depictions of sexual acts. Compulsive and/or claustrophobic unsimulated sexual behaviour is used as a way of asking probing questions of intimacy. This is shown to be a very different thing from the highly visual and staged satisfactions of pornography. (shrink)

This chapter examines one of the more neglected aspects of Hobbes’s body of written work: his efforts at ecclesiastical history. It argues that ecclesiastical history became an increasingly important intellectual pursuit for Hobbes as his career advanced. This development partly reflected the growing dominance of religious questions in his mature thought, but historical criticism also offered Hobbes a rhetorical mode that potentially allowed him to encode theological and ecclesiological views that he could not openly express after 1660. Ecclesiastical history (...) thus permitted Hobbes to advance his political assault on clerical power, and his philosophical deconstruction of Trinitarian orthodoxy, in conditions of censorship. The narrative shape of Hobbes’s ecclesiastical history borrowed much from Protestant historiography, but its substance moved in different directions, toward Enlightenment patterns of thought. (shrink)

In order to understand why Orlando was not published in Spain until 1977, almost forty years after the original publication in England, the Francoist regime context is analyzed in this reflection paper, as well as the editorial censorship and self-censorship procedures. It is assumed that this novel by Virginia Woolf is an example of the latter, based on the censorship criteria established by Abellán, since the text transgressed at least three of them. Moreover, the first translation (...) of Orlando in Spain, carried out by Enrique Ortenbach, is analyzed and compared to the one by Borges, not only the first translation of this novel to Spanish, but also the most popular and commercial to date, in order to determine the motivations to commission this retranslation to Ortenbach and the features of this text, in the light of the changes in the Spanish social context. To this end, the paper also draws from the concepts and practices of paratexts, retranslation, and translation criticism. It is concluded that the retranslation by Ortenbach is active, according to Pym’s proposal, and that it could have been dictated by the commercial success of the film adaptation of the novel in 1992. Also, although the translation decisions are not linked to the Spanish social changes, Ortenbach retrieves from the original the feature of Orlando’s gender distinction, through the use of the personal pronouns she/he when alluding to the character. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:David Hume and the Danish Debate about Freedom of the Press in the 1770sJohn Christian LaursenWhen the reception history of David Hume’s political writings is written, there will have to be some discussion of their fate in “peripheral” countries like Denmark. Hume’s “Of Liberty of the Press” was translated into Danish as early as 1771. It is not widely known that Denmark was the first country officially to declare (...) freedom of the press and that a lively debate broke out once such freedom was declared. Hume’s essay was put to work in that debate. The story of this translation provides insights into the influence of Hume’s ideas in peripheral countries in Europe, and of Denmark in continental European ideas. Among other things, here we have an example of Hume’s work used in a concrete propaganda battle.The Danish translation of Hume’s essay was published as the last of three supplemental essays in a 31-page pamphlet entitled Mr. F. A. de Voltaire’s Letter to His Majesty the King of Denmark concerning freedom of the press in his states, together with some essays of relevant content. 1 A copy can be found at the Royal Library in Copenhagen in volume twenty of the forty-five bound volumes of pamphlets and booklets from 1770 to 1773 which make up Luxdorph’s Collection of Press Freedom Writings. 2 These pamphlets, in German, French, and (mostly) Danish, were collected at the time by Bolle Willum Luxdorph, a Danish man of letters and court counselor. [End Page 167]The occasion for Voltaire’s letter and our pamphlet was King Christian VII’s declaration of freedom of the press in his territories (the Kingdoms of Norway and Denmark and the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein) on 4 September 1770. It was in the form of a Cabinet Order to his Danish Chancellery, in the following words:We are fully convinced that it is as harmful to the impartial search for truth as it is to the discovery of obsolete errors and prejudices, if upright patriots, zealous for the common good and what is genuinely best for their fellow citizens, because they are frightened by reputation, orders, and preconceived opinions, are hindered from being free to write according to their insight, conscience, and conviction, attacking abuses and uncovering prejudices. And thus in this regard, after ripe consideration, we have decided to permit in our kingdoms and lands in general an unlimited freedom of the press of such a form, that from now on no one shall be required and obliged to submit books and writings that he wants to bring to the press to the previously required censorship and approval, and thus to submit them to the control of those who have undertaken the business until now of inspecting them; so have we graciously revealed and made known this our will concerning our kingdoms to our Danish Chancellery. Given at Friedrichsberg, the 4 September 1770. Christian. 3The foregoing cabinet order was largely the idea of Johann Friedrich Struensee, court physician and soon to be Prime Minister for Christian VII. 4 Less than ten years earlier, two periodicals he was involved with when he lived in Danish Altona had been suppressed, 5 and when he came to power by a series of accidents, one of his first acts was to arrange for the king to declare freedom of the press. [End Page 168]Response to this declaration was immediate. In Denmark it led to a flurry of pamphlets on a myriad of topics, including the high cost of living and the salaries of ministers, 6 monopolies and trade issues (vol. III), coinage (vol. IV), civil servants, the public debt, the agricultural economy (vol. V), the abolition of tenant farmers’ work obligations (vol. VI), the Iceland trade (vol. VII), marriage law, breweries (vol. VIII), banks, lotteries (vol. IX), soldiers’ and sailors’ pay (vol. X), the Norwegian economy (vol. XI), the universities and academies (vol. XII), the power of women (vol. XIII), irreligion and impiety (vol. XIV), prophecies of doom (vol. XV), fables, allegories and libels (vols. XVI–XVIII), and the eternity of hell (vol. XIX).Many pamphlets discussed press freedom... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.2 (2000) 189-202 [Access article in PDF] Spinoza in Denmark and the Fall of Struensee, 1770-1772 John Christian Laursen * Baruch (Benedict) de Spinoza was the arch-heretic of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He was denounced in half a dozen languages from the time he began to publish until at least the 1780s, when Lessing's allegiance to Spinoza became the heart of (...) a literary scandal. 1 In time-honored fashion, some of these denunciations led to the burning of books and the imprisonment or banning of authors. The most spectacular case, however, led to the trial of a prime minister, the cutting off of his right hand and of his head, and the drawing and quartering of his body in full public ceremony. The year was 1772, the prime minister was Johann Friedrich Struensee, and the country was Denmark.Late eighteenth-century Denmark was not known for barbarities of the type represented by Struensee's execution. Previously disgraced prime ministers had merely been imprisoned, and other political enemies of the ruling powers had [End Page 189] merely been exiled. 2 Why such harshness with Struensee? What was at stake in the fall of Struensee?The answers to these questions are complex, but an important element of those answers lies in Struensee's public image, which made it seem both necessary and justifiable to treat him with such harshness. In turn, public opinion about Struensee was closely tied to the reputation of Spinoza. This essay will show that charges of Spinozism were part of the campaign that poisoned public opinion against Struensee. This was an unusually clear case of a theological and philosophical debate having direct political effects.Before getting to the role of Spinozism and anti-Spinozism in eighteenth-century Denmark, let us fill in important points of the story. The charge against Struensee was lèse majesté, for plotting the death of the King and for usurping power in violation of the constitution. Behind these charges was a further element which encouraged outrage: sleeping with Queen Caroline Matilda. That much was true, as both the Queen, a sister of George III of England, and Struensee admitted, each in order to save the other. The King knew about it all along but did not care. He did not care because he had become a libertine, going out to whorehouses most nights with rowdy friends, and he figured that what was good for the gander was good for the goose. He was also schizophrenic and easily manipulable by those around him, so that Struensee and the Queen encountered no disapproval from him until he fell under other people's influence. After Struensee and the Queen were taken into custody, the King was forced to divorce the Queen and she was sent to live in a Hannoverian castle in Celle because her brother did not want the embarrassment of having her back in England. She died there a few years later. 3It is an irony that we owe our knowledge of the state of public opinion in Denmark in this period to Struensee. Until shortly before the fatal events mentioned above, the Danish press had been subject to censorship that might have prevented the expression of many of the subsequent attacks on Struensee. But in September 1770 Struensee persuaded the king to declare freedom of the press in all his realms (consisting of the kingdoms of Denmark and Norway, the Duchies of Slesvig and Holsten [Schleswig and Holstein in German], Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes, and colonies in India, Africa, and the Caribbean). 4 It is not widely [End Page 190] known that Denmark was the first country to declare unlimited freedom of the press as official public policy. For much of the century England and the Netherlands had effective freedom of the press, but it had never been declared official policy. The next to do so was rebellious Virginia, in the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), followed by other colonies and then the Bill of Rights of the new... (shrink)

This article argues for a Freudian theory of internal emotion, which is best characterised as key “safety valves of the psyche”. After briefly clarifying some of Freud’s metapsychology, I present an account regarding the origin of (self-)censorship and morality as internalised aggression. I then show how this conception expands and can be detailed through a defence of a hydraulic model of the psyche that has specific “safety valves” of disgust, shame, and pity constantly counteracting specific sets of Freudian (...) drives. This model is important for explicating Freud’s crucial concept of sublimation, which continues to have key therapeutic and normative relevance today, which I show through the case of jokes. I finish with the argument that largely happy, productive lives can be seen as in a dynamic between the release of too much (perversion) and too little (neurosis) psychical pressure through these mechanisms. (shrink)

Mainly in the 1960s, intellectual life in Poland formed a barrier of resistance against communism. Already before the political upheaval in the year 1989, the works of Western philosophers were read and received in select circles of Polish intellectuals. Neither was Hannah Arendt an unknown person. Despite problems with censorship, three of her books were published in 1988. After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 Hannah Arendt's works ceased being something forbidden and mysterious. In this paper, (...) Hannah Arendt's literary reception in Poland before and after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc will be analyzed and evaluated. Afterwards the question will be discussed, how much influence Hannah Arendt's ideas had on the consolidation of democracy in Poland. (edited). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:33 HOW TO BECOME A MODERATE SKEPTIC: HUME'S WAY OUT OF PYRRHONISM The nature and extent of Hume's skepticism have been assessed in various ways. He was viewed as a radical skeptic until the end of the XIXth century. Many contemporary interpretations, which can be traced back to Kemp Smith's book, have claimed since that a reassessment was indispensable if we are to take seriously either the very project (...) of a science of human nature or Hume's naturalist conception of belief. The idea of a science of human nature presupposes that at least some sort of positive knowledge is possible. The naturalist conception of belief claims that some of our beliefs, though lacking rational justification, are nevertheless unavoidable and gain this way a certainty all their own. Both the Treatise of Human Nature in Book I and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding -1 conclude with a moderate or mitigated skepticism after making a strong case for radical pyrrhonism. In this paper I wish to carry out two connected tasks: first I want to consider whether Hume's skepticism in the Treatise is the same as that of the Enquiry or not; second, I want to determine which arguments he puts forward for his shift from pyrrhonism to modern skepticism. The most noticeable differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry occur immediately after the analysis of causation. In the Enquiry we find almost nothing concerning the reality of the external world and the nature of the self, but Hume emphasizes heavily the 34 anti-metaphysical and anti-theological outcomes of the science of human nature in his sections on Liberty and Necessity (VIII), on Miracles (X), on Providence and a possible future state (XI). He stresses the devastating agnostic consequences of his principles and his agnosticism culminates in the dreadful censorship of the final lines of the book. On the contrary, the fourth part of the Treatise, Book I, offers an intricate and sophisticated treatment of various subjects. The intricacy shows in the very title of this part: "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy." Hume actually intertwines the exposition of his skeptical system — an expression which sounds odd — with the critical examination of rival systems and an attempt at accounting for the nature of things. These intricate undertakings are the direct upshot of Hume's analysis of causation. He thinks he has established that our causal beliefs are the products of custom alone and that nevertheless they are our only reliable beliefs. Lacking any rational justification, they are simply natural — which means that we cannot hinder ourselves from making inferences and predictions. Accordingly, reason has been immersed in the wider concept of imagination and thus naturalized: it is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (T 179). Basically, some beliefs are unavoidable. Now, a crucial problem is to know how far we can go into the analysis of such natural beliefs. In the Treatise, Hume sets out to investigate some of them whereas in the Enquiry he is more prudent and merely talks of instincts without considering their mechanism. In the Treatise, the tentative analysis of these natural beliefs has important metaphysical outcomes. Using the concepts and principles of his new-born science of human nature, Hume provides us with 35 a new ontology which states the nature of things from the standpoint of our beliefs concerning it. Thus, we get a Humean version of the nature of the external world and of the nature of the self. Unfortunately, this assessment of what there is on the basis of what we believe there is has unwanted skeptical effects. Hume's "as if" ontology tends to appear definitely fictitious, all the more so because the analysis of our natural beliefs is not successful and even quite defective. So, the skeptical outcome pushes through the positive project itself as the failure to account for our natural beliefs shakes the very belief in their special reliability. Such is, for example, the blatant result of the study of our belief in the external world (T 217). Again, in the Treatise, Hume is eager to emphasize the devastating anti-metaphysical implications of his thought. Under the... (shrink)

Anthony Collins is known mostly as an eighteenth-century freethinker who contributed to ideas of rational religion and religious toleration, as a close friend of John Locke, and as a necessitarian and materialist who held a significant correspondence with Samuel Clarke. Yet, his political philosophy has rarely received serious attention, and he remains a neglected figure in the history of political thought. This article attempts to recover Collins as a philosopher who developed a complex political theory, by focusing on his conceptions (...) of liberty and authority. It shows that he conceptualised liberty, and liberty of thought in particular, both as non-interference and non-domination, namely, an absence of censorship as well as an absence of continuous tyranny over the minds of humankind. Then, it shows that Collins also developed a thorough idea of civil authority, according to which even religious liberties may depend in some cases on the discretion of the civil sovereign. Finally, this article suggests that Collins’s multi-layered theory continued to develop after his lifetime, and that he therefore had a prominent place in eighteenth-century debates of liberty and authority. (shrink)

During the era of the English Revolutions and shortly after that, some spaces, albeit limited, of female visibility open up. Thanks to the window of opportunity caused by the collapse of censorship, the participation in the radical sects and in the Civil war, some remarkable women succeed in introducing themselves in the public sphere, shaping it since its very genesis. Moreover, analysing law institutions as jointure and feoffment, the attempt is to reconstruct some fragments of juridical female autonomy, (...) which belie the total pervasiveness of coverture in the XVII century. As in private law, in public law women, in the role of queens, gain centrality: the principle of female authority, while safeguards the holding of the monarchical regime, destabilizes its patriarchal structure. Going through the works of Katherine Chidley, Margaret Cavendish, Damaris Masham and Mary Astell, the essay aims at reconstructing women's public voice, a voice which upsets the consolidated frames and subverts the established positions, questioning the same social hierarchies. (shrink)

Plato’s most infamous discussions of poetry in the Republic, in which he both develops original distinctions in narratology and advocates some form of censorship, raises numerous philosophical and philological questions. Foremost among them, perhaps, is the puzzle of why he returns to poetry in Book X after having dealt with it thoroughly in Books II–III, particularly because his accounts of the “mimetic” aspect of poetry are, on their face, quite different. How are we to understand this double treatment? (...) Here I will focus on a single aspect of this question, the compatibility of the notion of μίμησις and its cognates in the two books. As Nickolas Pappas has said, “Whether Books 3 and 10 offer compatible accounts of mimêsis, and how one might make them compatible, remains the most controversial question about Plato’s aesthetics”.2 I will show that there is a single notion of μίμησις operative throughout, namely that of representation by resemblance. I will take an unusual tack. I will not begin with the most problematic part of Book III for this interpretation about poetic, linguistic μίμησις, but with the later sections on musical μίμησις. Once we have an account of this, I claim, it is easier to see how narrative μίμησις is also a kind of representation by resemblance. (shrink)

The primary objective of this article is to describe how the children of soldiers critiqued and examined media representations of war. Taken from a more extensive qualitative case study involving eight teachers, this article examines one social studies teacher and her students’ perspectives on media coverage of war through two Socratic Seminar discussions focused on two wars: the American Civil War and Gulf War. Data was collected through interviews, focus groups, and classroom observations. Students leveled a specific set of critiques (...) at television media and those who consume it. They also grappled with two ethical quandaries: censorship and the justness of war.This article emerged from an unusual place – a Mathew Brady photograph. The teacher, a lecturer typically, decided to engage her students in discussion. This discussion was designed to provide “process and sense-making time,” according to their teacher, Ms. Jones, after four days of lecture on the American Civil War. Yet, the discussion grew into something much different than Ms. Jones's original plan. It evolved into an interrogation of how the media represents war. Inspired by the thoughtful discussion, several months later, Ms. Jones engaged the same students in an examination of media representations of the first Gulf War. Ms. Jones is the focus of this article because out of the eight other teachers in the larger qualitative study, she was the only one to focus on classroom time (two entire class sessions) on media representations of war. (shrink)

Perhaps no show has ever engaged in philosophy as much as South Park. Although it has made many philosophical arguments, this chapter will focus on the arguments South Park makes regarding censorship and freedom of speech, especially the ones made in the banned episodes “Cartoon Wars” (Part I and II), “200” and “201.” Does catering to terrorism create more? Should we respond to terrorism by doing more of what the terrorist want to forbid? When it comes to mockery, is (...) everything fair game? How much should we be willing to sacrifice for freedom of speech? And how far should freedom of speech go? After a historical summary of South Park’s controversies, and by engaging with the works of many past philosophers (e.g., John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper) and contemporary ones (e.g., Geroge Letsas, Aaron James, and Brian Leiter), this chapter will answer these questions and more. (shrink)