La raison pour laquelle il y a inadéquation de notre connaissance à la nature des corps extérieurs, mais aussi à celle de notre corps propre ainsi qu'à celle notre esprit, et donc à la nature de notre ego, c'est que nous sommes des êtres finis. Pour Descartes comme pour Spinoza la finitude de notre entendement rend impossible l'adéquation de la connaissance. À la connaissance adéquate, Descartes substitue la connaissance complète : certaine, mais non-absolue, vérifiée, mais seulement (...) provisoire. La mise au jour de cette première origine cartésienne de la théorie spinoziste de l'idée adéquate conduit l'auteur à l'hypothèse suivante : cette théorie accomplirait au sein de la métaphysique rationnelle développée dans l'Éthique la doctrine de la révélation et de la grâce présente dans la pensée théologique chrétienne. Dès lors il met en évidence la correspondance entre la vision béatifique suarézienne et la connaissance adéquate spinozienne, la première anticipant historiquement la seconde, à cette différence près que pour Thomas d'Aquin comme pour Suarez, « c'est la vision béatifique qui commande la connaissance », alors que c'est l'inverse pour Spinoza. Pour l'auteur, c'est le refus de toute création qui a conduit Spinoza à retrouver le modèle théologique de la vision béatifique comme moyen d'accès à la connaissance adéquates des choses et de Dieu. (shrink)

The Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez was an eminent philosopher and theologian whose _Disputationes Metaphysicae_ was first published in Spain in 1597 and was widely studied throughout Europe during the seventeenth century. The _Disputationes Metaphysicae_ had a great influence on the development of early modern philosophy and on such well-known figures as Descartes and Leibniz. This is the first time that Disputations 17, 18, and 19 have been translated into English. The _Metaphysical Disputations_ provide an excellent philosophical introduction to the (...) medieval Aristotelian discussion of efficient causality. The work constitutes a synthesis of monumental proportions: problematic issues are lucidly delineated and the various arguments are laid out in depth. Disputations 17, 18, and 19 deal explicitly with such issues as the nature of causality, the types of efficient causes, the prerequisites for causal action, causal contingency, human free choice, and chance. (shrink)

Las Disputaciones metafísicas de Francisco Suárez se presentan como una reconstrucción de la filosofía fundamental que se organiza no ya según el esquema de la metafísica aristotélica, ni problemáticamente, al estilo del comentario escolástico, sino como un edificio ordenado que expone la noción de la realidad misma. Es la elaboración de un sistema que no sólo respete el orden tradicional de las cuestiones filosóficas, sino que configure una nueva estructura mediante la cual la metafísica, lejos de ser un freno para (...) el desarrollo científico pueda transformarse en el resorte para su progreso. Estamos ante una especie de Enciclopedia del saber filosófico estructurado sistemáticamente, sobre cuya base podrá el pensamiento europeo llevar a cabo su revolución racionalista. La Europa moderna e ilustrada, de Descartes a Kant, buscará, de un modo manifiesto o implícito, en las Disputaciones metafísicas la referencia escolar que precisa para su propia construcción teórica racional y crítica. En suma, la equilibrada doctrina de Suárez constituye el fulcro a partir del que podrán alzarse las más variadas doctrinas sobre el conocimiento humano, la naturaleza, la sociedad y la legitimación del poder político, que aún hoy constituyen la base de nuestra comprensión de la realidad. (shrink)

Les Disputationes Metaphysicae de Suarez, publiées en 1597, constituent le moment culminant de la pensée scolastique au siècle d’or espagnol. Mais elles traduisent également l’avènement d’un point de rupture dans le déploiement de l’histoire de la métaphysique. La notion de Disputatio s’inscrit, d’une part, dans le prolongement de la terminologie conceptuelle médiévale. D’autre part, que la Disputatio se dise métaphysique, laisse présupposer que sa finalité ne saurait se limiter au domaine logico-théologique. Il convient, certes, d’articuler les principes métaphysiques aux (...) vérités théologiques, mais également, d’effectuer par un geste inaugural, l’espace d’une autonomisation de la philosophie première par rapport à la théologie divine et surnaturelle.Avec l’œuvre de Suarez, la métaphysique est confrontée à la possibilité de la systématicité de son déploiement. (shrink)

This translation of Suarez's 54th Disputation documents the ancient Greek and Medieval sources of his discussion. It also considers Suarez's influence upon hitherto unknown late scholastic writers and the relevance of his intentionality theory to figures such as Descartes and Kant.

In seiner Vorlesung "Uber das Willentliche und das Unwillentliche" unternimmt Suarez, der als Autor der Fruhen Neuzeit in seinem Werk wie nur wenige andere Autoren seiner Zeit die mittelalterliche Philosophie und Theologie systematisch aufnimmt und neu verarbeitet, den Versuch, die Willenstheorien der Patristik, der Hochscholastik und der fruhneuzeitlichen Aristotelesrezeption miteinander zu verknupfen. Das Werk entstammt einer Vorlesungsreihe, die Suarez zwischen 1578 und 1585 am Collegium Romanum auf Einladung von Papst Gregor XIII. abhielt. In der Diskussion der Willensfreiheit, der (...) Rolle von Zwang oder Gewalt und den verschiedenen Arten des Willentlichen legt Suarez den Grundstein fur seine spatere Moralphilosophie. (shrink)

L'index detaille de la Metaphysique d'Aristote publie en 1597 par Suarez, constitue une introduction aux Disputes metaphysiques. Il a pour objectif de produire les conditions d'un renouvellement de l'heritage de la Metaphysique d'Aristote en redefinissant le contenu et les limites d'une science de l'etant.Le projet de refondation de la metaphysique comme ontologie s'effectue dans cet ouvrage de presentation en quatre moments:1) L'exposition du probleme de la nature de la connaissance qui implique le depassement de l'equivocite de la notion (...) de sagesse.2) La determination de l'objet, des proprietes et des principes veritables de la metaphysique en tant que science de l'universel, c'est a dire de l'etantite de l'etant selon son abstraction la plus extreme.3) La redefinition du statut de la realite a partir d'une theorie de la representation de l'objet qui fasse abstraction de l'objet, c'est a dire qui procede a l'indifferenciation des etants afin d'en donner une representation universelle et abstraite; ainsi est affirme le primat d'une ontologie de l'essence sur toute ontotheologie.4) Enfin, la mise en place d'un systeme de reference transcendantal rendant possible une fondation universelle de la comprehension de l'etant par la mediation d'une theorie du concept.L'index prefigure ainsi, par son ambition et sa demarche, ce que Heidegger nommera, en evoquant la philosophie de Suarez, l'avenement du "caractere fondamental de la metaphysique moderne". (shrink)

This article focuses on the problem of oratorical attention as it was formulated and transmitted by medieval theologians. Since a continuous attention is humanly impossible and the degradation of attention inevitable, how can one ensure the moral and religious value of prayer? The notion of virtual attention is an answer to that problem, allowing a certain persistence of attention within distraction itself. The article focuses on the building of this notion in Thomas Aquinas and on its more systematic development in (...) Francisco Suárez; it shows how this notion was used in various ways, favoring moral laxity or, on the contrary, supporting a demand for concentration and constancy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials ed. by Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom SorellRichard A. WatsonRoger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell, editors. Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xviii + 170. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $18.95.This volume includes primarily source materials from authors who were contemporary to Descartes’s composition of the Meditations. Thus there are no selections from Augustine, Aquinas, and Montaigne, for (...) example, who were more influential on the Meditations than some of the authors excerpted. Of course their influence is already amply documented by such scholars as Gilson and Gouhier. Probably the most important source included is Suárez, whose role is championed by Jean-Luc Marion in several works. Readers should look for the forthcoming Index Augustino-Cartèsian: Textes et Commentaire by Zbigniew Janowski (Paris: J. Vrin) for a startling challenge to the view that Descartes is Suárezian.In the volume under review, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo is of special interest because Descartes thought of refuting him item by item (but decided exposition of his own view would be adequate). In his youth Descartes had a definite interest in Petrus Ramus, although Beeckman told him his method consisted of tired old tricks. Francisco Sanches and Pierre Charron are important for their expositions of sceptical arguments and attitudes. Christopher Clavius is Descartes’s direct predecessor in mathematical analysis, and none of Descartes’s protests that he never read the man has convinced anyone. Scipion Dupleix is a fine example of how the Old Philosophy appeared to the New Philosophers, and Marin Mersenne, of course, compiled material on every subject Descartes ever had an interest in. Pierre Gassendi exercised Descartes’s ire more than any other commentator on the Meditations, and Descartes again probably read Gassendi’s continuing criticisms even though he claimed he wouldn’t. [End Page 366]Of special interest is Jean de Silhon, an old friend of Descartes’s who published a book containing a proto-cogito three years before the Meditations appeared. François de la Mothe le Vayer represents the libertine strain many detect in Descartes’s writings, while Jean-Baptiste Morin provides fodder for those who detect Descartes’s piety, although Descartes asserts that the man is an idiot for defending the immobility of the earth. Finally, Charles Sorel provides an example of the deductive mode of exposition in a text that shows that the notion of a unified science was more than Cartesian. One contemporary who was left out and should have been included was the Augustinian Guillaume Gibieuf.But overall, this is an interesting and useful collection of works Descartes doubtless knew. [End Page 367]Richard A. WatsonWashington UniversityCopyright © 1999 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

This study examines the answers of Suarez and Descartes to basic questions regarding the philosophical knowledge of God. It is placed against the background of the reactions to both by Dutch Reformed theologians and philosophers in the seventeenth Century.

Cualquier estudio focalizado en la ontología propuesta por Leibniz debería prestar atención a conceptos claves, tales como esencias o posibilidades, existencia o actualización, contingencia, necesidad y libertad, entre otros. Al aproximarse a estas nociones, Leibniz reconoció abierta y explícitamente que los temas por los cuales él se interesaba habían sido tratados por Francisco Suárez, René Descartes y Baruch Spinoza. No obstante, se detecta una falta de coincidencia entre las posiciones adoptadas por estos pensadores y las tesis defendidas por Leibniz. Tal (...) diferencia resalta cuando dicho filósofo se propuso explicar, de un modo claro, distinto y conciso, la predisposición de las esencias para existir. Este deseo metafísico trasciende cualquier modalidad de reduccionismo lógico, y si se materializara, el resultado sería una actualización que Leibniz tiene a bien presentar, sin embargo, como contingente y limitada en la mayoría de los casos. (shrink)

In his discussions of the Eucharist, Descartes gives prominent place to the notion of the “surfaces” of bodies. Given this context, it may seem that his account of surfaces is of limited interest. However, I hope to show that such an account is in fact linked to a philosophically significant medieval debate over whether certain mathematical “indivisibles”, including surfaces, really exist in nature. Moreover, the particular emphasis in Descartes on the fact that surfaces are modes rather than parts of bodies (...) bespeaks the influence of the later scholastic Francisco Suárez. However, in his own contribution to the medieval debate, Suárez refrained from identifying surfaces with modes, holding instead that they are special “constituents” of bodies that differ from the parts of which these bodies are composed. Two main conclusions derive from the comparison of the views of Suárez and Descartes on surfaces. The first is that Descartes’s “modal realist” account is in fact superior to the “moderate realist” account that Suárez offers, for reasons internal to Suárez’s own system. The second is that Suárez’s reasons for refraining from adopting modal realism in this case serve to highlight a serious deficiency in Descartes’s version of this view. In this way, a consideration of the relevant Suárezian background allows us to better appreciate both the strengths and the weaknesses of Descartes’s stance on the metaphysics of surfaces. (shrink)

A Egmond, le 16 avril 1648, un peu moins de deux ans avant sa mort, Descartes s'entretient avec un étudiant hollandais en théologie, Frans Burman. Le jeune homme de vingt ans présente au philosophe de courts extraits de ses principales oeuvres publiées (Méditations métaphysiques, Principes de la philosophie, Discours de la méthode) que l'auteur en personne se charge d'expliquer, répondant aussi aux objections de son interlocuteur. Ce texte possède donc un statut décisif dans le corpus cartésien car il s'agit (...) d'un commentaire des points les plus délicats de la philosophie de Descartes par lui-même. Ce faisant, il ne se contente pas de répéter ce qu'il a déjà écrit sur le doute, la connaissance sensible, l'existence de Dieu, le mouvement de la matière ou encore la santé du corps, il ne cesse au contraire d'approfondir, de nuancer, voire de transformer les thèses sur lesquelles il est interrogé. Ce texte interdit ainsi de faire de la pensée de Descartes une "doctrine" stable et immuable. Il donne plutôt à voir de manière éclatante une pensée en marche, celle d'un philosophe majeur et reconnu qui accepte pourtant de remettre sur la table de travail les points essentiels d'une oeuvre déjà constituée en fonction des questions précises qui lui sont posées. Bien plus qu'un simple résumé de sa philosophie, cet Entretien montre l'inlassable exigence de l'effort de la pensée cartésienne à la conquête de sa propre clarté. (shrink)

This paper compares the development of the notion of continuous quantity in the work of Francisco Suárez and René Descartes. The discussion begins with a consideration of Suárez’s rejection of the view – common to ‘realists’ such as Thomas Aquinas and ‘nominalists’ such as William of Ockham – that quantity is inseparable from the extension of material integral parts. Crucial here is Suárez’s view that quantified extension exhibits a kind of impenetrability that distinguishes it from other kinds of extension. This (...) view sheds considerable light on initially obscure remarks on impenetrability in Descartes’ late correspondence with Henry More. Though Descartes differs from Suárez and other major scholastic figures in his understanding of the relation of quantity to material substance, he nonetheless requires in the end some version of the Suárezian distinction between quantified and unquantified extension. (shrink)

La «démythologisation» est une herméneutique philosophique forgée par Hans Jonas au début de son itinéraire intellectuel, afin d'interpréter existentiellement les récits mythologiques ainsi que les textes théologiques et philosophiques de l’Antiquité tardive. Il s’agissait d’abord d’une méthodologie d’objectivation et subjectivation pour comprendre l’expérience existentielle de l’homme gnostique face à la divinité et l’être dans le monde. Dans la suite, Jonas a développé l’herméneutique de la démythologisation par l’objectivation et la subjectivation par rapport aux textes néotestamentaires. Le mot démythologisation (Entmythologisierung) est (...) utilisé par lui pour la première fois en 1930 dans une étude philosophique, «Sur la structure herméneutique du dogme», pour comprendre le problème existentiel de la liberté chrétienne. Quelques années plus tard, il a développé une phénoménologie herméneutique, également par l’objectivation et la subjectivation, afin de comprendre l’être vivant et la particularité de l’homme dans la nature. Entre-temps, Hans Jonas a aussi utilisé l’herméneutique de la démythologisation par l’objectivation et la subjectivation pour critiquer la philosophie de Martin Heidegger et la théologie de Rudolf Bultmann dans plusieurs articles philosophiques par rapport au gnosticisme, à la théologie et à la démythologisation bultmannienne, ainsi que pour rédiger Le Concept de Dieu après Auschwitz. (shrink)

This essay explores the reception and used of Suárez’s philosophy by two canonical early modern philosophers, René Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz. It is argued that Descartes’ theory of distinctions does not betray any indications of being Suárezian, despite many claims to the contrary. Leibniz, however, was a very different reader of Suárez’s works, it is argued, and his thinking about individuation was clearly influenced by Suárez even if he did not adopt the Suárezian position in the end.

Suarez precursor de Descartes? A doutrina suazeriana sobre a causa final revista Resumo: Stephan Schmid busca mostrar que Francisco Suárez é um precursor da crítica que Descartes fez à causalidade final na explicação da natureza. Suárez teria reduzido a noção de causa à causa eficiente, teria eliminado a presença da causa final nas ações dos agentes naturais, isto é, daqueles entes que não possuem intelecto, e teria eliminado a presença da causa final nas ações divinas. Deste modo, ele seria (...) um precursor do pensamento mecanicista de Descartes e, sob certo aspecto, também de Espinosa. Contra esta interpretação, procuro mostrar que Suárez não reduz a noção de causa à causa eficiente, não elimina a presença da causa final nem nos agentes naturais, nem na ação divina e que, portanto, ele não pode ser considerado, neste assunto, um precursor de Descartes nem de Espinosa. Palavras-Chave: Metafísica. Causa eficiente. Causa final.: Stephan Schmid try to show that Francisco Suárez is a forerunner of the criticism made by Descartes of end causes in the explanation of nature. The hypothesis is that Suárez had reduced the notion of cause to efficient cause, had eliminated the presence of end causes in the actions of the natural agents, i. e., of the beings that have not an intellect, and had eliminated the presence of end causes in the actions of God. In this way he would be a forerunner of the mechanistic thought of Descartes and, from a certain aspect, of Spinoza. Against this interpretation I try to show that Suárez do not reduce the notion of cause to efficient cause and that he eliminates the presence of end cause neither in the natural agents nor in the actions of God. Therefore, he should be considered in this issue a forerunner neither of Descartes nor of Spinoza. Keywords: Metaphysics. Efficient cause. End cause. Résumé: Stephan Schmid essaie de montrer que Francisco Suárez est um précurseur de la critique faite par Descartes à la cause finale dans l’explication de la nature. Suárez aurait réduit la notion de cause à la cause efficiente, elimine la présence de la cause finale dans les actions des agentes naturels, c'est-à-dire, de ceux qui ne possèdent pas d'intellect, et aurait elimine la présence de la cause finale dans les actions divines. Il serait ainsi um précurseur de la pensée mécaniste de Descartes et, dans une certaine mesure, de Spinoza. Contre cette interprétation, j'essaie de montrer que Suárez ne réduit pas la notion de cause à la cause efficiente, n'élimine pas la présence de la cause finale ni dans les agentes naturels ni dans l'action divine et qu'il ne peut donc être considéré comme um précurseur de Descartes ni d'Espinosa. Mots clés: Metaphysique. Cause finale. Cause eficiente. Data de registro: 13/05/2019 Data de aceite: /10/2019. (shrink)

Este texto pretende indicar alguns aspectos da trajetória da noção de beatitude, de Agostinho a Descartes. Através da transformação semântico-conceitual da expressão homo capax Dei, podemos observar que, de Agostinho a Tomás de Aquino e deste a Suarez e a Descartes, a beatitude vai progressivamente deixando de ser entendida como capacidade de “conter” Deus e torna-se cada vez mais a capacidade racional - “natural” - de “pensar” Deus.

An English translation of the Second Disputation.

This paper deals with Suárez's theory of extension and continuous quantity, as it is discussed in the Metaphysical Disputations and as a possible source for Descartes's concept of res extensa. In a first part of the paper, I analyse Suárez' account of divisibility and extension in a comparison with the Dominicans', Scotus and Fonseca's, and Ockham's. In the light of this analysis, Suárez's most original contribution seems being the claim that material composites have integral parts 'entitatively' extended (partem extra partem) (...) independently from categorial quantity. Such a theory allows Suárez to merge the Dominicans', the Scotists' and the Ockhamists' account, as the integral parts fund the internal but pre-quantitative divisibility of body, which is the source of quantity. In a second part of the paper, I deal with the reception of Suárez’s theory (especially in Rubio, Arriaga, Araujo, Eustachius and Abra de Raçonis), as well as with Descartes’ concept of res extensa. I conclude that Suárez’s account has been mainly criticized by the seventeenth Century Aristotelianism, as well as by Descartes. Despite that, Suárez’s idea of non-quantitatively extended parts had an interesting reception and effect in the debate, and especially in the (dominant) Scotistic context. (shrink)

La dispute metaphysique XXXI condense a travers la distinction scolastique de l'essence et de l'existence ce que Heidegger a pu appeler la these de l'ontologie medievale. La determination de la distinction de l'essentia et de l'existencia au coeur de l'etant fini comme distinction de raison, s'inscrit dans un processus de constitution de la metaphysique comme ontologie de l'essence. L'essence sera conceptuellement determinee et assimilee au possible et l'existence en tant que fait brut sera identifiee a un etat de facticite et (...) de precarite entitatives. Suarez redonne ainsi un nouvel elan a la problematique de l'essence et de l'existence en la degageant de la tradition pour l'ouvrir a la modernite de sa destinee. (shrink)

In der Fünften metaphysischen Disputation behandelt Suárez die Definition der Individualität, das metaphysische Individuationsprinzip und das physische Individuationsprinzip der Substanzen und Akzidentien. Die Darlegung berücksichtigt einen großen Teil der damals maßgeblichen Literatur und gibt zugleich einen Eindruck von der Schulphysik des späten 16. Jahrhunderts.

In der Fünften metaphysischen Disputation behandelt Suárez (1548-1617) die Definition der Individualität, das metaphysische Individuationsprinzip (Individualdifferenz) und das physische Individuationsprinzip der Substanzen und Akzidentien. Die Darlegung berücksichtigt einen großen Teil der damals maßgeblichen Literatur und gibt zugleich einen Eindruck von der Schulphysik des späten 16. Jahrhunderts.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Su irez NORMAN j. WELLS IT HAS LONG BEEN ACKNOWLEDGEDthat Francisco Sufirez's distinction between a formal and an objective concept exercised some influence upon Descartes's teaching on 'idea'.' It would appear, however, that not enough attention has been given to that distinction of Sufirez (and especially to another to be mentioned shordy) to aid in dispelling what I take to be (...) a widespread confusion and misunderstanding with regard to 'idea' in Descartes, especially with respect to 'idea' taken 'objectively'. Much, if not all, of the confusion in question has to do with Descartes's admittedly equivocal use of the term 'idea'. For he had allowed that 'idea' could be taken 'materially' (materialiter), on the one hand, for the knowing activity of the intellect. On the other hand, it could be taken 'objectively' (objective) for the thing (res) represented by that knowing activity.' At this point, the contemporary reader can only be brought up short, See E. Gilson, Index scolastico-cart~sien (New York: Burt Franklin Reprint, 1912), 48-49; Discours de la m~thode: Texte et commentazre (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947), 321; G. Rodis-Lewisin her edition of Meditationes de Prima PhRosoph.m (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), 41 n. 1; L'oeuure de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971), 53~ n. 8; J. Collins, Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), 165;T.J. Cronin, S.J., Objecttve Being m Descartes and SuArez (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966); "Objective Reality of Ideas in Human Thought: Descartes and Su~rez," Wisdom in Depth: Essays in Honor of Henri Renard, SJ., eds. V. F. Daues, S.J., M. R. Holloway, S.J., L. Sweeney, S.J. (Milwaukee : Bruce, 1966), 68-79; L. Gilen, S.J., "Uber die Beziehungen Descartes zur zeitgenossischen Scholastik," Scholastik 32 (1957): 41-66; R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la th~orie cart6sienne de l'&re objectif," Revue d'histoire de la philosophic 3 (1929): 464-72;J. Owens, C.S.S.R., in The Cambridge HtstoU of Later Medu,val Philosophy, eds. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 459; G. Nuchelmans,Judgment and Propositwnfrom Descartesto Kant (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1983), 36-54. " Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam et P. Tannery, 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1897-19o9; hereafter cited according to volume, page and line), Praefatio ad Lectorem, 7: 8. 19-251 "Sed respondeo hic subesse aequivocationem in voce ideae: sumi enim potest vel materialiter, pro operatione intellectus, quo sensu me perfectior dici nequit, vel objective, pro re per istam operationem repraesentata, quae res, etsi non supponatur extra intellectum existere, potest tamen me esse perfectior ratione suae essentiae." It is clear that two realities are to be causally accounted for. The [33] 34 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28"1 JANUARY 1990 conditioned as we are by an appreciation of 'objectivity' altogether extramental! It makes for a considerable wrench of perspective to do justice to Descartes's acknowledged doctrine of intramental objectivity and an intramental 'thing represented' (resrepraesentata). 'Idea', then, in traditional Cartesian fashion, designates the act of representing as well as the 'thing represented '. S Yet, for all this, and despite repeated expressions of the same doctrine, there is a persistent tendency in the history of Cartesianism and its scholarship to interpret 'idea' taken 'objectively' as in some way representative. Contrary to what I take to be Descartes's constant position, such a rendering unwittingly transfers that function which is proper to the cognitive activity, mind is the efficient cause of its cognitive activity. With respect to ideas taken 'objectively', such as the ideas of God and the triangle on the levels of metaphysical and mathematical intelligibility, an efficient cause, extrinsic to the mind, is certainly at issue. For here we are in the presence of what is independent of the mind, however intramental it may be. On the triangle, see Medit. 5; 7: 64. ]4s7 : "...est tamen profecto determinata quaedam ejus natura, sire essentia, sive forma, immutabUis et aeterna, quae a me non efficta est, nec a mente mea dependet." For the idea of God, see Medit. 5; 7: 68. l o-12: "Nam sane multis modis inteUigo illam [ideam... (shrink)

Annotation A central piece of Suarez's (1584-1617) metaphysics, which is considered important because it was not a commentary on Aristotle, and was used in universities and by both his fellow Jesuits and Protestant scholars and theologians for centuries. He deals with the formal principles of the nature of material substances, that is, their substantial form, which is central to his interpretation of Aristotelian realism. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 127-128 [Access article in PDF] Dennis Des Chene. Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. viii + 220. Cloth, $45.00. The history of philosophy aims at the recovery and interpretation of past thought, and its reconstructions seek to avoid anachronism. Dennis Des Chene's book is exemplary in this respect. It offers a sophisticated (...) and accurate report on Late Scholastic views and arguments about life and its form and principle, the soul. It is full of subtle and informed discussions of texts from, principally, Francisco Toledo, Pedro Fonseca, the commentators from Coimbra, Francisco Suárez, and Rodrigo de Arriaga.But the aim of the history of philosophy is philosophical and not exclusively historical. Recovery of the past is, for the historian of philosophy, at the service of contemporary understanding. The Late Scholastic authors studied by Des Chene understood this to be so. Suárez, for instance, distinguished between those doctrines and inquiries which are "antiquated (antiquatae) and wholly relegated from philosophy" and those which are not (Metaphysical Disputations, "Copious Index to Aristotle's Metaphysics," Book I, ch. 7). Unfortunately, when judged from this perspective, Des Chene's book is not as successful.In spite of its many comparisons between current debates, Descartes's views, and Late Scholastic doctrines, the book does not succeed in extracting much by way of genuine philosophical insight. Though well-informed and intelligent, for the most part these glosses are mere statements of Late Scholastic views in contemporary terms. But correctly describing alchemical theories from the point of view of modern chemistry does not make them any less archaic.This book is indeed more a contribution to the history of ideas or of science than to the history of philosophy. To be fair, it is true that, first, as such it is a most valuable contribution; second, much of what Late Scholastics had to say about life and the soul is indeed antiquated; third, even if philosophically antiquated, an adequate grasp of Late Aristotelian thought on these matters is necessary to understand Descartes and subsequent developments; and finally, the kind of informed historical recovery that Des Chene has provided here is a necessary condition for whatever philosophical lessons could be gained from these texts.Life's Form is divided into four parts. The first, "Data for the Study of Souls," looks at the phenomena which the Late Aristotelians sought to understand and explain, recovering both their grasp of the place of the living among other substances, and the constraints, [End Page 127] originating both from accumulated experience and from Christian faith, to which they were subject.The second part, "Defining the Soul," first examines the question of how to define life. It then looks at the definition of the soul as "first act of an organic or potentially living physical body"—whether the soul is an accident of the body, an entirely separate substance, or the substantial form of the body. Here one finds addressed the question whether there is a form of the body separate from the soul, or whether strictly the body has only one form, the soul. The issue of cadaveric forms, peculiar forms of corpses arising after death and the departure of the soul, comes up here. In the last section of this part Des Chene examines the definition of the soul as a principle of life and the relation, both epistemological and ontological, between this definition in terms of the operations of the soul, and the earlier one of the soul as form, that is, in terms of its being.Part 3, "Powers and Parts," looks at the vegetative (nutritive, reproductive, and augmentative), animal (sensitive), and spiritual (intellective) powers of the soul. Des Chene examines the criteria for distinguishing between powers, the relation between the one soul and its many powers, and the unity of the soul. "Unity," the fourth part of the book, takes up this last topic. It looks at the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual powers as "parts" of the... (shrink)