We examine the interrelationships between analog computational modelling and analogue (physical) modelling. To this end, we attempt a regimentation of the informal distinction between analog and digital, which turns on the consideration of computing in a broader context. We argue that in doing so one comes to see that (scientific) computation is better conceptualised as an epistemic process relative to agents, wherein representations play a key role. We distinguish between two, conceptually distinct, kinds of representation that, we argue, (...) are both involved in each case of computing. Based on the semantic and syntactic properties of each of these representations, we put forward a new account of the distinction between analog and digital computing. We discuss how the developed account is able to explain various properties of different models of computation, and we finish by conceptually comparing analog computational modelling to analogue (scale) modelling. It is concluded that, contrary to the standard view, the two practices are orthogonal, differing both in their foundations and in the epistemic functions they fulfil. (shrink)

The paper argues that digital ontology (the ultimate nature of reality is digital, and the universe is a computational system equivalent to a Turing Machine) should be carefully distinguished from informational ontology (the ultimate nature of reality is structural), in order to abandon the former and retain only the latter as a promising line of research. Digital vs. analogue is a Boolean dichotomy typical of our computational paradigm, but digital and analogue are only “modes (...) of presentation” of Being (to paraphrase Kant), that is, ways in which reality is experienced or conceptualised by an epistemic agent at a given level of abstraction. A preferable alternative is provided by an informational approach to structural realism, according to which knowledge of the world is knowledge of its structures. The most reasonable ontological commitment turns out to be in favour of an interpretation of reality as the totality of structures dynamically interacting with each other. The paper is the first part (the pars destruens) of a two-part piece of research. The pars construens, entitled “A Defence of Informational Structural Realism”, is developed in a separate article, also published in this journal. (shrink)

Representation is central to contemporary theorizing about the mind/brain. But the nature of representation--both in the mind/brain and more generally--is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations vary in a step-wise manner. I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is used in cognitive science; in its (...) place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis's account of analog and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation. I will argue that the distinctions available in this four-fold account accord with representational features of theoretical interest in cognitive science more usefully than the received analog/digital dichotomy. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for three claims. The first is that the difference between analog and digital representation lies in the format and not the medium of representation. The second is that whether a given system is analog or digital will sometimes depend on facts about the user of that system. The third is that the first two claims are implicit in Haugeland's (1998) account of the distinction.

The ‘received view’ of the analog–digital distinction holds that analog representations are continuous while digital representations are discrete. In this paper I first provide support for the received view by showing how it (1) emerges from the theory of computation, and (2) explains engineering practices. Second, I critically assess several recently offered alternatives, arguing that to the degree they are justified they demonstrate not that the received view is incorrect, but rather that distinct senses of the terms have (...) become entrenched specific fields, perhaps most notably in the cognitive psychology of mental imagery. (shrink)

Noisefest! is an interactive, multisensory experience centered around a small Maine town and rooted in the sounds and noise of its streets. Comprising a Virtual Reality tour, soundwalks and remixes, a 2D laser cut geographical map with Arduino controllers, and a Futuristic noise intoner, one of the objectives of this collaborative, transdisciplinary, and theory-based project is to create concrete opportunities for students to participate in the “real” world and engage with the materiality of noise and its manifestations by interacting with (...) the soundscape through novel, interactive, and multisensory practices. Noisefest! is also an example of how one can creatively and artistically extend the reach of the digital humanities beyond the borders of academia and into the public realm. (shrink)

We analyzed the association between the analog and the digital home learning environment in toddlers’ and preschoolers’ homes, and whether both aspects are associated with children’s social and academic competencies. Here, we used data of the national representative sample of Growing up in Germany II, which includes 4,914 children aged 0–5 years. The HLE was assessed via parental survey that included items on the analog HLE and items on the digital HLE. Children’s socio-emotional, practical life skills, and academic (...) competencies were assessed via standardized parental ratings. Our results indicate that there are two dimensions of the HLE, an analog and a digital, that are slightly positively associated, especially in the toddler age group. For toddlers, only analog HLE activities were associated with better socio-emotional outcomes and practical life skills. However, interaction effects indicate that toddlers with less frequent analog HLE activities showed better socio-emotional skills in households with more frequent digital activities. For preschoolers, digital HLE activities were associated with weaker socio-emotional skills but higher academic skills, although the analog HLE shows higher effect sizes for the academic outcomes. Our study points out that analog and digital HLE activities seem to be partly associated, but not interchangeable. Further, they seem to be important variables that can explain individual differences in young children’s socio-emotional, practical life, and academic competencies. However, digital media usage at home may also have negative effects on children’s social–emotional competencies. This association needs to be investigated further. (shrink)

The abstract basis of modern computation is the formal description of a finite state machine, the Universal Turing Machine, based on manipulation of integers and logic symbols. In this contribution to the discourse on the computer-brain analogy, we discuss the extent to which analog computing, as performed by the mammalian brain, is like and unlike the digital computing of Universal Turing Machines. We begin with ordinary reality being a permanent dialog between continuous and discontinuous worlds. So it is with (...) computing, which can be analog or digital, and is often mixed. The theory behind computers is essentially digital, but efficient simulations of phenomena can be performed by analog devices; indeed, any physical calculation requires implementation in the physical world and is therefore analog to some extent, despite being based on abstract logic and arithmetic. The mammalian brain, comprised of neuronal networks, functions as an analog device and has given rise to artificial neural networks that are implemented as digital algorithms but function as analog models would. Analog constructs compute with the implementation of a variety of feedback and feedforward loops. In contrast, digital algorithms allow the implementation of recursive processes that enable them to generate unparalleled emergent properties. We briefly illustrate how the cortical organization of neurons can integrate signals and make predictions analogically. While we conclude that brains are not digital computers, we speculate on the recent implementation of human writing in the brain as a possible digital path that slowly evolves the brain into a genuine (slow) Turing machine. (shrink)

It will always remain a remarkable phenomenon in the history of philosophy, that there was a time, when even mathematicians, who at the same time were philosophers, began to doubt, not of the accuracy of their geometrical propositions so far as they concerned space, but of their objective validity and the applicability of this concept itself, and of all its corollaries, to nature. They showed much concern whether a line in nature might not consist of physical points, and consequently that (...) true space in the object might consist of simple [discrete] parts, while the space which the geometer has in his mind [being continuous] cannot be such. (shrink)

Receptor tyrosine kinases exhibit ligand‐induced activity and uptake into cells via endocytosis. In the case of epidermal growth factor (EGF) receptor (EGFR), the resulting endosomes are trafficked to the perinuclear region, where dephosphorylation of receptors occurs, which are subsequently directed to degradation. Traveling endosomes bearing phosphorylated EGFRs are subjected to the activity of cytoplasmic phosphatases as well as interactions with the endoplasmic reticulum (ER). The peri‐nuclear region harbors ER‐embedded phosphatases, a component of the EGFR‐bearing endosome‐ER contact site. The ER is (...) also emerging as a central player in spatiotemporal control of endosomal motility, positioning, tubulation, and fission. Past studies strongly suggest that the physical interaction between the ER and endosomes forms a reaction “unit” for EGFR dephosphorylation. Independently, endosomes have been implicated to enable quantization of EGFR signals by modulation of the phosphorylation levels. Here, we review the distinct mechanisms by which endosomes form the logistical means for signal quantization and speculate on the role of the ER. (shrink)

Flanders will complete the migration from analog to digital terrestrial television by the end of 2008. Despite the cable dominated television landscape, the Flemish government is aiming at a smooth transition from analog to digital terrestrial television. Therefore, a multi-methodical study has been set up by order of the Flemish government to understand the specific features and needs of analog antenna viewers and their expectations for the analog switch-off. The study shows that there are three distinctive types of (...) analog antenna viewers. The results demonstrate that the antenna viewers are rather badly informed about the upcoming analog switch-off, which may lead to a negative attitude and may impede a smooth transition. Finally, antenna viewers seem to be rather conservative viewers: they wish to keep on watching the same television programs from the same channels. Moreover, digital terrestrial television is their preferred alternative. (shrink)

It is fairly well-known that certain hard computational problems (that is, 'difficult' problems for a digital processor to solve) can in fact be solved much more easily with an analog machine. This raises questions about the true nature of the distinction between analog and digital computation (if such a distinction exists). I try to analyze the source of the observed difference in terms of (1) expanding parallelism and (2) more generally, infinite-state Turing machines. The issue of discreteness vs (...) continuity will also be touched upon, although it is not so important for analyzing these particular problems. (shrink)

Sean Cubitt _The Cinema Effect_ Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004 ISBN 0-262-03312-7 456 pp.

We argue that living systems process information such that functionality emerges in them on a continuous basis. We then provide a framework that can explain and model the normativity of biological functionality. In addition we offer an explanation of the anticipatory nature of functionality within our overall approach. We adopt a Peircean approach to Biosemiotics, and a dynamical approach to Digital-Analog relations and to the interplay between different levels of functionality in autonomous systems, taking an integrative approach. We then (...) apply the underlying biosemiotic logic to a particular biological system, giving a model of the B-Cell Receptor signaling system, in order to demonstrate how biosemiotic concepts can be used to build an account of biological information and functionality. Next we show how this framework can be used to explain and model more complex aspects of biological normativity, for example, how cross-talk between different signaling pathways can be avoided. Overall, we describe an integrated theoretical framework for the emergence of normative functions and, consequently, for the way information is transduced across several interconnected organizational levels in an autonomous system, and we demonstrate how this can be applied in real biological phenomena. Our aim is to open the way towards realistic tools for the modeling of information and normativity in autonomous biological agents. (shrink)

The distinction between analog and digital representation is reexamined; it emerges that a more fundamental distinction is that between symbolic and analog simulation. Analog simulation is analyzed in terms of a (near) isomorphism of causal structures between a simulating and a simulated process. It is then argued that a core concept, naturalistic analog simulation, may play a role in a bottom-up theory of adaptive behavior which provides an alternative to representational analyses. The appendix discusses some formal conditions for naturalistic (...) analog simulation. (shrink)

We live in an era characterized by technology as an integral part of the overall experiences. Non-hierarchic access to communication and virtual contacts in the metaverse, experienced as no less real than those in the brick-and-mortar world. The global health crisis has further highlighted the understanding that the integration of technology into our lives is inevitable, and when it comes to teaching and learning, the right use of technology can take teachers and learners to new, exciting places. The social distancing (...) regulations imposed worldwide provided educators with an opportunity to try out a variety of technological tools that enable surprising collaborations and access to information that encourages cognitive flexibility and a reexamination of our assumptions on knowledge, learning, teaching, human interaction, and space-time’s limitations. However, one great challenge within this ongoing transition concerns underprepared educators, feeling the pressure to make a successful shift while sustaining their educational inner compass regarding what constitutes adequate education. In this teacher’s self-study, I examined my teaching experience while teaching online. Informed by existing research, critical reflections, dialogue with a critical friend, a community of colleagues, and students’ artifacts, I inquire whether—and how—I can practice dialogical pedagogy while teaching online. (shrink)

The issue of symbol grounding is not essentially different in analog and digital computation. The principal difference between the two is that in analog computers continuous variables change continuously, whereas in digital computers discrete variables change in discrete steps (at the relevant level of analysis). Interpretations are imposed on analog computations just as on digital computations: by attaching meanings to the variables and the processes defined over them. As Harnad (2001) claims, states acquire intrinsic meaning through their (...) relation to the real (physical) environment, for example, through transduction. However, this is independent of the question of the continuity or discreteness of the variables or the transduction processes. (shrink)

Through an extended ethnography of a sports team of boys growing from 7 to 11 years old, I explore Norwegian parents' anxieties about the digital world encroaching on their children's lives. I compare parents' monitoring of their children's (non)digital leisure activities with how kids interact (non)digitally. On the surface, as parents observe how their children's bodies move from screens to sports, they see their kids' attentive hands shifting focus from electronic gaming and screen swiping to a more welcomed (...) ballplaying and high‐fiving with nonelectronic teammates. However, close inspection reveals that my interlocutors never completely enter or leave the digital, but dwell within both worlds simultaneously. The result shows the meaning of children sports as changed by the digital, how the digital appears in the foreground or the background of our interactions, and how an emphasis on attentive hands can help unearth how the digital passes through us to constitute our lifeworlds. (shrink)

Characterizing different kinds of representation is of fundamental importance to cognitive science, and one traditional way of doing so is in terms of the analog–digital distinction. Indeed the distinction is often appealed to in ways both narrow and broad. In this paper I argue that the analog–digital distinction does not apply to representational schemes but only to representational systems, where a representational system is constituted by a representational scheme and its user, and that whether a representational system is (...) analog or non-analog depends on facts about that user. This aspect of the distinction has gone unnoticed, and I argue that the failure to notice it can be an impediment to scientific progress. (shrink)

Computationalism about the brain is the view that the brain literally performs computations. For the view to be interesting, we need an account of computation. The most well-developed account of computation is Turing Machine computation, the account provided by theoretical computer science which provides the basis for contemporary digital computers. Some have thought that, given the seemingly-close analogy between the all-or-nothing nature of neural spikes in brains and the binary nature of digital logic, neural computation could be a (...) species of digital computation. A few recent authors have offered arguments against this idea; here, I review recent findings in neuroscience that further cement the implausibility of this view. However, I argue that we can retain the view that the brain is a computer if we expand what we mean by “computation” to include analog computation. I articulate an account of analog computation as the manipulation of analog representations based on previous work on the difference between analog and non-analog representations, extending a view originally articulated in Shagrir :271–279, 2010). Given that analog computation constitutes a significant chapter in the history of computation, this revision of computationalism to include analog computation is not an ad hoc addition. Brains may well be computers, but of the analog kind, rather than the digital kind. (shrink)

From analog to digital news -- A new paradigm for news -- Legacy news organizations move from analog to digital -- Intellectual property and information sharing -- Citizen responsibility in the digital era -- Thinking through ethical issues in digital journalism -- DOIT, a process for normative analysis -- Issues in convergent journalism -- Privacy and disclosure -- Deception in sourcing and presentation -- Media corruption -- Using the virtual world to create a better physical world (...) -- Beyond ethics: communicating wisely -- Digital diversity and democracy. (shrink)

Digital and analog: What do these terms mean today? The use and meaning of such terms change through time. The analog, in particular, seems to go through various phases of popularity and disuse, its appeal pegged most frequently to nostalgic longings for nontechnical or romantic modes of art and culture. The definition of the digital vacillates as well, its precise definition often eclipsed by a kind of fever-pitched industrial bonanza around the latest technologies and the latest commercial ventures. (...) One common response to the question of the digital is to make reference to things like Twitter, Playstation, or computers in general. Here one might be correct, but only coincidentally, for the basic order of digitality (the digitality of digitality) has not yet been demonstrated through mere denotation. And the second question—the question of the analog—is harder still, with responses often also consisting of mere denotations of things: sound waves, the phonograph needle, magnetic tape, a sundial. At least denotation itself is analogical. This article will aim to define the analog explicitly and argue, perhaps counterintuitively, that the golden age of analog thinking was not a few decades past, prior to the wide-spread adoption of the computer. In fact, the fields of structuralism and poststructuralism that emerged in the middle to late twentieth century, concurrent with the deployment of the digital computer, were characteristically digital, what with their focus on the symbolic order and logical economies. If anything, the golden age of analog is happening today, all around us, as evidenced by the proliferation of characteristically analog concerns: sensation, materiality, experience, affect, ethics, and aesthetics. (shrink)

Hume's attempt to show that deduction is the only legitimate form of inference presupposes that enumerative induction is the only non-deductive form of inference. In actuality, enumerative induction is not even a form of inference: all supposed cases of enumerative induction are disguised cases of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), so far as they aren't simply cases of mentation of a purely associative kind and, consequently, of a kind that is non-inductive and otherwise non-inferential. The justification for IBE lies (...) in two truths, each analytic, viz. that good explanations eliminate anomalies and, second, that anomaly-elimination is identical with discontinuity-elimination. Given these truisms, along with the empirical data to which even skeptics must grant that we have access, it follows that induction is truth-conducive, a corrollary being that skepticism with regard to the veridicality of our senses is indefensible. Hume's erroneous beliefs about non-deductive inference are consequences of his belief that the world has a digital, as opposed to an analogue, structure--of, in other words, his belief that the spatiotemporal manifold decomposes into minimal units. This belief of his is not only false, but analytically so, and its negation has the consequence--for reasons additional to the one already given---that many forms of skepticism are non-starters. It also has the consequence, later given empirical confirmation by the (apparent) truth of Relativity Theory, that spatiotemporal relations are causal relations. Finally, it has the consequence that, contrary to what Hume argues, there are instances of causation. Additional reinforcemet for this claim is shown to lie in a fact first identified by Kant, viz. that we couldn't even ask whether or not there were instances of causation unless there were in fact such instances. Other, similarly 'transcendental' arguments of Kant's are put forth, sometimes in a modified form, so as to buttress the anti-skeptical positions advocated in thsi paper. (shrink)

This paper considers the particular ways in which the familiar letter and twenty-first century technologies like the Internet differingly shaped and shape our experience of distance and presence. It follows Heidegger, Dreyfus, and Borgmann in critiquing the kinds of experience and action the Internet makes possible, and—by way of Benjamin’s concept of “aura”—argues that while mediated communication over distance might have never been easier, faster, or cheaper, this increase in our effective power comes at the cost of a diminution of (...) the affective power of the messages carried. (shrink)

This is the first monograph to develop a hermeneutic approach to the digital--as both a technological milieu and a cultural phenomenon. While philosophical in its orientation, the book covers a wide body of literature across science and technology studies, media studies, digital humanities, digital sociology, cognitive science, and the study of artificial intelligence. In the first part of the book, the author formulates an epistemological thesis according to which the "virtual never ended." Although the frontiers between the (...) real and the virtual are certainly more porous today, they still exist and endure. In the book's second part, the author offers an ontological reflection on emerging digital technologies as "imaginative machines." He introduces the concept of emagination, arguing that human schematizations are always externalized into technologies, and that human imagination has its analog in the digital dynamics of articulation between databases and algorithms. The author takes an ethical and political stance in the concluding chapter. He resorts to the notion of "digital habitus" for claiming that within the digital we are repeatedly being reconducted to an oversimplified image and understanding of ourselves. Digital Hermeneutics will be of interest to scholars across a wide range of disciplines, including those working on philosophy of technology, hermeneutics, science and technology studies, media studies, and the digital humanities. (shrink)

This encyclopaedia entry defines ‘analog(ue) photography’ as a construct of the digital age. After first situating the concept’s history in relation to that of the larger field of ‘the analog’, thereby exposing its connection to the American field of cybernetics, the entry describes how analog photography’s identity as a synonym for film was initially constructed and has subsequently evolved. Then it elaborates on the category’s formulation as a site of resistance to emerging technologies. Analog photography’s ongoing usage, the entry (...) suggests, is a testament to the way that information-age epistemologies have organized the shape and scope of the photographic field. (shrink)

Pervasive digitality reveals us as analogue creatures that are unprepared for a world and a logic generated increasingly through automation. Promulgated by capitalism, digitality has created a new form of alienation, one far more powerful and comprehensive than that envisaged by either Marx or Lukács in the analogue-industrial age. Digital alienation-through-automation is the central process in our digital post-modernity. The effects reach increasing registers and spheres of culture, economy and politics. This essay considers the effects within (...) the production of knowledge within higher education. Through a critique of Clayton Christensen’s concept of ‘disruptive technologies’, it develops the argument that knowledge produced in our higher institutions of learning suffer from two forms of ‘knowledge capture’. The first and most comprehensive is knowledge increasingly oriented toward instrumental outcomes, generated in vocationally oriented and market-pressured contexts, and produced by the general-sector institutions; second is knowledge, much of it profound and potentially world-changing—in economics and climate science in the cases discussed here. These are generated in both prestigious general-sector universities, and in the elite Ivy League and Russell Group universities but are unable to gain traction with an ascendant and alien post-Westphalian, post-modern and post-Enlightenment political context—created by a globalising digitality. I argue that unless we recognise our analogue essence, and that this has been alienated by digital automation, then the aporias of digitality, with knowledge production an important element, then our institution of higher learning will continue to produce much valuable knowledge that has diminishing practical (political) effect. (shrink)

A radically empirical exploration of movement and technology and the transformations of choreography in a digital realm. Digital technologies offer the possibility of capturing, storing, and manipulating movement, abstracting it from the body and transforming it into numerical information. In Moving without a Body, Stamatia Portanova considers what really happens when the physicality of movement is translated into a numerical code by a technological system. Drawing on the radical empiricism of Gilles Deleuze and Alfred North Whitehead, she argues (...) that this does not amount to a technical assessment of software's capacity to record motion but requires a philosophical rethinking of what movement itself is, or can become. Discussing the development of different audiovisual tools and the shift from analog to digital, she focuses on some choreographic realizations of this evolution, including works by Loie Fuller and Merce Cunningham. Throughout, Portanova considers these technologies and dances as ways to think—rather than just perform or perceive—movement. She distinguishes the choreographic thought from the performance: a body performs a movement, and a mind thinks or choreographs a dance. Similarly, she sees the move from analog to digital as a shift in conception rather than simply in technical realization. Analyzing choreographic technologies for their capacity to redesign the way movement is thought, Moving without a Body offers an ambitiously conceived reflection on the ontological implications of the encounter between movement and technological systems. (shrink)

There is much discussion about whether the human mind is a computer, whether the human brain could be emulated on a computer, and whether at all physical entities are computers (pancomputationalism). These discussions, and others, require criteria for what is digital. I propose that a state is digital if and only if it is a token of a type that serves a particular function - typically a representational function for the system. This proposal is made on a syntactic (...) level, assuming three levels of description (physical, syntactic, semantic). It suggests that being digital is a matter of discovery or rather a matter of how we wish to describe the world, if a functional description can be assumed. Given the criterion provided and the necessary empirical research, we should be in a position to decide on a given system (e.g. the human brain) whether it is a digital system and can thus be reproduced in a different digital system (since digital systems allow multiple realization). (shrink)

Computational neuroscientists not only employ computer models and simulations in studying brain functions. They also view the modeled nervous system itself as computing. What does it mean to say that the brain computes? And what is the utility of the ‘brain-as-computer’ assumption in studying brain functions? In previous work, I have argued that a structural conception of computation is not adequate to address these questions. Here I outline an alternative conception of computation, which I call the analog-model. The term ‘analog-model’ (...) does not mean continuous, non-discrete or non-digital. It means that the functional performance of the system simulates mathematical relations in some other system, between what is being represented. The brain-as-computer view is invoked to demonstrate that the internal cellular activity is appropriate for the pertinent information-processing task.Keywords: Computation; Computational neuroscience; Analog computers; Representation; Simulation. (shrink)

The Isis bibliography of the history of science has been published continuously since the first issue of the journal in 1913. This essay examines how information practices used to produce the bibliography have shaped, and were shaped by, the evolving discipline of the history of science. We first focus on the intellectual endeavors of George Sarton, who used the bibliography to help define and create a new academic field: the history of science. Next, we outline the administrative struggles of the (...) History of Science Society (HSS) as it tried to continue the project after Sarton’s retirement. Finally, we examine the technological aspects of producing a bibliography by focusing on the transition from analog to digital technologies over the last fifty years. In this overview, we show the central place the Isis bibliography played in the HSS community and argue that information practices surrounding the bibliography are an underutilized resource for studying the history of the discipline. (shrink)

This article presents a model and a case study of the narrative structures that are present in the interactive media design of multimedia applications in the mass media. As basic categories for the history and structure of media, we employ the model of the modes of the physical, analog, and digital presentation/representation. In this case study of the online edition of the New York Times, we have the case of a newspaper that in the digital edition employs multi-media (...) applications. Contrasting the traditional concept of “narrativity” with the current status quo of the digital media outlets, we will examine the specific conditions of the multimedia applications in the mass media with this sample case of the New York Times. As narrative structure of interactive design in multimedia for mass communication, we analyze the types of narrative media and general narrativity in the New York Times with the background of its processes of interactivity and media convergence. (shrink)

Image in the Making examines the ways in which digital technology changes our understanding of and engagement with the visual arts. At the current stage of development in digital technology, we cannot always tell, just by looking, that an image was made with digital - versus analog - tools. But a case can be made for fully appreciating an image only in terms of its underlying digital structure and technology.

Focused on the field of knowledge lying between digital and analog circuit theory, this new text will help engineers working with digital systems shorten their product development cycles and help fix their latest design problems. The scope of the material covered includes signal reflection, crosstalk, and noise problems which occur in high speed digital machines (above 10 megahertz). This volume will be of practical use to digital logic designers, staff and senior communications scientists, and all those (...) interested in digital design. (shrink)

We address an argument by Floridi (Synthese 168(1):151–178, 2009; 2011a), to the effect that digital and analogue are not features of reality, only of modes of presentation of reality. One can therefore have an informational ontology, like Floridi’s Informational Structural Realism, without commitment to a supposedly digital or analogue world. After introducing the topic in Sect. 1, in Sect. 2 we explain what the proposition expressed by the title of our paper means. In Sect. 3, we (...) describe Floridi’s argument. In the following three sections, we raise three difficulties for it, (i) an objection from intuitions: Floridi’s view is not supported by the intuitions embedded in the scientific views he exploits (Sect. 4); (ii) an objection from mereology: the view is incompatible with the world’s having parts (Sect. 5); (iii) an objection from counting: the view entails that the question of how many things there are doesn’t make sense (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we outline two possible ways out for Floridi’s position. Such ways out involve tampering with the logical properties of identity, and this may be bothersome enough. Thus, Floridi’s modus ponens will be our (and most ontologists’) modus tollens. (shrink)