Issues of responsibility in the world of nanotechnology are becoming explicit with the emergence of a discourse on ‘responsible development’ of nanoscience and nanotechnologies. Much of this discourse centres on the ambivalences of nanotechnology and of promising technology in general. Actors must find means of dealing with these ambivalences. Actors’ actions and responses to ambivalence are shaped by their position and context, along with strategic games they are involved in, together with other actors. A number of interviews were conducted (...) with industrial actors with the aim of uncovering their ethical stances towards responsible development of nanotechnology. The data shows that standard repertoires of justification of nanotechnological development were used. Thus, the industrial actors fell back on their position and associated responsibilities. Such responses reinforce a division of moral labour in which industrial actors and scientists can focus on the progress of science and technology, while other actors, such as NGOs, are expected to take care of broader considerations, such as ethical and social issues. (shrink)

Ambivalence (as in practical conflicts, moral dilemmas, conflicting beliefs, and mixed feelings) is a central phenomenon of human life. Yet ambivalence is incompatible with entrenched philosophical conceptions of personhood, judgement, and action, and is denied or marginalised by thinkers of diverse concerns. This book takes a radical new stance, bringing the study of core philosophical issues together with that of ambivalence. The book proposes new accounts in several areas – including subjectivity, consciousness, rationality, and value – while (...) elucidating a wide range of phenomena expressive of ambivalence, from emotional ambivalence to self-deception. The book rejects the view that ambivalence makes a person divided, showing that our tension-fraught attitudes are profoundly unitary. Ambivalence is not tantamount to confusion or to paralysis: it is always basically rational, and often creative, active, and perceptive as well. The book develops themes from Wittgenstein, Davidson, Sartre, and Freud. It engages with contemporary debates in Analytic Philosophy in addition to work ranging from Aristotle to Cultural Studies and Empirical Psychology, and considers a rich set of examples from daily life and literature. (shrink)

Ambivalence is most naturally characterized as a case of conflicting desires. In most cases, an agent’s intrinsic desires conflict contingently: there is some possible world in which both desires would be satisfied. This paper argues, though, that there are cases in which intrinsic desires necessarily conflict—i.e., the desires are not jointly satisfiable in any possible world. Desiring a challenge for its own sake is a paradigm case of such a desire. Ambivalence of this sort in an agent’s desires (...) creates special problems for the project of reducing all facts about an agent’s desires to facts about his or her preferences over options. If this reductive project fails, there is reason to suspect that the Decision Theory cannot give us a complete theory of Humean rationality. (shrink)

BackgroundDebates around euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are ongoing around the globe. Public support has been mounting in Western countries, while some decline has been observed in the USA and Eastern Europe. Physicians’ support for euthanasia and PAS has been lower than that of the general public, but a trend toward higher acceptance among physicians has been seen in recent years. The aim of this study was to examine the current attitudes of Finnish physicians toward euthanasia and PAS and whether there (...) have been changes in these attitudes over three decades.MethodsA questionnaire survey was conducted with all Finnish physicians of working age in 2020 and the results were compared to previous studies conducted in 1993, 2003 and 2013.ResultsThe proportions of physicians fully agreeing and fully disagreeing with the legalization of euthanasia increased from 1993 to 2020. The number of physicians, who expressed no opinion for or against euthanasia decreased from 19 to 5% during the same period. The proportion of physicians having no opinion of whether a physician should be punished for assisting in a suicide decreased from 20 to 10%.ConclusionsThis study shows that Finnish physicians’ ambivalence toward euthanasia and PAS has decreased. The ongoing debate has probably forced physicians to form more solid opinions on these matters. Our study highlights that attitudes toward euthanasia and PAS are still divided within the medical profession. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Locke, Nozick, and the Ambivalence of Property Kant, Narveson, and the Ambivalence of Property Marx and the Structural Coerciveness of Property.

The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to it, only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon full treatment in the context of action theory – providing an analysis of how it relates to the structure and freedom of the will. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt's (...) account, all revolving around the charge that his account contains a serious ambiguity between willing and identifying. With such objections in place, I then develop an analysis that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities that Frankfurt's analysis is prey to. I briefly distinguish ambivalence from other types of internal conflict. This paper aims to offer conceptual clarification on the phenomenon of ambivalence, which will then allow for discussions about the normative merits and demerits of ambivalence, the effects of ambivalence on autonomous action, and methods of resolution of ambivalence. (shrink)

Ambivalence is a form of inner volitional conflict that we experience as being irresolvable without significant cost. Because of this, very few of us relish feelings of ambivalence. Yet for many in the Western philosophical tradition, ambivalence is not simply an unappealing experience that's hard to manage. According to Unificationists--whose view finds its historical roots in Plato and Augustine and is ably defended by contemporary philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard--ambivalence is a failure of (...) well-functioning agency. The reasons for this, we're told, are threefold. First, it precludes agents from resolving their wills in a way that is necessary for autonomy. Second, it precludes agents from fully affirming their live and, in particular, from fully affirming the choices they make. As a result, ambivalence robs them of an important source of meaning. Finally, ambivalence causes agents to act in self-defeating ways. In so doing, they act without integrity. Ambivalence is thus seen as a threat to a trio of important agential goods, and as a result, it imperils the best forms of human agency. -/- Against the Unificationists, D. Justin Coates argues that ambivalence does not preclude volitional resolution or normatively significant forms of affirmation. Nor does it guarantee self-defeat. Consequently, ambivalence as such is no threat to autonomy, meaning, or integrity. In assessing these arguments, ambivalence is also revealed to have an important role in securing the very goods that unificationists contend it undermines. The reason for this is that each of these goods requires the agent to be normatively competent. But normative competence itself, Coates argues, often leads agents to be ambivalent. The best forms of human agency are therefore shown to be not only compatible with ambivalence but as regularly requiring it. Ambivalence is thus not a volitional defect, but a crucial constituent of well-functioning agency. (shrink)

The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to it, only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon full treatment in the context of action theory - providing an analysis of how it relates to the structure and freedom of the will. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt's (...) account, all revolving around the charge that his account contains a serious ambiguity between willing and identifying. With such objections in place, I then develop an analysis that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities that Frankfurt's analysis is prey to. I briefly distinguish ambivalence from other types of internal conflict. This paper aims to offer conceptual clarification on the phenomenon of ambivalence, which will then allow for discussions about the normative merits and demerits of ambivalence, the effects of ambivalence on autonomous action, and methods of resolution of ambivalence. (shrink)

In this chapter, I will address the philosophical ambivalence of the concept of Willkür in and after Kant. The aim of my chapter is to defend it against the charge of irrationality and mere chance, and to rehabilitate it from a historical and analytic point of view. I will analyze Kant’s use of the word “Willkür”, and chronologically follow the semantic and systematic changes in his philosophical work. Finally, I address recent attempts to revitalize the concept of Willkür in (...) the analytic debate by referring to the work of Harry Frankfurt and Robert Kane. I shall argue that we need to distinguish between two kinds of libera arbitria. Whereas the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae can be interpreted in terms of the pejorative sense of “Willkür”—as mere chance—the liberum arbitrium voluntatis equals a reflective kind of Willkür—literal Will-kür —which involves freedom of the will. (shrink)

ZHOU Y, WINDSOR C, COYER F and THEOBALD K. Nursing Inquiry 2010; 17: 186–196Ambivalence and the experience of China-educated nurses working in AustraliaThe last decade has seen an increase in research on the experience of immigrant nurses. There are two prevailing approaches in this body of work. One is a focus on the positive or negative aspects of the experience, and the other, a depiction of the experience as a linear movement from struggle to a comfortable state. Based on our (...) study findings on the experience of China-educated nurses working in Australia, this study proposes that the concept of ambivalence is more appropriate in portraying the experience of immigrant nurses. Several sources of ambivalence experienced by the participants are represented: a disparity between expectation and reality, conflicting social and cultural norms, the dual reference points of comparison, divergent interests within families, and a sense that although it is unsatisfactory, it is hard to go back. We argue that immigration generates various forms of ambivalence and immigrant nurses must live with more or less ambivalence. The notion of ambivalence can explain a range of behaviours and situations beyond the scope of rational-choice explanations. To date, ambivalence as a theoretical concept in understanding the experience of immigrant nurses has been either ignored or insufficiently addressed in the literature. (shrink)

This encyclopedia entry spells out the concept of ambivalence in emotions.

In many situations, people are unsure in their moral judgements. In much recent philosophical literature, this kind of moral doubt has been analysed in terms of uncertainty in one’s moral beliefs. Non-cognitivists, however, argue that moral judgements express a kind of conative attitude, more akin to a desire than a belief. This paper presents a scientifically informed reconciliation of non-cognitivism and moral doubt. The central claim is that attitudinal ambivalence—the degree to which one holds conflicting attitudes towards the same (...) object—can play the role of moral doubt for non-cognitivists. I will demonstrate that ambivalence has all of the features that we would expect it to have in order to play the role of moral doubt. It is gradable, can vary through time, covaries with strength of motivation, and is suitably distinct from the other features of our moral judgements. As well as providing a defence of non-cognitivism, this insight poses a new challenge for the view: deciding how to act under moral ambivalence. (shrink)

Although ambivalence in a strict sense, according to which a person holds opposed attitudes, and holds them as opposed, is an ordinary and widespread phenomenon, it appears impossible on the common presupposition that persons are either unitary or plural. These two conceptions of personhood call for dispensing with ambivalence by employing tactics of harmonizing, splitting, or annulling the unitary subject. However, such tactics are useless if ambivalence is sometimes strictly conscious. This paper sharpens the notion of conscious (...) ambivalence, such that the above tactics cannot be applied to ordinary moments of explicit and clear ambivalent consciousness. It is shown that such moments reveal ambivalence as an attitude that is part of human life. The argument employs three features of consciousness that together capture its outgoing character. In the last section some of the implications of conscious ambivalence for consciousness and the mind are clarified as the analysis of conscious ambivalence in this paper is compared with Hume’s and John Barth’s phenomenalist conceptions. -/- An additional note: See Razinsky, Ambivalence: A Philosohical Exploration (Rowman & Littlefield Int., 2016), Ch. 5 for a version of this paper that also includes a long section on the unity of consciousness (but does not include the section named 'Phenomenalist Ambivalence?'). (shrink)

Patient ambivalence is a little studied phenomenon. Therefore, the contribution of Moore et al. (2022) about patient ambivalence in medical decision-making is welcome. Also, the idea that ambivalen...

The Ambivalence of Denial: Danger and Appeal of Rituals. Edited by Ute Hüsken and Udo Simon. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2016. Pp. 315. €38.

This paper replies to an argument due to Greenspan (1980) and to Morton (2002) against the view that emotions are perceptions of values. The argument holds that this view cannot make room for ambivalent emotions both of which are appropriate, such as when it is appropriate to feel fear and attraction towards something. This would make for a contradiction, for appropriate emotions are supposed to present things as they are. The problem, I argue, is that this line of thoughts forgets (...) that things can have positive and negative aspects: something can both be dangerous and attractive, for instance. (shrink)

This essay focuses on three topics that arose at the Photography and Historical Interpretation conference: photography’s incapacity to conceive duration; photography and the “rim of ontological uncertainty;” photography’s “anthropological revolution.” In the late nineteenth century, blindness to duration was conceptualized as the cost of photographic precision. Since the late twentieth century, blindness to our own desires, or inauthenticity, has been underlined as the price of photographic ubiquity. These forms of blindness, however, are not so much disabilities to be overcome as (...) they are aspects of modern consciousness to be acknowledged. The engagement with photography’s impact on historical consciousness gives rise to reconsiderations of temporal extension and to the difficulties of acknowledging one’s desires in an increasingly open and fractured social field. Photography’s indexicality combined with its reproducibility gives rise to photographic ambivalence. As with other forms of ambivalence, we should be less concerned with diluting its constitutive tensions than with learning to live with its conflicted possibilities. (shrink)

This article demonstrates that ritual plays an ambivalent role in the interaction between religion and violence. Ritual triggers and gives meaning to violence, or it enforces peace and coexistence. The first part of the article defines the ambivalence of ritual in the context of violence. The second part surveys standard rituals of peace and violence from Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The third part focuses on the ambivalent nature of Orthodox Christian rituals.

Drawing on insights from scholarship on contentious action frames, this article examines the framing of demands for social justice for migrant farmworkers in Spain, Italy and Canada during the COVID-19 pandemic. We focus particularly on how activists in each country aligned their action frames with prevalent public discourses on the essential contribution migrants make to agricultural production, the need to guarantee “health for all,” and “increased vulnerability” of migrants’ lives during the global health crisis. Using these diagnostic frames, activists in (...) the three countries called for secure legal status for all migrants. Drawing on the literature on contentious action frames, we then analyze if action frames advanced by activists during the COVID-19 pandemic “resonated” with the understanding of these issues by policymakers. We challenge an approach to understanding resonance in binary terms as either present or absent. Instead, we introduce the notion of “ambivalent resonance” to draw attention to the fact that some frames are accepted only partially or only by some policymakers but not the others, as was the case in the three countries under study. We then situate this ambivalent resonance in the context of immigration priorities and recent trends in immigration policy development in these three countries and suggest that activists can build on ambivalences to advance migrant rights to status. (shrink)

Especially older adults are increasingly stimulated to think about, talk about and record their preferences with regard to future (health)care decisions, preferably in a pro-active manner. In this paper, I analyse these anticipatory choice processes. My goal is twofold: Firstly, to provide a deeper understanding of what it actually means to decide in advance about end-of-life treatments or options. Secondly, to make a theoretical contribution to bioethics and ACP-theories by rethinking the concept of end-of-life choices from a phenomenological viewpoint. To (...) achieve this, I start by presenting a case narrative that elucidates how these anticipatory choices are lived. Secondly, I map out a theoretical framework about choice based on the phenomenology of the will of Paul Ricoeur. Finally, guided by this Ricoeurian framework, I investigate the potential meaning of choice in the context of contemporary advance care planning trajectories. The analysis demonstrates that choice and agency always imply notions of passivity and uncontrollability. It also indicates the significant value of hesitation and ambivalence. Moreover, it highlights the importance of the notion of co-responsibility in the context of anticipated end-of-life choices, and the relevant distinction between a (willed) choice and a wish. To improve care and support regarding end-of-life trajectories and to promote meaningful conversations, it is imperative to integrate these underrated elements more substantially in our theories, language and practical approaches. I conclude by suggesting that, in order to do justice to the real-life complexities, we might even need to revise the notion of advance ‘directives’. (shrink)

A surprising lack of consensus exists among contemporary Jewish scholars about Judaism's position vis-à-vis torture. Some claim that Judaism condones torture while others insist that Judaism condemns it. These diverging opinions on such a troubling practice suggest an ambivalence deep within the Judaic textual tradition about torturing bodies. This brief essay critiques both perspectives for twisting the textual tradition and offers some preliminary suggestions for a more robust Judaic approach to torture.

This paper takes as its starting point a debate between Harry Frankfurt and J. David Velleman. Frankfurt argues that we need to resolve ambivalence since it necessarily threatens autonomy. Velleman challenges this claim, arguing that a desire to resolve ambivalence threatens autonomy when it prompts repression. I argue that the relationship between ambivalence and autonomy is more ambiguous than either theorist tends to acknowledge. In doing so, I recommend three features relevant for assessing whether or not (...) class='Hi'>ambivalence threatens autonomy. (shrink)

Summary The First Sacred War was hotly debated in the 4th century. The crimes committed by the Crisaeans in this war were later equated to those committed by the Phocians during the Third Sacred War, or those committed by the Locrians of Amphissa during the Fourth Sacred War. This paper shows how the parallels drawn between the First and Third Sacred Wars (SW1–SW3) and between the First and Fourth Sacred Wars (SW1–SW4) were respectively shaped and used as an argument in (...) two different milieus: in pro-Macedonian intellectual circles in Athens, and in the Athenian forensic and deliberative arena. The main aim of this paper is to understand why ‘SW1–SW3’ is not used as an argument in the latter. In fact, Athens’ most prominent politicians had to cope with the Athenian support for the Phocians in the so-called Third Sacred War. Thus, the Phocians were depicted as guilty, but not to the point that they were compared to the Crisaeans. The legacy of the latter was ambivalent and lent itself to this shift in meaning. (shrink)

`In the grand tradition of classical social theory, Barry Smart challenges us to face up to the ambivalences of the contemporary moment and to take responsibility for our individual and social existence' - Douglas Kellner, University of California, Los Angeles ` a brilliant excursus through modern social theory, Smart’s book should be read and re-read for its careful analysis of the dilemmas of morality in postmodernism' - Bryan S. Turner, Deakin University Through a critical discussion of the 'ambivalent fruits' of (...) social analysis, exemplified in particular by the work of Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Vattimo, Beck, Bourdieu, Goffman, Giddens, Levinas and Bauman, this book submits that an important responsibility of social enquiry today is to engage critically with the moral difficulties and ethical dilemmas which have arisen in relation to modernity. Facing Modernity offers a wide-ranging analysis of the ways in which issues of reflexivity, ethics and moral responsibility inform social and political thought. This is illustrated with the examples of risk society, modern forms of subjectivity and the problematic relationship between care of the self and a concern for others, the fashioning of the body, the idea and the practice of justice, and the communitarian call to regulate the pursuit of self interest and rediscover 'community'. A comprehensive overview of the ambiguities and moral dilemmas of modernity, this book will be essential reading for students of sociology, social theory and cultural studies. (shrink)

Responding to Mark Harris, I reflect on his tantalizing question whether the provision of naturalistic explanations for biblical miracles renders the narratives more, or less, credible. I address his “reversal,” in which professional scientists now feature among defenders of a literalistic reading, while professional biblical scholars are often skeptical. I suggest this underlines the ambivalence of scientific naturalism from the standpoint of Christian theology. Historical examples are adduced to show that, until the mid‐nineteenth century, naturalistic and theistic explanations were (...) commonly regarded as complementary. Accordingly, the primacy often accorded to scientific progress in accounts of secularization is questionable. Two concluding questions are raised. If a methodological naturalism inheres in biblical scholarship, as in the sciences, how do biblical scholars decide whether the historical trajectories they construct for the composition of biblical texts are destructive or affirmative of faith? Second, when the miracle is the Resurrection of the dead Christ, does not the scientific impossibility of this foundational event remain sacrosanct? (shrink)

This paper theorizes and historicizes the ideas of modern language and translation and challenges the imperialist and nationalistic mode of worlding with the notion of ‘untranslatability’ that is embedded in the linguistic and cultural practices of colonial Taiwan and Korea. I redefine the notion of translation as a bordering system – the knowledge-production of boundaries, discrimination, and classification – that simultaneously creates the translatable and the untranslatable (i.e. the equivalence and incommensurability) in asymmetrical power relations. With this, I discuss how (...) this ambivalence is embodied in the experiences of colonial writers Wu Yung-fu and Pak T’aewŏn and their novellas ‘Head and Body’ (1933) and ‘A Day in the life of Kubo the Novelist’ (1934). I illustrate two characteristics of the ambivalent untranslatability embedded in their novellas: the linguistic untranslatability and the experience of ‘unhomeness’. The linguistic untranslatability and unhomeness, I argue, result in the colonized’s dislocation in homogeneous time-space relationships, resulting to the incompletion of the modernization project through colonialism. At the same time untranslatability offers a site to explore the transnational space that crosses linguistic boundaries, and to caution against the legacy of colonialism. (shrink)

La sociologie classique a utilisé la notion d’ambivalence sociale pour désigner la combinaison, nécessaire, mais chargée de conflit, entre l’obéissance aux normes et la volonté d’affirmer sa liberté. Il faut distinguer cette notion de celle d’ambivalence culturelle, qui désigne la nécessité de suivre à la fois des exigences culturelles opposées, en particulier dans un rapport majorité/minorité. La figure de l’étranger dessinée par Georg Simmel est l’exemple type de cette ambivalence, source de frustrations, mais qui néanmoins représente la (...) moins mauvaise solution possible. Après des siècles de raisonnements fondés sur la notion « ou... ou », nous ressentons la nécessité de nous placer en situation d’ambivalence.The notion of sociological ambivalence has been widely used to refer to the conflict-permeated combination of compliance with norms and search for individual autonomy. We must draw a distinction between this kind of ambivalence and a cultural ambivalence relating to the coexistence of two cultures to be inevitably found in a majority/minority relationship. The figure of the stranger designed by Georg Simmel is a classical example of this ambivalence, which induces frustrations, but represents the most acceptable solution possible. After centuries of dialectical thinking of the « either-or » type, we feel the urge to put ourselves in a situation of ambivalence. (shrink)

Ambivalence—where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs—is sometimes thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that a cognitivist can account for ambivalence without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments. It is central to the account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about (...) the subject's response. (shrink)

Why is it so hard to make up our minds? Adam and Eve set the template: Do we or don't we eat the apple? They chose, half-heartedly, and nothing was ever the same again. With this book, Kenneth Weisbrode offers a crisp, literate, and provocative introduction to the age-old struggle with ambivalence. Ambivalence results from a basic desire to have it both ways. This is only natural--although insisting upon it against all reason often results not in "both" but (...) in the disappointing "neither." Ambivalence has insinuated itself into our culture as a kind of obligatory reflex, or default position, before practically every choice we make. It affects not only individuals; organizations, societies, and cultures can also be ambivalent. How often have we asked the scornful question, "Are we the Hamlet of nations"? How often have we demanded that our leaders appear decisive, judicious, and stalwart? And how eager have we been to censure them when they hesitate or waver? Weisbrode traces the concept of ambivalence, from the Garden of Eden to Freud and beyond. The Obama era, he says, may be America's own era of ambivalence: neither red nor blue but a multicolored kaleidoscope. Ambivalence, he argues, need not be destructive. We must learn to distinguish it from its symptoms--selfishness, ambiguity, and indecision--and accept that frustration, guilt, and paralysis felt by individuals need not lead automatically to a collective pathology. Drawing upon examples from philosophy, history, literature, and the social sciences, _On Ambivalence_ is a pocket-sized portrait of a complex human condition. It should be read by anyone who has ever grappled with making the right choice. (shrink)

David Wong has introduced the notion of moral ambivalence in the philosophical debate. In this paper, we focus on the nature of moral ambivalence and on its interpretation. We hold that moral ambivalence is not a phenomenon that provides evidence for relativism, as Wong claims, and as relativism is usually understood. Rather, ambivalence denotes a pluralist attitude, an attitude characterized by the thought that two different, even incompatible, courses of action can both be permissible when considered (...) from a single perspective. We distinguish pluralism from relativism and argue that it is more appropriate to consider Wong’s position as an objectivist pluralism. We also highlight the similarity between Wong and Hume’s accounts. (shrink)

The concept of value is often discredited for its ambivalence: value increases and decreases, and is valid for one person but not necessarily for the next. Philosophies of value are subjectivist or contaminated by economic rationality. I show, from Gilbert Simondon, that value can be conceived of as a variable quantity without falling into levelling or axiological relativism. This implies dismissing the neo-Kantian separation of ontology and axiology, rejecting the conception of culture as a set of values and the (...) bipolarity of value oppositions, and finally thinking of value from a physical-mathematical rather than an economic analogy. (shrink)

This paper argues that ambivalence can serve as a proxy for consensus-based debates in public discourse as it allows for individuals to maintain flexible and analytic perspectives on matters that otherwise appear contradictory. In particular, an affirmative understanding of ambivalence will be presented to supplement the highly influential Habermasian approach by drawing from sociological theories of ambivalence found in the work of Simmel, Bauman and Kołakowski. While the theme of ambivalence is not completely absent from Habermas’s (...) work on the public sphere, it is typically described as a structural consequence of contradiction rather than a form of action that is capable of working with and around inconsistencies in ethics, knowledge and social values. This allows for participation to be sustained through contradiction, rather than being withdrawn in frustration, while also encouraging open-minded judgements capable of avoiding forms of fanaticism. (shrink)

This commentary explores the sometimes uncomfortable ambivalence that colors most people’s experience of disability, either as an aspect of a person’s own identity, or as an aspect of a person’s interactions with a person with a disability. Disabilities are experienced by many as both a positive and a negative aspect of a person’s identity. The commentary describes the work of two disability scholars who have recently explored how this ambivalence affects both legal schemes and parenting decisions, and argue (...) for a ‘destigmatizing’ of this ambivalence. The framework provided by these scholars illuminates ways in which ambivalence about the experience of disability is revealed by many of the contributors to this collection of essays, and suggests that an open confrontation with this ambivalence may facilitate more satisfactory relationships between people with and people without disabilities. (shrink)

Posidonia oceanicais an endemic seagrass from the mediterranean that provides key ecosystem services. A protected species, its presence is regressing due to anthropogenic pressures, some associated to the tourism economy that much of the Mediterranean coast depends on. In 1992, the European Union declared it a priority habitat, and since the early 2000s, it has occupied a central space in marine conservation debates in the Balearic Islands. Popularly known as Posidonia, this seagrass went from being considereddirtthat ruinedvirginBalearic beaches to become (...) an emblematic species. This article takes this U-turn in policy and public perception as a study case to think of knowledge-making practices and restoration initiatives as a form of environmental care. The relational, situated and affective character of care ethics helps to understand the human and ecological labour embedded in knowledge-making and restoration practices and its inevitable engagement with the Balearic tourism industry. Drawing on those engagements, I reflect on environmental care practices of knowledge-making and restoration, arguing that they emerge ambivalently: they challenge management logics based on economic rationales while forced to develop and coexist inside those same rationales. I conclude by arguing that developing care-centric narratives for environmental conservation and restoration is essential to continue promoting more-than-human aquatic relations in which the needs of others are the ethical basis for action. (shrink)

Focusing on the spectacular propaganda exhibitions “Degenerate Art” and “Degenerate Music,” critical studies of Nazism's art policy long considered the regime's public attack on modernism and the turn to pseudo-classicism as decisive proof of Nazism's reactionary character. Studies such as Die Kunst im Dritten Reich , which inspired broader research on the topic in the early 1970s, subscribed to a modern conception of aesthetics in which art expresses complex systems of ideas in progress. Artistic style, from this perspective, corresponded to (...) political tendencies and reflected the traditional divide between conservatism and progressivism. But those boundaries have become blurred in the wake of more recent research, which has demonstrated the involvement of modernist artists in Nazi art and, conversely, the continual performance of popular jazz music in the Third Reich . Seen against such instances of modernist collaboration and its own occasional mimicry of modernism, National Socialism acquires a more ambivalent profile, characterized by the ongoing conflict between reactionary factions and those who favoured modernization for various reasons. (shrink)

Although counterproductive work behaviors can be extremely damaging to organizations and society as a whole, we do not yet fully understand the link between employees’ organizational attachment and their intention to engage in such behaviors. Based on social identity theory, we predicted a negative relationship between organizational identification and counterproductive work behaviors. We also predicted that this relationship would be moderated by ambivalent identification. We explored counterproductive work behaviors toward the organization and other individuals. Study 1, a survey of 198 (...) employees, revealed that employees who identified strongly with their organization reported lower levels of CWB-O, but as predicted, only when ambivalent identification was low. Study 2 involved a manipulation in the form of a scenario presented to 228 U.S. employees, generally replicated the findings of Study 1: the link between organizational identification and CWB-O was stronger for participants in the low ambivalence condition than for those in the high ambivalence condition. The interaction effect of ambivalent and organizational identification on CWB-I was only marginally significant in the second study. These findings provide new evidence for the positive influence of organizational identification under conditions of low ambivalence on counterproductive behaviors toward an organization. (shrink)

We are all ambivalent at every turn. “Should I skip class on this gorgeous spring day?” “Do I really want to marry Eric?” Despite being uncomfortable and unsettling, there are some forms of ambivalence that are appropriate and responsible. Even when they seem trivial and superficial, they reveal some of our deepest values, the self-images we would like to project. In this paper, I analyze collaborative ambivalence, the kind of ambivalence that arises from our identity-forming close relationships. (...) The sources and resolutions of collaborative ambivalence reveal how much of our thinking—and so also of our motivational structure—emerges from the details of our collaborative and dialogical engagements. The imaginative skills and strategies exercised in remaining justifiably of two minds—of preserving appropriate ambivalence—are central to practical reasoning. Because these skills provide models for addressing conflicts in the public sphere, because they prompt shared deliberation, they are among the civic virtues. (shrink)

Ambivalence is often presented through cases of defeated ambivalence and multivalence, in which opposed attitudes suggest mutual isolation and defeat each other. Properly understood, however, ambivalence implies the existence of poles that are conflictually yet rationally interlinked and are open to non-defeated joint conduct. This paper considers cases that range from indecisiveness and easy adoption of conflicting attitudes, to tragically conflicted deliberation and to cases of shifting between self-deceptively serious attitudes. Analyzing such cases as variants of defeated (...) ambivalence, I argue that the phenomena of defeated ambivalence are marginal to ambivalence even though they are by the same token exemplary of it. The poles in such cases are connected as opposing attitudes in such a way that the attitudes and the opposition are both undermined. The article focuses on two forms of vague multivalence, one of which is taken from Heidegger’s analysis of curiosity. (shrink)

Hili Razinsky, free downlad at link. ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves (...) a worry about the possibility of a conflict between an emotion and a judgement. Back into the 1980s Greenspan has argued that emotional ambivalence is possible, her reasons implying that objectivist accounts of emotion are inconsistent with ambivalence. Tappolet has more recently replied that perceptual accounts allow for emotional ambivalence since the opposed values seen in ambivalence are good or bad in different senses. The present paper identifies strict objectivist ambivalence between judgements and between emotional perceptions by contrasting them with such ambivalence of separate values such as evoked by Tappolet. (shrink)

The paper develops two objections to Michael Bratman’s self-governance approach to the normativity of rational requirements. Bratman, drawing upon work by Harry Frankfurt, argues that having a place where one stands is a necessary, constitutive element of self-governance, and that violations of the consistency and coherence requirements on intentions make one lack a place where one stands. This allows for reasons of self-governance to ground reasons to comply with these rational requirements, thereby vindicating the normativity of rationality. The first objection (...) is that the account under-generates reasons, since not all cases of incoherence will involve a failure to have a place where one stands. The second objection is that the account over-generates reasons: we would have strong reasons to avoid both incoherence and ambivalence. However, if we follow Frankfurt in thinking that ambivalence is a “disease of the will” that is as irrational as having contradictory beliefs, this second objection doesn’t get off the ground. Thus, the first part of the paper is devoted to explaining why Frankfurt’s argument for the irrationality of ambivalence fails. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether philosophers ever regarded the teaching of philosophy as a central concern by considering the first decades of professional associations that ultimately merged into the American Philosophical Association (APA). Before the APA, philosophical education was mostly devoted to the development of the Christian gentleman. Upon its founding, the APA’s first president (James Edwin Creighton) took the central functions of the APA to promote original investigation, publication, and collaboration, rather than teaching. Despite Creighton’s position that teaching should not (...) play a role in the APA, an investigation of the early years of the APA show that philosophers had some, albeit infrequent, interest in pedagogical issues related to philosophy. Thus, it is argued that the early years of the APA reflect a deep ambivalence toward teaching. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against certain dogmas about ambivalence and alienation. Authors such as Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard demand a unity of persons that excludes ambivalence. Other philosophers such as David Velleman have criticized this demand as overblown, yet these critics, too, demand a personal unity that excludes an extreme form of ambivalence (“radical ambivalence”). I defend radical ambivalence by arguing that, to be true to oneself, one sometimes needs to be radically ambivalent. (...) Certain dogmas about alienation are even more entrenched. Allen Wood’s entry on “alienation” in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy begins as follows: “A psychological or social evil, characterized by one or another type of harmful separation, disruption or fragmentation, which sunders things that belong together.” I think that it is not true that self-alienation is necessarily “harmful.” I argue that radical ambivalence is a form of self-alienation. Thus, because faithfulness to oneself sometimes requires radical ambivalence, to be true to oneself, one sometimes needs to be alienated from oneself. (shrink)

Recent philosophical arguments in favor of legal markets in human organs such as kidneys claim that respect for autonomy justifies such markets. I argue that these arguments fail to establish the moral permissibility of commercialized organ sales because they do not show that those most likely to serve as vendors would choose to sell autonomously. Pro-market views utilize hierarchical theories of autonomy to demonstrate that potential organ vendors may autonomously consent to selling their organs even in the absence of any (...) practical alternative to doing so. But central to hierarchical accounts of autonomy is the idea that persons my experience volitional ambivalence, a condition in which the will is irreconcilably conflicted. Because commercialized organ sales would create volitional ambivalence in many of those who opt to sell an organ, the choice to sell an organ would not be an autonomous one. (shrink)

When we disagree with each other at the beginning of a debate, we are confident that we are right and the other side is just wrong, 2017). But at the end of the debate, we could be persuaded that we are wrong and the other side is right. This happens a lot when we disagree on empirical or factual claims. However, when we disagree with each other on moral issues, it is quite rare that either side is persuaded. We could (...) be frustrated by the other’s stubbornness. But sometimes we come to see that the other side has a point. Their view seems reasonable. We might even feel that we could have taken their moral perspective and values. This phenomenon of moral ambivalence is discussed extensively by David Wong as part of his argument for moral relativism that there is no single true morality. Recently, Agustín Vicente and Agustín Arrieta write to refute Wong’s argument. They argue that moral ambivalence is a phenomenon of moral pluralism, the position that there are different acceptable courses of actions, rather than moral relativism. In this paper, I argue that moral ambivalence does not support the kind of moral pluralism that Vicente and Arrieta argue for. Furthermore, I point out that moral ambivalence does not support Wong’s naturalism, the position that morality has human nature constraints, but it does support the kind of relativism that he endorses. (shrink)

Homi Bhabha brings attention to the figure of the postcolonial metropolitan subject—a third world subject who resides in the first world. Bhabha describes the experiences of the “colonial” subject as ambivalently split. As much as his work is insightful, Bhabha's descriptions of the daily life of postcolonial metropolitan subjects as split and doubled is problematic. His analysis lends only to the possibility of these splittings/doublings as schizophrenically wholly arising. His analysis cannot account for the agonistic moments when the colonial subject (...) is caught in not knowing, and in developing understanding about present circumstances. A framework with an account of context and horizons, such as in phenomenology, can better depict the experiences of the postcolonial metropolitan subject. Maurice Merleau-Ponty follows a gestaltian contact with the world, which advances that the “most basic unit of experience is that of figure-on-a-background.” One perceives the figure/theme because of and within the background/horizon. In this horizonal framework, human experiences are ambiguously open. The openness in the horizon of the gestaltian framework better accounts for the conditions Bhabha refers to as splitting. The ambivalence can be understood not simply as conundrums that defy understanding but as ambiguous moments for expanding, developing, and growing. (shrink)

This article describes the place of Women's and Gender Studies programmes in Australian universities as a way of thinking about the place of feminism in the academy. It begins with a story of one such small programme at a time of stress and locates this story in an account of change in Australian universities over the last 20-plus years. The narrative traces a contradictory domain in which women, feminist scholarship and Women's and Gender Studies are enmeshed. The article draws on (...) feminist literature about Australian universities to argue that while neo-liberal university environments are clearly places where masculinist values prevail, the flows of power around individual Women's and Gender Studies programmes cannot be simply predicted. Women's and Gender Studies programmes are thriving in some universities (on a small scale). As well as institutional imperatives Women's and Gender Studies programmes are engaged by specific intellectual challenges and some of these are sketched with reference to the Australian context. Asserting the need for dedicated research and teaching that focuses on gender, the article concludes that Women's and Gender Studies programmes in Australian universities are energetic places for this to occur. It proposes an ambivalent optimism to describe its assessment of these programmes and their viability as future places of work for feminist scholars. (shrink)

A popular orientation about the meaning of human life in scholarly and public discourses is to conceive of human life as a form of existence whose essential value exists per se, that is, human life is necessary and not contingent on other ideals or entities. The import of this orientation is that human life is valuable in and by itself; and thus held to be sacred. This article employs expository and hermeneutical approaches in arguing for a fluid and ambivalent understanding (...) of human life among the Yorùbá people mostly in Nigeria. By drawing from orature – sayings, anecdotes, proverbs – the article shall argue for the preponderance among the Yorùbá of a situation approach where the quality of life of an individual, social status, moral conduct and the particular context of death determines the value attached to human life. Such contextual ambivalence in the meaning of life ensures that the duty to preserve human life is at one instance considered noble, and in another instance, human life seems to be given less value. Quality of life, individual social status and the moral conduct of individuals function as existential schemes central to an understanding of the Yorùbá attitude to life and post-mortem existence. Beyond the religio-cultural semiotics through which the Yorùbá relate to human life and the passage from life to death, the article submits that a Yorùbá orientation which emphasises that life is meaningful on the basis of the quality of life is the foundation for a Yorùbá ethics of human life. (shrink)

This article challenges Margaret E. Simons’s claim that Sartre forced himself on Beauvoir on October 15, 1929. We argue that Diary of a Philosophy Student: Volume 3, 1926–30 depicts the young Beauvoir struggling with conflicting feelings about marriage, sexual desire, and gender roles. Highlighting early reflections on “the woman in love,” we suggest that Beauvoir’s diary discloses gendered harm but not sexual violation. We name this harm erotic ambivalence and find it central to The Second Sex.