The aim of this article is to bring to light some of the factors that allowed the emergence of secularization, and to understand to what extent and in what ways these factors contributed to the formation of the main lines of Spinozism. I will first examine the issues of secularization, emphasizing the importance of the transformations in the status of the Hebrew language during the Renaissance. I will then analyze the role that the Tractatus theologico-politicus may have had (...) in European culture. Finally, I will clarify Spinoza’s relationship to deism and atheism, specifying the nature of the controversies related to his religious attitude. (shrink)

At his death, Spinoza left two major works, very different from one another. The first is the Ethics, rigorously set out in geometrical terms, with definitions, axioms, and theorems. In the Ethics, Spinoza takes the reader down the path of reason to an ultimate beatitude, a rational salvation, a kind of peace of mind attained through the true knowledge of God, oneself, and one's place in the world. The other is of a very different sort. The Tractatus theologico-politicus (...) is set out in twenty chapters. It begins with a discussion of prophecy and revelation, followed by a detailed description of Scripture, and what we can learn from it, the message of scripture. And that message is to be obedient to God, and to love our neighbours as ourselves. Two books, two styles of argument, two very different paths to salvation, arguably two Gods and arguably two very different kinds of kinds of salvation at the end. But one author. The challenge is evident: how do these books fit together? One is about reason, the other about revelation, one is about personal salvation, the other more focused on how we live together. Spinoza's writing has always drawn strong reactions, both positive and negative: he was accepted by some as a kind of secular prophet offering us a guide to life, and rejected by others as a kind of atheist and heretic. In this book, a diverse international group of seventeen scholars confronts these two central works in the philosophical canon, and explores what Spinoza is trying to tell us about life, the world, and our place in it. (shrink)

O presente texto tem como objetivo apontar algumas das razões pelas quais Spinoza foi considerado um herege. Acreditamos que as três principais razões que colaboraram para essa interpretação do seu pensamento estão contidas mais explicitamente no _Tratado Teológico Político_ do que em sua principal obra filosófica, a _Ética_. Ademais, o _Tratado Teológico Político_ teve maior alcance entre o vulgo, pois era o objetivo de Spinoza que a obra tivesse a maior repercussão possível e influenciasse no conflituoso cenário político e religioso (...) de sua época, ao mesmo tempo em que a _Ética_ permanecia confinada entre as mãos dos seus amigos e leitores mais próximos. (shrink)

In his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Spinoza seeks to separate religion from philosophy and from politics. Yet the true metaphysical understanding of God remains relevant to a proper grasp of the state for Spinoza. Through identifying a common logical structure underlying Spinoza’s conception of God and the two subjects of the TTP - the relation of faith and reason, and the origin of the state and its relation to individual citizens – the paper attempts to demonstrate that Spinoza’s argument for (...) the autonomy of secular reason and the secular state in the TTP is inseparable from his metaphysical theology. (shrink)

스피노자가 자신의 정치적 관점과 분석을 기술한 『신학정치론』과 『정치론』은 상당한 분량을 여러 형태의 국가형태(군주정, 민주정, 신정, 과두정 등) 간의 비교 및 각 국가형태의 헌정제도에 대한 분석에 할애하고 있지만, 정치제도학자로서 스피노자의 모습은 그간 활발히 논의되지 못하였다. 본 논문은 『신학정치론』에서 스피노자가 수행한 고대 히브리 국가의 신정 제도에 대한 분석을 재구성하면서, 그가 히브리 국가의 제도와 역사에서 민주공화정의 제도에 대한 어떤 교훈을 도출했는지를 탐구한다. 스피노자는 종교와 정치의 분리가 불가능하다고 보며, 종교적 제도들이 오히려 대중의 정치적 역량과 단합을 증진시킬 수 있다고 주장한다. 그러나 이를 위해서는 종교 엘리트의 (...) 권력을 제한하고, 다양한 종교 사이의 조화를 유지하는 정책이 필수적임을 강조한다. 논문은 신정 체제의 안정성이 정치적, 사회경제적 평등과 권력의 분배를 제도화하는데 성공했다는 점에 기인한다고 결론지으며, 스피노자의 히브리 신정 분석이 근대 민주주의에 주는 시사점을 모색한다. (shrink)

The impermanence of human affairs is a major theme in Spinoza’s discussions of political histories, and from our present-day perspective it is both intriguing and ironic to see how this very theme has played out in the evolving fate of Spinoza’s association with atheism. While Spinoza’s contemporaries charged him with atheism in order to impugn his philosophy (and sometimes his character), in our times many lay readers and some scholars portray Spinoza as an atheist in order to commemorate (...) his role as a founder of modern secularism. In this paper, I will argue that Spinoza deserves neither vilification nor praise for being an atheist, for the simple reason that he was not one (unless one employs the term ‘atheism’ in a very peculiar sense). I have chosen the current topic as my contribution to a volume focused on the TTP, the Ethics, and their interrelations because it is precisely these two books which brought about the common reactionary accusation of atheism by Spinoza’s contemporaries. Addressing Spinoza’s 1663 book, Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, Bayle writes: “Spinoza appears as orthodox in that book about the nature of God.” As we shall shortly see, Descartes too was accused of atheism by some of his contemporaries (though not so by Bayle). The latter designates his target quite explicitly: “[Spinoza’s] Tractatus Theologico Politicus, printed in Amsterdam, in the year 1670, is a pernicious and execrable book which contains all the seeds of the Atheism he plainly discovered in his Opera Posthuma.” François Lamy, in his 1696 Le nouvel athéisme renversé, also focused on the Ethics and the TTP in his attack on Spinoza’s atheism. Bayle’s reference to the Opera Posthuma is ostensibly targeting the Ethics at least primarily, if not uniquely. Even the most suspicious and distrustful mind would have to labor hard in order to find atheism in the Hebrew Grammar, or even in the Tractatus Politicus where Spinoza argues that it is not within the power, and hence right, of the commonwealth to induce people to adopt utterly absurd beliefs, such as “that the whole is greater than its part or that God does not exist.” The TTP and the Ethics are the works where Spinoza launches his merciless attack on anthropocentric thinking and anthropomorphic religion. Spinoza’s panentheism (“quicquid est, in Deo est”) constitutes the metaphysical foundation of the Ethics, and it is repeatedly and clearly alluded to in the TTP. Since it is these two elements – (1) Spinoza’s open assertions of panentheism and (2) his critique of andromorphic conceptions of God – which are the historical grounds for the atheism charge, it seems natural that the merit of this charge should be decided primarily by examination of these two foundational works. I will proceed in the following manner. In the first part of the paper, we will make our first acquaintance with the imputation of atheism by Spinoza’s contemporaries and Spinoza’s response to the charge (or lack thereof). In the second part, I discuss three broad strategies, or hermeneutic avenues, that have been pursued to impute atheism to Spinoza. The first of the three was dominant in Spinoza’s time, while the latter two were employed more recently. These strategies are not mutually exclusive and we can find occasionally various combinations of different shades of these three strategies. In this part, I will also raise some preliminary questions about the cogency of the hermeneutics employed by each strategy. In the third and fourth parts of the paper, I will discuss a small selection of key texts from the Ethics and the TTP, respectively, and argue that the atheist readings fail to make sense of these key passages (unless one adopts an extreme hermeneutics of suspicion which could allegedly find any view harbored in any text). Let me stress that this selection of passages is far from comprehensive, and that dozens of other passages can be adduced to establish the very same point. I hope by the end of the fourth part to convince the reader of the deep problems besetting the atheist readings. In the fifth and last part, I show that both panentheism and the critique of anthropomorphic religion and anthropomorphic conceptions of providence were quite common within rabbinic discourse. Thus, I will argue that if we are not in the business of announcing that both Maimonides and the Kabbalists were atheists, we should avoid the same imputation to Spinoza. Underlying my argument in this final part is the claim that at least some perceptions of Spinoza as an atheist are instances of what could be termed conceptual colonialism, i.e. the enforcement of the categories of a hegemonic culture (in this case, Western Christianity ) on minority cultures (in the current case, rabbinic Judaism). To be clear, this attitude need not be motivated by ill intentions or racism. It is always tempting and easy to explain the unfamiliar through the familiar, but conceptual stagnation and insistence on imposing the categories of the familiar on other cultures may quickly lead to deep distortion and blindness, despite one’s best intentions. Unless one is exceedingly careful to avoid the – completely natural – temptation to impose one’s own categories on a foreign culture (and to look for the coin only under the street light), one is likely to end up with distorted conceptions of the relevant alien culture, despite one’s best intentions. (shrink)

Chapters 17 and 18 of the TTP constitute a textual unit in which Spinoza submits the case of the ancient Hebrew state to close examination. This is not the work of a historian, at least not in any sense that we, twenty-first century readers, would recognize as such. Many of Spinoza’s claims in these chapters are highly speculative, and seem to be poorly backed by historical evidence. Other claims are broad-brush, ahistorical generalizations: for example, in a marginal note, Spinoza refers (...) to his Jewish contemporaries as if they were identical with the ancient Hebrews. Projections from Spinoza’s own experience of his Jewish and Dutch contemporaries are quite common, and the Erastian lesson that Spinoza attempts to draw from his “history” of the ancient Hebrew state is all too conspicuous. Even Spinoza’s philosophical arguments in these two chapters are not uniformly convincing, as I will attempt to show. Yet in spite of all these faults, the two chapters are a masterpiece of their own kind: a case study of the psychological foundations of politics and religion. The work that comes closest in my mind is Freud’s 1939 Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion. The two works are similar not only in terms of their chronological subject matter – the Hebrews of Moses’s time – but also in their attempt to reconstruct the communal psyche of the Hebrews in order to demonstrate their respective social theories about the foundation of civilization. Needless to say, there are numerous differences between the two works, not the least of which are their distinct aims and the very different political contexts in which they were produced. We will return to this comparison with Freud’s Moses and Monotheism toward the end of the essay, but let me first stage the background for our discussion. Chapter 16 of the TTP begins a new section of the book which primarily deals with the relation between religion and the state. In this chapter Spinoza presents an outline of his political theory and his understanding of key notions such as right, power, the state of nature, the social contract, sovereignty, democracy, and justice. The title of chapter 17 announces its aim and focus: “showing that no one can transfer everything to the Supreme Power, and that this is not necessary; on the Hebrew Republic, as it was during the life of Moses, and after his death, before they elected Kings, and on its excellence; and finally, on the causes why the divine Republic [Respublica divina] could perish, and could hardly survive without rebellions” (III/201). The far less ambitious title of eighteenth chapter states that in it “certain Political doctrines are inferred from the Republic and history of the Hebrews” (III/221). Essentially, the two chapters present a surprising, ironic, and penetrating reading of the story of the divine Hebrew Republic, a reading which highlights both how much and how little was achieved by the use of the fantastic political device of attributing divine sanctification to the state and its sovereign. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Judaism and EnlightenmentHeidi Morrison RavvenAdam Sutcliffe. Judaism and Enlightenment. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xv + 314. Cloth, $60.00.Adam Sutcliffe's detailed and wide-ranging historical study of the image of the Jews and of Judaism in the minds of Enlightenment thinkers very broadly conceived might better be [End Page 343] titled Enlightenment Myths of Jews and Judaism. Sutcliffe admirably captures the consistently mythic portrayal of Jews and (...) Judaism mostly offered as interpretations of the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) rather than with reference to actual living or historical Jews. Although not explicitly acknowledged, what Sutcliffe offers the reader is a comprehensive catalogue of Enlightenment ideology or, better, theologizing about Judaism and the Jews. I say theologizing because the ubiquitous stark ambivalence toward the Jews that Sutcliffe argues Enlightenment thinkers to a person harbored, from the early Christian Hebraists and Kabbalists to the deists, to Voltaire and beyond the Enlightenment proper even to Freud (whom Sutcliffe not completely in jest regards as the last philosophe) echoes and reconfigures the quintessential Christian ambivalence toward Jews as both God's chosen and God's rejected. Christianity's need to legitimate the Hebrew Bible as the Old Testament stands in perpetual conflict with its need to de-legitimate the Jews as its rightful owners and heirs. Sutcliffe is utterly convincing that the Enlightenment conception of the Jews has irreducible mythic and conflictual aspects.The author's intended purpose, however, which is to convince the reader that Judaism and the Jews are the paradigmatic crux of the unassimilability of the mythic and particular by Enlightenment reason and hence to bring into question Enlightenment ideals themselves, is less convincing. Instead the data Sutcliffe amasses seem to point to the conclusion that Enlightenment thinkers were deeply imbued with mythic categories and ancient prejudices not easily sloughed off by mere protestations of rational autonomy and commitment to universal ideals.Sutcliffe's mistake is to grant to the Enlightenment thinkers their ground on both their self-valuation as exemplars of the deployment of universal reason or rational universalism and also their classification of Judaism as particularist mythos in opposition to just such reason. What Sutcliffe's carefully collected and exhaustively presented data suggest, instead, is that when it came to Judaism, the Enlightenment thinkers were neither rational nor universalist but instead culture bound and impassioned. The book's great strength is its admirable and exhaustive scholarly grasp of European Enlightenment works and its systematic presentation of the Jews in the imagination of these Enlighteners. Nevertheless, missing from this book is a scholarly understanding of Jewish sources both biblical and post-biblical and especially of Jewish philosophy. As a result, Judaism (and even the Hebrew Bible) signify to the author what Enlighteners mistakenly and prejudicially cast it as, namely, Europe's quintessential mythic particularism. But this caricature ignores the reality of rabbinic Judaism's profoundly rationalist tendencies and also the universalist aspirations and claims of the Jewish philosophic tradition whose deep roots go back to the Hellenistic era, let alone the universality of the Bible which is hardly less than that of Shakespeare. Hence Sutcliffe perpetuates a negative (and false) stereotype in the name of valorizing it. In this he is persuaded by a post-modernist agenda suggested, but not generally intrusive, throughout the book and made explicit at the end.Particularly jarring is Sutcliffe's inclusion of Spinoza in his catalogue of Enlightenment villifiers of Judaism as a form of unassimilable particularism and mythic primitivism. Spinoza instead clearly and repeatedly argues in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus that biblical Judaism is exemplified par excellence by its universalist ethics and hence it is the Ancient Jewish Commonwealth that ought to serve as an exemplar for the Dutch republic and all modern polities, as Michael Rosenthal has admirably shown in several essays. Spinoza draws this conclusion from the deployment of what he explicitly develops as his scientific method of reading texts, a method he argues is the same as the scientific method of amassing the data of nature and systematizing it in order to let its explanatory categories emerge therefrom (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, vii). The central result of using the scientific method on the Bible... (shrink)

INTRODUCTION BRAD S. GREGORY Until now those interested in Spinoza have lacked an adequate English translation of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. ...

This new and complete translation of Spinoza's famous 17th-century work fills an important gap, not only for all scholars of Spinoza, but also for everyone interested in the relationship between Western philosophy and religion, and the history of biblical exegesis.

On many interpretations of Spinoza’s political philosophy, democracy emerges as his ideal type of government. But a type of government can be ideal and yet it can be unwise to implement it if certain background conditions obtain. For example, a dominion’s people can be too ‘wretched by the conditions of slavery’ to rule themselves. This begs the following question. Do Spinoza’s arguments for democracy entail that all political bodies should be democracies at all times (the received view), or do they (...) merely entail that we should only have a democracy when the right sort of background conditions are in place (the challenging view)? This paper argues that a new interpretation of one of the four versions of the rationality argument for democracy as it features in the Tractatus entails that the received view is correct. The paper also explains away part of the appeal of the challenging view by arguing that none of the other versions of the rationality argument supports the received view. It closes by arguing that a slightly modernised version of the rationality argument can be important for contemporary political philosophy. (shrink)

Einleitung: Da Costa und das Marranenproblem. Die Gründung der Sephardischen Gemeinde in Amsterdam. Die Spaltung des Bewusstseins. Das Schicksal da Costas. Da Costa und Spinoza.--Propostas contra a tradição. Thesen gegen die Tradition.--Sobre a mortalidade da alma. Über die Sterblichkeit der Seele.--Exemplar humanae vitae. Ein Beispiel menschlichen Lebens.--Regesten.--Anmerkungen.

The contention in this paper is that the theological-political disputes Spinoza was concerned with 350 years ago are similar to the conspiratorial disputes we experience today. The world in Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus, a political intervention in his time, serves as a “mirror image”, that is to say, it deals with the same problem we face today albeit in a different mode. Understanding our contemporary condition under the auspices of a Spinozist perspective, problems in countermeasures to the conspiratorial disputes (...) come to light. Scholarly work and practice focus on the epistemological dimension of conspiracy theories, tying in the extent to which they are problematic to the degree in which they deal in untruth. However, the lesson from Spinoza’s analysis of the theological-political disputes is that such theories do not deal in truth, but, in affect, they do not spring from a lack of education but a lack of certainty. The work of Spinoza opens up a different approach, and if our aim is like that of the TTP, to defend political life against the threat of civil war, such a different approach is in order. (shrink)

The first complete English translation of Spinoza's Tractatus theologico-politicus was published anonymously in London in 1689 under the title A treatise partly theological and partly political, though prior to it Charles Blount had incorporated a liberal translation of chapter 6 of the Tractatus in his Miracles no violations of the laws of nature. The language employed in the 1689 translation suggested a decidedly political intention for the work and thus certain liberties were taken with the text. Since (...) that time there have been translations of passages or chapters from the Tractatus into English. Most recently, A. G. Wernham has translated and edited selections from the Tractatus theologico-politicus and Tractatus politicus in The Political Works of Spinoza. Still, the standard source for English language readers of Spinoza has been R. H. M. Elwes's two-volume translation of The Works of Spinoza, published originally in 1883 and reprinted without emendations in 1951. His translation, however useful, is far from adequate and the appearance of Samuel Shirley's translation of Spinoza's Tractatus is most welcome. (shrink)

Dans le chapitre 12 de son TTP, Spinoza définit le sacré de la sorte : « Mérite le nom de sacré et de divin ce qui est destiné à l'exercice de la piété et de la religion et ce caractère sacré demeurera attaché à une chose aussi longtemps seulement que les hommes s'en serviront religieusement ». De par cette définition première qui fait relever le sacré de la religion, Spinoza est en train d'exclure le sacré du domaine de la vérité (...) qui est propre à la philosophie. Quant à sa lecture désacralisante de la Bible, bien qu'elle s'appuie sur sa philosophie pour nier au surnaturel son existence, c'est par le biais de sa « méthode historico-critique », qu'elle va permettre à Spinoza d'atteindre son but. La question du sacré est donc loin d'être pour Spinoza une question de simple piété ou de soumission au divin. Elle est au contraire une source de problèmes. Cet article voudrait montrer comment Spinoza comprend ce problème, et d'examiner la solution qu'il y propose à travers son programme de désacralisation radicale de l'Écriture.In the 12th chapter of his Tractatus theologico-politicus, Spinoza defines the sacred in this way: “A thing is called sacred and Divine when it is designed for promoting piety, and continues sacred so long as it is religiously used: if the users cease to be pious, the thing ceases to be sacred”. By this first definition that situates the sacred in the realm of religion, Spinoza is excluding the sacred from the domain of the truth proper to philosophy. As for his desacralizing reading of the Bible, though it denies, on the basis of his philosophy, any existence to the supernatural, it is thanks to the “historico-critical method” that this reading will enable Spinoza to attain his goal. For Spinoza, the question of the sacred is therefore far from being a question of simple piety or submission to the divine. On the contrary, it is a source of problems. This article will attempt to show how Spinoza deals with this situation and to examine the solution he proposes through his program of radical desacralisation of the Scriptures. (shrink)

ONE OF THE MOST VEXING AND PERSISTENT ISSUES among students of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is the question of the work’s intended audience. Determining the audience of the TTP is critical not only for judging the work’s tone but also for assessing its purpose and scope. Despite the importance of this issue, Spinoza offers little help in resolving the question of his intended audience. Indeed, after outlining the argument of the work in the preface, he playfully dodges the question (...) of audience. (shrink)

Examining the philosophical, theological, and political teachings of the Tractatus theologico-politicus, this book proposes that Benedict Spinoza fashions a ...

Is there a thought of voluntary servitude in Spinoza’s theory? Starting with tensions arising from the apparent contradiction between such a thought and Spinoza’s anthropology, this paper shows that the Tractatus Theologico-politicus’s author identifies some political conditions that lead to the reversal of the conatus and make men fight “for their servitude as if it were their salvation”. Spinoza dampens La Boetie’s hypothesis : a man or a people cannot want to enslave himself/themselves, but can be induced to (...) do it under the effect of the adoption of a certain politics or institution. It is not only the fear the monarchical regime breeds. The foundation of the Hebrew Republic, after the Jewish people left Egypt, also raises the issue of voluntary servitude. Spinoza’s thought, consequently, shows a discerning political rationalism that can help us today to think about the “hidden external causes” which can weaken, even conflict with the desire for freedom. (shrink)

Dans cet ouvrage, nous nous proposons de parcourir le Tractatus Theologico-Politicus de Spinoza afin de donner au lecteur philosophe tous les éléments susceptibles de l'aider à saisir la place des citations bibliques dans cette œuvre, ainsi que ses conséquences sur la pensée philosophique de l'auteur. D'autre part nous voulons montrer au lecteur hébraïsant l'utilisation que Spinoza a faite des sources bibliques au sens large, mais traditionnel. Nous utiliserons également la grammaire de l'Hébreu que Spinoza a laissé inachevée : (...) Compendium Grammatices Linguoe Hebroeoe, Abrégé de Grammaire Hébraïque, publié dans les Opera Posthuma, 1671. Nous tenterons une approche de son œuvre en dehors des luttes et des passions que son seul nom inspire, lui qui sa vie durant s'écartera par tous les moyens des combats de son époque afin de pouvoir accéder à la connaissance vraie qui seule apporte le bonheur. (shrink)

Historia, as both a type of critical inquiry and a source of information about nature and the human world, is a key category in Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus. In this work, the Latin word cannot be simply and invariably translated as “history,” not even if we add the proviso that its meaning wavers inevitably between “history” and “story,” for its semantic range is too broad and complex. At the two ends of the semantic spectrum we have the impartial report, (...) on the one hand, and the creations of sheer fantasy, on the other. Historia may therefore denote the detached observation of nature and the philological analysis of a text, but it can also refer to the free exercise of the imagination in a variety of narrative contexts. While Spinoza denies that the inquiry resulting from historia and its products may have true cognitive value, he acknowledges that historia plays a fundamental role in society and politics. The reason is that historia and the imagination are bound up together by a special relationship. This is apparent at all levels of the historical engagement with reality, but is particularly true in the case of religion, moral norms and belief systems, for in this variegated domain the link between imagination and historia functions as the connective tissue that keeps societies united and functioning. This specific nexus of imagination and historia is Spinoza’s original contribution to the early modern notion of “moral certainty.” More importantly, it is only at this level that Spinoza grants a modicum of intelligibility to the ‘historical’ productions of the imagination, be they signa, revelationes, or even nugae. The fact remains, though, that to a certain extent humans keep having a distorted grasp of reality, indeed hallucinate, even when their ‘historical’ accounts of reality are socially and politically productive. Here the key element is the notion of fictional continuity based on a socially constructed trust in narrative accounts of reality: the imagination turns reality into stories, but in so doing it keeps the otherwise constitutively hallucinatory nature of humans at bay and under control. Perceptibilitas, that is, the ability to provide acceptable cognitive solutions between intelligible knowledge and moral certainty, is ultimately what defines the contribution of the imagination to the human work of knowledge. (shrink)

This volume analyzes in detail Spinoza's reasoning in Tractatus theologico-politicus, identifies allies and enemies in its historical context, and explores its more or less obvious connection with the Ethica.

This study analyses Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico politicus from the point of view of the confrontation between revealed Scripture and philosophy, and links it with the history of this confrontation in Maimonides and the Arab philosophers, highlighting similarities and differences. The three key points of the analysis are the following: Salvation through philosophy; Salvation through religion; and the guarantor of Salvation: political power.

This paper treats a recalcitrant problem in Spinoza scholarship, namely, how to reconcile the conception of 'power' in his political writings with that found in his Ethics. Some have doubted the capacity of Spinoza's political philosophy to yield an adequate normative theory. If he is unable to provide a normative ground for political philosophy then perhaps this exposes a problem in Spinoza's philosophy taken as a whole. I argue that the considerable normative resources of his ethical and political philosophy, as (...) well their continuing relevance today, are best appreciated through attending to his notion of the exemplar. (shrink)

In this paper I will describe certain significant features of the title-page of Hume's Treatise which have gone largely unnoticed. My discussion will focus on two features of the titlepage. First, Hume's Treatise shares its title with a relevant and well-known work by Hobbes. Second, the epigram of the title-page, which is taken from Tacitus, also serves as the title for the final chapter of Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. In the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries Hobbes and Spinoza were infamous (...) as the two most influential representatives of 'atheistic' or antiChristian philosophy. The significance of these features of the title-page of the Treatise, therefore, is that in this important context Hume unambiguously alludes to these philosophers and their 'atheistic' doctrines. This, I will argue, accords well with a proper understanding of the nature of Hume's own anti-Christian intentions in the Treatise. (shrink)

Vertaling (verkorte versie) van en commentaar op de wijsgerige verhandeling van de Nederlandse filosoof (1632-1677) over de betekenis van het christendom.

‘배교자’에서 시작하여 ‘최초의 근대적 유대인’, 심지어 ‘시오니즘의 선구자’에 이르기까지, 유대인 스피노자는 역사 속에서 다양한 형상 아래 평가되어 왔다. 이 다양한 평가들의 바탕에는 신학정치론의 대부분을 차지하는 유대교 분석이 있다. 이 글에서 나는 스피노자의 유대교 분석의 목표가 무엇인지를 분명히하는 가운데 유대교에 대한 그의 입장을 밝히고자 한다. 스피노자는 우선 당대나 후대의 ‘반유대주의’의 모든 논거를 제시했다고 평가될 만큼, 예언, 선민사상, 의례 등 유대교의 특수성을 이루는 요소들에 대해 실로 가차없는 비판을 가하고 있다. 이 비판은 유대교를 폄하하고 기독교를 편드는 것으로, 혹은 종교 일반을 철학(이성)이나 자유주의 정치에 (...) 복속시키려는 우회적 수단으로 평가되어 왔다. 우리는 이런 평가들을 일면적이라고 보고, 보다 온전한 평가를 위해 스피노자가 신앙의 본질로 간주한 복종의 의미를 고찰한다. 이로부터 우리는 스피노자가 이성의 관점에서 인정하는 종교 고유의 적극적 역할과 더불어 유대교의 장점을 도출한다. 마지막으로 결론에서는 유대교에 대한 스피노자 진술에 나타나는 비일관성이 이 측면을 통해 볼 때 어떻게 해소되는지 보여준다. (shrink)