Philosophers have used the terms 'impersonal' and 'personal value' to refer to, among others things, whether something's value is universal or particular to an individual. In this paper, I propose an account of impersonal value that, I argue, better captures the intuitive distinction than potential alternatives, while providing conceptual resources for moving beyond the traditional stark dichotomy. I illustrate the practical importance of my theoretical account with reference to debate over the evaluative scope of cultural heritage.

Kok-Chor Tan addresses three key questions in political philosophy: Where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? He argues for an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck-egalitarian ideal of why equality matters, and a global scope for distributive justice.

The study ascertained (1) whether an observer's scope of justice with reference to either the moral agent or the target person of a moral act, would affect his/her judgements of the ethicality of the act, and (2) whether observer judgements of ethicality parallel the moral agent's decision processes in systematically evaluating the intensity of the moral issue. A scenario approach was used. Results affirmed both research questions. Discussions covered the implications of the findings for the underlying cognitive processes of (...) moral judgements, for the link between judgements of fairness and ethicality, as well as for the debate of ethical absolutism versus relativism. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that to properly understand our commitment to a principle of free speech, we must pay attention to what should count as speech for the purposes of such a principle. We defend the view that ‘speech’ here should be a technical term, with something other than its ordinary sense. We then offer a partial characterization of this technical sense. We contrast our view with some influential views about free speech , and show that our view has (...) distinct advantages. Finally, we consider racist hate speech. Here, we argue that if certain theorists are right about what some racist hate speech does, then such speech should fall outside the scope of the free speech principle, and so, should be as regulable as any non-speech action. (shrink)

Many philosophers argue that religious schools are guilty of indoctrinatory harm. I think they are right to be worried about that. But in this article, I will postulate that there are other harms for many individuals that are more severe outside the religious school. Accordingly the full scope of harm should be taken into account when evaluating the harm that some religious schools may do. Once we do that, I suggest, justice may require that we choose the lesser harm. (...) To simplify matters, I focus my attention on the stigmatic harm done to Muslims, and the role that Islamic schools might be expected to play in mitigating that harm. If the full weight of stigmatic harm is factored into the ethical analysis concerning Islamic schools, then I suggest that there are sufficiently weighty pro tanto reasons for Muslim parents to prefer an Islamic school over the alternatives, notwithstanding the potential indoctrinatory harm. (shrink)

The Whorfian hypothesis has received support from recent findings in psychology, linguistics, and anthropology. This evidence has been interpreted as supporting the view that language modulates all stages of perception and cognition, in accordance with Whorf’s original proposal. In light of a much broader body of evidence on time perception, I propose to evaluate these findings with respect to their scope. When assessed collectively, the entire body of evidence on time perception shows that the Whorfian hypothesis has a limited (...) scope and that it does not affect early stages of time perception. In particular, all the available evidence shows that the scope of language modulation is limited in the case of time perception, and that the most important mechanisms for time perception are cognitive clocks and simultaneity windows, which we use to perceive the temporal properties of events. Language modulation has distorting effects, but only at later stages of processing or with respect to specific categorization tasks. The paper explains what is the role of these effects in the context of all the available evidence on time cognition and perception. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide-scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow-scopers’) that it violates narrow-scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter-example to narrow-scope views. But a narrow-scoper should reject a crucial assumption which Brunero makes, namely, the claim that we always violate conditional (...) narrow-scope requirements when we do not comply with them. I show how Brunero's objection can be met by denying this claim, and I provide independent arguments in favour of denying it. (shrink)

Recent science funding policy scholars and practitioners have advocated for the use of lotteries, or elements of random chance, as supplementations of traditional peer review for evaluating grant applications. One of the primary motivations for lotteries is their purported openness to innovative research. The purpose of this paper is to argue that current proponents of funding science by lottery overestimate the viability of peer review and thus unduly restrict the scope of lotteries in science funding practice. I further show (...) how this analysis suggests a different way of introducing lotteries into science funding policy. (shrink)

We characterize pairs of monotone generalized quantifiers Q1 and Q2 over finite domains that give rise to an entailment relation between their two relative scope construals. This relation between quantifiers, which is referred to as scope dominance, is used for identifying entailment relations between the two scopal interpretations of simple sentences of the form NP1–V–NP2. Simple numerical or set-theoretical considerations that follow from our main result are used for characterizing such relations. The variety of examples in which they (...) hold are shown to go far beyond the familiar existential-universal type. (shrink)

Purpose To quantify how often physical therapists from high-income countries (HIC) travelling to low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) practise outside their scope of practice, in what circumstances, and their likelihood of doing the same in the future. Methods An exploratory descriptive study using a survey. Results One hundred and twenty-six licensed physical therapists from around the world participated. Physical therapists typically spent less than a month (73.8 per cent) in LMIC; 67.5 per cent believed that physical therapists practise outside (...) of their scope, and 31.7 per cent reported doing so. Reasons were believing that something is better than nothing (47.5 per cent ), a mismatch between the physical therapist’s and host’s expectations (40.0 per cent ), and preserving their relationship with the host (25.0 per cent ). It was deemed appropriate by 64.5 per cent to practise outside of their scope in some situations and 53.8% considered repeating the activity in the future. Half of the respondent’s first experience in LMIC occurred as a student or in their first decade of practice. Conclusions Working in LMIC requires a keen understanding of the risks and challenges associated with such experiences. To ensure best practice, a skill set that consists of critical self-reflection, systems thinking, and structural competency combined with clinical competency and accountability is imperative. (shrink)

This dissertation is based on the compositional model theoretic approach to natural language semantics that was initiated by Montague (1970) and developed by subsequent work. In this general approach, coordination and negation are treated following Keenan & Faltz (1978, 1985) using boolean algebras. As in Barwise & Cooper (1981) noun phrases uniformly denote objects in the boolean domain of generalized quanti®ers. These foundational assumptions, although elegant and minimalistic, are challenged by various phenomena of coordination, plurality and scope. The dissertation (...) solves these problems by developing a ¯exible process of meaning composition, as ®rst proposed by Partee & Rooth (1983). Flexible interpretation involves semantic operations without any phonological counterpart, which participate in the interpretation process and change meanings of overt expressions. The dissertation introduces a novel ¯exible system where a small number of operations describe the behaviour of complex phenomena such as `non-boolean' and, the scope of inde®nites and the semantics of collectivity with quanti®cational NPs. The proposed theory is based on a distinction between two features of meanings in natural language. (shrink)

Traditionally, theorists suggested that imaginative resistance is limited to morally repugnant claims. More recently, theorists have argued that the phenomenon of imaginative resistance is wider in scope, extending to descriptive claims. On both sides, though, theorists have focused on cases where imaginative resistance goes right, tracking something that is wrong with the story—that it is morally repugnant, or conceptually contradictory. I use a rarely cited discussion from Kant to argue that imaginative resistance can also occur when something goes wrong (...) with the reader—namely, when a reader imports their own biases into the story, and resists a descriptive claim as a result. In identifying this new class of claims that can meet imaginative resistance, Kant presses the question: when should we cultivate imaginative resistance and when should we fight it? (shrink)

The paper investigates the scope properties of indefinites.

ABSTRACT I suggest how a broadly Kantian critique of classical logic might spring from reflections on constructibility conditions. According to Kant, mathematics is concerned with objects that are given through ‘arbitrary synthesis,’ in the form of ‘constructions of concepts’ in the medium of ‘pure intuition.’ Logic, by contrast, is narrowly constrained – it has no objects of its own and is fixed by the very forms of thought. That is why there is not much room for developments within logic, as (...) compared to the progress in mathematics. Kant’s view of logic remains critical, though – through considerations that are effectively on the scope and limits of classical logic and which play a part in his transcendental idealism. The most important ones are to be found in his critique of the use of reductio ad absurdum proofs in metaphysics and his solutions to the ‘antinomies of pure reason.’ Arguably, these considerations carry over to mathematics as well – by way of ‘analogues’ to the antinomies – in particular in resolving infinity paradoxes. (shrink)

Over the past several decades environmental ethics has grown markedly, normative ethics having provided essential grounding in assessing human treatment of the environment. Even a systematic approach, such as Paul Taylor’s, in a sense tells the environment how it is to be treated, whether that be Earth’s ecosystem or the universe itself. Can the environment, especially the ecosystem, as understood through the study of ecology, in turn offer normative and applied ethics any edification? The study of ecology has certainly increased (...) awareness of the fact that it is not possible for a moral agent within the ecosystem to step outside its intricate mesh of actions and events, of causes and effects. That is, absolutely everything that an agent can do can have some, often unforeseeable, outcome in the environment. An incompletely snuffed-out match tossed out a car window can cause a forest fire, which causes biome destruction, which causes x, y, and z. In sum, the ecosystem can edify ethics in terms of the scope of ethics, which remains an unsettled, if too-often ignored, matter. By such an inclusive view of moral scope, as derived in part from ecology and as presented here, the scope of moral behavior would include—whether or not adventitiously—every action an agent may do. By this view, moral scope is, in essence, unlimited. The article offers some ramifications of this view of moral scope. (shrink)

This chapter distinguishes between several senses of “normativity”. For example, that we ought to abstain from causing unnecessary suffering is a normative, not descriptive, claim. And so is the claim that we have good reason, and ought to drive on the right, or left, side of the road because the law requires us to do that. Reasons and oughts are normative, by definition. Indeed, it may be that “[t]he normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, (...) or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons” (Raz 1999, 67) . That is what the “reasons-first” view holds, but there are also other views, and what is by definition a normative statement, or a normative fact if you like, depends on how we define normativity. -/- It may seem that requirements are also by definition normative. But it seems that there can also be requirements that one has no reason to meet: it is less clear whether such requirements are normative in the same sense that reasons and oughts are normative. This paper will go through various further phenomena, which are candidates for being normative in some other sense than normative reasons and oughts, defending however the view that not all of them are. But arguably four or so different senses of normativity can be distinguished. -/- The paper will accept the view that the normativity of reasons and oughts, which is here called normativity1, is central. It is an open question whether all requirements or expectations or socially constructed norms are normative in that sense. Arguably it depends on the contents and content-independent authority of the legislators, whether we have good reasons, or ought, to meet the requirements, obey the law, or to follow the etiquette, or to conform to others’ interpersonal expectations, requests, demands or prescriptions. Whether and when we do have such reasons is a difficult and important substantive question, which concerns the normativity1 of requirements of law. -/- In another sense, norms (intended to guide behavior) are trivially or by definition normative, and constitute normativity: some forms of behavior are ruled as acceptable (e.g. driving on the right) and others as unacceptable (e.g. driving on the left) in light of the norm. Even in the case of a bad norm (that we have no reason to follow, and which ought to be changed, and ought not prevail) classifies behaviours as acceptable or unacceptable in light of the norm. Surely norms are by definition normative? Call this conformity to social norms and actual expectations normativity2. It is not an open question whether social norms are normative in that sense – they are by definition normative2. But importantly, it is an open question whether one has good reasons, or sufficient reason, or ought, to follow any social norm – that is, whether the norm in question is normative1. -/- The first section of the article characterizes further the difference between these two senses of normativity, and additionally introduces various other candidate senses of “normativity”. These possible senses of “normativity” may be at stake in the debates about normative requirements of rationality , about so called ought-to-be -rules , about normativity of linguistic meaning , about “directions of fit” of beliefs and desires , about subjective authority of intentions and decisions and interpersonal authority or co-authority of concrete others. -/- In later sections these cases are discussed. Do they constitute separate senses of normativity? And are the later phenomena such that they give agents good reasons: do they include normativity1 – the core sense? A “normative power -model” is suggested as a framework for examining whether actual social norms, laws, expectations provide good reasons and oughts or not. Once we understand the relation between the first two senses of normativity, do the later phenomena follow the same pattern – is the “normative powers – model” relevant for them as well? (shrink)

Developments in Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT) and cell-free fetal DNA analysis raise the possibility that antenatal services may soon be able to support couples in non-invasively testing for, and diagnosing, an unprecedented range of genetic disorders and traits coded within their unborn child’s genome. Inevitably, this has prompted debate within the bioethics literature about what screening options should be offered to couples for the purpose of reproductive choice. In relation to this problem, the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) and (...) American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) tentatively recommend that any expansion of this type of screening, as facilitated by NIPT, should be limited to serious congenital and childhood disorders. In support of this recommendation, the ESHG and ASHG cite considerations of distribution justice. Notably, however, an account of justice in the organization and provision of this type of screening which might substantiate this recommendation has yet to be developed. This paper attempts to redress this oversight through an investigation of Norman Daniels’ theory of Just health: meeting health needs fairly. In line with this aim, the paper examines what special moral importance (for Just health) screening for the purpose of reproductive choice might have where concerning serious congenital and childhood disorders in particular. The paper concludes that screening for reproductive choice where concerning serious congenital and childhood disorders may be important for providing women with fair opportunity to protect their health (by either having or not having an affected child). (shrink)

The child objection is a major challenge for reductionism, which requires hearers to have positive reasons for testimonial justification. However, it has been pointed out that anti-reductionism, which requires only the absence of negative reasons, or defeaters, suffers from the same kind of problem. The child objection presupposes the empirical thesis that “children do not have the capacity to consider reasons,” but the plausibility of this assumption may be revealed by developmental psychology research on selective trust. This paper uses recent (...) epistemological studies as a guide to narrow down the types of defeaters that children are required to consider, and then clarifies what kind of reasons various experiments can be said to test the ability to consider, and in what sense children who pass the test can be said to be “considering” reasons. In doing so, we clarify the scope and limits of the implications that selective trust studies can have for reductionism and anti-reductionism. We then suggest what future psychological research is desired from an epistemological interest to go beyond the current limitations. (shrink)

Kantian constructivists accord a constitutive, justificatory role to the issue of scope: they typically claim that first-order practical thought depends for its authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope, or by all relevant others, and some Kantian constructivists, notably Onora O'Neill, hold that our views of the nature and criteria of practical reasoning also depend for their authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope. The paper considers whether O'Neill-type Kantian constructivism can coherently accord (...) this key role to the issue of scope while adhering to the universalist, ‘cosmopolitan’ commitments at its core. The paper argues that this is not so. On the one hand, it shows that O'Neill's attempt to ‘fix’ the scope of practical reasoning supposes, rather than establishes, a view of ethical standing and the scope of practical reasoning. On the other hand, the paper argues that Kantian constructivism should endorse a non-constructivist, perfectionist view of the good to determine that scope. The paper thereby supports the perfectionist conjecture that Kantian constructivism, in order to defend its universalist commitments, should take refuge in non-constructivist, perfectionist considerations, and that Kantian constructivism should therefore construe perfectionism as a partial, though uneasy, ally. (shrink)

This paper examines two contexts in ethical theory that some have thought support the claim that attempts, rather than actions, are what are morally required of agents. In each context there is an appeal to the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'. I begin by explaining how I think appeals to this principle typically work. I conclude that not only do the contexts in question not demonstrate that moral requirements range over attempts, but also that any argument in support of that (...) conclusion has serious obstacles to overcome. (shrink)

The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities has developed a curriculum leading to a certificate in health care ethics consultation. A certification in ethics consultation initially seems to fit nicely into the biomedical model of clinical expertise espoused by modern biomedicine, but examining what exactly constitutes moral expertise, particularly for traditional Christians, reveals a significant problem: the certification relies on an implicit view of ethics as essentially procedural. It leaves virtually all serious moral content to be filled in, if at (...) all, after an ostensibly neutral scaffolding has been erected. Such an approach does not help answer deep moral questions about how one should live, and it is these questions that ought to be encouraged during some conflicts that result in requests for ethics consultations. This paper suggests that, in certain circumstances, and for a subset of patients, encouraging conversion can help remedy the deficiency of an overly mechanized approach. A system open to conversion would have more room for Traditional Christians, regardless of the outcome, as it would take morality as lived, communal experience more seriously and help others, if desired, to do so as well. (shrink)

At the United Nations climate change conference in 2011, parties decided to launch the “Durban Platform” to work towards a new long-term climate agreement. The decision was notable for the absence of any reference to “equity”, a prominent principle in all previous major climate agreements. Wealthy countries resisted the inclusion of equity on the grounds that the term had become too closely yoked to developing countries’ favored conception of equity. This conception, according to wealthy countries, exempts developing countries from making (...) commitments that are stringent enough for the collective effort needed to avoid dangerous climate change. In circumstances where even mentioning the term equity has become problematic, a critical question is whether scope for a fair agreement is being squeezed out of negotiations. To address this question we set out a conceptual framework for normative theorizing about fairness in international negotiations, accompanied by a set of minimal standards of fairness and plausible feasibility constraints for sharing the global climate change mitigation effort. We argue that a fair and feasible agreement may be reached by (i) reforming the current binary approach to differentiating developed and developing country groups, in tandem with (ii) introducing a more principled approach to differentiating the mitigation commitments of individual countries. These two priorities may provide the basis for a principled bargain between developed and developing countries that safeguards the opportunity to avoid dangerous climate change without sacrificing widely acceptable conceptions of equity. (shrink)

The notion of scope as it relates to a model of logical form is discussed. The inability of the accepted definition of scope to account for the contrast between priority scope - the logical priority of different quantifiers & other logical notions via rule ordering - & binding scope - the identification of the connection between variables of quantification & a particular quantifier - is demonstrated. The semantic ambiguity of this dichotomy of scope is explored (...) via examination of donkey sentences. A formal representation of this dichotomy is suggested. The government-binding approach & principle of compositionality that handle scope relations via the logical form is rejected due to the complexity of the mechanism by which syntactic form results in logical forms. A discourse representational approach is also rejected. It is concluded that the interaction of syntax & semantics is instead better represented by a game-theoretical treatment of scope & anaphora. 26 References. T. Rosenberg. (shrink)

in two letters concerning the Spanish-American War of 1898, Charles Sanders Peirce openly expresses some egregious prejudices against several groups of people, including Hispanics—people of at least partly Spanish origin in the Iberian Peninsula or the Americas (L 254 and L 339; reprint, translation to Spanish, and commentary in Nubiola and Zalamea 76–811). In an undated letter to his cousin Henry Cabot Lodge, a Massachusetts politician, Peirce writes regarding the war: “I don’t believe the Spaniards will make a good fight; (...) for as I have studied them in Spain, the whole people has been corrupted with the centuries of cruelty, injustice and rapine they have indulged in, and have little real manhood left” (L 254; .. (shrink)

It is often believed that domestic principles of justice cannot ground freedom of international movement. Some argue that since principles of justice are not global in scope, justice does not require freedom of movement at the global level. This is problematic, for it confuses the grounds with the scope of justice. Given that the scope of justice is potentially global, freedom of movement must also be global in scope. Others have argued that the grounds of freedom (...) of movement themselves are restricted in scope. If cooperation, democracy, and coercion are what presumably ground the right to freedom of movement, to the extent that they are not global in scope, freedom of movement need not be global in scope either. In this article, I argue that even if the grounds of freedom of movement are or should not be global in scope, freedom of movement must be. (shrink)

Strawson has recently developed a style of semantic subject-predicate analysis which, applied to certain sentences, rivals a standard account that turns on the notion of scope. His account depends on three notions: (i) complex, derivative properties, (ii) predicate-negation, and (iii) substantiation—an alleged semantic function having particular-specification as a special case. As I further develop it, the suspicion energes that his account simply is the scope account in disguise. I show that it is rather an untenable rival, placing the (...) blame on his notion (iii), vindicating his notion (i) and finding his notion (ii) theoretically needless. (shrink)

BackgroundEmpirical research can become relevant for bioethics in at least two ways. First, by informing the development or refinement of ethical recommendations. Second, by evaluating how ethical recommendations are translated into practice. This study aims to investigate the scope and objectives of empirical studies evaluating how ethical recommendations are translated into practice. MethodsA sample of the latest 400 publications from four bioethics journals was created and screened. All publications were included if they met one of the following three criteria: (...) (1) evaluative empirical research, (2) non-evaluative empirical research and (3) borderline cases. For all publications categorized as evaluative empirical research we analyzed which objects (norms and recommendations) had been evaluated.Results234 studies were included of which 54% (n = 126) were categorized as non-evaluative empirical studies, 36% (n = 84) as evaluative empirical studies, and 10% (n = 24) as borderline cases. The object of evaluation were aspirational norms in 5 of the 84 included evaluative empirical studies, more specific norms in 14 (16%) studies and concrete best practices in 65 (77%) studies. The specific best practices can be grouped under five broader categories: ethical procedures, ethical institutions, clinical or research practices, educational programs, and legal regulations.ConclusionsThis mapping study shows that empirical evaluative studies can be found at all stages in the translational process from theory to best practices. Our study suggests two intertwined dimensions for structuring the field of evaluative/translational empirical studies in bioethics: First, three broader categories of evaluation objects and second five categories for types of best practices.Trial registration: The methodology used was described in a study protocol that was registered publicly on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/r6h4y/). (shrink)

This study explored how the nature of CEOs’ human capital affects the scope of their firms’ corporate social responsibility initiatives. By integrating upper echelons theory with the attention-based view of the firm, the analyses showed that generalist CEOs with a broader range of knowledge and skills tend to aim their firms’ corporate social responsibility efforts toward a broader range of responsibility domains than do specialist CEOs with a narrower range of knowledge and skills. The difference is weaker when a (...) firm’s board has a sustainability committee or when industry peers are active in a broad range of corporate social responsibility domains. These findings are supported by data on S&P 1500 firms spanning 2000 to 2018. (shrink)

Since its origins as an academic newsletter, _Agriculture and Human Values_ has evolved to be one of the leading journals publishing critical scholarship of the food and agricultural system. This essay illustrates and comments on the evolution of the scale and scope of research published in the journal over the years.

Neurodevices that collect neural (or brain activity) data have been characterised as having the ability to register the inner workings of human mentality. There are concerns that the proliferation of such devices in the consumer-directed realm may result in the mass processing and commercialisation of neural data (as has been the case with social media data) and even threaten the mental privacy of individuals. To prevent this, some argue that all raw neural data should be conceptualised and regulated as “medical (...) data” even if it is collected from consumer-directed devices in obviously non-clinical settings. In this paper, we argue that without a clearer formulation of what does and does not count as medical data, this approach might also uncritically enlarge the scope for medical influence and an unwarranted medicalisation of everyday aspects of mental life. Indeed, if we were to accept the position that all neural data is medical data because it offers insights into personally sensitive information (such a person’s thoughts, emotions, or intentions) then this could even unnecessarily expand the boundaries of medical data to other forms of data that otherwise seem to be non-clinical. If all brain data (neural activity data) is considered to be medical data even when collected from consumer-directed devices then we might unintentionally reduce meaningful distinctions between what is and what is not rightfully in the purview of medicine. (shrink)

Moral leadership matters. As world politics enters a new and dangerous era, judgment, constancy, moral purpose, and a willingness to overcome partisan politicking are essential for America's leaders. Tempered Strength finds the alternative standard of leadership that Americans are seeking in the classical philosophy of prudence. Ethan Fishman's new work brings together leading American political scientists—including Ronald Beiner, Kenneth L. Deutsch, and George Anastaplo—to discuss the evolution of a standard of prudential leadership both reasonable in nature and practical in (...) class='Hi'>scope. Section One studies the meaning of prudence and its evolution in the history of political science from Aristotelian phronesis to Xenophon, Thomas Aquinas, Edmund Burke, and Michael Oakeshott. Section Two demonstrates how the theory of prudential leadership can be applied to practical political issues. (shrink)

Healthcare counts as a morally relevant good whose distribution should neither be left to the free market nor be simply imposed by governmental decisions without further justification. This problem is particularly prevalent in the current boom of anti-ageing medicine. While the public demand for medical interventions which promise a longer, healthier and more active and attractive life has been increasing, public healthcare systems usually do not cover these products and services, thus leaving their allocation to the mechanisms of supply and (...) demand on the free market. This situation raises the question on which basis the underlying preferences for and claims to a longer, healthier life should be evaluated. What makes anti-ageing medicine eligible for public funding? In this article, we discuss the role of anti-ageing medicine with regard to the scope and limits of public healthcare. We will first briefly sketch the basic problem of justifying a particular healthcare scheme within the framework of a modern liberal democracy, focusing on the challenge anti-ageing interventions pose in this regard. In the next section, we will present and discuss three possible solutions to the problem, essentialistic, transcendental, and procedural strategies of defining the scope of public healthcare. We will suggest a procedural solution adopting essentialistic and transcendental elements and discuss its theoretical and practical implications with regard to anti-ageing medicine. (shrink)

_The Scope of Morality _ was first published in 1980. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. The scope of morality, Peter A. French contends, is much narrower than many traditional and contemporary works in ethical theory suggest. We trivialize morality if we think it has something to say about everything we do; it touches us all, but not at all (...) times. This essay in philosophical ethics focuses upon the origin, purpose, and function of the various concepts to be found in a more or less mature morality. The author draws a distinction between moral concepts that arise from an individual's wish to live a worthwhile life and those directed towards the development of virtue in the moral community. Moral concepts, in his view, are subjective creations of human beings rather than laws with an objective basis in nature. The ethics of sociobiology, of the lifeboat and spaceship models, and of game theory all come under his critical eye in this useful and progressive work. _The Scope of Morality_, says Hector-Neri Castaneda, "represents a serious effort at discussing the nature of morality, taking into account the most important contributions of recent writers.". (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic caused an unprecedented and highly threatening, constrained, and confusing social and educational environment, we decided to expand the traditional focus of the extraneous load in Cognitive Load Theory acknowledging the psychological environment in which learning occurs. We therefore adapted and implemented principles of the CLT to reduce extraneous load for our students by facilitating their educational activities. Given previous empirical support for the principles of CLT, it was expected that the adoption of these principles might enable our (...) students to cultivate attitudes and skills across multiple domains such as online learning and presentation technologies, implementing and maintaining a “classroom atmosphere” in a virtual environment, participating in discussions among large online groups of students, facilitating group work, providing virtual office hours for students, and proactively planning for upcoming semesters. (shrink)

Many church fathers have been identified as having held a xenolalic view on the gift of tongues. Scholars who have shown evidence of this have, however, omitted to give sufficient attention to the scope of the tongues the church fathers detailed. Many of these church fathers, referenced, identify the gift of tongues as the ability to speak all languages. This supernatural ability to speak all languages has been appropriately designated as pan-xenolalia. This article aimed to highlight the existence and (...) prevalence of the pan-xenolalic view among the church fathers and examined the works of the relevant church fathers to determine how they gave expression to their view, which passages of Scripture they applied their view to and how they motivated their view. The pan-xenolalic sentiments of many church fathers could be confirmed though they used various phrases to express it. These references to pan-xenolalia were used in the context of both Acts and 1 Corinthians. Their possible motivations for holding this view seemed to have come from sources outside of the text itself, with tradition, expectation and purpose of tongues from their perspective being the most likely influences. Contribution: The patristic perspective on tongues were not merely xenolalic but pan-xenolalic. Pan-xenolalia as interpretive key to 1 Corinthians 12–14 provides a fresh perspective to reading the text, which may pose some significant challenges to how the text is interpreted. Establishing the veracity of the pan-xenolalic view lays the foundation for scholars to evaluate a reading of 1 Corinthians 14 from this perspective. (shrink)

A unique presentation of philosophy as an integral part of human culture. The whole of philosophy is the scope for this survey which portrays contemporary ideas in philosophy in continuity with the great ideas of the past. The author emphasizes our link with and dependency on the classical cultures of India, China and Japan. Originally published in 1977 by Glencoe Press and Collier, a division of Macmillan.

Besides their cardinal and proportional readings, many and few have been argued to allow for a ‘reverse’ proportional reading that defies the conservativity universal. Recently, an analysis has been developed that derives the correct truth conditions for this reading while preserving conservativity. The present paper investigates two predictions of this analysis, based on two key ingredients. First, many is decomposed into a determiner stem many and the degree operator POS. This predicts that other elements may scopally intervene between the two (...) parts. Second, non-reverse and reverse readings arise from the versatile association possibilities of POS, as independently witnessed in the grammar. In languages in which the same versatile association profile is granted to the superlative degree operator -est, reverse readings are expected to arise for most as well. Both predictions are borne out. (shrink)

Overview A scope marking structure is characterized by the fact that it has two clauses, each of which contains wh expressions [CP-1...wh1...][CP-2...wh2(...whn)...]. While wh- 1 is a fixed lexical item, wh-2...wh-n are not. A possible answer to the question seems to specify values not for wh1 but for wh2...whn. In recent years such structures have come under a lot of scrutiny and various analyses have been proposed to account for their properties. In spite of differences in detail, these analyses (...) can be classified into two groups on the basis of the status they accord to the wh expressions. The direct dependency approach treats wh-1 as semantically inert and assigns matrix scope to wh- 2...wh-n. The indirect dependency approach, on the other hand, takes wh-1 to play a crucial role in determining what the question quantifies over. Wh-2...wh-n do not have matrix scope but play an indirect role in matrix quantification because CP-2 forms the restriction of wh-1. Seen in this light, the direct and indirect dependency approaches are not tied to particular syntactic claims about the relation between CP-1 and CP-2. Whether a particular analysis can be characterized as direct or indirect depends solely on the status of the wh expressions at transparent LF, von Stechow’s term for the level of syntactic representation that feeds into the interpretive module. (shrink)

This article1 deals with a well-known but still ill-explained fact about German, namely scope inversion under a particular accent contour, as illustrated with the following examples, where “/” and “\” stand for rising and falling accent: (a) Mindestens ein Stu- dent hat jeden Roman gelesen, lit. ‘at least one student has every novel read’, with the reading “For at least one student x: x read every book”, and (b) Mindestens /EIN Student hat \JEDen Roman gelesen, with the additional reading (...) “For every novel y: at least one student read y”. I will derive the scope inversion in this reading from general principles of scope assignment and focus marking in German. In particular, I will argue that focus is assigned to constituents that precede the verbal predicate, which leads to syntactic configurations that in turn result in ambiguous interpretations. This explanation must be couched in a framework of derivational economy that favors shorter derivations. It is argued that the relevant comparison class is defined with respect to phonological form, not, as has been suggested for English, with respect t o identity of semantic interpretation, and that this may be a general property of “free” word order languages. (shrink)

A recent theory provides a unified cross-linguistic analysis of the interpretations that are assigned to expressions for disjunction, Negative Polarity Items, Free Choice Items, and the non-interrogative uses of wh-phrases in languages such as Mandarin Chinese. If this approach is on the right track, children should be expected to demonstrate similar patterns in the acquisition of these linguistic expressions. Previous research has found that, by age four, children have acquired the knowledge that both the existential indefinite renhe “any” and wh-words (...) in Mandarin Chinese are interpreted as Negative Polarity Items when they are bound by downward entailing operators, but the same expressions are interpreted as Free Choice Items when they are bound by deontic modals or by the Mandarin adverbial quantifier dou “all”. The present study extends this line of research to the Mandarin disjunction word huozhe. A Truth Value Judgment Task was used to investigate the possibility that disjunction phrases that are bound by the adverbial quantifier dou generate a conjunctive interpretation in the grammars of Mandarin-speaking 4-year-old children. The findings confirmed this prediction. We discuss the implications of the findings for linguistic theory and for language learnability. (shrink)

Information and its cognate concepts are frequently used in increasingly varied areas of scientific and scholarly investigations, from computing and engineering to philosophy and the social sciences. As a consequence, a great deal of interesting and exciting research is taking place in a wide range of fields, which do not always communicate with each other. So the second workshop1 of the IEG (the interdepartmental research group in philosophy of information at the University of Oxford2), took the shape of a series (...) of seminars, hosted in Oxford by the Department of Engineering Science, during the academic year 2008–2009. The project aimed to bring together leading experts in the broadly construed area of information research, with the goal of offering a stimulating series of talks and discussions on “the nature and scope of information”. (shrink)

The word "ethics" is often used as a synonym for morality or values or ideals. But ethics is also sometimes defined as critical reflection on moral claims and moral beliefs, which themselves pertain to ideas about right and wrong conduct, good and bad motives and intentions, and so on. The scope of ethics is therefore enormous, and the problems and dilemmas theoretically subject to ethical scrutiny are endlessly varied and fascinating. This is no less the case in medicine; it (...) often seems that a new ethical issue arises every time there is a breakthrough in medical technology that gives us powers we didn't have before. (shrink)

This book examines business education from the perspective of the social sciences and humanities, specifically sociology and ethics. In particular, it offers the rare combination of liberal arts and business management education which is used to investigate how aspects of business education might be responsible for and connected to the distribution of wealth that currently dominates the global economy. Through interviews with business ethics faculty members, students, and graduates around the world, as well as attendance in business ethics classes and (...) examination of classroom materials, the author presents patterns of theory, perspectives, and outcomes from culturally and geographically diverse business schools. This research provides insights into how business ethics educators are responding to the growing diversity in student populations, and the dual crises of environmental destruction and lack of ethical stewardship. The book also discusses alternative discourses within business schools and makes recommendations for future improvements. (shrink)