This piece, included in the drift special issue of continent. , was created as one step in a thread of inquiry. While each of the contributions to drift stand on their own, the project was an attempt to follow a line of theoretical inquiry as it passed through time and the postal service(s) from October 2012 until May 2013. This issue hosts two threads: between space & place and between intention & attention . The editors recommend that to experience the (...) drifiting thought that attention be paid to the contributions as they entered into conversation one after another. This particular piece is from the BETWEEN INTENTION & ATTENTION thread: Jeremy Fernando, Sitting in the Dock of the bay, watching... * R.H. Jackson, Reading Eyes * Gina Rae Foster, Nyctoleptic Nomadism: The Drift/Swerve of Knowing * Bronwyn Lay, Driftwood * Patricia Reed, Sentences on Drifitng * David Prater, drift: a way * * * * The gaze drifts where the stare dares not. The gaze is attentive while the stare is intent. Dériver : Equally to drift and/or to derive. —When drifting then, something must be taken along. Something must be derived from the drift. Something of oneself must always become other. Incorporating the other, incorporating oneself as other. Je est un autre , Rimbaud disait; 1 this in his last letter to Georges Izambard, a final correspondence to a former mentor and friend, from whom he was drifting away, having derived much. The drift is a control incomplete. To drift is to come closer and closer, but to always be turning away, pulling apart, pulling oneself apart. It is parabolic in the sense that it is always eluding a formerly established intent. Of all axes, it never finds room to rest. Filling new spaces, always changing places, ever escaping the Cartesian; the indubitable pinpointing of position. It is never pinned down. Love together what we will be apart. Once together, we will drift apart. Il le faut . Attention is held; it traces the path. It follows each point which traces the arc, the line, the swerve. It is not concerned with the figure being drawn, but rather the movement between one point and the next. The smallest movement. The clinamen of De Rerum Natura is the smallest of swerves, it is nothing more than the minimum — nec plus quam minimum . Michel Serres says of the clinamen , that it is an absurdity — a logical, geometrical, mechanical, physical absurdity. 'The clinamen, from here (its state of absurdity), finds refuge in subjectivity; it passes from the world to the soul, from the physical to the metaphysical, from the theory of inert bodies in freefall to the theory of the free movements of the living.' 2 So this swerve is something of the mind and something of the body, both in action, rather than a body which is merely acted upon. Swerve, however, has a connotation of suddenness. It is a movement which is made to avoid an otherwise inevitable impact. Drift, on the other hand, is the unleashing of something which is then allowed to follow a more complex series of forces. These forces now come from within as well as without. It is no longer tethered; now following tides, winds, flows or pitched slopes, now acting on its own. We are not atoms in freefall. Our attention long ago pulled us from this precipitous descent. We now live, ourselves, as one of the many forces. In the drift, as with the gaze, there is an ease. ‘Ease is the proper name of this unrepresentable space.’ It is the space nearest, the next, the neighboring space. To occupy this space requires a turn, a shift or a drift. It cannot be reached by proceeding straight ahead. ‘..the space adjacent, the empty place where each can move freely, in a semantic constellation where spatial proximity borders on opportune time (ad-agio, moving at ease) and convenience borders on the correct relation.’ 3 Intention always seeks to straighten this line, to make it less complex, to isolate the point of departure and the desired destination. It believes there can be two points and, between them, there must be a straight line. Can there be? Maybe. Must there be? Never. Straight lines may exist, but they can never be followed to the finish. After leaving this point, we will never reach that one without being buffeted at least a little — at least the least. One foot in front of the other, this is a very restrictive dance, less even than a two-step. Straight lines lead only to lost intentions, being the shortest and quickest way to get there. When attention drifts it slowly turns away from the intended target, leaving it for something which pulls the attention away. Now we are for a moment free; all at once we can pivot, now we can waltz. Drifting along the page, deriving from what is seen. Reading is seeing; the movement of the eyes as they drift. Reading in the eyes what has been seen, what has been derived from the act of reading. Reading eyes drift back and forth down the page, now and then jump back and forth, up to the top, one word, back down, quickly a few pages back, now gaze out towards the horizon. When attention drifts it is the gaze that follows. Our attention is not restricted to the path the words follow, but links them together; deriving what is to be seen, rather than read. La philosophie fait voir . ‘Thus, philosophers speak through proverbs, and demonstrate. They connect their imaginations with foreign rings, flown into famous tombs.’ 4 Now drifting off to sleep, dreams come as unintended visions. To dream is pure drift, vision without an object, gazing into the dark, reading the unknown of the night. NOTES: Arthur Rimbaud, Poésies (Paris: Bibliothéque de Cluny, 1958), 57. Michel Serres, La Naissance de la Physique (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1977), 10. Translation courtesy of R.H. Jackson. Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1993), 25. Louis Aragon, Une Vague des Rêves (Paris: Editions Seghers, 2006), 10. Translation courtesy of R.H. Jackson.  . (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nihilistic Cosmology and Catonian Ethics in Lucan’s Bellum CivileR. Sklenár*For many years, a powerful communis opinio dominated the scholarly literature on Lucan: that the poet is not merely influenced by Stoicism but is himself a committed Stoic, who expounds his doctrines both in his own voice and in the speeches of Cato. 1 The obvious difficulty with this argument is that Cato’s Stoic ideal defies reconciliation with some of (...) the most powerful and characteristic utterances of Lucan’s authorial voice. A more recent line of interpretation, typified by W. R. Johnson (1987), John Henderson (1988), and Jamie Masters (1992), 2 has rejected the putatively Stoic Lucan in favor of a dark, sinister, at times grimly parodic poet who both describes and exemplifies a view of the cosmos as chaotic, fragmentary, and ultimately meaningless. Under this reading, which has gained currency mostly since the mid-1980s, 3 Lucan’s Cato becomes a nasty caricature both of the Stoic sage and of the traditional Roman vir bonus. 4 While this satirical interpretation of Lucan’s Cato represents a significant improvement over the orthodoxy which it has displaced, it still does not adequately account for the systematic opposition between Cato’s Stoic ideal and the universe in which he attempts to practice it, or for the painful futility of his attempt to make sense of a world where senselessness is sovereign.The Stoic morality according to which Cato regulates his life presupposes a Stoic cosmos, both governed by and part of a divine logos. This cosmos is reason and order, all its processes part of a divine plan. 5 Since the task of human beings is to understand this plan and [End Page 281] consciously to conform their actions to it, the highest ethical plane is reached when human reason, brought to perfection, governs all aspects of a person’s behavior, for it brings that person into harmony with the rationally ordered cosmos. In other words, the height of wisdom and the height of goodness are one and the same (Long and Sedley 1987, I 374). But Lucan deposits Cato into a universe devoid of reason, “one wholly without purpose or meaning” (Johnson 1987, 10), marked by “the blatant absence of any design” (8)—in short, a nihilistic universe, 6 where the cosmological prerequisites for Catonian ethics necessarily fail. Cato’s pursuit of the Stoic ideal is in a literal sense doomed from the start, as Lucan assigns a prominent section of the Bellum Civile’s long proem to an exposition of his anti-rational cosmology:Fert animus causas tantarum expromere rerum, immensumque aperitur opus, quid in arma furentem impulerit populum, quid pacem excusserit orbi. invida fatorum series summisque negatum stare diu nimioque graves sub pondere lapsus nec se Roma ferens. sic, cum compage soluta saecula tot mundi suprema coegerit hora antiquum repetens iterum chaos, [omnia mixtis sidera sideribus concurrent,] 7 ignea pontum astra petent, tellus extendere litora nolet excutietque fretum, fratri contraria Phoebe ibit et obliquum bigas agitare per orbem indignata diem poscet sibi, totaque discors machina divulsi turbabit foedera mundi.(1.67–80)As many commentators have noted, the imagery of this passage is strongly reminiscent of the Stoic theory of ekpyrosis, 8 in which the celestial fire draws the other elements up toward itself and thereby consumes [End Page 282] the entire universe; hence Lucan’s image of the stars falling into the sea (ignea pontum astra petent): in fact the sea would be rising up toward the stars, but Lucan adopts the perspective of a terrestrial observer, from which the stars would appear to be falling. The world-conflagration, moreover, is a metaphor for the civil war and its causes. 9 These causes, though multiple, are not discrete; instead, they comprise a chain of causation, as indicated by series in the first cause (invida fatorum series) and further suggested by the paratactic arrangement in which all four causes are listed. The semantic force of series does not confine itself to the first cause, but rather governs a sequence in which each cause results directly from its predecessor. Summisque negatum / stare diu and nimioque graves sub pondere lapsus, then, are both consequences of fate’s... (shrink)

qua re flecte te, quaeso, et maiores tuos respice atque ita guberna rem publicam ut natum esse te ciues tui gaudeant: sine quo nec beatus nec c[l]arus nec †unctus† quisquam esse omni potest.

‘pedibus makes no better sense than metre.’ Shackleton Bailey, who suspects an allusion to the exclusus amator theme and accordingly suggests unctis…postibus . But iunctis pedibus is idiomatic Latin for an all-out fight and has an authentic look to it; Ovid, Met. 9. 42–4 illustrates the usage: rursusque ad bella coimus inque gradu stetimus certi non cedere, eratque cum pede pes iunctus. See further Verg. A. 10. 361 haeret pede pes densusque viro vir; Liv. 38. 21. 13 pede collato pugnandum (...) est; Sil. 4. 352–53 teritur iunctis umbonibus umbo, pesque pedem permit; Ov. Am. 1. 4. 44 nec tenerum duro cum pede iunge pedem. However, ‘Stand up to your wife, Cresciturus, and fight’ will not do. That would be a humourless piece of advice and, in any event, Cresciturus appears to be too henpecked to act on it. Since he cannot fight with fair means, he must resort to foul. pēdibus is neither corruption nor false quantity, but a comic coinage: pēs, pēdis, from pēdo , on the analogy of pēs, pĕdis, ‘foot’: Cresciture, si non vis vapulare, coniugi iterum atque iterum oppedas necesse est. Dorsa in the first verse calls attention to the fact that Cresciturus enjoys a strategic position for such a manoeuvre – a position which is the very reverse of iunctis pĕdibus in its normal sense. In short, iunctis…pēdibus is a παρ προσδοκαν for iunctis…pĕdibus. (shrink)

Pojęcie eutanazji ma w kręgu kultury europejskiej nie tylko znaczenie historyczne. Odnosząc się do historii, filozofii, medycyny, etyki czy literatury, nabrało ono także charakteru instytucjonalnego w okresie Trzeciej Rzeszy, kiedy eutanazja stała się elementem walki z najsłabszymi członkami społeczeństwa. Na przykładzie analizy kazania biskupa niemieckiego Cicmensa Augusta Grafa von Galena z 3 sierpnia 1941 r. ukazany został sprzeciw Kościoła katolickiego w Trzeciej Rzeszy w okresie tzw. Kirchenkampf. Analiza kontekstualna miała na celu ukazanie elementów charakterystycznych języka i argumentacji, którymi posługiwał się (...) Clemens August. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada İmam Mâlik’in/Mâlikîlerin necasetler ve kadınların özel halleriyle ilgili üç sünni mezhep başta olmak üzere cumhura muhalefet ettiği ve bu mezhebin karakteristiği haline gelen bazı temel meselelerden yola çıkılarak onların Hicaz bölgesi kaynaklı bir mezhep olarak eser çizgisinde mi rey çizgisinde mi yahut bu iki arasında olup esere mi daha yakın olduğu ihtimallerini ortaya koymak amaçlanmıştır. Bu noktada Mâlikîlerin ve diğer mezheplerin muteber klasik kaynakları ile “ihtilâfu’l-fukahâ” türünden eserlere müracaat edilmiştir. Ele alınan örneklerde Mâlikîlerin görüşleri şöyledir: Suların pislenmesi konusunda (...) Mâlikîler suyun azlık ya da çokluk ölçüsünü değil suyun rengi, tadı ve kokusu gibi temel vasıflarından birinin değişip değişmediğini esas alarak hüküm vermişlerdir. Eti yenen hayvanların idrar ve dışkıları konusunda eti yenen hayvan necis bir şeyler yeyip içmemişse bunların hem idrarları hem de dışkılarının temiz olup, namaza engel olmadığı görüşünü benimsemişlerdir. Köpeğin kendisinin ve yaladığı kabın temiz olup olmadığı konusunda Mâlikîler köpek ve domuz dahil canlı olan her hayvan -necis bir şey yemiş olsa bile- temiz olduğu görüşünü savunmuşlardır. Hayzın herhangi bir alt sınırının olup-olmadığı noktasında bunun alt bir sınırının olmadığı ve bir defalık kanama yani kısa bir müddet kanın gelmesinin âdetin sübutu için yeterli olduğunu görüşünü benimsemişlerdir. Âdetli kadının Kur’an okuması meselesinde ise bu durumda olan kadının Kur’an’a dokunmasının yasak olduğu, fakat onu dokunmadan okuyabileceği görüşünde olmuşlardır. Hatta öğretici veya öğrenci olanlar zaruret miktarınca eğitim amacıyla ruhsat hükümden faydalanarak Kur’ân’a hem dokunabilir hem de onu okuyabilir. Elde edilen bulgular neticesinde İmam Mâlik’in/Mâlikîlerin maslahat ve istihsanı kullanmada öne çıkan bir mezhep olarak reyi kullanmakla birlikte, genel olarak nasların umumundan veya mutlaklığından hareket ettikleri, görüşlerine aykırı özel nasları mutlaka usule ait bir yöntemle te’vil ettikleri yahut cerh ve ta’dil yoluna başvurdukları veya meşru gerekçeleri olan istihsan yoluyla terk ettikleri, dolayısıyla esere daha yakın oldukları ve Hicaz fıkhını temsil ettikleri sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. (shrink)

Columella invites his readers to plant different flowers, including violets—which will be the main focus of the following discussion :uerum ubi iam puro discrimine pectita tellusdeposito squalore nitens sua semina poscet, 95pangite tunc uarios, terrestria sidera, flores:candida leucoia et flauentia lumina caltae,narcissique comas et hiantis saeua leonisora feri, calathisque uirentia lilia canis,necnon uel niueos uel caeruleos hyacinthos. 100tum quae pallet humi, quae frondes purpurat auro,ponatur uiola, et nimium rosa plena pudoris.96 pangite Heinsius: pingite SAR || 99 nitentia Gesner || 101 (...) frondes SA: frondens R | purpurat auro ϛ: purpura tabo SAR: purpura et auro Ursinus: purpurat albo HeinsiusThis is the text of Rodgers's recent OCT, but with a somewhat modified apparatus criticus. For the purposes of my argument, it will be useful also to quote from the outset a related catalogue of melliferous flowers from another book of Columella's treatise : mille praeterea semina uel crudo caespite uirentia uel subacto sulco flores amicissimos apibus creant, ut sunt in uirgineo solo […] gladiolus narcissi. at in hortensi lira consita nitent candida lilia nec his sordidiora leucoia, tum Punicae rosae luteolaeque et Sarranae uiolae, nec minus caelestis luminis hyacinthus.There are a number of more general similarities, but the relevant point is that the two catalogues list many of the same flowers and describe them in similar ways, which means that one catalogue can serve as an interpretative guide to the other. The first two items in the prose list of garden flowers correspond to candida leucoia and calathisque uirentia lilia canis, similarly listed in the first half of the verse catalogue; nitent can thus support Gesner's emendation nitentia for uirentia, unduly neglected by recent editors. The metaphoric periphrasis gladiolus narcissi can be compared with narcissique comas. Both texts describe the hyacinth as sky-blue, which seems to be otherwise unparalleled. Finally, just like the prose list, Columella's poem groups roses with two varieties of violet :tum quae pallet humi, quae frondes purpurat auro,ponatur uiola, et nimium rosa plena pudoris.The prose version makes it all but certain that the poem should likewise refer to a yellow and a purple varieties of violet. While Columella's verse description of the former variety is fairly unambiguous, that of the latter raises questions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Su irez NORMAN j. WELLS IT HAS LONG BEEN ACKNOWLEDGEDthat Francisco Sufirez's distinction between a formal and an objective concept exercised some influence upon Descartes's teaching on 'idea'.' It would appear, however, that not enough attention has been given to that distinction of Sufirez (and especially to another to be mentioned shordy) to aid in dispelling what I take to be (...) a widespread confusion and misunderstanding with regard to 'idea' in Descartes, especially with respect to 'idea' taken 'objectively'. Much, if not all, of the confusion in question has to do with Descartes's admittedly equivocal use of the term 'idea'. For he had allowed that 'idea' could be taken 'materially' (materialiter), on the one hand, for the knowing activity of the intellect. On the other hand, it could be taken 'objectively' (objective) for the thing (res) represented by that knowing activity.' At this point, the contemporary reader can only be brought up short, See E. Gilson, Index scolastico-cart~sien (New York: Burt Franklin Reprint, 1912), 48-49; Discours de la m~thode: Texte et commentazre (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947), 321; G. Rodis-Lewisin her edition of Meditationes de Prima PhRosoph.m (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), 41 n. 1; L'oeuure de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971), 53~ n. 8; J. Collins, Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), 165;T.J. Cronin, S.J., Objecttve Being m Descartes and SuArez (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966); "Objective Reality of Ideas in Human Thought: Descartes and Su~rez," Wisdom in Depth: Essays in Honor of Henri Renard, SJ., eds. V. F. Daues, S.J., M. R. Holloway, S.J., L. Sweeney, S.J. (Milwaukee : Bruce, 1966), 68-79; L. Gilen, S.J., "Uber die Beziehungen Descartes zur zeitgenossischen Scholastik," Scholastik 32 (1957): 41-66; R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la th~orie cart6sienne de l'&re objectif," Revue d'histoire de la philosophic 3 (1929): 464-72;J. Owens, C.S.S.R., in The Cambridge HtstoU of Later Medu,val Philosophy, eds. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 459; G. Nuchelmans,Judgment and Propositwnfrom Descartesto Kant (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1983), 36-54. " Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam et P. Tannery, 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1897-19o9; hereafter cited according to volume, page and line), Praefatio ad Lectorem, 7: 8. 19-251 "Sed respondeo hic subesse aequivocationem in voce ideae: sumi enim potest vel materialiter, pro operatione intellectus, quo sensu me perfectior dici nequit, vel objective, pro re per istam operationem repraesentata, quae res, etsi non supponatur extra intellectum existere, potest tamen me esse perfectior ratione suae essentiae." It is clear that two realities are to be causally accounted for. The [33] 34 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28"1 JANUARY 1990 conditioned as we are by an appreciation of 'objectivity' altogether extramental! It makes for a considerable wrench of perspective to do justice to Descartes's acknowledged doctrine of intramental objectivity and an intramental 'thing represented' (resrepraesentata). 'Idea', then, in traditional Cartesian fashion, designates the act of representing as well as the 'thing represented '. S Yet, for all this, and despite repeated expressions of the same doctrine, there is a persistent tendency in the history of Cartesianism and its scholarship to interpret 'idea' taken 'objectively' as in some way representative. Contrary to what I take to be Descartes's constant position, such a rendering unwittingly transfers that function which is proper to the cognitive activity, mind is the efficient cause of its cognitive activity. With respect to ideas taken 'objectively', such as the ideas of God and the triangle on the levels of metaphysical and mathematical intelligibility, an efficient cause, extrinsic to the mind, is certainly at issue. For here we are in the presence of what is independent of the mind, however intramental it may be. On the triangle, see Medit. 5; 7: 64. ]4s7 : "...est tamen profecto determinata quaedam ejus natura, sire essentia, sive forma, immutabUis et aeterna, quae a me non efficta est, nec a mente mea dependet." For the idea of God, see Medit. 5; 7: 68. l o-12: "Nam sane multis modis inteUigo illam [ideam... (shrink)

Constantius, as though the Temple of Janus had been closed and all enemies had been laid low, was longing to visit Rome and, following the death of Magnentius, to hold a triumph, without a victory title and after shedding Roman blood. For he did not himself defeat any belligerent nation or learn that any had been defeated through the courage of his commanders, nor did he add anything to the empire, and in dangerous circumstances he was never seen to lead (...) from the front, nor even to be among the front ranks. But he wanted to display an exaggeratedly long procession, standards stiff with gold and the beauty of his attendants, to a population who were living more peacefully, neither anticipating nor wishing to see this or anything like it. For perhaps he was unaware that some earlier emperors had been content with lictors in peacetime, but when the heat of battle could not allow inactivity, one of them had entrusted himself to a small fishing boat, blasted by raging gales, another had followed the example of the Decii and offered up his life in a vow for the state, and another had himself explored the enemy camp alongside the regular soldiers; that, in short, various of them had won renown for magnificent deeds, and so committed their glories to the distinguished memory of posterity. …When he was approaching the city, observing with a serene expression the respectful attendance of the Senate, and the venerable likenesses of the patrician families, he thought, not like Cineas, the legate of Pyrrhus, that a multitude of kings had been assembled together, but rather that this was the refuge of the whole world [cumque urbi propinquaret, senatus officia, reuerendasque patriciae stirpis effigies, ore sereno contemplans, non ut Cineas ille Pyrrhi legatus, in unum coactam multitudinem regum, sed asylum mundi totius adesse existimabat]. Next, when he turned his gaze to the general populace, he was astonished at the speed with which every type of men from everywhere had flowed into Rome. As though he were trying to terrify the Euphrates or the Rhine with the sight of arms, with the standards in front of him on each side, he sat alone in a golden chariot, glittering with the shimmer of many different precious stones, whose flashes seemed to produce a flickering light. After many others had preceded him, he was surrounded by dragons, woven from purple cloth and affixed to the golden, bejewelled tips of spears, open to the wind with their broad mouths and so hissing as though roused with anger, trailing the coils of their tails in the wind [eumque post antegressos multiplices alios, purpureis subtegminibus texti, circumdedere dracones, hastarum aureis gemmatisque summitatibus illigati, hiatu uasto perflabiles, et ideo uelut ira perciti sibilantes, caudarumque uolumina relinquentes in uentum]. Then there came a twin column of armed men, with shields and plumed helmets, shining with glittering light, clothed in gleaming cuirasses, with armoured horsemen, whom they call clibanarii, arranged among them, masked and protected by breastplates, encircled with iron bands, so that you might have thought them to be statues finished by the hand of Praxiteles, not men [sparsique catafracti equites, quos clibanarios dictitant, personati thoracum muniti tegminibus, et limbis ferreis cincti, ut Praxitelis manu polita crederes simulacra, non uiros]. Slender rings of metal plates, fitted to the curves of the body, clothed them, spread across all their limbs, so that, in whatever direction necessity moved their joints, their clothing moved likewise, since the joins had been made to fit so well.When he was hailed as Augustus with favourable cries, [Constantius] did not shudder at the din that thundered from hills and shores, but showed himself unmoved, as he appeared in his provinces. For, when passing through high gates, he stooped his short body, and, keeping his gaze straight, as though his neck were fixed, he turned his head neither right nor left, as though an image of a man, and he was never seen to nod when the wheel shook, or to spit or wipe or rub his face or nose, or to move his hand [nam et corpus perhumile curuabat portas ingrediens celsas, et uelut collo munito, rectam aciem luminum tendens, nec dextra uultum nec laeua flectebat, tamquam figmentum hominis, nec, cum rota concuteret, nutans, nec spuens, aut os aut nasum tergens uel fricans, manumue agitans uisus est umquam]. Although this behaviour was an affectation, it, and other aspects of his more private life, were however indications of extraordinary endurance, granted to him alone, as it was given to be supposed. This passage, which describes the aduentus of Constantius II into Rome in 357, is one of the best-known episodes in the Res Gestae of Ammianus Marcellinus. This historical work was completed by the retired military officer in around 390, with the surviving books covering the period from 353 to the aftermath of the Battle of Adrianople in 378. Unsurprisingly, this passage is also one of the most debated. Throughout his work, Ammianus regularly criticized Constantius as a weak, vicious ruler, influenced by women and, in particular, eunuchs, and so contrasted him with his cousin and successor Julian, the emperor who receives the most favourable treatment within this text. The degree and nature of criticism within this particular passage has, however, been the subject of a variety of wildly differing interpretations. It is clear that, at the outset, Ammianus is inveighing against the notion of holding a triumph for victory in a civil war, but there has been debate over whether Constantius was actually celebrating a triumph or merely the anniversary of his accession. Similarly, the description of the Senate as ‘the refuge of the whole world’ has been read in contrasting ways, being regarded as derogatory by Johannes Straub, as neutral, or even positive, by Pierre Dufraigne, and as respectful by R.C. Blockley. While this passage as a whole is generally read as an attack on Constantius for his pretentions to ill-deserved military glory, it also raises the question of whether Ammianus was also criticizing Constantius for the way in which he performed his aduentus, emphasizing his pompous and autocratic behaviour in order to contrast him with Julian, who preferred to behave more like a ciuilis princeps in public. Of course, such a reading almost inevitably produces a portrait of Ammianus as an impractically nostalgic figure, harking back to a style of rule which was anachronistic in the post-Diocletianic Later Roman Empire. In addition, Ammianus also presented Julian as performing an aduentus into Constantinople in 361, employing some phrases that were similar to those used to describe Constantius’ procession in 357. Furthermore, as John Matthews has illustrated, Ammianus’ presentations of the occasions when Julian eschewed late-antique imperial protocol are not without tinges of criticism, and his judgement on the propriety of different modes of imperial behaviour varied dependent on the context. (shrink)

THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION ARE CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRADICTIONS ARISING FROM THE CONJUNCTION OF THREE PRINCIPLES OF CONFIRMATION - NICOD’S CRITERION, THE EQUIVALENCE CONDITION, AND WHAT THE PAPER CALLS THE SCIENTIFIC LAWS CONDITION. THE PAPER DISCUSSES IN DETAIL THE VARIOUS SOLUTIONS PROVIDED BY ABANDONING ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES. IN THE END IT FINDS NICOD’S CRITERION FALSE, BUT FINDS THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY H.G. ALEXANDER AND OTHERS OF WHY NICOD’S CRITERION IS FALSE THEMSELVES UNSATISFACTORY. IT THEN PROVIDES A MORE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT (...) OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH "RA.BA" CONFIRMS "ALL R’S ARE B". (shrink)

«Theologicis et Philosophicis doctrinis, ex ipsa Iuris et lustititiae, nec non Prudentiae, aliarumque Virtutum Moralium Natura desumptis, compendiario illustratus et sub auspiciis lUustrissimi Domini D. Georgii de Lubomir L U B O M I R S K I, Comitis in Visnicz et Jaroslaw: Poloniarum Archimarschalci, et Regni Exercituum Ducis, nec non Generalis Cracoviae: et Casimiriensis, Olstinensis, Chmielnicensis, Nizinensis etc. etc. Capitanei. Publicae Disputantium concertationi propositus ab Alexandro J a s k m a n i c k i, sacrae Theologiae auditore. (...) In Cardinalitio Hosiano Collegio Societatis Jesu. Anno ab Homine Deo nato. M.DC.LXIV [1664]. Brunsbergae, Typis Henrici Schultz». En habes, Benevolo Lector, plenum titulum libri, qui hie nostram movet attentionem. Primum Auctoris biographia traditur, deinde de eiusdem operis dedicatione sermo est, postea vero ipsa eins politica et socialis doctrina explicatur et commentatur. (shrink)

«Theologicis et Philosophicis doctrinis, ex ipsa Iuris et lustititiae, nec non Prudentiae, aliarumque Virtutum Moralium Natura desumptis, compendiario illustratus et sub auspiciis lUustrissimi Domini D. Georgii de Lubomir L U B O M I R S K I, Comitis in Visnicz et Jaroslaw: Poloniarum Archimarschalci, et Regni Exercituum Ducis, nec non Generalis Cracoviae: et Casimiriensis, Olstinensis, Chmielnicensis, Nizinensis etc. etc. Capitanei. Publicae Disputantium concertationi propositus ab Alexandro J a s k m a n i c k i, sacrae Theologiae auditore. (...) In Cardinalitio Hosiano Collegio Societatis Jesu. Anno ab Homine Deo nato. M.DC.LXIV [1664]. Brunsbergae, Typis Henrici Schultz». En habes, Benevolo Lector, plenum titulum libri, qui hie nostram movet attentionem. Primum Auctoris biographia traditur, deinde de eiusdem operis dedicatione sermo est, postea vero ipsa eins politica et socialis doctrina explicatur et commentatur. (shrink)

We generalize two well-known model-theoretic characterization theorems from propositional modal logic to first-order modal logic. We first study FML-definable frames and give a version of the Goldblatt–Thomason theorem for this logic. The advantage of this result, compared with the original Goldblatt–Thomason theorem, is that it does not need the condition of ultrafilter reflection and uses only closure under bounded morphic images, generated subframes and disjoint unions. We then investigate Lindström type theorems for first-order modal logic. We show that FML has (...) the maximal expressive power among the logics extending FML which satisfy compactness, bisimulation invariance and the Tarski union property. (shrink)

An algebraic semantics, based on factor algebras, for one-way and two-way implicative verbs is proposed. Implicative verbs denote elements of filters or of ideals generated by identity functions in factor algebras. This semantics explains in particular the problem of implicational equivalence raised by two-way implicative verbs, and shows that the negation necessary to establish the implicativity of these verbs is the negation which preserves the presuppositions of sentences with implicative verbs. In addition, it follows from the proposed semantics that any (...) two implicative verbs denoting in the same algebra but belonging to different categories, are semantically related. (shrink)

Did Plato abandon, or sharply modify, the Theory of Forms in later life? In the Phaedo, Symposium, and Republic it is generally agreed that Plato held that universals exist. But in Parmenides, he subjected that theory to criticism. If the criticism were valid, and Plato knew so, then the Parmenides marks a turning point in his thought. If, however, Plato became aware that there are radical differences in the logical behaviour of concepts, and the later dialogues are a record of (...) his attempt to analyse those differences, then Plato’s thought can be said to have moved in a new and vitally important direction after the Parmenides . Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics brings together twenty essays by leading philosophers from the UK and the USA reflecting upon this important issue and upon the questions arising from it. (shrink)

Social conditions of race and class continue to combine in ways that raise systemic questions about the adequacy and legitimacy of liberal, capitalist democracy in America. More radical alternatives, however, are still generally held to be irrelevant in the American context. The following is an effort to correct this widespread misrepresentation of socialism’s relevance to America generally, and to matters of race in particular. I consider the work of C.L.R. James who, fifty years ago, developed a class-oriented, explicitly Marxist theory (...) in which the aspirations and struggles of African-Americans were given a central place, both analytically and politically. (shrink)

The most glamorous and even glorious moments in a legal system come when a high court recognizes an abstract principle involving, for example, human liberty or equality. Indeed, Americans, and not a few non-Americans, have been greatly stirred--and divided--by the opinions of the Supreme Court, especially in the area of race relations, where the Court has tried to revolutionize American society. But these stirring decisions are aberrations, says Cass R. Sunstein, and perhaps thankfully so. In Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, (...) Sunstein, one of America's best known commentators on our legal system, offers a bold, new thesis about how the law should work in America, arguing that the courts best enable people to live together, despite their diversity, by resolving particular cases without taking sides in broader, more abstract conflicts. Sunstein offers a close analysis of the way the law can mediate disputes in a diverse society, examining how the law works in practical terms, and showing that, to arrive at workable, practical solutions, judges must avoid broad, abstract reasoning. Why? For one thing, critics and adversaries who would never agree on fundamental ideals are often willing to accept the concrete details of a particular decision. Likewise, a plea bargain for someone caught exceeding the speed limit need not--indeed, must not--delve into sweeping issues of government regulation and personal liberty. Thus judges purposely limit the scope of their decisions to avoid reopening large-scale controversies. Sunstein calls such actions incompletely theorized agreements. In identifying them as the core feature of legal reasoning--and as a central part of constitutional thinking in America, South Africa, and Eastern Europe-- he takes issue with advocates of comprehensive theories and systemization, from Robert Bork to Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, and Ronald Dworkin, who defends an ambitious role for courts in the elaboration of rights. Equally important, Sunstein goes on to argue that it is the living practice of the nation's citizens that truly makes law. For example, he cites Griswold v. Connecticut, a groundbreaking case in which the Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's restrictions on the use of contraceptives by married couples--a law that was no longer enforced by prosecutors. In overturning the legislation, the Court invoked the abstract right of privacy; the author asserts that the justices should have appealed to the narrower principle that citizens need not comply with laws that lack real enforcement. By avoiding large-scale issues and values, such a decision could have led to a different outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick, the decision that upheld Georgia's rarely prosecuted ban on sodomy. And by pointing to the need for flexibility over time and circumstances, Sunstein offers a novel understanding of the old ideal of the rule of law. Legal reasoning can seem impenetrable, mysterious, baroque. This book helps dissolve the mystery. Whether discussing the interpretation of the Constitution or the spell cast by the revolutionary Warren Court, Cass Sunstein writes with grace and power, offering a striking and original vision of the role of the law in a diverse society. In his flexible, practical approach to legal reasoning, he moves the debate over fundamental values and principles out of the courts and back to its rightful place in a democratic state: the legislatures elected by the people. (shrink)

The problems and the history of contacts between distant continents in bygone ages and long before the age of fast and easy travel, have always fascinated both professional scholars and the interested public. Was ancient history really nothing but the history of co-existing and isolated geographic, cultural and political “islands?” Already at school we learned too much about migrations of peoples, economic contacts, influences on art styles, conquests, and the rise, expansion and fall of empires to believe that. The (highly (...) improbable) theory that certain archaeological finds in America suggest, or even prove, Mediterranean influence (e.g., the arrival of Phoenician ships), or the alleged Viking discovery of America centuries before Columbus, or Thor Heyerdahl's adventurous journey to prove South American influence on remote Pacific islands did not fail to cause widespread interest and even excitement (although many scholars still feel that Heyerdahl's epic adventure, thrilling as it is, failed to prove what it set out to prove). The island of Madagascar is pretty close to the African continent, but its language exhibits more points of contact with Polynesian than with African tongues. And the blow-bellows used by Malagache smiths are similar to those used in Malaysia and unlike those known to African metalworkers. Clearly the Polynesians, those great ancient mariners, sailed further than originally seemed likely. Musicologists studying the cantillation of the Hebrew Bible in the liturgy of the ancient Jewish communities on the Malabar coast in India discovered to their surprise that it was similar to the cantillation not of the Babylonian but of the Yemenite Jews! This surprise was, of course, no surprise to those who knew anything about trade-winds and shipping routes between South Arabia and the Indian coast. Historians of religion, even more than general historians, studying the spread and expansion of religious ideas and movements have realised long ago that the beginning of all wisdom is a basic knowledge of economic geography. (shrink)

Arvind Thomas has written a remarkable book. That said, however, it must be quickly added that it is not a book for everyone, not even for all students of medieval literature. It is a very thoughtf...

The aim of this paper is to understand the philosophical role of Collingwood’s proposed logic of question and answer. I shall consider its historical background as a response to Bradley, to the “realists” and to the logical positivists. I shall also consider the similarities and differences between it and modern developments in logics of question and answer and also in anti-realist philosophical logic. In analysing Collingwood’s proposed logic, and its potential for development, I shall attempt a sketch of how it (...) would work out in formal terms. To be sure Collingwood dismissed the symbolism of Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica as “typographical jargon” and he thought the various artificial logical languages of his time to be “numerous and frightful offspring of propositional logic out of illiteracy”. Nevertheless he did recognise an important role for the logician in articulating his system, namely to identify what it is to be a proposition and what it is to be a question and in doing so to identify what constitutes an “absolute presupposition”. Moreover since Collingwood’s day there have been important developments in logic and semantics, which are expressed through typographical jargon, and yet which are highly relevant to Collingwood’s proposed logic and to its philosophical role. (shrink)

Book Information Self-Governance and Cooperation. By Robert H. Myers. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. vi + 179. Hardback, £30.00.

As everyone knows, since the end of the Second World War there has been a sensational revival of interest in the non-Christian religions particularly in the United States and in this country. The revival has taken two forms, the one popular, the other academic. The first of these has turned almost exclusively to Hindu and Buddhist mysticism and can be seen as an energetic reaction against the dogmatic and until very recently rigid structure of institutionalised Christianity and a search for (...) a lived experience of the freedom of the spirit which is held to be the true content of mysticism, obscured in Christianity by the basic dogma of a transcendent God, the ‘wholly Other’ of Rudolf Otto and his numerous followers, but wholly untrammelled by any such concept in the higher reaches of Vedanta and Buddhism, particularly in its Zen manifestation. On the academic side the picture is less clear. There is, of course, the claim that the study of religion, like any other academic study, must be subjected to and controlled by the same principles of ‘scientific’ objectivity to which the other ‘arts’ subjects have been subjected, to their own undoing. But even here there would seem to be a bias in favour of the religions of India and the Far East as against Islam, largely, one supposes, in response to popular demand. (shrink)

Regarded as a revisionist historian in the West, Patricia Crone, who wrote many books and articles on various subjects of early Islamic history, was a prolific researcher. The place and role of mawālī, in the Umayyad and Abbāsid society, has been one of the special topics she has been interested in since the very beginning of her academic life. Her works with a revisionist perspective have been faced many criticisms by colleagues, especially the western ones, because of her biased view (...) of the sources written by Muslim authors, her methodology, and her results. However, it is obvious that Crone’s studies on mawālī have positively or negatively affected the Eastern and Western academics in Islamic studies. This article’s main purpose is to reveal Crone’s views on mawālī in Isla-mic society and draw an outline without comment as much as possible. The paper consists of three parts. In the first part, Crone’s revisionist perspective and her works on mawālī have been explained. In the second part, her distinctive views on the mawālī and its origin have been discussed. Finally, in the third part, her findings of the position of mawālī in social, political, military, and economic life during the Rāshidun Caliphs, the Umayyads, and the Abbāsids have been introduced. This study, which tackles Crone’s views on mawālī, aims to encourage the further studies on this subject. (shrink)