Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.

We use evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science to examine the issue of the theory-ladenness of perceptual observation. This evidence shows that perception is theory-laden, but that it is only strongly theory-laden when the perceptual evidence is ambiguous or degraded, or when it requires a difficult perceptual judgment. We argue that debates about the theory-ladenness issue have focused too narrowly on the issue of perceptual experience, and that a full account of the scientific process requires an (...) examination of theory-ladenness in attention, perception, data interpretation, data production, memory, and scientific communication. We conclude that the evidence for theory-ladenness does not lead to a relativist account of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an upsurge of interest in the second-person perspective, not only in philosophy of mind, language, law and ethics, but also in various empirical disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience and developmental psychology. A distinctive and perhaps also slightly puzzling feature of this ongoing discussion is that whereas many contributors insist that a proper consideration of the second-person perspective will have an impact on our understanding of social cognition, joint action, communication, self-consciousness, morality, and so on, there remains (...) considerable disagreement about what exactly a second-person perspective amounts to (see Eilan 2014; Conant and Rödl 2014). What is the difference between adopting a second-person and a third-person perspective on another? How does one relate to another as a you and how does that differ from relating to another as a he, she or they? In the following, I will consider three different proposals and argue that a promising but somewhat overlooked account can be found in the work of Husserl. (shrink)

Through a study of a sophisticated contemporary scientific experiment, it is shown how and why use of the term 'observation' in reference to that experiment departs from ordinary and philosophical usages which associate observation epistemically with perception. The role of "background information" is examined, and general conclusions are arrived at regarding the use of descriptive language in and in talking about science. These conclusions bring out the reasoning by which science builds on what it has learned, and, further, (...) how that process of building consists not only in adding to our substantive knowledge, but also in increasing our ability to learn about nature, by extending our ability to observe it in new ways. The argument of this paper is thus a step toward understanding how it is that all our knowledge of nature rests on observation. (shrink)

To investigate whether implicit detection occurs uniformly during change blindness with single or combination feature stimuli, and whether implicit detection is affected by exposure duration and delay, two one-shot change detection experiments are designed. The implicit detection effect is measured by comparing the reaction times of baseline trials, in which stimulus exhibits no change and participants report “same,” and change blindness trials, in which the stimulus exhibits a change but participants report “same.” If the RTs of blindness trials are longer (...) than those of baseline trials, implicit detection has occurred. The strength of the implicit detection effect was measured by the difference in RTs between the baseline and change blindness trials, where the larger the difference, the stronger the implicit detection effect. In both Experiments 1 and 2, the results showed that the RTs of change blindness trials were significantly longer than those of baseline trials. Whether under set size 4, 6, or 8, the RTs of the change blindness trials were significantly longer than those in the baseline trials. In Experiment 1, the difference between the baseline trials’ RTs and change blindness trials’ RTs of the single features was significantly larger than that of the combination features. However, in Experiment 2, the difference between the baseline trials’ RTs and the change blindness trials’ RTs of single features was significantly smaller than that of the combination features. In Experiment 1a, when the exposure duration was shorter, the difference between the baseline and change blindness trials’ RTs was smaller. In Experiment 2, when the delay was longer, the difference between the two trials’ RTs was larger. These results suggest that regardless of whether the change occurs in a single or a combination of features and whether there is a long exposure duration or delay, implicit detection occurs uniformly during the change blindness period. Moreover, longer exposure durations and delays strengthen the implicit detection effect. Set sizes had no significant impact on implicit detection. (shrink)

For much of the last forty years, certain shared epistemological concerns have guided research in both the history and the philosophy of science: the testing of theory (including the replication of experiments), the assessment of evidence, the bearing of theoretical and metaphysical assumptions on the reality of scientific objects, and, above all, the interaction of subjective and objective factors in scientific inquiry. This essay proposes a turn toward ontology—more specifically, toward the ontologies created and sustained by scientific observation. Such (...) a shift in focus would invite a rethinking of the neo‐Kantian distinctions (along with their characteristic metaphors, such as “lenses,” “filters,” and “perspectives”) that have, implicitly or explicitly, informed much of late twentieth‐century history and philosophy of science. In particular, the current gap between psychology and epistemology might be bridged, if the psychology in question were collective rather than individual and the epistemology oriented toward discovery rather than warranting and testing. (shrink)

This article uses the mythological figure of the satyr to examine European attitudes towards incorporating mythical creatures into zoology and, more broadly, to survey attempts to reconcile the relative status of myth vis-à-vis modern science. Evidence is used from the past five hundred years to argue for the longevity of these debates, which continue to repeat the same arguments based on the same sources. It is argued that scholars’ attitudes towards Ancient civilizations play a significant role in explaining whether they (...) decide to consider the satyr as the product of the imperfect observation of monkeys or as a creature on its own right. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this study, the learning experiences of four elementary school teachers who were basketball coaches were explored. Specifically, the learning experiences gained through observing professional basketball coaches’ sessions were examined by employing van Manen’s hermeneutic-phenomenological approach, which focuses on the thematic analysis of lived experiences. Previous coaching studies that have focused on the professional development of coaches have revealed that observing elite coaching sessions could be a major source of practical coaching knowledge because coaches could learn from experienced coaches. (...) Quantitative studies of this learning effect have revealed that observers learn new coaching methods from a general perspective. However, this study revealed that teachers give specific meaning and value to observed phenomena from the perspective of personal interest based on their coaching or teaching beliefs. This learning was interpreted from a multifaceted perspective, which was evident from their coaching interests and questions. This study disclosed that teachers reflect on their coaching philosophy, methods and attitude. Furthermore, even if teachers generally tend to highlight their coaching methods, this has a qualitatively complex nature because the meaning and value given to coaching methods varied in each teacher’s reflection. The perspective of problem-solving highlighted how to answer their personal questions based on practical coaching problems by observing a coaching session. Discovering the methodological differences between the observation session and the daily coaching session were highlighted. (shrink)

ArgumentEarly modern Europeans routinely compared nature to a theater or spectacle, so it makes sense to examine the practices of observing real spectacles and performances in order to better comprehend acts of witnessing nature. Using examples from the history of fireworks, this essay explores acts of observing natural and artificial spectacles between the sixteenth and late eighteenth centuries and suggests these acts of observation were mutually constitutive and entailed ongoing and diverse exchanges. The essay follows the changing ways in (...) which audiences were imagined or expected to react to fireworks and shows how these also shaped experiences of natural phenomena. Both natural and artificial spectacles were intended to teach morals about the state and nature, yet audiences rarely seemed to take away what they were expected to learn. The essay examines how performers thus sought to discipline audience observation, before exploring, in conclusion, how spectacle provided a vocabulary for discerning and articulating new natural phenomena, and sites for the pursuit of novel experiments. (shrink)

A great amount of literature documents young children’s innate interest in discovering their surroundings and gradually developing more complex activities and thoughts. It has been demonstrated that when environments support young children’s innate interest and progressive autonomy, they help children acquire a self-determined behavior. However, little is known about the application of this evidence in the daily practice of early childhood educational settings. This study examines Emmi Pikler Nursery School, a center that implements an autonomy-supportive educational approach. We conducted a (...) systematic observation of two experienced Pikler educators while they accompanied young children’s free play. Our objective was to assess: if educators’ instrumental action follows a systematic behavioral sequence; if each instrumental action is supported by specific relational behaviors; and if educators display differentiated intervention levels with regards to children’s free play through the adaptation of the relational dimension. We conducted lag sequential analysis in order to find behavioral patterns and concurrences between the observed behaviors. Our findings indicate that educators perform systematic action sequences and that each of the instrumental actions of those sequences has a specific relational value. We conclude that educators display three differentiated intervention levels depending on the child and the circumstances of the moment, providing an appropriate autonomy support and reinforcing children’s self-determination. (shrink)

The fine-tuning argument can be used to support the Many Universe hypothesis. The Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy objection seeks to undercut the support for the Many Universe hypothesis. The objection is that although the evidence that there is life somewhere confirms Many Universes, the specific evidence that there is life in this universe does not. I will argue that the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy is not committed by the fine-tuning argument. The key issue is the procedure by which the universe with life (...) is selected for observation. Once we take account of the procedure, we find that the support for the Many Universe hypothesis remains. (shrink)

Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is a major cause of death and disability in Western society, and often results in functional and neuropsychological abnormalities. Memory impairment is one of the most significant cognitive implications after TBI. In the current study we investigated procedural memory acquisition by observational training in TBI patients. It was previously found that while practicing a new motor skill, patients engage in all three phases of skill learning–fast acquisition, between-session consolidation, and long-term retention, though their pattern of learning (...) is atypical compared to healthy participants. A different set of studies showed that training by observing a motor task, generally prompted effective acquisition and consolidation of procedural knowledge in healthy participants. The aim of our study was to (i) evaluate the potential benefit of action observation in TBI patients. (ii) Examine the possibility of general improvement in performance between the first (24 h post-training) and second (2 weeks post-training) stage of the study. (iii) Investigate the link between patients’ ability to benefit from observational learning (viaperformance gains–speed and accuracy) and common measures of injury (such as severity of injury, functional and cognitive measures).Materials and methodsPatients hospitalized after moderate to severe TBI, were trained by observation for the finger opposition sequence (FOS) motor task. They were then tested for the observation-trained sequence (A) and a similar control sequence (B), at two different time-points (24 h post-training and 2 weeks later).Results revealed(i) a significant difference in performance between the trained (A) and untrained (B) sequences, in favor of the trained sequence. (ii) An increase in performance for both sequences A and B toward the second (retention) session. (iii) The advantage for sequence A was stable and preserved also in the second session. (iv) Participants with lower moderate Functional Independence Measure (FIM) scores gained more from observational-procedural learning, compared with patients with higher functional abilities.ConclusionOverall, these findings support the notion that TBI patients may achieve procedural memory consolidation and retention through observational learning. Moreover, different functional traits may predict the outcomes of observational training in different patients. These findings may have significant practical implications in the future, regarding skill acquisition methods in TBI patients. (shrink)

This chapter aims to establish a philosophical discussion about the epistemological conditions of “observation”, from the cybersemiotic transdisciplinary view of knowing. For this purpose, the discussion will be divided into three parts, each one of them with the intention of outlining a conceptual critique that later allows a pertinent justification of the observation from a transcendental semiotics. This work is based on a problem: it seeks to show that a the cybersemiotic point of view, to consider on a (...) foundationalist stance, fails to overcome the epistemological contradictions involved in the contemporary critique of modern philosophy. Hence, the objective on this work is to propose as an alternative the teleological and nominalist attitude of transcendental semiotics, and also as an epistemological principle that allows overcoming problems of the foundationalist. Then, in a first moment, we will seek to establish a critique of the phenomenology of observation from the pragmatic point of view, developed by N. R. Hanson and Richard Rorty. In this direction, the contradictions involved in the definition of knowledge will be shown from the phenomenological and phenomenological positions. In general terms, the epistemological problems found in the foundations of knowledge based on observation will be exposed: specifically, the problem of the empirical basis and perception and the question of the mind as an inner space. Then, in a second moment, a characterization of the “observation” and the “observable fact” will be made from the cybersemiotic point of view. In this sense, these concepts will be described from the peircean semiosis, starting from the theoretical link proposed by Søren Brier. Hence, when considering the observation within the sphere of significance, the approaches will show a non-phenomenological characterization of knowledge and, from there, the overcoming of pragmatic critiques towards phenomenology. The closing will allow circumscribing knowledge from a communicative, semiotic and autopoietic approach. Finally, and as a contribution to the state of the discussion, the present chapter will make a defense of the cybersemiotic phenomenology of observation but considering the pragmatic conditions of knowledge from a transcendental semiotics perspective. In this sense, the transcendental concepts of truth-consensus and fin-ideal will be used to develop a relevant theoretical field that allows a transcendental justification of the communicative-intersubjective nature of knowledge postulated by cybersemiotics. (shrink)

By analyzing and subsequently synthesizing two aesthetically relevant aspects of the observation tower, the author seeks in this article to uncover the special nature and relevance that the observation tower has for aesthetics. The article aims to demonstrate how the characteristics of this special work of architecture correspond to its mission to be the centre of surveying the landscape , what kind of insight into our own existence such experience may provide , and why the observation tower, (...) together with the view of the landscape, forms a single aesthetic situation. (shrink)

Although quantum theory is applicable, in principle, to both the microscopic and macroscopic realms, the strategy of practically applying quantum theory by retaining a classical conception of the macroscopic world has had tremendous success. This has nevertheless rendered the task of interpretation daunting. We argue the need for recognizing and solving the ‘observation problem', namely constructing a ‘quantum-compatible’ view of the properties and states of macroscopic objects in everyday thinking to realistically interpret quantum theory consistently at both the microscopic (...) and macroscopic levels. Toward a solution to this problem, we point out a category of properties called ‘relational properties’ that we regularly associate with everyday objects. We see them as being potentially quantum-compatible. Some possible physical implications are discussed. We conclude by touching upon the nexus between the relational property view within quantum physics and some neurobiological issues underlying cognition. (shrink)

Space is big. It is very, very big. On the currently most favored cosmological theories, we are living in an infinite world, a world that contains an infinite number of planets, stars, galaxies, and black holes. This is an implication of most “multiverse theoriesâ€, according to which our universe is just one in a vast ensemble of physically real universes. But it is also a consequence of the standard Big Bang cosmology, if combined with the assumption that our universe is (...) open or flat, as recent evidence suggests it is. An open or flat universe – assuming the simplest topology[1] – is spatially infinite at any time and contains infinitely many planets etc. (shrink)