This article aims to strengthen the thesis that Augustine made theological use of the Porphyrian concept of union without confusion (ἀσύγχυτος ἕνωσις). More specifically, the purpose is to show the important role played by this doctrine in the Augustinian theological and especially trinitarian thought. In order to demonstrate Augustine’s dependence on Porphyry, parallels between Augustinian texts and chapter 3 of the De natura hominis by Nemesius of Emesa (late 4th century CE) are pointed out. In this section, Nemesius (...) refers the theory of the union without confusion of soul and body contained in the Σύμμικτα ζητήματα, a lost Porphyrian work. After analysing the argument developed by Nemesius, who uses the Porphyrian notion to account for the union of the two natures in Christ, the Christological application of the union without confusion by Augustine (Ep. 137, 11 ; Serm. 186, 1) is discussed. Then, the various passages in which the Christian writer refers to this model of union to explain the relationship between the three divine persons (De Tr. IX and VII ; De gen. ad. litt. VIII 19 ; Serm. VII, 4 ; Ep. 170, 5 ; In Ioh. Evang. XCV 1 ; De civ. Dei XI 28) is examined. The theological interest of the concept of union without confusion is due to the fact that it is a powerful tool for thinking about a relationship of several elements which are unified in a single reality, while remaining distinct. (shrink)

Boethius represents one of the most important milestones in Christian reflection about fate and providence, especially considering that he takes into account Proclus’ contributions to these questions. For this reason, The Consolation of philosophy is considered a crucial work for the development of this topic. However, Boethius also exposes his ideas in his commentary on the book that constitutes one of the oldest and most relevant texts on the problem of future contingents, namely Aristotle’s De interpretatione. Although St. Thomas refers (...) to Boethius many times in his systematic works and even devotes two commentaries to two of his theological opuscules, it is of special interest that both authors composed a commentary on the abovementioned work by Aristotle. The commentary of Saint Thomas does not interpret the whole book, but it does study the pages about future contingents in dialogue with Boethius. We will study such texts in our presentation. They constitute one of the greatest contributions of Aquinas to the problem of necessity and contingency and therefore to the vexata quaestio of divine intervention in the world and particularly in human free will. Not only Augustin but also Aristotle (read by Boethius) and Nemesius of Emesa will be decisive in Aquinas’ perception of this matter. (shrink)

Némésius, évêque d’Émèse en Syrie (aujourd’hui Homs) vers la fin du ive et le début du ve siècle après J.-C., ne nous a laissé qu’un seul ouvrage, le De natura hominis. Parfois salué comme le « premier traité d’anthropologie chrétienne », ce livre occupe une place à part dans la tradition patristique. En effet, au lieu de tenter de réfuter les théories « païennes », c’est-à-dire relevant de la philosophie grecque, concernant la nature de l’homme, l’auteur y récupère très largement (...) une tendanc... (shrink)

In Nemesius' treatment of providence we find an original and suggestive step in the historical development of this teaching. His treatise 'On the Nature of Man' calls for a special attention that focuses on it not only as a testimony of the reception of ancient thought, but also as a personal contribution. In particular, in addition to his criticisms of the doctrine of fate and the conception of general providence advocated by some pagan authors, we find the introduction of (...) divine freedom as a predominant factor in the presentation of providence. Divine power and its freedom (even with respect to necessary entities) establish a new and specifically Christian approach to the problem. The divine will gains in prominence and, as a consequence, the metaphysical scope of God's power, which is above the creatural concepts of contingency and necessity, is emphasised. Thus, Nemesius anticipates the more complex expositions that would later be given by the medieval scholastics, who, like him, would make an ever wider use of Aristotelian philosophy without limiting themselves to taking Platonism and the other Hellenistic schools into account. (shrink)

In these pages, we expose the main traits of St. Albert the Great’s doctrine of providence and fate, considered by Palazzo the keystone of his philosophical system. To describe it we examine his systematic works, primarily his Summa of Theology. His discussion follows clearly the guidelines of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, in order to delve into the set of problems faced over the centuries by theological tradition. Albert also restates the reflections of different authors like Boethius or Saint (...) John of Damascus but, in his Summa he incorporates to his reflections also the noteworthy book of Nemesius of Emesa, De natura hominis, which includes some pages on providence. Albert gives his personal solution to the complex questions of providence, destiny and contingency of the world. His conception of providence is developed in the frame of the creative power of the almighty God. God’s knowledge is necessary and inerrant and his providential purposes are infallible, but that does not mean that every event is necessary. He does not communicate His own proprieties to the creatures. In order to understand this problem, Albert recalls the notion of hypothetical necessity coined by Boethius in an Aristotelian framework and the difference between 'necessitas consequentis' and 'necessitas consequentiae' proposed by Alexander of Hales. He also develops his account of providence, closely linked to the topic of fate. However, it would be exaggerated to deem his position deterministic. (shrink)

As was first pointed out by Gercke, there are close parallels, which clearly suggest a common source, between Apuleius, de Platone 1.12, the treatise On Fate falsely attributed to Plutarch, Calcidius' excursus on fate in his commentary on Plato's Timaeus, and certain sections of the treatise de Natura hominis by Nemesius. Gercke traced the doctrines common to these works to the school of Gaius; recently however Dillon has pointed out that, while Albinus shares with these works the characteristic Middle-Platonic (...) notion of fate as conditional or hypothetical – our actions are free, but once we have acted the consequences of our actions are fated and inevitable – he does not share certain other common features, such as the identification of fate as substance with the world-soul and the hierarchy of three providences. (shrink)

Studies the doctrine of providence of the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry of Tyre. Following a survey of Hellenistic theories of fate and providence, the doctrine of destiny ex hupotheseos, developed on the basis of Plato’s dialogues, is examined : according to it, our acts are free, but their consequences are necessary. As an integral part of Middle Platonic philosophy, this theory was probably transmitted to Late Antiquity by Porphyry. We then move on to examine Porphyry’s treatise On what depends on us, (...) which contains an interpretation of Plato’s Myth of Er, and develops the doctrine of the twofold choice of lives. Nemesius and Proclus react, each in his own way, against the individualism of Porphyry’s approach. In conclusion, the theory of fate and providence in Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy is briefly examined. (shrink)

Ibn al-Fa's Kitmin, the Book of the Delight of the Believer preserves, in the first part, in at least three of its 100 philosophical and theological problems, passages from the hitherto lost Arabic version of Philoponus' De Aeternitate mundi contra Proclum. All quotations are taken from the refutation of the first proof, one of them from the beginning which is also lost in Greek. For this latter passage a parallel is found in al-Isfiz who draws on the same Philoponus source (...) in his Kit Masil al-umhiyya (Book on Metaphysical Questions). A comparison of the other passages to the extant Greek text suggests that al-Ank's overall accurate use of sources can be gained from his quotations of the extant Arabic versions of the De Anima-paraphrase, Nemesius' De Natura hominis and b. Rabban al-'s Firdaws al-ḥikma (Paradise of Wisdom). (shrink)

Central passages: Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate 181–3, 189, 192, 205, Nemesius On Human Nature 105.6–106.13; Although in the first three centuries AD there were several Stoic theories of fate in circulation, only one systematic exposition of a later Stoic compatibilist theory has survived. This is found in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Fate, with parallels in Nemesius. These are the only sources that provide a Stoic account of that which depends on us and its relation to Stoic fate (...) theory. This chapter is devoted to this theory and its reception by opponents in later antiquity. It is shown that this theory goes back to a particular second century AD Stoic view, which, although ‘orthodox’, differs noticeably from Chrysippus’. The reason for the modifications can be found in the confrontation with the newly developed Middle Platonist and Peripatetic theories of fate and freedom, and the shift of emphasis to the predetermination of ‘mental events’ as opposed to actions only, which forced the discussion of Stoic type determinism and that which depends on us to a new level. It is in the context of the confrontation of these theories with the Stoic ones that problems similar to modern problems of free will and determinism arise, and both the Stoics and their opponents introduce new arguments designed to cope with the new state of the debate. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to ascribe to Chrysippus two ‘compatibilist’ theories and to explain their differences through the fact that our sources depend on different parts of the philosopher’s corpus. This can be confirmed by a passage in Eusebius and by Chrysippus’ wordy style of writing. In my opinion, Alexander and Nemesius report the more general theory, stating that fate rules everything but employs the nature of each being as a means to accomplish its plans. Cicero and Gellius (...) report a theory more connected with human responsibility. Their accounts are similar, but the fact that they are not drawing upon the same source becomes clear once we analyse in detail the objections to which the philosopher was responding: Cicero seems to report a criticism levelled by Arcesilaus against Zeno, Gellius one levelled against Chrysippus by his contemporaries. (shrink)