The purpose of this paper is to identify the upholders of the thesis reported by Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis 23, aimed to reject Stoic determinism. A brief introduction will be devoted to the relationship between this text and the more general context of the Stoic philosophy. Then, I will take into account the objection against Stoic determinism raised by some anonymous philosophers: according to it, causal determinism would be inconsistent with the choice among indistinguishables. Chrysippus replied that if that choice (...) were not determined, it would occur without causes; and this would be absurd. Then I will summarize the most likely hypotheses about the identification of Chrysippus’ opponents, and I will opt for Academics. Finally, I will try to conjecture the link between Plutarch’s passage and the debate among Stoics and Academics about indistinguishables, as we know it from other sources. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to ascribe to Chrysippus two ‘compatibilist’ theories and to explain their differences through the fact that our sources depend on different parts of the philosopher’s corpus. This can be confirmed by a passage in Eusebius and by Chrysippus’ wordy style of writing. In my opinion, Alexander and Nemesius report the more general theory, stating that fate rules everything but employs the nature of each being as a means to accomplish its plans. Cicero and Gellius report (...) a theory more connected with human responsibility. Their accounts are similar, but the fact that they are not drawing upon the same source becomes clear once we analyse in detail the objections to which the philosopher was responding: Cicero seems to report a criticism levelled by Arcesilaus against Zeno, Gellius one levelled against Chrysippus by his contemporaries. (shrink)

M. DE CARO-M. MORI-E. SPINELLI, Libero arbitrio. Storia di una controversia filosofica, Carocci, Roma 2014.