L’auteur aborde l’approche synchronique en histoire des idées et développe la théorie du discours social qu’il a exposée dans nombre de ses livres en tant qu’analyse en totalité en coupe synchronique de ce qui s’écrit et se diffuse dans un état de société. Il définit dans le cadre de cette problématique les notions fondamentales d’hégémonie discursive, de topographie, d’interdiscursivité et de sociogramme notamment.

La politique de « réformes et ouverture » vers l’étranger, initiée par Deng Xiaoping au sortir de la Révolution culturelle en 1978 s’est avérée, d’un point de vue économique, une véritable réussite qui a amené la Chine au rang des grandes puissances mondiales en à peine trente ans. D’un point de vue social par contre, le résultat est tout autre : transfigurée par ces réformes qui ont acté le basculement d’une économie planifiée vers une économie de marché, la société (...) chinoise s’est retrouvée bouleversée par la disparition de l’État-providence et la restructuration du secteur de production étatique, autant de dommages collatéraux qui vont brutalement vulnérabiliser et « précariser » des millions d’individus. Dès la fin des années 1980, vont se constituer de nouvelles « classes dangereuses » de paysans sans terres, de chômeurs et de pauvres, des « masses dangereuses » que l’État-parti chinois va devoir discipliner, puisque c’est sur leur exploitation que va se construire le miracle chinois. C’est donc un véritable arsenal discursif, une langue de bois élaborée et complétée sur trois décennies, que les dirigeants du Parti communiste chinois vont mettre en place pour formuler les perceptions et « corriger les consciences erronées » de ces populations vers une acceptation d’un ordre social qui leur est foncièrement défavorable.From the economic point of view, the policy for « reform and openness » to other countries initiated by Deng Xiaoping as the Cultural Revolution ended in 1978 was a genuine success that made China a top-ranking world power in the space of barely thirty years. The outcome was very different from the social point of view, however: the reforms that turned a planned economy into a market economy caused radical upheaval in Chinese society as collateral damage from the demise of the welfare state and the restructuring of the State-controlled production sector plunged millions into precariousness and insecurity. The late 1980s saw the emergence of a new « dangerous class » of landless peasants, unemployed workers and poverty-stricken individuals: the « dangerous masses » that the Chinese party-state would have to discipline so that the « Chinese miracle » could be built by exploiting their labour. Thus did China’s Communist party leadership deploy a whole arsenal of political doublespeak, developed and honed over three decades, designed to formulate perceptions and « correct » the « erroneous conceptions » of these populations to lead them to acceptance of a social order which is fundamentally opposed to their interests. (shrink)

Over the last twenty years, archaeologists have used various process-oriented modes of enquiry to undermine the belief that humans are special. Barad (2007) developed Bohr’s indeterminist interpretation of quantum mechanics into agential realism which offers an ontological basis for distributing agency away from humans and plays a crucial role in underwriting some posthumanist archaeological agendas. But its origins in quantum physics make agential realism difficult to understand and evaluate. Despite the challenge, the first two parts of this paper are devoted (...) to each task in turn, with limited success. Part three turns to the archaeological literature, where the evaluation of agential realism turns out to be even more inadequate and so I advise against its use in support of process-oriented approaches in archaeology. The final section turns to the activity of an art workshop and introduces a playful approach to working with clay. Clayful phenomenology is a way of investigating the relationship between gesture, material and ideation. During sculpting, phenomenological experience is not subjective, stable and external but is generated within a transient creative system where entities, ideas and agency reciprocally, emerge as ephemeral manifestations. Clayful phenomenology and agential realism are ontologically similar and both are controversial but agential realism has a wall of quantum conceptual complexity standing between it and a judgement about credibility whereas playing with clay can be assessed directly, through experience. (shrink)

Over the past decade, the physics literature on torsionful non-relativistic gravity has burgeoned; more recently, philosophers have also begun to explore this topic. As of yet, however, the connections between the writings of physicists and philosophers on torsionful non-relativistic gravity remain unclear. In this article, we seek to bridge the gap, in particular by situating within the context of the existing physics literature a recent theory of non-relativistic torsionful gravity developed by philosophers Meskhidze and Weatherall (Philos Sci, https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.136, 2023) we (...) also discuss the philosophical significance of that theory. (shrink)

De Neys argues against assigning exclusive capacities to automatic versus controlled processes. The dual implicit process model provides a theoretical rationale for the exclusivity of automatic threat processing, and corresponding data provide empirical evidence of such exclusivity. De Neys's dismissal of exclusivity is premature and based on a limited sampling of psychological research.

In this article I consider whether there a right to incestuous marriage. I begin by suggesting that the liberal state get out of the "marriage" business by leveling down to a universal civil union or "registered domestic partnership" status. Removing the symbolism of the term "marriage" from political conflict, privatizing it in the same way as religion, would have the advantage of both consistency and political reconciliation. The question is then whether incestuous unions should be both legal and eligible for (...) this status. I argue that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from the permissible types of legally registered partnerships, are quite weak. The objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first-degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention in their own right. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient. One potentially surprising conclusion of this inquiry is that far from creating strong reasons for tolerating these practices, religious or cultural reasons for valuing incest (as well as polygamy) actually seem to count against tolerating them. The reason is that from a liberal perspective, tolerating polygamy and incest involves the assumption that it is possible to disassociate polygamy and incest simpliciter from abusive practices associated with them, including environments where children are raised to devalue their own sexual (and other) autonomy. However, the presence of comprehensive doctrines which include polygyny or incest as part of a good life actually makes it harder to justify disassociating polygamy and incest themselves from the likely abuse and coercion practiced by those who would value polygyny or incest. (shrink)

I describe how close attention to the process of sculpting clay from the perspective of Material Engagement Theory can create a detailed description of a mutable sense of agency and of self. First, I show that sculpting is associated with a loss of sense of agency and self. Second, that to sense agency as a systemic phenomenon creates anxiety. Third, that meaning in an art encounter develops in association with an anterospective viewpoint. Fourth, that within the logic of the extended (...) mind, emergent meaning becomes openly available for further exploration. Fifth, that artistic creativity is not an opaque process. It proceeds in a similar manner to other forms of human, sense-making activities. Finally, that playing seriously with clay can be used in an investigative manner—as a tool for material conceptualisation. (shrink)

Dieses Buch ist kein eigentliches Lehrbuch; es will dem Leset" weniger einen Begriff yom Inhalt als yom Geist der modcrnen Physik vermitteln und ihn von der Angemessenheit einer Denk­ weise iiberzeugen, die in ihrer auf das auBerste getriebenen Sach­ lichkeit ihn zunachst befremden muB. Es gibt sehr bekannte und ausgezeichnete Biichc'r (von E d din g ton, J e a n s, deB r 0 g lie und J 0 r dan), die in derselben Absicht geschrieben wurden, so daB cine (...) neue Darstellung sich nur rechtfertigen laBt, wenn sie nicht einfach wiederholt, was bereits eindringlich genug gesagt worden ist, sondern zum Thema etwas Neues vorzubringen hat. Dieses Neue liegt fur das vorliegende Buch nicht sosehr in seiner grundsatzlichen Einstellung, die sich von der J 0 r dan s kaum unterscheidet, als im Versuch, die fur die neue Physik entscheidcn­ den Ideen unter Verzicht auf jede Mathematik so Zu entwickeln, daB auch der Nichtfachmann sich uber sie ein klares Urteil zu bilden vermag und sie nicht einfach auf guten Glauben hinnehmen muB. Es war dazu notwendig, ihre Leistungsfahigkeit gerade an solchen Phanomencn aufzuzeigen, deren Deutung man bisher ihrer Schwierigkcit wegen vor Nichtphysikern nicht mit Nutzen be­ sprechen Zu konnen glaubte. (shrink)

This article analyses the rhetorical legitimation strategy of post-Soviet Uzbekistan under Islam Karimov as an authoritarian state. I show that the most important mode of legitimation in this case is neither the consequentialist appeal to stability, order or welfare, nor a direct appeal to guardianship, i.e., special knowledge. Rather, Karimov and his court intellectuals seek to advance a conception of 'ideology' as the comprehensive pre-political consensus of the political community. Their concept of 'ideology' is used to advance a political logic (...) whereby the nature of the political community, the purpose of the state, the unifying political telos and the present regime are fused into a single entity. This ontological fusion is presented as a hegemonic reality and occurs at the pre-political level, resulting in the vanishingly small space left over for politics that characterizes authoritarian systems. I then suggest that such analysis of the hegemonic strategy of authoritarian regimes, and above all the teleological conception of politics it advances, is a superior approach to authoritarian legitimation than the search for explicit 'consequentualist' versus 'principled' arguments. (shrink)

In a recent article, Saba Mahmood has presented an intriguing account of what was at stake morally and emotionally for a large number of Muslims in the Danish cartoon controversy. In doing so, she offers a framework for thinking about such instances that takes the place of accounts that portray the conflict as one between a liberal, secular commitment to free speech and a religious commitment to combating blasphemy.

This paper examines what is involved in using comparative methods within political theory and whether there should be such a sub-field as "comparative political theory." It argues that "political theory" consists of multiple kinds of activities which are either primarily "scholarly" or "engaged." It is easy to imagine how scholarly forms of political theory can, and have been, comparative. The paper critiques, however, existing calls for the creation of "comparative political theory" (CPT) sub-field focused on the study of "non-Western" texts. (...) CPT needs to explain why it is not merely "expanding the canon" to include non-Western texts and why a certain non-Western text is "alien," thus justifying the moniker "comparative." I argue, systematically though 10 discrete theses, that the strongest warrant for an "engaged" comparative political theory is the first-order evaluation of the implication of the contestations of norms, values and principles between distinct and coherent doctrines of thought. (shrink)

Let Hn stand for an assembly of n grains of salt. Then the paradox of Sorites may be presented this way:H10,000 is a heap. pIf H10,000 is a heap then H10,000-1 is a heap. pH9,999 is a heap. MPH9,999 is a heap then H9,999-1 is a heap. P19998. If H2 is a heap then H2-1 is a heap. P19999. H1 is a heap. MP20000. H1 is not a heap. P20001. H1 is and is not a heap. ConA more significant example (...) of the argument results where Ht stands for a human being at time t where t=O is the present and the human being is one year old. (shrink)

This paper argues that the four most plausible arguments compatible with public reason for an outright legal ban on all forms of polygamy are unvictorious. I consider the types of arguments political liberals would have to insist on, and precisely how strongly, in order for a general prohibition against polygamy to be justified, while also considering what general attitude towards "marriage" and legal recognition of the right to marry are most consistent with political liberalism. I argue that a liberal state (...) should get out of the "marriage business" by leveling down to a universal status of "civil union" neutral as to the gender and affective purpose of domestic partnerships. I then refute what I regard as the four most plausible rational objections to offering this civil union status to multi-member domestic partnerships. The most common objection to polygamy is on grounds of gender equality, more specifically, female equality. But advancing this argument forcefully often involves neglecting the tendency of political liberalism (by whatever name it goes in contemporary, complex, multicultural societies) to tolerate a certain amount of inequality in private, within the bounds of robust and meaningful freedoms of choice and exit. Properly understood, polygamy involves no inherent statement about the essential inferiority of women, and certainly not more than many other existing practices and institutions (including many expressions of the main monotheistic religions) which political liberals regard as tolerable, even reasonable. Arguments from the welfare of children, fairness in the spousal market, and the abuse of family subsidies are also considered and found insufficient for excluding polygamy. (shrink)

Some scholars have argued that religiously injurious speech poses a serious problem for secular liberal thought. It has been suggested that secular liberal thought and political practice often misrecognize the nature of the injury involved in speech that violates the sacred and that much secular thought about religious injury (and free exercise more generally) is premised on unacknowledged Protestant conceptions of what real religion is. In this essay, I argue against the ideas that secular liberalism tends to treat religion only (...) as a matter of freely chosen belief and that the unchosen, habituated nature of much religious experience raises a problem for the defense of speech that violates the sacred. I argue that secular thought and practice should remain very concerned about the social and political harms of speech directed unambiguously at social groups but need not eliminate the gap between religious attachments and religious persons. (shrink)

The phenomenon of “Muslim Democracy” has been analyzed by scholars for a number of years, at least since the mid-1990s. The standard view about Muslim Democracy is that (perhaps like its European counterpart Christian Democracy) it represents a nonideological, or postideological, pragmatic approach to electoral politics. The purpose of this article is to advance two primary arguments. The first is that the turn to Muslim Democracy as an ideology and practice should first be understood as a way of thinking about (...) politics that breaks with the sovereigntist imaginary that dominated modern Islamic political thought. Second, Muslim Democrats do not forswear the use of democratic means to advance goals derived from religious commitment as part of their recognition of pluralism and constitutional democracy. Their attitude toward politics should thus be seen as a form of agonistic pluralism. This article thus proposes an interpretation of Muslim Democracy as post-sovereigntist agonistic political Islam. (shrink)