Contemporary infectious disease surveillance systems aim to employ the speed and scope of big data in an attempt to provide global health security. Both shifts - the perception of health problems through the framework of global health security and the corresponding technological approaches – imply epistemological changes, methodological ambivalences as well as manifold societal effects. Bringing current findings from social sciences and public health praxis into a dialogue, this conversation style contribution points out several broader implications of changing disease surveillance. (...) The conversation covers epidemiological issues such as the shift from expert knowledge to algorithmic knowledge, the securitization of global health, and the construction of new kinds of threats. Those developments are detailed and discussed in their impacts for health provision in a broader sense. (shrink)

This book provides actionable steps for educators to commit to inclusion of diversity immediately, working toward culturally responsive teaching.

Citizens of liberal, affluent societies are regularly encouraged to support reforms meant to improve conditions for badly-off people in the developing world. Our economic and political support is solicited for causes such as: banning child labor, implementing universal primary education, closing down sweatshops and brothels, etc. But what if the relevant populations or individuals in the developing world do not support these particular reforms or aid programs? What if they would strongly prefer other reforms and programs, or would rank the (...) various benefits that might be offered differently than seems reasonable to the Western, liberal supporters of these campaigns and organizations? What is the proper liberal response here? I argue that the proper liberal response is to support those programs and reforms that the global poor most value. The bulk of the paper is devoted to arguing against the popular liberal argument which states that we can safely disregard the preferences of the oppressed when they seem very unreasonable because these individuals suffer from “adaptive preferences.” This typically is taken to mean that their preferences are “not their own” in an important sense. I put forward various different proposals for why adaptive preferences can be safely dismissed, but ultimately argue that they are not persuasive. And if it is no longer legitimate to appeal to adaptive preferences as a basis for disregarding what oppressed people want, then I argue that to do so is straightforward paternalism, and so is unjustifiable in all but the most extreme cases. Finally, I argue for the following concrete recommendations: Given that resources are not infinite, we should (1) Support programs that give oppressed people increased access to information, such as access to technology, (2) support those reforms and aid programs that the oppressed themselves regard as most important, with special emphasis on those opportunities for education that they deem valuable, and (3) refrain from supporting coercive policies intended to thwart adaptive preferences. (shrink)

Joan McGregor argues that “colleges and universities should adopt as part of their core mission the development of skills of civil discourse” rather than engaging in the practice of restricting controversial speakers from making presentations on campuses. I agree with McGregor concerning the need for increased civil discourse. However, this does not mean universities should welcome speakers to publicly present any material they wish without restriction or oversight. In this paper, I make three main arguments: (i) Colleges and universities have (...) a duty to protect members of the campus community from the harm and exclusion resulting from hateful or harmful speech, in the same way that they must protect them from sexual assaults and concussions. (ii) In the vast majority of cases, this duty can be fulfilled by holding speakers to standards of discourse that prevail in academic debate, and insisting on a number of procedural requirements. (iii) We should be wary of conservative arguments framed in terms of free speech, because they can be deployed to undermine important functions of the university in a democratic society, namely, to teach students how to be discerning citizens, and to protect thinkers willing to be critical of the government and the ruling classes. (shrink)

Following John Rawls, nonideal theory is typically divided into: (1) “partial-compliance theory” and (2) “transitional theory." The former is concerned with those circumstances in which individuals and political regimes do not fully comply with the requirements of justice, such as when people break the law or some individuals do not do their fair share within a distributive scheme. The latter is concerned with circumstances in which background institutions may be unjust or may not exist at all. This paper focuses on (...) issues arising in transitional theory. In particular, I am concerned with what Rawls’ has called “burdened societies," that is, those societies that find themselves in unfavorable conditions, such that their historical, social or economic circumstances make it difficult to establish just institutions. The paper investigates exactly how such burdened societies should proceed towards a more just condition in an acceptable fashion. Rawls himself tells us very little, except to suggest that societies in this condition should look for policies and courses of action that are morally permissible, politically possible and likely to be effective. In this paper I first try to anticipate what a Rawlsian might say about the best way for burdened societies to handle transitional problems and so move towards the ideal of justice. Next, I construct a model of transitional justice for burdened societies. Ultimately, I argue for a model of transitional justice that makes use of a nonideal version of Rawls’ notion of the worst-off representative person. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 48-49.

The scarcity of human organs requires the transplant community to make difficult allocation decisions. This process begins at individual medical centers, where transplant teams decide which patients to place on the transplant waiting list. Each transplant center utilizes its own listing criteria to determine if a patient is eligible for transplantation. These criteria have historically considered preexisting affective and psychotic disorders to be relative or absolute contraindications to transplantation. While attitudes within the field appear to be moving away from this (...) practice, there is no data to confirm that eligibility criteria have changed. There are no nationwide guidelines detailing the manner in which affective and psychotic disorders should impact transplant eligibility. Individual transplant centers thus form their own transplant eligibility criteria, resulting in significant inter-institution variability. Data from the 1990s indicates that the majority of transplant programs considered certain psychiatric illnesses, such as active schizophrenia, to be absolute contraindications to transplantation. A review of literature reveals that no comprehensive data has been collected on the topic since that time. Furthermore, the limited data available about current practices suggests that psychiatric illness continues to be viewed as a contraindication to transplantation at some transplant centers. In light of this finding, we review psychiatric literature that examines the impact of affective and psychotic disorders on transplant outcomes and conclude that the presence of these disorders is not an accurate predictor of transplant success. We then discuss the requirements of justice as they relate to the creation of a just organ allocation system. We conclude that transplant eligibility criteria that exclude patients with affective and psychotic disorders on the basis of their psychiatric diagnosis alone are unjust. Just listing criteria must incorporate only those factors that have a causative effect on posttransplant morbidity and mortality. Justice also demands that we eliminate current inter-institution practice variations in favor of national transplant eligibility criteria. Given the limited data available about current practices, we call for an updated study investigating the manner in which affect and psychotic disorders impact transplant eligibility determinations. (shrink)

Despite tributes paid to Fuller as an intellectual father of ADR, little attention has been paid within the ADR field to the broader interactionist vision that underlies Fuller’s discussion about process. A closer reading of Fuller’s study of mediation, however, reveals that he intended that study to substantiate his interactionist thesis about the nature of social ordering. He understood ordering to be generated by and to reflect a particular experience of social interaction. Fuller’s interactionist vision recognizes (...) the creative, choice-making and purposive dimensions of human reality, emphasizes participation as a normative criterion for institutional design, and gives rise to a pluralistic notion of power arrangements. It appears in Fuller’s thinking about process as a kind of dialectic and integrative mindset that pervades his means-ends analysis, functional analytical approach and his emphasis on institutional design. This interactionist vision has particular relevance for the practice and research of ADR, for example, in helping to develop a more integrative approach to process pluralism. (shrink)

... four most important American legal theorists of the last hundred years. Of the others, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Roscoe Pound, and Karl N. Llewellyn, ...

Les investigations esthétiques ont un double objectif : elles sont à la fois des investigations sur le monde et des enquêtes sur les moyens de le connaître. Cela signifie qu’elles cherchent à être redevables à la fois des événements et des dispositifs avec lesquels nous les percevons. Elles cherchent à établir des prétentions à la vérité tout en critiquant les institutions du pouvoir et du savoir qui revendiquent le monopole des mécanismes de production de la vérité.

El artículo ilustra la utilización del _case method_ a través de una investigación socio-educativa reciente donde se traza una analogía entre el caso de los exploradores de L. Fuller con la situación vital marcada por la pandemia. A tal efecto, pasa revista a cuestiones radicales que se desataron ante la urgencia de un problema cardinal de supervivencia y de salud pública que dejó todo lo demás (derecho, convenciones, moralidad, libertades) en la sombra y plantea algunos dilemas ético-jurídicos desencadenados bajo (...) ciertas situaciones consideradas de emergencia extrema donde la supervivencia de todos está en juego. Frente a la trampa hobbesiana de un supuesto estado de naturaleza por el cual es justificable cualquier tipo de ataque preventivo o violencia, en el artículo se trata de argumentar, al hilo de las respuestas dadas al caso jurídico de Fuller, nuevas formas de entender la comunidad, el pacto social, lo público y lo político. (shrink)

Lang, B. Philosophy and the manners of art.--Hofstadter, A. Freedom, enownment, and philosophy.--Mehta, J. L. A stranger from Asia.--Fox, D. A. A passage past India.--Rucker, D. Philosophy and the constitution of Emerson's world.--Schneider, H. W. The pragmatic movement in historical perspective.--Barnes, H. E. Reflections on myth and magic.--Cauvel, J. The imperious presence of theater.--Seay, A. Musical conservatism in the fourteenth century.--Hochman, W. R. The enduring fascination of war.--Davenport, M. M. J. Glenn Gray and the promise of wisdom.