It is argued that a concept of substance is possible which not only avoids metaphysical blind alleys but is worthy of serious philosophical attention. Starting with parker's notion of substance a conception is developed in which substance has the moments of haecceity, Logical independence, Causal independence, Causal efficacy, And conservation through change. Event and substance ontologies are compared and reasons for the superiority of the latter given. The results are related to the problem of personal (...) identity, And it is suggested that a person's body may be identifiable by him by means of his person rather than the converse. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Two Philosophical Impulses Substance The Empiricists on Substance Descartes on Substance Spinoza on Attribute The Subjective Interpretation The Objective Interpretation Gueroult OI and SI Descartes and Spinoza.

Leibniz saw the question of the eucharist as a crucial stumbling block to the agreement between Lutherans and Calvinists. Mandated together with Daniel Ernst Jablonsky to prepare working documents for the negotiations between Hanover and Brandenburg in 1697, Leibniz carefully read through the Calvinist Confessions of faith and the works of Calvin in their 1671 edition. He made an extensive collection of excerpts from the Confessions of faith and from Calvin's Institutes all intended to show that Calvinists admitted the substantial (...) presence of Christ's body in the eucharist. (This collection of excerpts is analysed here for the first time and compared with another little-known document, the Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken). L. had argued previously in 1691/92 that, contrary to the assertions of Pellisson-Fontanier, his own conception of substance and of Christ's presence in the eucharist was completely different from Calvin's. However, by 1697, it was clear to Leibniz that Calvin's concept of substance, which was broadly speaking Aristotelian, was never defined clearly by the reformer, and could be made to coincide with Leibniz's own notion of substance as force rather than substance in its dimensional sense. At the same time L. dissociated Ubiquitarianism (doctrine characteristic of late sixteenth century Lutheranism, which defended the dimensional presence of Christ's body in heaven and in the eucharist, by arguing that Christ in his divine nature could cause his physical body to be present in several places at the same time) from Lutheranism. He also drove a wedge between the doctrines of Zwingli and Calvin. L. thus attempted to find religious union on a common ontology and he might well have succeeded if it were not for complex political circumstances, which ultimately caused the failure of the negotiations. (shrink)

Quoique leibniz donne l'apprence de baser sa philosophie sur le principe de l'identite, c'est pourtant sur celui de la raison suffisante qu'il insiste le plus dans son oeuvre. ce principe de la raison suffisante joue un role majeur parce que leibniz derive sa conception de la substance d'une analogie entre le sujet et les attributs des propositions et les concepts de substance et leurs attributs. cette analogie mene a une theorie de retenue de la verite et a une (...) autre qui affirme que les attributs sont inherents a la substance: theories compatibles avec la raison suffisante mais non avec celle de l'identite. leibniz n'a ps compris la conception de la substance chez spinoza dans laquelle les attributs sont identiques a la substance. le raisonnement de leibniz contre spinoza n'est donc guere convainquant. je suggere que la raison de ce malentendu ne releve pas uniquement de la logique de leibniz, mais aussi d'une theologie basee sur une ame d'une immortalite qui persiste et sur la theorie d'une morale vengeresse. (shrink)

The article relates Ch'an Buddhism, to Western thought via the philosophy of Spinoza, in particular through the concept of substance. It shows that Spinoza abandoned this concept as a fundamental metaphysical one. The consequent reuse of ?substance? requires a re?examination of the concepts of property and identity. It is seen that Spinoza made this drastic break with Western tradition by experiencing egolessness, the psychological basis for his metaphysical moves. The move is illustrated by the development of (...) quantum physics. Egolessness and a rethinking of identity are basic to a feeling for, if not an understanding of, Ch'an Buddhism. (shrink)

This intelligent and often subtle introduction to rationalist metaphysics focuses on the development of the concept of substance in Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. After briefly reviewing the Aristotelian background in the introduction, Woolhouse spends the first three chapters presenting the broad outlines of each thinker’s account of substance. These are followed by three chapters devoted more specifically to the metaphysics of extended substance and to foundational issues in early modern physics. Next come two chapters on thinking (...) substance and its relation to extended substance, and finally a chapter on the relation between created and uncreated substance, which Woolhouse describes as "an organizing centre of the whole book". (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe most prominent early modern argument against materialism is to be found in Descartes. Previously I had argued that this argument relies crucially on a robust conception of substance, according to which it has a single principal attribute of which all its other intrinsic qualities are modes. In the present paper I return to this claim. In Section 2, I address a question that is often raised about that conception of substance: its commitment to the idea that a (...) substance has a single such principal attribute. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and Daniel Garber have argued that this claim relies on Descartes's identification of substance with attribute. But I argue that it relies on his view that a substance has a single, unitary nature. In Section 3, I examine the role of this conception of substance in arguments found in Malebranche and Leibniz and compare these arguments with Descartes's. (shrink)

Inherited primarily from Aristotle and his scholastic commentators, the concept of substance plays a central role in early modern metaphysics. Roger Woolhouse's book is the first monograph-length introduction devoted to this important philosophical concept. Aimed primarily at the advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate, this wide-ranging and clearly-written book offers a judiciously compendious but rich account of the doctrine of substance in the hands of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.

This book introduces student to the three major figures of modern philosophy known as the rationalists. It is not for complete beginners, but it is an accessible account of their thought. By concerning itself with metaphysics, and in particular substance, the book relates an important historical debate largely neglected by the contemporary debates in the once again popular area of traditional metaphysics. in philosophy. (Do Not USE).

Descartes’s interrelated theories of attributes and conceptual distinction (or rational distinc­tion) are developed. This follows Nolan (1997) in identifying substances and their attributes as they exist apart from the mind’s concepts. This resource is then used to articulate a solution to a famous problem about Descartes’s concept of substance. The key is that the concept of substance is itself to be regarded as an attribute of independently existing things.

Brentano uses terms in place of predicates (e.g. "a thinker" in place of "thinks") and characterizes the "is" of predication in terms of the part-whole relation. Taking as his ontological data certain intentional phenomena that are apprehended with certainty, he conceives the substance-accident relation as a defmeable type of part-whole relation which we can apprehend in "inner perception". He is then able to distinguish the following types of individual or ens reale: substances; primary individuals which are not substances; accidents; (...) aggregates; and boundaries. (shrink)

I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is unacceptably strong. (...) On the other hand, if we take principal attributes to be tropes, then IC introduces challenges which undermine the argument. This is partly because the assumption of tropes makes it possible to distinguish several versions of substance dualism, versions which differ with respect to their degree of generality. I argue that taking principal attributes to be tropes makes it challenging to establish any of these versions by way of an IC-based separability argument. I conclude the paper by suggesting a way forward for the proponent of the separability argument. (shrink)

The concept of substance is considered fundamental in order to understand chemistry and other related concepts, but many problems have been reported about its learning process. Considering the importance of textbooks in the training of chemistry teachers, this study aimed to identify the concepts of substance in general chemistry textbook glossaries. In addition, the study assessed the concepts of substance in relation to other chemical concepts and, when available, compared them with the concepts established by the (...) IUPAC. The methodology employed was content analysis and the results showed that concepts and statements related to the term ‘substance’ are different in the general chemistry textbooks analyzed. They also differ from those stated by IUPAC. Furthermore, it was found that many concepts are dependent on the concept of substance. It is concluded that there must be a greater effort from the community of chemists and the teaching of chemistry in the search for conceptual uniformity to reduce the problems of conceptual understanding. (shrink)

This paper examines the debate about the referential meaning of Kant’s concept of substance. In the Critique of Pure Reason and other works such as the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, the category or concept of substance appears quite uncontroversially to have both a logical meaning (by which it means roughly ‘a thing that is the ultimate subject of predication’) and an objective meaning (by which it means roughly ‘a thing that is permanent’, or, equivalently, ‘a (...) thing existing at all times’). However, it is highly contested what kind of object, or objects, are supposed to meet, in experience, the criteria imposed by the conjunction of these two distinct meanings. I discuss two examples of the main interpretations to be found in the literature: Peter Strawson (2000), who contends that the reference of substance is only matter, and Claudia Jáuregui (2021), who also includes ordinary particular objects as substances. I scrutinize their fit with some of the textual evidence, primarily from the First Analogy of Experience, and finally reject Jáuregui’s interpretation as implying a kind of mereological essentialism about particular objects. Keywords: substance, meaning, matter, ordinary objects, First Analogy of Experience. (shrink)

Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument (...) for substance dualism from an important objection. (shrink)

Anselm's argument has two distinct conclusions: (a) we cannot intelligibly doubt that god exists, and (b) this god, whose existence we cannot doubt, exists necessarily. if we replace anselm's vague conception of god by the spinozistic conception of substance, a defensible version of the ontological argument, understood as having these two conclusions, can be constructed. two important consequences of this analysis are: (1) the ontological argument, properly understood, deals simply with the concept of substance. it is a (...) further question whether substance ought to be understood as god. (2) the ontological argument does not actually demonstrate the existence of anything. it simply makes clear the consequences of adopting a metaphysical view which employs the spinozistic conception of substance. (shrink)

Since the failure of both pure corpuscular and pure wave philosophies of nature, process theories assume that only events need to exist in order to have a physics. Starting from an ontology of actual events, a dispositional analysis is shown here to lead to a new idea of substance, that of a `distribution of potentiality or propensity'. This begins to provide a useful foundation for quantum physics. A model is presented to show how the existence of physical substances could (...) be a reasonable consequence of a theory of processes. (shrink)

My objective is a better comprehension of two theoretically fundamental concepts. One, the concept of a substance in an ordinary (non-Aristotelian) sense, ranging over such things as salt, carbon, copper, iron, water, and methane – kinds of stuff that now count as (chemical) elements and compounds. The other I’ll call the object-concept in the abstract sense of Russell, Wittgenstein, and Frege in their logico-semantical enquiries. The material object-concept constitutes the heart of our received logico / ontic (...) system, still massively influenced by Aristotle after almost 2.5 millennia. On such an account, the fundamentality of material objects and their attributes are the metaphysical basis of the cosmos, as reflected in our received logic, Quine’s ‘canonical notation’ – derived via the empiricism of Russell from Frege’s function-based Begriffschrifft, and consisting of concrete singular terms and variables, quantifiers and predicate-expressions. The inadequacy of Frege’s approach to understanding concepts is reflected in his initial question. Frege enquires of ‘what it is that we are calling an object’, remarking that he regards a regular definition as impossible: “we have here something too simple to admit of logical analysis”. The imagined ultimacy or simplicity of the idea of a single object (arithmetically, just a unit – one as against two, three, four, etc.) as foundational to the calculus is just that – imagined. It is also guaranteed to block the comprehension of the substance-concept. (shrink)

At the opening of Spinoza’s Ethics, we find the three celebrated definitions of substance, attribute, and God: E1d3: By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed [Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat]. E1d4: By (...) attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence [Per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens]. E1d6: By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence We are accustomed to think of these paramount definitions as a fixed and settled formulation of the core of Spinoza’s metaphysics, but if we look at the development of Spinoza’s thought, the picture we get is quite different. In the early drafts of the Ethics and in his early works, Spinoza seems to have experimented with various conceptualizations of the relations between substance, attribute, and God. Some of Spinoza’s works make barely any use of the notions of substance and attribute, and the testimony of Spinoza’s letters suggests that, at a certain stage in his philosophical development, the concept of attribute may have been put on the back burner, if not completely dropped. Indeed, another closely related concept—accident [accidens]—was fated to be pulled out of the system (and for good reasons ). The final version of the Ethics makes hardly any use of this notion, but Spinoza’s letters show that in early drafts of the Ethics he used the term ‘accident’ to refer to what cannot be or be conceived without substance. In this paper I will attempt to provide a brief outline of the genealogy of Spinoza’s key metaphysical concepts. This genealogy, like any other, can help us to reexamine and reconsider what seems to us natural, stable and obvious. In the first part of the paper, I rely on Spinoza’s letters to trace the development of his definitions of substance and attribute in the early drafts of the Ethics. The letters, whose dates are more or less established, also provide a temporal grid for our subsequent discussions. The second part surveys Spinoza’s discussion and conceptualization of substance and attributes in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, the Theological-Political Treatise (1670), and briefly, Spinoza’s 1663 book on Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, and its appendix on Metaphysical Thoughts, the Cogitata Metaphysica. The third part of the paper is dedicated to Spinoza’s understanding of substance and attribute in the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being. I conclude with some remarks on the stability of Spinoza’s final position on the issue, as expressed in the published version of the Ethics . (shrink)

The aim of this article is to clarify an aspect of Descartes’s conception of mind that seriously impacts on the standard objections against Cartesian dualism. By a close reading of Descartes’s writings on imagination, I argue that the capacity to imagine does not inhere as a mode in the mind itself, but only in the embodied mind, that is, a mind that is not united to the body does not possess the faculty to imagine. As a mode considered as a (...) general property, and not as an instance of it, belongs to the essence of the substance, and as imagination (like sensation) arises from the mind-body union, then the problem arises of knowing to what extent a Cartesian embodied mind is separable from the body. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify and discuss the following feature of our judgments about hypothetical scenarios concerning the identity of persons: with respect to the vast majority of scenarios, both members of a pair of logically complementary propositions about personal identity are conceivable. I consider a number of explanations of this feature that draw on the metaphysics and the epistemology of personal identity, none of which prove to be satisfactory. I then argue that in order to give an adequate explanation, (...) one needs to recognize an important characteristic of our concept of personal identity: it is such that if there are mental substances (or the like), they constitute personal identity. At the same time, there can still be persons if there are no such substances. Since this finding casts doubts on the way that thought experiments about personal identity are usually set up, I end by outlining its potential consequences for the debate over the identity of persons. (shrink)

Resumo: Procurar analisar um conceito como o de Substância é, por si mesmo, entrar no coração da metafísica. Quando este conceito se situa no Corpus Aristotelicum a tarefa ganha outra dimensão pois implica uma leitura conjunta das suas obras principais, a saber, As Categorias e a Metafísica. Tal leitura conjunta levanta desde logo vários problemas: a autenticidade, a articulação entre os seus próprios livros, e sobretudo, a questão fundamental: se é possível fazer uma tal leitura. O propósito do nosso ensaio (...) é executar tal tarefa, levando-nos a efetuar uma desmontagem necessária e decisiva do conceito. A terminar, perceberemos como partir desta análise, o significado de substancia abriria para um modelo que persistiria durante séculos. (shrink)

In this book, Eric Havelock presents a challenging account of the development of the idea of justice in early Greece, and particularly of the way justice changed as Greek oral tradition gradually gave way to the written word in a literate society. He begins by examining the educational functions of poets in preliterate Greece, showing how they conserved and transmitted the traditions of society, a thesis adumbrated in his earlier book Preface to Plato. Homer, he demonstrates, has much to say (...) about justice, but since that idea is nowhere in the epics directly stated or expressed, it must be deduced from the speech and actions of the characters. Havelock's careful reading of the Iliad and the Odyssey is original and revealing; it sheds light both on Homeric notions of justice and on the Archaic Greek society depicted in the poems. As Havelock continues his inquiry from Hesiod to Aeschylus, his findings become more complex. The oral Greek world shades into a literate one. Words lose some kinds of meanings, gain others, and steadily become more suited to the conceptualization that Plato strove for and achieved. This evolution of language itself, Havelock shows, was one of the principal accomplishments of the Greek world. Lucidly written and forcefully argued, this book is a major contribution to our knowledge of ancient Greece--its politics, philosophy, and literature, from Homer to Plato. (shrink)

This essay offers an interpretation of Descartes’ treatment of the concepts of place and space in the Principles of Philosophy. On the basis of that interpretation, I argue that his understanding and application of the concept of space supports a pluralist interpretation of Descartes on extended substance. I survey the Scholastic evolution of issues in the Aristotelian theory of place and clarify elements of Descartes’ appropriation and transformation thereof: the relationship between internal and external place, the precise content (...) of the claim that space and body are really identical, and the way we conceptually distinguish space from body. Descartes applies his concept of space in ways that illuminate the metaphysical structure of extension. In particular, he uses the concept to specify the degree to which finite parts of matter are independent of each other. I argue that for Descartes, conceiving extension as indivisible is an artifact of conceiving it as a space. That is, pace the monistic reading of Cartesian extended substance, regarding extension as indivisible is an artifact of conceiving it in a way more removed from its real nature. (shrink)

The historical development of the understanding of water is traced in the light of the development of the general concept of chemical substance. From the times of the earliest known ancient Greek philosophers, water has played a central role in the conception of the material constitution of the world. But it was Aristotle who developed the most sophisticated understanding of water to have come down to us from the ancients. He viewed it as part of an intricate and (...) systematic theory of chemical substance, which classified water as an element along with earth, fire and air. His view exerted a considerable influence on Arabic and European thinkers throughout the Middle Ages, and wasn’t successfully challenged until the eighteenth century. After Lavoisier, it was recognised that water, though unlike air a single substance and not a mixture, is neither an element nor always liquid. General features of chemical substances, distinguishing elements, compounds and mixtures, were elaborated in a general theory and harmonised with the mechanical features of matter towards the end of the nineteenth century. Finally, the continuous conception of matter underlying the Aristotelian view, which had been unsuccessfully challenged in the seventeenth century, was definitely overturned in the twentieth century, and the intricate microstructure of water was revealed. (shrink)

The paper sets out from Göodel's question about primitive concepts, in connection with Gödel's proposal of the employment of phenomenological method. The author assumes that the answer that can be found in Kant is relevant as a starting point. In a modification of the approach by K. Reich, a reconstruction of Kant's "deduction'' of logical forms of judgment is presented, which serve Kant as the basis for his "metaphysical deduction of categories'' including substantiality and causality. It is proposed that different (...) aspects of Kant's "original unity of self-consciousness'' as applied and attached to concrete representations step by step yield different forms of concepts, judgments, and inferences. Categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are shown to be gradually strengthening the conditions of bringing our representations under the "objective unity of consciousness", and in this way gradually implementing logical laws. The corresponding concepts of substantiality, causality, and mutual influence appear to be grounded in the primitive forms of our thinking. (shrink)