CM-triviality of a stable theory is a notion introduced by Hrushovski [1]. The importance of this property is first that it holds of Hrushovski's new non 1-based strongly minimal sets, and second that it is still quite a restrictive property, and forbids the existence of definable fields or simple groups (see [2]). In [5], Frank Wagner posed some questions aboutCM-triviality, asking in particular whether a structure of finite rank, which is “coordinatized” byCM-trivial types of rank 1, is itselfCM-trivial. (...) (Actually Wagner worked in a slightly more general context, adapting the definitions to a certain “local” framework, in which algebraic closure is replaced byP-closure, forPsome family of types. We will, however, remain in the standard context, and will just remark here that it is routine to translate our results into Wagner's framework, as well as to generalise to the superstable theory/regular type context.) In any case we answer Wagner's question positively. Also in an attempt to put forward some concrete conjectures about the possible geometries of strongly minimal sets (or stable theories) we tentatively suggest a hierarchy of geometric properties of forking, the first two levels of which correspond to 1-basedness andCM-triviality respectively. We do not know whether this is a strict hierarchy (or even whether these are the “right” notions), but we conjecture that it is, and moreover that a counterexample to Cherlin's conjecture can be found at level three in the hierarchy. (shrink)

Continuing work of Baldwin and Shi 1), we study non-ω-saturated generic structures of the ab initio Hrushovski construction with amalgamation over closed sets. We show that they are CM-trivial with weak elimination of imaginaries. Our main tool is a new characterization of non-forking in these theories.

We define a generalized version of CM-triviality, and show that in the presence of enough regular types, or solubility, a stable CM-trivial group is nilpotent-by-finite. A torsion-free small CM-trivial stable group is abelian and connected. The first result makes use of a generalized version of the analysis of bad groups.

We show that every reduct of a stable. CM-trivial theory of finite U-rank is CM-trivial.

We show that any relational generic structure whose theory has finite closure and amalgamation over closed sets is stable CM-trivial with weak elimination of imaginaries.

For every structure M of finite signature Mekler 781) has constructed a group G such that for every κ the maximal number of n -types over an elementary equivalent model of cardinality κ is the same for M and G . These groups are nilpotent of class 2 and of exponent p , where p is a fixed prime greater than 2. We consider stable structures M only and show that M is CM -trivial if and only if G (...) is CM -trivial. Furthermore, we obtain that the free group F 2 in the variety of 2 -nilpotent groups of exponent p>2 with ω free generators has a CM -trivial ω -stable theory. (shrink)

In a simple CM-trivial theory every hyperimaginary is interbounded with a sequence of finitary hyperimaginaries. Moreover, such a theory eliminates hyperimaginaries whenever it eliminates finitary hyperimaginaries. In a supersimple CM-trivial theory, the independence relation is stable.

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Ahead of Print. We present numerous natural algebraic examples without the so-called Canonical Base Property (CBP). We prove that every commutative unitary ring of finite Morley rank without finite-index proper ideals satisfies the CBP if and only if it is a field, a ring of positive characteristic or a finite direct product of these. In addition, we construct a CM-trivial commutative local ring with a finite residue field without the CBP. Furthermore, we also show that (...) finite-dimensional non-associative algebras over an algebraically closed field of characteristic [math] give rise to triangular rings without the CBP. This also applies to Baudisch’s [math]-step nilpotent Lie algebras, which yields the existence of a [math]-step nilpotent group of finite Morley rank whose theory, in the pure language of groups, is CM-trivial and does not satisfy the CBP. (shrink)

We present numerous natural algebraic examples without the so-called Canonical Base Property (CBP). We prove that every commutative unitary ring of finite Morley rank without finite-index proper ideals satisfies the CBP if and only if it is a field, a ring of positive characteristic or a finite direct product of these. In addition, we construct a CM-trivial commutative local ring with a finite residue field without the CBP. Furthermore, we also show that finite-dimensional non-associative algebras over an algebraically closed (...) field of characteristic [Formula: see text] give rise to triangular rings without the CBP. This also applies to Baudisch’s [Formula: see text]-step nilpotent Lie algebras, which yields the existence of a [Formula: see text]-step nilpotent group of finite Morley rank whose theory, in the pure language of groups, is CM-trivial and does not satisfy the CBP. (shrink)

In the present paper we shall prove that countable ω-categorical simple CM-trivial theories and countable ω-categorical simple theories with strong stable forking are low. In addition, we observe that simple theories of bounded finite weight are low.

An ω-categorical supersimple group is finite-by-abelian-by-finite, and has finite SU-rank. Every definable subgroup is commensurable with an acl( $\emptyset$ )-definable subgroup. Every finitely based regular type in a CM-trivial ω-categorical simple theory is non-orthogonal to a type of SU-rank 1. In particular, a supersimple ω-categorical CM-trivial theory has finite SU-rank.

The notion of CM-triviality was introduced by Hrushovski, who showed that his new strongly minimal sets have this property. Recently Baudisch has shown that his new ω 1 -categorical group has this property. Here we show that any group of finite Morley rank definable in a CM-trivial theory is nilpotent-by-finite, or equivalently no simple group of finite Morley rank can be definable in a CM-trivial theory.

In this paper we construct a non-CM-trivial stable theory in which no infinite field is interpretable. In fact our theory will also be trivial and ω-stable, but of infinite Morley rank. A long term aim would be to find a nonCM-trivial theory which has finite Morley rank (or is even strongly minimal) and does not interpret a field. The construction in this paper is direct, and is a “3-dimensional” version of the free pseudoplane. In a sense we (...) are cheating: the original point of the notion ofCM-triviality was to describe the geometry of a strongly minimal set, or even of a regular type. In our example, non-CM-triviality will come from the behaviour of three orthogonal regular types.A stable theory is said to beCM-trivial if wheneverA⊆Band acl(Ac) ∩ acl(B) = acl(A) inTeq, then Cb(stp(c/A)) ⊆ Cb(stp(c/B)). ( An infinite stable field will not beCM-trivial.) The notion is due to Hrushovski [3], where he gave several equivalent definitions, as well as showing that his new strongly minimal sets constructed “ab ovo” wereCM-trivial. The notion was studied further in [6] where it was shown thatCM-trivial groups of finite Morley rank are nilpotent-by-finite. These results were generalized in various ways to the superstable case in [8]. (shrink)

We construct a stable one-based, trivial theory with a reduct which is not trivial. This answers a question of John B. Goode. Using this, we construct a stable theory which is n-ample for all natural numbers n, and does not interpret an infinite group.

An amalgamation base p in a simple theory is stably definable if its canonical base is interdefinable with the set of canonical parameters for the ϕ-definitions of p as ϕ ranges through all stable formulae. A necessary condition for stably definability is given and used to produce an example of a supersimple theory with stable forking having types that are not stably definable. This answers negatively a question posed in [8]. A criterion for and example of a stably definable amalgamation (...) base whose restriction to the canonical base is not axiomatised by stable formulae are also given. The examples involve generic relations over non CM-trivial stable theories. (shrink)

Based on the work done in [][] in the o‐minimal and geometric settings, we study expansions of models of a supersimple theory with a new predicate distiguishing a set of forking‐independent elements that is dense inside a partial type, which we call H‐structures. We show that any two such expansions have the same theory and that under some technical conditions, the saturated models of this common theory are again H‐structures. We prove that under these assumptions the expansion is supersimple and (...) characterize forking and canonical bases of types in the expansion. We also analyze the effect these expansions have on one‐basedness and CM‐triviality. In the one‐based case, when T has SU‐rank and the SU‐rank is continuous, we take to be the type of elements of SU‐rank and we describe a natural “geometry of generics modulo H” associated with such expansions and show it is modular. (shrink)

Non-$n$-ampleness as defined by Pillay [20] and Evans [5] is preserved under analysability. Generalizing this to a more general notion of $\Sigma$-ampleness, this gives an immediate proof for all simple theories of a weakened version of the Canonical Base Property (CBP) proven by Chatzidakis [4] for types of finite SU-rank. This is then applied to the special case of groups.

This paper discusses the risk of gross negligence manslaughter (GNM) and corporate manslaughter charges (CM) when clinicians use an artificially intelligent system’s (AIS’s) outputs in their practice. I identify the elements of these offenses within the context of the law of England and Wales and explore how they could be applied in a potential scenario where a patient's death has followed AIS use by a clinician. The risk of a conviction due to making an AIS-augmented workplace mistake highlights the non- (...) class='Hi'>trivial nature of AIS adoption in healthcare, and that the consequences of its use must be considered by all interested parties prior to AIS adoption. (shrink)

The legitimacy of the dominant intensive meat production system with respect to the issue of animal welfare is increasingly being questioned by stakeholders across the meat supply chain. The current meat supply is highly undifferentiated, catering only for the extremes of morality concerns (i.e., conventional vs. organic meat products). However, a latent need for compromise products has been identified. That is, consumer differences exist regarding the trade-offs they make between different aspects associated with meat consumption. The heterogeneity in consumer demand (...) could function as a starting point for market segmentation, targeting and positioning regarding animal welfare concepts that are differentiated in terms of animal welfare and price levels. Despite this, stakeholders in the meat supply chain seem to be trapped in the dominant business model focused on low cost prices. This paper aims to identify conflicting interests that stakeholders in the meat supply chain experience in order to increase understanding of why heterogeneous consumer preferences are not met by a more differentiated supply of meat products produced at different levels of animal welfare standards. In addition, characteristics of the supply chain that contribute to the existence of high exit barriers and difficulty to shift to more animal-friendly production systems are identified. Following the analysis of conflicting interests among stakeholders and factors that contribute to difficulty to transform the existing dominant regime, different routes are discussed that may help and motivate stakeholders to overcome these barriers and stimulate the creation of new markets. (shrink)

According to physicalism, everything is physical, namely there are no entities (or no more restricted sorts of entities) that are not physical. In this paper, I shall examine the truth of this thesis by presenting a triviality objection against physicalism that is somehow similar to the one advanced against presentism. Firstly, I shall distinguish between two different definitions of the physical (roughly, every entity is physical-1 iff it has some feature F, such as impenetrability or exact spatio-temporal location, while every (...) entity is physical-2 iff it is accepted by some ideal, true and complete physical theory) and between unrestricted and restricted versions of physicalism (according to the former ones, physicalism is true for every entity while, according to the latter ones, it is true only with regard to some restricted domain of entities). Secondly, I shall argue that physicalists have to deal with six different problems: the triviality of some versions of physicalism, the content-indeterminacy of the physical and the justification of the “faith” according to which we will formulate some ideal, true and complete physical theory (given the definition of the physical-2), the restricted domain problem (so that restricted versions of physicalism seem not to exclude the existence of seemingly non-physical entities), the (possible and plausible) incompatibility between the two different definitions of the physical, the extension of the physical investigation problem. (shrink)

The thesis that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities has putatively been refuted many times by so-called ‘triviality results’, although it has also enjoyed a number of resurrections. In this paper I assault it yet again with a new such result. I begin by motivating the thesis and discussing some of the philosophical ramifications of its fluctuating fortunes. I will canvas various reasons, old and new, why the thesis seems plausible, and why we should care about its fate. I will (...) look at some objections to Lewis’s famous triviality results, and thus some reasons for the pursuit of further triviality results. I will generalize Lewis’s results in ways that meet the objections. I will conclude with some reflections on the demise of the thesis—or otherwise. (shrink)

A pervasive and influential argument appeals to trivial truths to demonstrate that the aim of inquiry is not the acquisition of truth. But the argument fails, for it neglects to distinguish between the complexity of the sentence used to express a truth and the complexity of the truth expressed by a sentence.

A triviality result for what Lewis called “the Desire by Necessity Thesis” and Broome : 265–267, 1991) called “the Desire as Expectation Thesis” is presented. The result shows that this thesis and three other reasonable conditions can be jointly satisfied only in trivial cases. Some meta-ethical implications of the result are discussed. The discussion also highlights several issues regarding Lewis ’ original triviality result for “the Desire as Belief Thesis” that have not been properly understood in the literature.

Inquiry into the meaning of logical terms in natural language (‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if’) has generally proceeded along two dimensions. On the one hand, semantic theories aim to predict native speaker intuitions about the natural language sentences involving those logical terms. On the other hand, logical theories explore the formal properties of the translations of those terms into formal languages. Sometimes, these two lines of inquiry appear to be in tension: for instance, our best logical investigation into conditional connectives may (...) show that there is no conditional operator that has all the properties native speaker intuitions suggest if has. Indicative conditionals have famously been the source of one such tension, ever since the triviality proofs of both Lewis (1976) and Gibbard (1981) established conclusions which are in prima facie tension with ordinary judgments about natural language indicative conditionals. In a recent series of papers, Branden Fitelson has strengthened both triviality results (Fitelson 2013, 2015, 2016), revealing a common culprit: a logical schema known as IMPORT-EXPORT. Fitelson’s results focus the tension between the logical results and ordinary judgments, since IMPORT-EXPORT seems to be supported by intuitions about natural language. In this paper, we argue that the intuitions which have been taken to support IMPORT-EXPORT are really evidence for a closely related, but subtly different, principle. We show that the two principles are independent by showing how, given a standard assumption about the conditional operator in the formal language in which IMPORT-EXPORT is stated, many existing theories of indicative conditionals validate one, but not the other. Moreover, we argue that once we clearly distinguish these principles, we can use propositional anaphora to show that IMPORT-EXPORT is in fact not valid for natural language indicative conditionals (given this assumption about the formal conditional operator). This gives us a principled and independently motivated way of rejecting a crucial premise in many triviality results, while still making sense of the speaker intuitions which appeared to motivate that premise. We suggest that this strategy has broad application and an important lesson: in theorizing about the logic of natural language, we must pay careful attention to the translation between the formal languages in which logical results are typically proved, and natural languages which are the subject matter of semantic theory. (shrink)