In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Place of the Money Bag in the Secular-Mendicant Controversy at ParisRobert J. Karris O.F.M. (bio)Money bag, money bag. So many Bible-reading Christians don't know of your existence. In their defense I note that you are only mentioned twice in the entire New Testament: John 12:6 and 13:29. If faithful Bible-reading Christians don't know of your existence, what is your fate among the faithful who are less than faithful?! (...) Is ignorance truly bliss?New Testament ScholarsMoney bag, money bag. Perhaps, New Testament scholars are the reason why you are almost unknown among Christians.1 Commentators on John's Gospel give you a passing notice, if that.2 Even when they make mention of you, they [End Page 21] generally don't integrate your existence with other features of John's theology or life situation.3 As for the Jesus Seminar, its members sweep you into the dustbin of history along with 99.9% of John's Gospel.4 You see, you are deemed unhistorical. A couple of scholars involved in the quest for the historical Jesus say "Hi!" to you, but then go on with more important matters.5 Other scholars involved in the application [End Page 22] of social science methodology to the study of the New Testament opine that you were kept as a security measure and contained money to pay for the annual temple tax and such like obligations, but then they hold their peace.6Money bag, money bag. Scholars who have investigated the theme of rich and poor in the New Testament hardly give [End Page 23] you a second glance. You do not play a leading role in their general conclusions.7So, money bag, we have to take leave of New Testament scholarship if we are going to make your acquaintance on a serious level.The Middle AgesFrancis of AssisiAs we move into the Middle Ages, we ask: Did St. Francis of Assisi provide us with guidance on how to treat you with the respect that you, O money bag, so richly deserve? You see, some scholars maintain that John's Gospel was most important to Francis's worldview.8 However, Francis doesn't seem to see the problem you created for his all-consuming embrace of Jesus' missionary command of traveling with no money.9 [End Page 24] Surely Francis knows of your existence, for he refers to you in his Fourth Admonition n. 3:And the more they (superiors) are perturbed about their superiorship being taken from them than they would be over the loss of the office of washing feet, so much the more do they collect for themselves a money bag (John 12:6; 13:29) to the peril of their souls.10Francis is heir to a Benedictine spiritualization of the money bag. See how Roger the Abbot in his Sermo in ultima cena employs the money bag:Woe, how many money bags, woe, how many purses are in the monasteries of St. Benedict! Woe, how many cowls, which cover the ears of the tonsured, enclose private supplies of the mind, the money bag of one's own will, the purse of murmuring, detraction, idleness, pride, envy, jealousy, and bad will! But remember, most beloved brothers, that those who do such things follow Judas the traitor. And therefore, unless you amend your lives, you will not possess the kingdom of God.11O money bag, so Francis goes his merry way, apparently ignorant of your true meaning and leaves the problems created by your existence to his learned followers such as Bonaventure of Bagnoregio. To Bonaventure we now turn, but do so through his responses to his secular opponents, William of Saint-Amour and Gerard of Abbeville. First let's hear from the secular masters. [End Page 25]William of Saint-Amour and Gerard of AbbevilleWilliam of Saint-Amour comments on John 12:6 and argues that it does not permit begging and is the basis for the normative view that the apostles and their successors should have a money bag. He writes:Augustine, 'the Lord had a purse to keep the offerings... (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Les philosophes de la période moderne sont souvent présentés comme ayant commis une erreur élémentaire: celle de confondre la force propositionnelle avec le contenu propositionnel. Par l'examen de deux cas saillants, à savoir les philosophes de Port-Royal et John Locke, je montre que l'accusation n'est pas fondée, et que Locke en particulier a les ressources requises pour construire une théorie des attitudes propositionnelles.

T. 1. 1907-1909 -- T. 2. 1909-1914 -- T. 3. 1914-1917.

Readers expecting a history of nineteenth‐century pathology are in for a surprise. They will find instead a self‐conscious example of cultural studies, critical of some assumptions made in this field and of some feminist writing, but containing some alarming sentences like “My goal has been to give shape to the accidental palimpsests of an inveterately verbal, and increasingly visual, culture; to assemble a particular series of hermeneutic loose ends into a coherent account of how an extraordinarily bizarre system of signification (...) came into being” . With learned English like that, who needs Latin? But once we get into the main part of the book, things get much better. We are confronted with a study of the fringes of science, in popular writings, in literature, and in raree‐shows, one working from sources that the more austere scientifics of the Victorian period despised and that historians of science are prone to ignore. Metaphor and analogy are everywhere, and sensitive stomachs will be churned by vivid accounts of disease, deformity, and surgery.The first chapter is concerned with the cholera morbus, the plague of the nineteenth century, and with the way it could be perceived as an indicator of social ills. John Ruskin's word “illth” as an opposite of health is revived, and the terrible blackness of the shriveled and dehydrated victims of this disease imported from the East is linked with colonial and racist notions. The theme that a healthy body is like a well‐run state leads into the next chapter, on breast cancer. Surgery was not only agonizing but ineffective in the first half of the nineteenth century, but then the survival rate after three years rose gradually from 4.7 percent to 45 percent by 1900. O'Connor asks whether this saga, with cancer seen as cellular overproduction, reveals close connections with gender construction and the symbolic importance of breasts, concluding that it does not and that the language used really was neutral rather than sexual.She then looks at amputations and artificial limbs, seeing amputation as a threat to the whole masculine body that could be countered by prostheses almost undetectable to the observer. This allows reflection on illustration, where curiously disembodied hands are shown carrying out amputations; on dissembling and artificiality; on materialism; and on metaphors of wholeness and replacement and of extending senses and capacities. We see some extraordinary advertisements where men with artificial legs climb ladders and skate, perhaps on thin ice. The final chapter examines deformity, with monsters and freaks . P. T. Barnum is prominent here, but interesting links are also made to the Great Exhibition at the Crystal Palace and its successors and the numerous museums that were such a feature of the Victorian period. They are strikingly placed in a continuum, rather than opposed, in a discussion of chaos and order, capitalism and health, deformity and degeneration. Wonder is presented as the key to modern sensibility, and there is a nice quotation on page 152: “If Beauty and the Beast should be brought into competition in London at the present day, Beauty would stand no chance against the Beast in the race for popularity.” Readers will have been led into a fascinating world at the periphery of the respectable science that most of us study and will rejoice in the extraordinary sights they see. (shrink)

The tendencies in bourgeois ideology that are intimately associated with religion constitute one of the subjects of current interest for criticism from the Marxist standpoint. The trend toward establishment of a clerical philosophy has long since been noted: its roots go back to the 19th century. But it has only been in the years between the two world wars, and during the present period that such currents as Neo-Thomism, Christian spiritualism, religious existentialism, and the like have flourished and, what is (...) particularly important, have exercised serious influence on secular intellectuals in the capitalist countries. (shrink)

A series of summary descriptions of the theories of the Pre-Socratics, Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, and Gnostics, the book suffers from controversial points made in an off-hand fashion. The two following interpretations are especially perplexing, if not erroneous: that Plato's philosophy is "materialistic in outlook" since by ideas he means "the material perfects of the material imperfects"; and that "the Atomistic philosophy is teleological" since it depicts the atoms as "intelligent agents," "striving for an ultimate purpose."—E. O. (...) T. (shrink)

The author tries to prove that hypnosis is a science to be used in everyday life. Hence his efforts to locate the lost body of a dead woman through hypnosis and the help of a very sensitive medium. The initial practical point of learning the whereabouts of the body gets lost however—the body is never found-in the course of his dialogues with the patient through whom he has contacted a "privileged soul" who lives close to the "Leader" in the highest (...) hierarchy of heaven. Mr. Ward attempts to provide simple answers to the great questions of life and death in an authoritative manner. Most of the book is in question and answer form with a final chapter of summary and conclusions. Altogether it is a naive exposition of a much disputed field.—E. O. T. (shrink)

This study is an attempt to develop an adequate theoretical model of the philosophical enterprise, to serve both as a guide for interpreting the history of philosophy and as a critical tool for evaluating the present state of and prospects for contemporary philosophical thought. Ballard proposes that philosophy be understood as man’s attempt to come to grips with the experience of crossing the boundaries that separate radically different aspects of human existence. These boundaries exist on many levels of experience; philosophy (...) is most concerned with the crossing of the internal boundaries of "archaic experience," the most fundamental and universal form of human experience. Perhaps the most fundamental boundary in archaic experience is that between inspired insight and rigorous, rational analysis. Ballard interprets the history of philosophy from the standpoint of that opposition; philosophy is man’s attempt to navigate the continual crossing from one of these modes of experience to the other. Ballard is most concerned with the tendency of most modern philosophies to stress one or the other aspect of the opposition, frequently to the point where the philosophical significance of the other side of the opposition is completely denied. Although Ballard finds the germ of the rationalistic, scientific perspective in Plato, he believes it is Descartes who molded that perspective into a powerful philosophical tradition, carried on by Hume and modern analysts. Against this tradition, which treats man as merely one more scientific object, stands the transcendental or Romantic tradition, which takes man’s subjectivity as its starting point and formative principle. In the context of this radical division of the tradition, Ballard finds the philosophy of Heidegger extremely important. It represents one of the few contemporary attempts to admit both insight and scientific reason as philosophically significant by examining both against a more fundamental ontological background, Being itself. Being is the original source of all possibilities, and its philosophical elucidation provides a context within which the conflicting aspects of archaic experience can be accommodated. Heidegger’s thought thus offers a model of philosophical reflection that avoids the reductionist extremities of the main traditions of modern thought, and it is that model Ballard believes offers the best prospects for future philosophical development.—O. T. (shrink)

Written by a prominent figure in Arab politics today and a well-known Islamic scholar, the book, after one chapter on the life of the Prophet, concentrates on an exposition of the essential message of Islam that purports to show its relevance to our contemporary world. Its pages abound in examples of religious toleration among the followers of Islam in the past to show how misled Westerners have been in depicting a religion of "righteousness" and "brotherhood" as the religion of the (...) sword.—E. O. T. (shrink)

The power of technology to transform religions, science, and political institutions has often been presented as nothing short of revolutionary. Does technology have a similarly transformative influence on societies’ morality? Scholars have not rigorously investigated the role of technology in moral revolutions, even though existing research on technomoral change suggests that this role may be considerable. In this paper, we explore what the role of technology in moral revolutions, understood as processes of radical group-level moral change, amounts to. We do (...) so by investigating four historical episodes of radical moral change in which technology plays a noteworthy role. Our case-studies illustrate the plurality of mechanisms involved in technomoral revolutions, but also suggest general patterns of technomoral change, such as technology’s capacity to stabilize and destabilize moral systems, and to make morally salient phenomena visible or invisible. We find several leads to expand and refine conceptual tools for analysing moral change, specifically by crystallizing the notions of ‘technomoral niche construction’ and ‘moral payoff mechanisms’. Coming to terms with the role of technology in radical moral change, we argue, enriches our understanding of moral revolutions, and alerts us to the depths of which technology can change our societies in wanted and unwanted ways. (shrink)

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying (...) 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)

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At the end of the Middle Ages, the friar Dominican Peter Schwarz wrote The shield of the Thomists. It is a handly book of philosophy in which he presents the main thesis of thomist school, between them is the theory of active intellect.

The article is devoted to the communicative competence of a doctor as a component of professional ethics. Knowledge of norms of the modern Russian literary language, compliance with these standards in the oral and written speech of a medical worker helps to establish contact between doctor and a patient. To identify the level of knowledge of Russian language norms, readiness for professional speech a scientific research was made, during which the most typical mistakes were revealed:orthoepic, morphological, lexical, stylistic. Following the (...) norms of the language and ethics of communication contributes to the achievement of the main aim of a medical activity – recovering of a patient. (shrink)