Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts: A Bargaining Theory of Equilibrium Marketing Contracts

In Pranab K. Bardhan, The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions. Oxford University Press UK (1989)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter looks upon the nexus of contracts in the village marketing system as a bilateral bargaining game and explores the properties of the equilibrium set of contracts.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,836

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-25

Downloads
5 (#1,787,131)

6 months
1 (#1,599,946)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references