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Delay in a bargaining game with contracts
Theory and Decision 65 (4):339-353 (2008)
Abstract
In a multilateral bargaining game where a proposer and responders can set up a “principal–agent” relationship by means of binding cash-offer contracts, we show that there is a Markov SPE with a delay in reaching an agreement. We also show that all the individually rational and efficient payoffs can be supported by SPEAuthor's Profile
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References found in this work
Alternating-Offer Bargaining and Common Knowledge of Rationality.Vincent J. Vannetelbosch - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (2):111-138.
Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment.Daniel Cardona-Coll - 2003 - Theory and Decision 54 (4):357-374.
Bargaining and delay: The role of external information. [REVIEW]Charles E. Hyde - 1997 - Theory and Decision 42 (1):81-104.
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