Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships

In Pranab K. Bardhan, The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions. Oxford University Press UK (1989)
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Abstract

In this chapter, the authors use a model of an infinitely repeated principal‐agent relationship where they explore the conditions under which labour contracts with threats of sacking or contract termination will be equilibrium outcomes.

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