Time and Retribution

Law and Philosophy 33 (5):655-682 (2014)
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Abstract

Retributivists believe that punishment can be deserved, and that deserved punishment is intrinsically good or important. They also believe that certain crimes deserve certain quantities of punishment. On the plausible assumption that the overall amount of any given punishment is a function of its severity and duration, we might think that retributivists would be indifferent as to whether a punishment were long and light or short and sharp, provided the offender gets the overall amount of punishment he deserves. In this paper I argue against this, showing that retributivists should actually prefer shorter and more severe punishments to longer, gentler options. I show this by focusing on, and developing a series of interpretations of, the retributivist claim that not punishing the guilty is bad, focusing on the relationship between that badness and time. I then show that each interpretation leads to a preference for shorter over longer punishment

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Patrick Tomlin
University of Warwick

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References found in this work

Why punish the deserving?Douglas N. Husak - 1992 - Noûs 26 (4):447-464.
The Restoration of Retribution.John Finnis - 1972 - Analysis 32 (4):131 - 135.
Even more varieties of retribution.Nigel Walker - 1999 - Philosophy 74 (4):595-605.

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